Nine Dead in Fox Glacier Crash, New Zealand
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Witness accounts varied in detail, but they generally described the aeroplane accelerating
normally down the airstrip and getting airborne at about, but certainly not later than, the usual
position. Two local witnesses standing near the operator’s facilities at the end of the runway,
and who were familiar with ZK-EUF taking off from the Fox Glacier runway, thought the
aeroplane got airborne earlier than it normally did. The aeroplane was then seen to continue
pitching upward until it appeared to be almost vertical. At about 100m the aeroplane entered
what was described as a wing-over to the left to point almost vertically downwards.
normally down the airstrip and getting airborne at about, but certainly not later than, the usual
position. Two local witnesses standing near the operator’s facilities at the end of the runway,
and who were familiar with ZK-EUF taking off from the Fox Glacier runway, thought the
aeroplane got airborne earlier than it normally did. The aeroplane was then seen to continue
pitching upward until it appeared to be almost vertical. At about 100m the aeroplane entered
what was described as a wing-over to the left to point almost vertically downwards.
pitching upward until it appeared to be almost vertical
Last edited by prospector; 1st Nov 2015 at 06:37.
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Tell me Prospector, in your fletcher experience, how do you possibly get a loaded fletcher climbing vertical after take off, without strapping a SRB to the bottom ? Perhaps walter were secretly testing a new engine...
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Perhaps if you read what was observed by the witnesses
rather than stating
you would have a better understanding of the sequence of events.
As to the rest of your post.
The first Fletcher I was operating, with an agricultural overload, was powered by a 225hp engine.
This Fletcher was powered by a 550hp turbine, it had less than an agricultural overload, and with that power it is quite conceivable that the take off path could be as observed by the witnesses.
It was obvious that that rate of climb could not be sustained and the aircraft did exactly as would be expected, dropped a wing and went vertical downward.
The distance from the commencement of the take off run, to where it impacted the ground after becoming airborne and going into the steep climb, stalling and impacting the ground certainly supports the witness observations.
The aeroplane was then seen to continue
pitching upward until it appeared to be almost vertical.
pitching upward until it appeared to be almost vertical.
how do you possibly get a loaded fletcher climbing vertical after take off
As to the rest of your post.
The first Fletcher I was operating, with an agricultural overload, was powered by a 225hp engine.
This Fletcher was powered by a 550hp turbine, it had less than an agricultural overload, and with that power it is quite conceivable that the take off path could be as observed by the witnesses.
It was obvious that that rate of climb could not be sustained and the aircraft did exactly as would be expected, dropped a wing and went vertical downward.
The distance from the commencement of the take off run, to where it impacted the ground after becoming airborne and going into the steep climb, stalling and impacting the ground certainly supports the witness observations.
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We are going around in circles here but what I gather is that you still believe that the original botched report was correct in saying that the cause of the pitch up was the aft c of g,- even though there have been many thousands of very successful flights before hand in a same or worse loading configuration. And against the flight tests conducted under the guidance of the CAA which prove at that weight and balance the plane was fully normally controllable AND to throw more in the mix it was fully controllable by a pilot of average skill to take off with a fully aft elevator trim as well as the c of g on the accident flight.
I'm not sure why you are quoting an abomination of a report. It has been found to be incorrect by the commission, effectively by the coroner and of course by almost every aviator who has read it, who has had anything to do with the parachute industry or the fletcher aircraft,- except you.
I have read what the report says. I have also spoken to, at length, a small number of witnesses two of which were never interviewed even though they asked to be, and were probably most qualified. Both these two were on different parts of the field but gave very similar accounts as to the sequence of events and both swear black and blue that it was not as was written in the report. One of these two was a tandem master who disconnected and removed the start cart from the aircraft for that flight and watched the whole thing effectively from the runway while making his way back to the hangar. I have walked the airfield with him and to the crash site as he gave a description of what he saw. The other was a well known aviation doctor from your corner of the country who gets around carrying out medicals for pilots. Perhaps you should hear his account.
