Rossair accident in 2017 - training and checking assessment
A boy called Robert Mayne with whom I was in First Year at high school gave me a turbine blade from that Viscount. His dad was a reporter for a daily newspaper. He was early on the scene, finding quite a few thrown blades lying in the grass.
Good on you JL revisiting those early stuff-ups for us.
Good on you JL revisiting those early stuff-ups for us.
As you will know, Vmc is a speed precisely defined by the aircraft certification requirements, and determined during certification flight testing.
Some of the thing you need to know during this determination are engine power, rudder force, rudder angle, actual weight and cg, sideslip angle, bank angle, heading. Depending on the aircraft, aileron force and aileron (spoiler) angle may also be handy. A continuous time history of bank angle and heading will be required for determining exactly when Vmc occurs.
A very conservative test plan is developed and flown for this determination.
If, as an instructor, you plan to demonstrate "Vmc ", as well as loading the aircraft correctly you will need to obtain the manufacturers Vmc bank angle and information on which is the limiting case ie static Vmc or dynamic Vmc. Even then, flying at "Vmc" is no guarantee of controllability if the wrong bank angle, rudder force, rudder angle is used.
If you are demonstrating a loss of control speed, be very careful that the (possibly) reduced maximum power at the demonstration altitude doesn't lead to low speeds, never experienced during the certification testing, which could reduce controllability.
Real Vmc determination or demonstration is a hazardous area of flight, some sort of departure from controlled flight should be expected at some stage, a very clear recovery procedure developed and practised at safe altitudes and speeds.
I don't know if instructors and flight examiners continue to practise being test pilots, even if unwittingly.
When I did my ME training I had an experienced instructor who said at the outset that there would be no simulated failures below 400'. He had been caught out too many times to persist with EFATO training that was more likely to kill him than a real engine failure.
Real Vmc determination or demonstration is a hazardous area of flight
PROCEDURES FOR PRACTICE DEMONSTRATION OF VMCA
One engine inoperative procedures should be practiced in anticipation of an emergency. This practice should be conducted at a safe altitude (5000 feet AGL), with full power operation on both engines, and should be started at a safe speed of at least 115 KIAS. As recovery ability is gained with practice, the starting speed may be lowered in small increments until the feel of the airplane in emergency conditions is well known. It should be noted that as the speed is reduced, directional control becomes more difficult. Emphasis should be placed on stopping the initial large yaw angles by the IMMEDIATE application of rudder supplemented by banking slightly away from the yaw. Practice should be continued until: (1) an instinctive corrective reaction is developed and the corrective procedure is automatic and, (2) airspeed, altitude, and heading can be maintained easily while the airplane is being prepared for a climb. In order to simulate an engine failure, set both engines at full power operation; then at a chosen speed, pull the throttle control of one engine to idle, and proceed with single-engine emergency procedures. Simulated single-engine flight characteristics can be practiced by setting propeller RPM to simulate a critical engine inoperative condition as shown in Figure 4-3.
wing Flaps - UP.
Landing Gear - UP.
Airspeed - Vsse (102 KIAS) or above.
Inoperative Engine - IDLE POWER.
Operative Engine - 2235 RPM and FULL THROTTLE.
Airspeed - DECREASE at approximately 1 knot per second until Vmca (red radial) or stall warning, whichever occurs first, is obtained.
Vsse is used in training and is not a limitation. It is recommended, however, that except for training demonstrations, takeoffs and landings, this airplane should not be flown at a speed slower than Vsse.
Under no circumstances should VMC demonstration be attempted at a speed slower than red radial on the airspeéd indicator.
One engine inoperative procedures should be practiced in anticipation of an emergency. This practice should be conducted at a safe altitude (5000 feet AGL), with full power operation on both engines, and should be started at a safe speed of at least 115 KIAS. As recovery ability is gained with practice, the starting speed may be lowered in small increments until the feel of the airplane in emergency conditions is well known. It should be noted that as the speed is reduced, directional control becomes more difficult. Emphasis should be placed on stopping the initial large yaw angles by the IMMEDIATE application of rudder supplemented by banking slightly away from the yaw. Practice should be continued until: (1) an instinctive corrective reaction is developed and the corrective procedure is automatic and, (2) airspeed, altitude, and heading can be maintained easily while the airplane is being prepared for a climb. In order to simulate an engine failure, set both engines at full power operation; then at a chosen speed, pull the throttle control of one engine to idle, and proceed with single-engine emergency procedures. Simulated single-engine flight characteristics can be practiced by setting propeller RPM to simulate a critical engine inoperative condition as shown in Figure 4-3.
wing Flaps - UP.
Landing Gear - UP.
Airspeed - Vsse (102 KIAS) or above.
