ATSB Report on Angel44 asymmetric accident now published.
Thread Starter
ATSB Report on Angel44 asymmetric accident now published.
ATSB report just published on the accident to VH-AIZ, an Angel 44 twin engine'pusher' aircraft.
https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications...r/ao-2019-072/
The aircraft crashed during simulated engine failure after lift-off at Mareeba on 14 December 2019. The report is concise, thorough and IMHO required reading by all Examiners and flying instructors. The instructor simulated an engine failure shortly (100 feet) after liftoff from a touch and go landing. Directional control was lost almost immediately.
The reasons why the loss of directional control occurred combined with other allied factors, are comprehensively covered. The report examined previous accidents of this nature of which three were over the period 2008 to 2017. It would have been more useful to have gone back a few more years to 2003. That year a Duchess VH-JWX crashed at Camden following a touch and go landing. In that accident, the highly experienced instructor cut the mixture control on the right hand engine at 50 feet. The student (a current airline pilot) was able to maintain directional control but the aircraft failed to climb on one engine because of the high drag of the windmilling propellor on the simulated failed engine. One wing clipped a tree and the Duchess belly landed under control. It then caught fire. The occupants were uninjured by the impact but received severe burns while exiting he aircraft. The instructor subsequently died.
The circumstances of both accidents (simulated engine failure following a touch and go landing) were similar. Thus the ATSB report to the Angel 44 event would have done well to include reference to the Camden accident. Both accidents prove that simulated engine failures at extremely low altitudes in light multi-engine aircraft are simply not worth the risks involved.
See ATSB report on the Camden Duchess accident.
https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications...aair200300224/
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https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications...r/ao-2019-072/
The aircraft crashed during simulated engine failure after lift-off at Mareeba on 14 December 2019. The report is concise, thorough and IMHO required reading by all Examiners and flying instructors. The instructor simulated an engine failure shortly (100 feet) after liftoff from a touch and go landing. Directional control was lost almost immediately.
The reasons why the loss of directional control occurred combined with other allied factors, are comprehensively covered. The report examined previous accidents of this nature of which three were over the period 2008 to 2017. It would have been more useful to have gone back a few more years to 2003. That year a Duchess VH-JWX crashed at Camden following a touch and go landing. In that accident, the highly experienced instructor cut the mixture control on the right hand engine at 50 feet. The student (a current airline pilot) was able to maintain directional control but the aircraft failed to climb on one engine because of the high drag of the windmilling propellor on the simulated failed engine. One wing clipped a tree and the Duchess belly landed under control. It then caught fire. The occupants were uninjured by the impact but received severe burns while exiting he aircraft. The instructor subsequently died.
The circumstances of both accidents (simulated engine failure following a touch and go landing) were similar. Thus the ATSB report to the Angel 44 event would have done well to include reference to the Camden accident. Both accidents prove that simulated engine failures at extremely low altitudes in light multi-engine aircraft are simply not worth the risks involved.
See ATSB report on the Camden Duchess accident.
https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications...aair200300224/
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It's not just
One just has to remember Tamair at Tamworth, a 707 off East Sale and a Viscount at Mangalore.
CC
simulated engine failures at extremely low altitudes in light multi-engine aircraft
CC
VH-ANB at Darwin as well, where they went to flight idle and simulated a simultaneous failure of the engine and autofeather system. Which itself was almost a carbon copy of the B1900 incident at Williamtown only a couple of years earlier...
EDIT: I hadn't seen the ATSB animation from the -ANB crash. It's available for download HERE. Doesn't take long for things to go awry...
EDIT: I hadn't seen the ATSB animation from the -ANB crash. It's available for download HERE. Doesn't take long for things to go awry...
As a close witness to this accident I had made an unrecorded statement to a young ATSB visitor . I heard it coming, looked to the strip 100 mts away to see it and watched it rotate and climb poorly only about 200mtrs from runways end. At approximately 100 ft it banked right with the gear down, and it was all down hill from there....over the corn field. When it banked right again, my initial thought was it was to avoiding the upcomming power line and /or buildings ahead....and sh*t that is a LOW level circuit Distance between those difficult to asssess from my perspective,
But sadly it wasnt a turn at all it was the right wing letting go airflow -wise and it plunged into the corn, after about 1/4 rotation. I wasnt aware of a lot of noise after the initial turn off the strip ...it was like watching from behind a glider on finals ...coming into land ...wrongly ! Its a bugger if you dont get it right.
RIP them 2 gents.
But sadly it wasnt a turn at all it was the right wing letting go airflow -wise and it plunged into the corn, after about 1/4 rotation. I wasnt aware of a lot of noise after the initial turn off the strip ...it was like watching from behind a glider on finals ...coming into land ...wrongly ! Its a bugger if you dont get it right.
