Forced landing near Bankstown
Man Bilong Balus long PNG
Join Date: Apr 2002
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Age: 69
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Eyewitnesses/journalists are notoriously unreliable and don't understand what the word means in aviation. Usually about the only correct thing on the article is the date.
'...a small Piper 3...'
I know that it's de rigueur to discuss post incident here, which I - generally - think is a good thing. I've occasionally learnt something new, as I'm sure others have, and I find the analysis some people come up with to be well thought out, logical and reasonable based on available data at the time.
I've rolled my eyes at the inevitable "let's wait until xxx official report" that some people trot out, and never thought I'd be the person to say that, hopefully I never will, but really?!
From available data we know the guy had an engine failure on final (ATC report by the pilot), there's a close witness whose reported what the pilot said to her ('stalled at 300ft"), and there's a reasonably believable comment that the firies had to deal with a minor fuel leak. From available photos it's possible to see damage to the aircraft that's consistent with the LHS wing hitting something during the landing phase, the LHS flap appears lowered but the RHS not (?), and there's some damage to one prop blade that could suggest it was turning when it impacted something (but it's impossible to be certain and given the other blade appears intact, and the failure report, it most likely wasn't). These are some things we know.
From this somehow people have arrived at a fuel issue associated with a failed tank change. Now while that's entirely possible of course it does seem a somewhat premature conclusion to come to based on the incredibly sparse information that appears presently available. It ignores such other possibilities such as carb icing (yes, it can happen in summer!) particularly given he was on final with reduced throttle and could have forgotten carb heat, an engine control manipulation mistake (leaned the mixture out instead of altering the throttle), catastrophic engine or associated component failure (yes, it certainly can occur under light load), electrical failure etc.
So, as a suggestion, I wonder if we could back up the bus and apply just a little science to this analysis? Perhaps someone with access to the then met report could confirm or eliminate any possibility of carb icing for a start? Maybe in a short time there will be more information that'll allow a far more rigorous analysis and conclusion, but at the moment I'm not seeing it...
Whatever the reason I hope the pilot continues on to have a long flying career, and that this simply becomes a colourful story of the past he can tell his as-yet unborn child about some time in the future.
FP.
I've rolled my eyes at the inevitable "let's wait until xxx official report" that some people trot out, and never thought I'd be the person to say that, hopefully I never will, but really?!
From available data we know the guy had an engine failure on final (ATC report by the pilot), there's a close witness whose reported what the pilot said to her ('stalled at 300ft"), and there's a reasonably believable comment that the firies had to deal with a minor fuel leak. From available photos it's possible to see damage to the aircraft that's consistent with the LHS wing hitting something during the landing phase, the LHS flap appears lowered but the RHS not (?), and there's some damage to one prop blade that could suggest it was turning when it impacted something (but it's impossible to be certain and given the other blade appears intact, and the failure report, it most likely wasn't). These are some things we know.
From this somehow people have arrived at a fuel issue associated with a failed tank change. Now while that's entirely possible of course it does seem a somewhat premature conclusion to come to based on the incredibly sparse information that appears presently available. It ignores such other possibilities such as carb icing (yes, it can happen in summer!) particularly given he was on final with reduced throttle and could have forgotten carb heat, an engine control manipulation mistake (leaned the mixture out instead of altering the throttle), catastrophic engine or associated component failure (yes, it certainly can occur under light load), electrical failure etc.
So, as a suggestion, I wonder if we could back up the bus and apply just a little science to this analysis? Perhaps someone with access to the then met report could confirm or eliminate any possibility of carb icing for a start? Maybe in a short time there will be more information that'll allow a far more rigorous analysis and conclusion, but at the moment I'm not seeing it...
Whatever the reason I hope the pilot continues on to have a long flying career, and that this simply becomes a colourful story of the past he can tell his as-yet unborn child about some time in the future.
FP.
Last edited by First_Principal; 21st Nov 2022 at 09:37. Reason: Punctuation fallure
The cause of this incident could be determined within an hour of it occurring. If it's investigated you'll find out the cause in about 3 years or so.