Inoperative Engine - IDLE POWER.
Operative Engine - 2235 RPM and FULL THROTTLE.
Airspeed - DECREASE at approximately 1 knot per second until Vmca (red radial) or stall warning, whichever occurs first, is obtained.
Vsse is used in training and is not a limitation. It is recommended, however, that except for training demonstrations, takeoffs and landings, this airplane should not be flown at a speed slower than Vsse.
Under no circumstances should VMC demonstration be attempted at a speed slower than red radial on the airspeéd indicator.
As written it is another nonsense demo claiming to be Vmc. There is no information on other variables which define Vmc eg bank angle, etc, etc.
So, are they trying to duplicate the certificated Vmc or is really just a low speed demo with a satisfactory safety margin?
It is implied that in the specified configuration, at the red line speed, the aircraft is easy to fly, so it may be that it is nowhere near the configuration required for Vmc.
Without a feel for the controllability margin available I can't comment on your question.
However, I certainly agree with the type of work-up recommended.
I don't know what the training system now requires.
As an aside, when validating a Vmc with a manufacturers flight test team, I often flew at the claimed Vmc then conducted a series of engine cuts with increased power settings for each cut until we reached MTP - or a power which was acceptable to do some analysis on.
If static Vmc was limiting then a different approach is obviously required.
So, are they trying to duplicate the certificated Vmc or is really just a low speed demo with a satisfactory safety margin?
It is implied that in the specified configuration, at the red line speed, the aircraft is easy to fly, so it may be that it is nowhere near the configuration required for Vmc.
Without a feel for the controllability margin available I can't comment on your question.
However, I certainly agree with the type of work-up recommended.
I don't know what the training system now requires.
As an aside, when validating a Vmc with a manufacturers flight test team, I often flew at the claimed Vmc then conducted a series of engine cuts with increased power settings for each cut until we reached MTP - or a power which was acceptable to do some analysis on.
If static Vmc was limiting then a different approach is obviously required.
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I put this exact question to CASA shortly after the accident. My partner was Martin Scott, the Chief Pilot flying from the right hand seat that day. CASA's response was that if they used pseudo students it made it too easy for the person being assessed. They also stated that it is perfectly acceptable practice for CASA to be assessing the right hand seat pilot, whilst that pilot is assessing the left hand seat pilot.
Assuming the RHS pilot is already a qualified instructor, and is being assessed as an examiner and/or CP, what is the safety problem with this? The RHS pilot is already qualified to take over if the LHS pilot fails to make the grade.
Not a multi FW rated guy, but any single engine work means keeping Vmca uppermost in mind. Manuals I've read suggest 5,000 as the minimum altitude for Vmca demonstration. Is that not telling us something with regard to single engine work? I'm fully aware of, and the necessity for, good training, but there must be a better way. Simulators are the only answer.
2/. engine failure in a Conquest should probably not be demonstrated with the power lever right back to the flight idle stop.
3/. A very great many simulated engine failures are practiced in twin engine aircraft of all classes without so much as giving the crew a fright. It can be done. I have done (removes socks... 13...14...15...) 16 C441 endorsements over the last 3 years and maybe the same number of prof checks without incident or even a nasty fright.
Lost count now of C404 endos and C421 and Baron and Chieftain endos. Why the hell would you even need to demo 'real' VMCA after seeing something limited, but similar, in your initial MEA training?
I still have no idea WTF they were doing or talking about in that cockpit in Renmark that night but to have some knee-jerk reaction and ban something that might, or might not, have had a bearing on the accident would be a typical modern Australian response
Derfred
I think that's where you're going wrong?
Assuming the RHS pilot is already a qualified instructor,
I wonder how many multi engine aircraft deaths there have been in Australia due to:
a) actual engine failure close to the ground, vs.
b) engine failure training
Seems to me we are often killing people in an attempt to stop people being killed rarely.
a) actual engine failure close to the ground, vs.
b) engine failure training
Seems to me we are often killing people in an attempt to stop people being killed rarely.
What is also quite interesting, is that this very FOI was one that drove Air North very hard that they should be doing their assymetric flying in the now available simulator in MEL rather than the aircraft. The accident in Darwin of the Brasilia, again practicing engine failures was due to the final one done on the aircraft vs the sim.
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Having been part of a check recently which involved CASA, it seems they have adopted this approach somewhat. There was a strict stipulation that there were to be no engine failure emergencies conducted below 1,000 feet AGL and I believe this was a reaction to this particular accident.
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Was this stipulation made verbally? Captain Nomad, did you ask whether this was a reaction to this accident?
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What exactly constitutes a 'qualified instructor' for the purposes of the flight that day? Yes, the RHS pilot was a qualified instructor, but had not undertaken any instructional flights for many years. Surely there must be some currency maintained in order to be classified as such???