RIP them 2 gents.
Your examiner/instructor/trainer should include in their brief ‘engine failures will not be simulated below XX AGL’
If they don’t brief it, ask them about it before takeoff.
If they don’t put a number on it that sounds reasonable, you are getting closer to being one of these stories.
Thank you to all my mentors who have imposed limits during training.
If they don’t brief it, ask them about it before takeoff.
If they don’t put a number on it that sounds reasonable, you are getting closer to being one of these stories.
Thank you to all my mentors who have imposed limits during training.
Thread Starter
Some months after the Camden Duchess accident I talked to the survivor who had returned to Canada after an extensive stay in hospital recovering from burns. He was an Air Canada pilot. He was full of praise for the help of the AFAP.who quickly organised administrative help for him while he was in hospital.
Before the flight, which was an instrument rating test in the Duchess, the instructor gave him a comprehensive briefing. Among other things, the plan was for an instrument approach under the hood at Camden followed by a circling approach This was to be followed by a touch and go and simulated engine failure after takeoff and a return to Bankstown
Because night was approaching the student made it clear he would not accept an engine failure after takeoff due to the rules saying no engine failures at night except in the cruise. The instructor accepted that but nevertheless cut a mixture just as the pilot had selected gear up shortly after lift off. The student was caught by surprise and urgently asked the instructor to reintroduce power to the 'failed' engine because the aircraft wasn't climbing due to the drag from windmilling prop. The instructor was attempting to re-introduce power when one wingtip clipped a tree. The aircraft hit and slid up sloping ground beyond the end of the runway before going through a fence. It had almost stopped when one wing hit a metal girder in long grass and the fuel tank split and caught fire. Both pilots escaped through their respective doors but the instructor received severe burn injuries.
The student was able to reach the instructor and carry him away from the burning aircraft. Fortuitously, a police van on a nearby road saw the accident. The student still carrying the instructor called for the police to get them to the nearest hospital. There was a delay while the police radiod for instructions and finally the two pilots were taken to hospital for treatment.
The simulated engine failure after liftoff took place after the Duchess was already well down the runway on the touch and go. It was therefore closer to rising terrain and a line of trees.than for a normal takeoff. It could be argued that one lesson from both the Mareeba and Camden accidents is that instructors should think twice before failing an engine following a touch and go since any obstacles to be cleared in the takeoff splay could be a lot closer than normal. A steeper climb gradient may be needed to clear those obstacles. This may prove difficult to achieve - especially with drag from a windmilling propeller on the 'failed'engine.
Before the flight, which was an instrument rating test in the Duchess, the instructor gave him a comprehensive briefing. Among other things, the plan was for an instrument approach under the hood at Camden followed by a circling approach This was to be followed by a touch and go and simulated engine failure after takeoff and a return to Bankstown
Because night was approaching the student made it clear he would not accept an engine failure after takeoff due to the rules saying no engine failures at night except in the cruise. The instructor accepted that but nevertheless cut a mixture just as the pilot had selected gear up shortly after lift off. The student was caught by surprise and urgently asked the instructor to reintroduce power to the 'failed' engine because the aircraft wasn't climbing due to the drag from windmilling prop. The instructor was attempting to re-introduce power when one wingtip clipped a tree. The aircraft hit and slid up sloping ground beyond the end of the runway before going through a fence. It had almost stopped when one wing hit a metal girder in long grass and the fuel tank split and caught fire. Both pilots escaped through their respective doors but the instructor received severe burn injuries.
The student was able to reach the instructor and carry him away from the burning aircraft. Fortuitously, a police van on a nearby road saw the accident. The student still carrying the instructor called for the police to get them to the nearest hospital. There was a delay while the police radiod for instructions and finally the two pilots were taken to hospital for treatment.
The simulated engine failure after liftoff took place after the Duchess was already well down the runway on the touch and go. It was therefore closer to rising terrain and a line of trees.than for a normal takeoff. It could be argued that one lesson from both the Mareeba and Camden accidents is that instructors should think twice before failing an engine following a touch and go since any obstacles to be cleared in the takeoff splay could be a lot closer than normal. A steeper climb gradient may be needed to clear those obstacles. This may prove difficult to achieve - especially with drag from a windmilling propeller on the 'failed'engine.
Last edited by Centaurus; 21st Oct 2020 at 15:00.
Your examiner/instructor/trainer should include in their brief ‘engine failures will not be simulated below XX AGL’
If they don’t brief it, ask them about it before takeoff.
If they don’t put a number on it that sounds reasonable, you are getting closer to being one of these stories.
If they don’t brief it, ask them about it before takeoff.
If they don’t put a number on it that sounds reasonable, you are getting closer to being one of these stories.
