C210 down Groote Eylandt
A sky diver on the beach disputed the " complete loss of power" not saying there was no power loss, but engine noise was heard by him on approach to the beach.
Well neither will grace the skies again I expect.
I am still amazed any in OKG survived that landing. Sorry for the drift.
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The turn back can and does work if you're above a certain height and have climbed out at the correct speed. My last single engine job taught all pilots turn backs in both VMC and IMC conditions and they worked everytime but you need to fly the numbers, have quick reaction times with a solid knowledge base of stall speeds/glide speeds and load factor effects on the those speeds in a turns for your specific aircraft.
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Correction to my last, the accident occurred in 96.
The report is gut wrenching https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/216
Possible sabotage caused the accident that was not proven to my knowledge.
The report is gut wrenching https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/216
Possible sabotage caused the accident that was not proven to my knowledge.
Duck Pilot, that is indeed a tragedy 
However I cannot agree with your earlier comment "EFATO and a turn back will always end up in death" as I have personal knowledge of successful returns.
In these returns the engine failures were of a partial nature. One involved completely losing a pot in a 172 resulting in, I suggest, ~60-70% power (assuming some mechanical drag from the useless piston/cylinder). It was a warm but not hot day, the a/c was two up, and the pilot completed a successful reversal at about 300-400 ft and landed back on the 2000' runway with a moderate tail wind.
There are also published examples of successful returns with less, or no, engine power.
For the avoidance of doubt this post absolutely isn't about advocating a return to the field following complete engine failure at low altitude; I expect we all know what we should do in that case. What I am really interested in, as earlier alluded, is the decision making process when you have partial power, and the training (or lack of it) around this process along with the subsequent path to the ground. It's my view that this is a worthwhile discussion to have, and one that has the potential to save lives.
To that end I've described a known successful return at something a little less than 3/4 power on a standard day with a moderately laden aircraft. The pilot made the decision to return based on their experience and factors of the time, but what would that decision have been if there was only, say, 50% power, or the aircraft was heavily loaded? Perhaps more important is what the outcome might have been for a pilot with less experience and no training for such events? Clearly each situation will be different, and I don't believe you could have a hard 'rule' on what to do, but it is something that could receive more attention and which is trainable to some degree.
When I say trainable, here's some possible examples:
FP.
However I cannot agree with your earlier comment "EFATO and a turn back will always end up in death" as I have personal knowledge of successful returns.
In these returns the engine failures were of a partial nature. One involved completely losing a pot in a 172 resulting in, I suggest, ~60-70% power (assuming some mechanical drag from the useless piston/cylinder). It was a warm but not hot day, the a/c was two up, and the pilot completed a successful reversal at about 300-400 ft and landed back on the 2000' runway with a moderate tail wind.
There are also published examples of successful returns with less, or no, engine power.
For the avoidance of doubt this post absolutely isn't about advocating a return to the field following complete engine failure at low altitude; I expect we all know what we should do in that case. What I am really interested in, as earlier alluded, is the decision making process when you have partial power, and the training (or lack of it) around this process along with the subsequent path to the ground. It's my view that this is a worthwhile discussion to have, and one that has the potential to save lives.
To that end I've described a known successful return at something a little less than 3/4 power on a standard day with a moderately laden aircraft. The pilot made the decision to return based on their experience and factors of the time, but what would that decision have been if there was only, say, 50% power, or the aircraft was heavily loaded? Perhaps more important is what the outcome might have been for a pilot with less experience and no training for such events? Clearly each situation will be different, and I don't believe you could have a hard 'rule' on what to do, but it is something that could receive more attention and which is trainable to some degree.
When I say trainable, here's some possible examples:
- try reducing power to see at what point the a/c can no longer maintain altitude
- in a climb reduce power to (say) 60% and complete a 180deg turn and note the altitude loss/control-ability
- discuss the various factors that might affect such a decision and, if possible, trial these
- trial landing (obviously where safely possible) with a tail wind and note/discuss the results vis-à-vis into wind approach/landing
FP.
FP - there is merit in training for it.
The most difficult thing to train for is the judgement required to decide whether the manouevre is viable or not... this is best achieved with scenario-based exercises as you suggest.
The main pinch points are the underpinning knowledge of aerodynamics required (ie high AoA flight, stalled stick position, best glide performance (ie AoA more so than speed) & the nexus between them), followed by the specific aircraft handling skills required (ability to select a control position that causes CLmax for the gliding / low power turn, the appropriate AoB & the immediate transition from high AoA flight to best glide once the turn is completed). Make no mistake, the aircraft handling required during a turnback must be "on point". Additionally, the maturity to cease the manouevre during the execution if it becomes apparent that it is not going to be successful - roll wings level & retain control to landing.