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If I can just go back right to the very beginning of this thread and quote Dick Smith:
"It has been claimed that one of the reasons Rossair has gone into administration is because of the terrible accident they had"
It is my understanding that the reason Rossair were unable to operate under their own AOC was due to CASA flatly refusing to approve any Chief Pilot put forward by them. I can only assume that CASA had identified systemic cultural issues within the company and used their power in this way to ensure Rossair remained grounded.
Perhaps I'm wrong???
"It has been claimed that one of the reasons Rossair has gone into administration is because of the terrible accident they had"
It is my understanding that the reason Rossair were unable to operate under their own AOC was due to CASA flatly refusing to approve any Chief Pilot put forward by them. I can only assume that CASA had identified systemic cultural issues within the company and used their power in this way to ensure Rossair remained grounded.
Perhaps I'm wrong???
ChoppaGirl, if the RHS pilot did not have recent hands-on in the instructional role, some very serious issues arise..
The general recency requirement in every operation I have been associated with has required activity in the role within the last 90 days. If not done within 90 days, it was a trip to the simulator, or in smaller operations, some dual. Perhaps you should research what other operators have written in their 'CASA APPROVED' Training and Checking manuals? CASA do make a Very Big Deal of 'approving' this one manual. Most of the other manuals are merely 'accepted', albeit often with much CASA influence.
I would be surprised if any T&C Manual in Australia had no recency requirement for asymmetric training/checking duties.
As for CASA using the lack of a suitable Chief Pilot, yes this is one of the easiest ways for them to stop an Operator who is on their hit list for other alleged offences or breaches. A lack of a CP is easier to run with than the legal processes often associated with non-compliance.
It is about time CASA forced Operators to give Chief Pilots true control of all associated operational matters. As it stands, too many CPs are forced to always take the cheapest way out when it comes to such non-essentials (in the CEO's eyes) as training. This sound familiar?
The general recency requirement in every operation I have been associated with has required activity in the role within the last 90 days. If not done within 90 days, it was a trip to the simulator, or in smaller operations, some dual. Perhaps you should research what other operators have written in their 'CASA APPROVED' Training and Checking manuals? CASA do make a Very Big Deal of 'approving' this one manual. Most of the other manuals are merely 'accepted', albeit often with much CASA influence.
I would be surprised if any T&C Manual in Australia had no recency requirement for asymmetric training/checking duties.
As for CASA using the lack of a suitable Chief Pilot, yes this is one of the easiest ways for them to stop an Operator who is on their hit list for other alleged offences or breaches. A lack of a CP is easier to run with than the legal processes often associated with non-compliance.
It is about time CASA forced Operators to give Chief Pilots true control of all associated operational matters. As it stands, too many CPs are forced to always take the cheapest way out when it comes to such non-essentials (in the CEO's eyes) as training. This sound familiar?
Last edited by Mach E Avelli; 23rd Jul 2018 at 04:59.
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Mach E Avelli, it is my understanding that in order to be approved for Check and Training, the candidate must have undertaken at least 6 training flights prior to assessment. This does not constitute the role of 'instructor'. Surely they are two different roles???
I completely agree with your comment regarding giving Chief Pilots true control. It is indeed a familiar situation to have to take the cheapest option in very important safety matters. It just isn't good enough!
I completely agree with your comment regarding giving Chief Pilots true control. It is indeed a familiar situation to have to take the cheapest option in very important safety matters. It just isn't good enough!
If the six 'training' flights were conducting line training or giving ICUS, of course this would be of no relevance to carrying out asymmetric instruction or checking duties.
The proper way this is done is to have the would-be instructor/check pilot receive either dual or simulator in which various exercises are practiced until better than simply proficient - i.e. extremely proficient. Then, and only then, the aircraft would be deliberately mishandled by the person giving the training and the candidate would be expected to recognise various situations i.e. those where prompting could be appropriate, and those where the only safe course would be to take control.
Of course there is more to it, like briefing, recognising common and not so common mistakes, debriefing, grading performance etc, but the above is the nitty-gritty survival stuff that is essential before undertaking any non-simulator crew training.
The proper way this is done is to have the would-be instructor/check pilot receive either dual or simulator in which various exercises are practiced until better than simply proficient - i.e. extremely proficient. Then, and only then, the aircraft would be deliberately mishandled by the person giving the training and the candidate would be expected to recognise various situations i.e. those where prompting could be appropriate, and those where the only safe course would be to take control.
Of course there is more to it, like briefing, recognising common and not so common mistakes, debriefing, grading performance etc, but the above is the nitty-gritty survival stuff that is essential before undertaking any non-simulator crew training.