Most everyone knows your average light twin is not going to be able to accelerate to Vyse with gear & flaps out and the 'failed' engine windmilling. Hell, even some turbine twins can't do it, which is why they have autofeather (and incidentally, why going to Flight Idle instead of Zero Thrust simulates dual independent failures on autofeather-equipped engines...)
Has anyone had an instructor, or briefed to an instructor, words to the effect of "in the event of an engine failure before clean configuration and 200/500AGL I'll close the good throttle and land straight ahead"? If so, what was their reaction?
From the report:
I am sorry to say the instructor had no business being there and should have declined the flight.
How can you conduct a proficiency check/ flight review in an aircraft that you are not familiar with.
The instructor had limited experience in multi-engine aeroplanes with retractable landing gear and only one short flight in the Angel 44 aircraft several years earlier.
How can you conduct a proficiency check/ flight review in an aircraft that you are not familiar with.
I have complete confidence that until the day I die, there will continue to be more GA deaths in Australia from engine failure training than from actual engine failures.
The lack of progress in this area is beyond belief.
The lack of progress in this area is beyond belief.
Thread Starter
I have complete confidence that until the day I die, there will continue to be more GA deaths in Australia from engine failure training than from actual engine failures.
Astute observation. One problem is the standard of instruction. A second problem is instructor personality. Some are over-confident cowboys and these sort of people rarely change for the better..buyer beware
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As has been said above it's notoriously difficult in many twin aircraft to climb and accelerate in TO config with a windmilling prop. Throw in poor pilot technique with an instructor who takes too long to take control and you've got a real problem. An engine failure that early on has a risk of loss of directional control, which I dare say is far more of a fatal issue than a twin glider with its gear down.
I suspect different skill levels can handle different procedures, but as a training ME pilot I felt most comfortable with this approach.
Angel 44 Accident.
In the Angel 44 accident the name of Camden, NSW, continues to rise.
Over the years Camden has had a continuing list of twin engine aircraft accidents. The usual theme is an engine failure, practise or for real at low level just after take-off. The aircraft then comes down off the northern end of the runway on the upslope. Some fatal, some serious injuries, some walk away. The aircraft are usually destroyed.
Off the cuff I can recall Hudson, Dove, Dutchess, Twin Comanche. There are others.
Camden would appear to have had more twin accidents than any other airport that I can recall. Please correct me if I am wrong.
Please add a few more and dates. These accidents go all the way back to the end of WWII. Finger trouble seems to be the main cause.
Over the years Camden has had a continuing list of twin engine aircraft accidents. The usual theme is an engine failure, practise or for real at low level just after take-off. The aircraft then comes down off the northern end of the runway on the upslope. Some fatal, some serious injuries, some walk away. The aircraft are usually destroyed.
Off the cuff I can recall Hudson, Dove, Dutchess, Twin Comanche. There are others.
Camden would appear to have had more twin accidents than any other airport that I can recall. Please correct me if I am wrong.
Please add a few more and dates. These accidents go all the way back to the end of WWII. Finger trouble seems to be the main cause.
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I have complete confidence that until the day I die, there will continue to be more GA deaths in Australia from engine failure training than from actual engine failures.
I did most of my CPL and all initial MEIFR training in a Seneca 1, and anyone who has flown this type of aircraft will know about the handling characteristics seemingly peculiar to that particular aircraft.
I possibly had more simulated EFATO's in that a/c than some people have had (insert your favourite whatever) but one thing that my Instructor, the late and much missed Tony Kingham never ever did was do a simulated EFATO below at least 400'.
He made it clear to me on numerous occasions that any failure below that altitude would be genuine!
I don’t think there was anything peculiar to the Seneca 1 that doesn’t apply to most light GA piston twins! The remaining engine merely took you to the site of the crash.
It was up to you whether that crash was under control or not!
It was up to you whether that crash was under control or not!
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I don’t think there was anything peculiar to the Seneca 1 that doesn’t apply to most light GA piston twins!
Also, AFAIK most other light piston twins had a better assymetric ROC than the Seneca 1. (190fpm @ 91kt at ISA from memory. Can tell a story about a simulated EFATO at Waikerie on a 40C day
)
The remaining engine merely took you to the site of the crash.
It was up to you whether that crash was under control or not!
It was up to you whether that crash was under control or not!
Last edited by Pinky the pilot; 23rd Oct 2020 at 10:50. Reason: details
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Please add a few more and dates. These accidents go all the way back to the end of WWII. Finger trouble seems to be the main cause.
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I did most of my CPL and all initial MEIFR training in a Seneca 1, and anyone who has flown this type of aircraft will know about the handling characteristics seemingly peculiar to that particular aircraft