Like all things, with training & practice it can be understood to the point where it can become one of the tools legitimately available in the event of a power loss after take-off. It can be safely trained for. However, it is not the only solution, nor is it advisable in all situations - the poor decision-making or handling is where it goes wrong. As an industry, we set people up for failure on this when we don't train for it & then at some point they give it a go when it needs to count...
For mine, I am still here today as a result of successfully executing a turnback following a complete engine failure after take-off over a populated area.
The most difficult thing to train for is the judgement required to decide whether the manouevre is viable or not... this is best achieved with scenario-based exercises as you suggest.
The main pinch points are the underpinning knowledge of aerodynamics required (ie high AoA flight, stalled stick position, best glide performance (ie AoA more so than speed) & the nexus between them), followed by the specific aircraft handling skills required (ability to select a control position that causes CLmax for the gliding / low power turn, the appropriate AoB & the immediate transition from high AoA flight to best glide once the turn is completed). Make no mistake, the aircraft handling required during a turnback must be "on point". Additionally, the maturity to cease the manouevre during the execution if it becomes apparent that it is not going to be successful - roll wings level & retain control to landing.
Like all things, with training & practice it can be understood to the point where it can become one of the tools legitimately available in the event of a power loss after take-off. It can be safely trained for. However, it is not the only solution, nor is it advisable in all situations - the poor decision-making or handling is where it goes wrong. As an industry, we set people up for failure on this when we don't train for it & then at some point they give it a go when it needs to count...
For mine, I am still here today as a result of successfully executing a turnback following a complete engine failure after take-off over a populated area.
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Yes, there certainly is merit in training for it.
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Back on the thread, anything else on the 210 on Groote?
In many ways, a partial power situation can be more deadly than a full engine-out - the reason being that a short period of Startle is replaced first by Disbelief followed up by Uncertainty often all the way into the crash. That's one reason many instructors (mine anyways years ago), and many training aircraft POH by the way, teach students to pull the power and glide it in just as soon as you reasonably can.
Yes, there certainly is merit in training for it.
Yes, there certainly is merit in training for it.
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NT News ran a story yesterday. Two things to note was the passengers comments re multi bounced landing, and obviously the below photo, which I will attach due to paywall. Looks like they landed on some uneven, rough ground then sadly came off that rising off the road, when looking at that undercarriage damage.
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Saying EFATO turn backs never work is like saying you will always close both throttles on a light twin if it had an EFATO. In order to successfully complete a turn back you really need to have trained for it and know you have excess glide capacity to firstly turn around, and easily make it back to the field and land with a tail wind. Otherwise you are better picking a place ahead and into wind where you can impact at a much slower pace in control. Just like in the case of the light twin continuing following an engine failure just after take-off, do the vitals, clean it up, see if it climbs, if it does, why land in the scrub, if it doesn't do it to a rate that is safe, close the throttles and land into wind under control... Of course many factors will affect either, type, weight, wind, conditions etc etc.... I doubt a 206 pilot would be trained to turn back unless in exceptional circumstance, big piston singles don't like to glide or even fly with low power. Bonanza and Lance/Saratoga glide like lead bricks so I can't imagine ever a situation where a turnback would work without some decent deity helping you out.
PS the threat is not all whether the aircraft 'can' turn around and land, but more is the pilot able to do this without panicking and stalling trying to drag the aircraft around at low speed, then entering a stall spin, LOC and crash out of control.
I doubt CASA even knows what rubbish is in the MOS these days, they just assume everyone complies and that the pilots were trained to a competent standard, after all the student signed they were trained in everything didn't they?
All the MOS are so full of holes and contradictions you wouldn't be able to hold anyone to account with a decent lawyer at your back.
PS the threat is not all whether the aircraft 'can' turn around and land, but more is the pilot able to do this without panicking and stalling trying to drag the aircraft around at low speed, then entering a stall spin, LOC and crash out of control.
I can 100% guarantee that CASA could not give a **** how a pilots licence is funded, so long as the training is conducted in accordance with the MOS, so why should they reject their operations? It's only a gravy train if you're not on it right?
All the MOS are so full of holes and contradictions you wouldn't be able to hold anyone to account with a decent lawyer at your back.
Last edited by 43Inches; 29th Jun 2023 at 09:54.
So a question for those 206/210 operators on here. Do you train your pilots for turn backs? Generally interested to hear an answer.