But it probably won't be investigated by CASA or ATSB and won't need to be. Both the student and instructor will be better pilots having experienced this, I know one dude (instructor) who had a similar experience, was exceptionally well treated by CASA (fairly) and now fly's an A320 for a major airline. That the student walked away from this is a job well done.
But it probably won't be investigated by CASA or ATSB and won't need to be. Both the student and instructor will be better pilots having experienced this, I know one dude (instructor) who had a similar experience, was exceptionally well treated by CASA (fairly) and now fly's an A320 for a major airline. That the student walked away from this is a job well done.
Use of carb heat on the approach is not a one size fits all. The POH does not say to apply carb heat in the approach.
Landing: "Carburetor heat should not be applied unless there is an indication of carburetor icing, since the use of carburetor heat causes a reduction in power which may be critical in case of a go-around. Full throttle operation with heat on is likely to cause detonation."
Very different air intake design to the Cessna.
Also the prop would be turning even if there was no power, unless the engine had siezed,
Landing: "Carburetor heat should not be applied unless there is an indication of carburetor icing, since the use of carburetor heat causes a reduction in power which may be critical in case of a go-around. Full throttle operation with heat on is likely to cause detonation."
Very different air intake design to the Cessna.
Also the prop would be turning even if there was no power, unless the engine had siezed,
However that's not to say it couldn't have had icing and the pilot - especially if it were his first solo experience - may have simply forgotten about the possibility and what to do. My point, perhaps somewhat poorly made late at night, was not so much about a specific alternative cause, rather it was intended to be a gentle suggestion that one should avoid leaping to a single conclusion to the exclusion of other possibilities on the basis of extremely limited information.
tossbag , quite.
FP.
Perhaps someone with access to the then met report could confirm or eliminate any possibility of carb icing for a start?
METAR YSSY 182330Z 02012KT 9999 FEW030 21/12 Q1010=
METAR YSSY 182300Z 02007KT 350V070 9999 SCT030 20/11 Q1011=
We used carby heat on for all low power descents including landing approach, with thousands of approaches each year between a fleet of up to 10 warriors it never posed a problem. There was one instance of a throttle getting stuck so badly during a solo flight the student physically bent the lever trying to increase power, but happened early base so the quick thinking student turned to final early and made the field with no issues. Engineering inspection post flight found no mechanical defect leading us to think it was throttle ice had locked up the mechanism and the student said they had not used carby heat. Other causes of failures in this area I have heard of is students moving fuel selectors to off on downwind instead of changing tanks, also moving the mixture rearward instead of the throttle when turning base. I have had carby ice when flying just under cloud base on a few occasions in Warriors at cruise power, quick application of carby heat and power quickly returned. Older engines some pilots can easily miss identify oil/lead fouling of plugs after prolonged descents as carby ice. That shouldn't happen in the circuit unless somethings really wrong.
Have to also remember that the carby ice graph is not related to ground temperature but actual OAT at the altitude you are, and the closer you get to the cloud base the closer to 100% humidity you get. So while it might not be likely on the ground, it could become far more likely at altitude. And then after engine shut down heat soak and OAT will melt any evidence of it.
PS the operator I worked for had a long history with PA28s having imported several new in the 70s, and still operated some of those through to the 2000s. Never got to operate a Warrior 3, but apart from some small changes they seemed pretty much the same thing with no bench seat and the battery relocated to the engine bay, same engine and carby as far as I'm aware.
Have to also remember that the carby ice graph is not related to ground temperature but actual OAT at the altitude you are, and the closer you get to the cloud base the closer to 100% humidity you get. So while it might not be likely on the ground, it could become far more likely at altitude. And then after engine shut down heat soak and OAT will melt any evidence of it.
PS the operator I worked for had a long history with PA28s having imported several new in the 70s, and still operated some of those through to the 2000s. Never got to operate a Warrior 3, but apart from some small changes they seemed pretty much the same thing with no bench seat and the battery relocated to the engine bay, same engine and carby as far as I'm aware.
Last edited by 43Inches; 21st Nov 2022 at 23:26.
From this somehow people have arrived at a fuel issue associated with a failed tank change. Now while that's entirely possible of course it does seem a somewhat premature conclusion to come to based on the incredibly sparse information that appears presently available. It ignores such other possibilities such as carb icing (yes, it can happen in summer!) particularly given he was on final with reduced throttle and could have forgotten carb heat, an engine control manipulation mistake (leaned the mixture out instead of altering the throttle), catastrophic engine or associated component failure (yes, it certainly can occur under light load), electrical failure etc.
I too have heard of students moving fuel selectors to off on downwind instead of changing tanks. Since it isn't easy to see the fuel selector when sitting in the left seat and must operate by feel alone, it's an easy thing for a rookie to do... but all of the Warrior IIIs I've flown have had the updated selectors fitted where you need to hold down a button to move it to the 'off' position and I expect this one did too. That's why I believe the only other fuel stuff-up you can make (aside from pulling the mixture for some reason) is to not swing the selector fully across. If you do this, nothing will happen for at least 10-15 seconds (especially at low throttle), giving you plenty of time to turn final before the engine goes silent.
43 Inches: Aside from the battery relocated to the engine bay and updated fuel selector, Warrior III's have the same O-320 engine and carby, more modern flat-panel (not the plastic 3D look) dash with a choice of steam or Avidyne glass, updated nav lights and slightly heavier BEW for the same Balance.
Of course, if you ran completely dry on one tank and unported in either base or final turn, you'd also get no warning until short final.
Amen!
Last edited by PiperCameron; 22nd Nov 2022 at 01:19. Reason: POH excerpt added
43 Inches: Aside from the battery relocated to the engine bay and updated fuel selector, Warrior III's have the same O-320 engine and carby, more modern flat-panel (not the plastic 3D look) dash with a choice of steam or Avidyne glass, updated nav lights and slightly heavier BEW for the same Balance.
Also fuel could still spill even if fuel exhaustion happened, either from the other tank or from unusable pockets.
In anycase students should be familiar with engine failure vital actions before they go solo. Not very difficult to remember mixture rich, fuel pump on, carby heat hot and change tanks.
Also fuel check on downwind is really about ensuring enough for the flight/continued circuits, and part of that in the PA28 is to confirm which tank is feeding. Switching tanks during a circuit session should be rare really, definitely not something a student should be doing on early solos.
I remember one student who reported post flight rough running that had started in the training area, turned out it was running on only 3 cylinders after one cylinders push rods had completely failed.
I too have heard of students moving fuel selectors to off on downwind instead of changing tanks. Since it isn't easy to see the fuel selector when sitting in the left seat.
Tank Change in the circuit?
Spot on, GIII and P88. If fuel is managed competently, there should be no need to change fuel tank selection after TOPD (subject of course to some unexpected delay or other surprise).
(Interestingly, a few flight reviews ago - in a Bonanza - the ATO told me the story of a practise forced landing that turned into a real forced landing during a recent flight review in a Bonanza. The pilot under review must have been doing quite of bit flying in Cessnas, because during the PFL he inadvertently set the fuel selector to point to position between "L" and "R", which position is not "BOTH" in a Bonanza! The engine duly stopped producing power and they landed in the paddock. The fuel selector was found in the wrong position, restored to a correct position and the aircraft flown out of the paddock.)
(Interestingly, a few flight reviews ago - in a Bonanza - the ATO told me the story of a practise forced landing that turned into a real forced landing during a recent flight review in a Bonanza. The pilot under review must have been doing quite of bit flying in Cessnas, because during the PFL he inadvertently set the fuel selector to point to position between "L" and "R", which position is not "BOTH" in a Bonanza! The engine duly stopped producing power and they landed in the paddock. The fuel selector was found in the wrong position, restored to a correct position and the aircraft flown out of the paddock.)
With the Warriors there is a healthy click as the fuel selector goes into the right place, difficult to miss unless rushing it.