Was something we did in the 90s. Certainly was valuable training and reinforced while the 210 fully loaded at low heights is certainly a brick, the training was more designed around what is and isn’t possible in a few different scenarios. Just airborne, fully loaded, a 180 wasn’t an option. Certainly at other heights it was an option, after a bit of practice.
Was something we did in the 90s. Certainly was valuable training and reinforced while the 210 fully loaded at low heights is certainly a brick, the training was more designed around what is and isn’t possible in a few different scenarios. Just airborne, fully loaded, a 180 wasn’t an option. Certainly at other heights it was an option, after a bit of practice.
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Which company practices turn backs? Everyone stresses minimising thermal shocks and maximising engine life. Engine cuts at T/O power are an anathema to the mindset of every charter operator. And besides after 500+ hours on type, you get a feel for what an aircraft will or won’t do.
But, I guess these days with 500 hours in a 210, you’ll get Virgin or Qantas banging on your door with a start date. 🤣 So no one has any useful experience within a company. How times have changed!
In 8+ years of working in the piston engine world, I cannot recall any of my peers experiencing engine failures. No doubt they happened somewhere in the country but in the 70’s there was no social media for us to fixate on the minutiae.
But, I guess these days with 500 hours in a 210, you’ll get Virgin or Qantas banging on your door with a start date. 🤣 So no one has any useful experience within a company. How times have changed!
In 8+ years of working in the piston engine world, I cannot recall any of my peers experiencing engine failures. No doubt they happened somewhere in the country but in the 70’s there was no social media for us to fixate on the minutiae.
Prelim Report has been released.
Vapour lock? I recall the FAA in the 90s released some info about that in regards to specific 210s.
Obviously not a great result in regards to the forced landing attempt, no idea what the landing intention here was. I am sure the PIC won't need to tell everyone it wasn't their finest hour, startle might have caught this person out considering they are what appears fresh CPL, sounds like a WTF is the aircraft doing, and what do I do sort of thing. Not great landing at those speeds with flap retracted. Very lucky they all made it out alive.
Vapour lock? I recall the FAA in the 90s released some info about that in regards to specific 210s.
Obviously not a great result in regards to the forced landing attempt, no idea what the landing intention here was. I am sure the PIC won't need to tell everyone it wasn't their finest hour, startle might have caught this person out considering they are what appears fresh CPL, sounds like a WTF is the aircraft doing, and what do I do sort of thing. Not great landing at those speeds with flap retracted. Very lucky they all made it out alive.
Moderate, Modest & Mild.
Prelim Report has been released.
Vapour lock? I recall the FAA in the 90s released some info about that in regards to specific 210s.
Obviously not a great result in regards to the forced landing attempt, no idea what the landing intention here was. I am sure the PIC won't need to tell everyone it wasn't their finest hour, startle might have caught this person out considering they are what appears fresh CPL, sounds like a WTF is the aircraft doing, and what do I do sort of thing. Not great landing at those speeds with flap retracted. Very lucky they all made it out alive.
Vapour lock? I recall the FAA in the 90s released some info about that in regards to specific 210s.
Obviously not a great result in regards to the forced landing attempt, no idea what the landing intention here was. I am sure the PIC won't need to tell everyone it wasn't their finest hour, startle might have caught this person out considering they are what appears fresh CPL, sounds like a WTF is the aircraft doing, and what do I do sort of thing. Not great landing at those speeds with flap retracted. Very lucky they all made it out alive.
That function is left to PPRuNers❗️
The C210 has a history of vaporisation of fuel in the system, first advised by Cessna in 1979.
Saw a video of pax who were on FTM at the time, and they stated that they were lucky the pilot landed in a clear area, and not in the (huge) trees, or the sea.
A good mate of mine - highly experienced - succumbed to his injuries after attempting a turnback following an EFATO at YCAB.
”partial” power loss means the remaining power is totally unreliable, and could suddenly quit - the best option is going to be it is restored, but if that did happen, it’s still going to be a return to land to find out wtf went wrong.
A bounced landing on a mining road - who would have thought 🤣
But what’s the first question the CP will ask you in this one? You were on a close right base for 28, why didn’t you pull the power, apply flap and land on 28? Instead they went on some bizarre low level, no flap, track alongside the runway, over buildings, that put them on the road upside down, and landing at 90kts.
If you look at the descent point here on the report, you could not pick a more perfect spot for a 28 glide approach. It was all lined up perfectly.
They got it down, and made it out alive, that’s the main thing, sure, but we all know many CPs won’t accept what went on here, considering they were set up perfectly for a glide approach for 28.
Perhaps it’s the operator and its training? Who knows. All forms part of the investigation.
I think there is two parts to this, the engine issue and the forced landing attempt.
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