The problem is, generally witness accounts do vary in detail,- as the report does day. But of those interviewed by TAIC, I believe they were all in the same general area (correct me if I'm wrong) with out necessarily a clear unimpeded view of the whole flight path. Also most were distraught tourists whom had just watched their friends die in a fiery plane crash (viewing from almost directly behind, on the deck at the top of the runway). How accurately can you judge a pitch angle from directly behind ?
I don't believe the aircraft went vertical (as was in the draft report), or any where near vertical. It is an impossibility because it simply does not have the performance without already having a great deal of speed or inertia before lift off,- which it didn't because it got airborne at the usual position, or early,- depending on who talk to or what you read.
I agree that if the aircraft was sitting on it's tail then yes of course there would be a change in positions of the passengers but overall the spread out would not be as different as one might think. I.e not all down against the back wall, because no matter which way round 8 people and 4 tandem rigs are in that tiny space,- it would still fill out a fair chunk of it.
Regardless, I do agree and believe that at some point, but later in the sequence of events, that there was a shift in load rearwards which would have made the recovery very difficult. However, I stress this as being LATER in, in the VERY steep attitude (read not near vertical).
The whole unanswered question, and the key to unlocking the cause of this crash, is:
WHAT CAUSED THE INITIAL PITCH UP ?
Not C of G (as you believe so)
Not a load shift (no room, very difficult to move)
Probably not trim (as was found in take off position and subsequent flight testing proves it still possible to take off with that load)
So what are we left with:
Control column break / failure ? (as has happened and subsequent ADs)
Control lock ?
Control cable failure ?
I really have no idea but I believe some failure or impediment in the control system somewhere, even if it was only temporary...
Prospector you should forget that report. Its mostly garbage. I take it you didn't watch the coroners inquest, as so much came out there. Many whiteness/experts especially those never interviewed or consulted.
I'm not sure why you are quoting an abomination of a report. It has been found to be incorrect by the commission, effectively by the coroner and of course by almost every aviator who has read it, who has had anything to do with the parachute industry or the fletcher aircraft,- except you.
Perhaps if you read what was observed by the witnesses
you would have a better understanding of the sequence of events.
you would have a better understanding of the sequence of events.
The problem is, generally witness accounts do vary in detail,- as the report does day. But of those interviewed by TAIC, I believe they were all in the same general area (correct me if I'm wrong) with out necessarily a clear unimpeded view of the whole flight path. Also most were distraught tourists whom had just watched their friends die in a fiery plane crash (viewing from almost directly behind, on the deck at the top of the runway). How accurately can you judge a pitch angle from directly behind ?
I don't believe the aircraft went vertical (as was in the draft report), or any where near vertical. It is an impossibility because it simply does not have the performance without already having a great deal of speed or inertia before lift off,- which it didn't because it got airborne at the usual position, or early,- depending on who talk to or what you read.
I agree that if the aircraft was sitting on it's tail then yes of course there would be a change in positions of the passengers but overall the spread out would not be as different as one might think. I.e not all down against the back wall, because no matter which way round 8 people and 4 tandem rigs are in that tiny space,- it would still fill out a fair chunk of it.
Regardless, I do agree and believe that at some point, but later in the sequence of events, that there was a shift in load rearwards which would have made the recovery very difficult. However, I stress this as being LATER in, in the VERY steep attitude (read not near vertical).
The whole unanswered question, and the key to unlocking the cause of this crash, is:
WHAT CAUSED THE INITIAL PITCH UP ?
Not C of G (as you believe so)
Not a load shift (no room, very difficult to move)
Probably not trim (as was found in take off position and subsequent flight testing proves it still possible to take off with that load)
So what are we left with:
Control column break / failure ? (as has happened and subsequent ADs)
Control lock ?
Control cable failure ?
I really have no idea but I believe some failure or impediment in the control system somewhere, even if it was only temporary...
Prospector you should forget that report. Its mostly garbage. I take it you didn't watch the coroners inquest, as so much came out there. Many whiteness/experts especially those never interviewed or consulted.
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4.2.16. At 0.122m rear of the aft limit, the centre of gravity on the accident flight was within the 5% grouping, and therefore likely to have been further aft than the centre of gravity on nearly all previous flights with 8 parachutists. At a minimum of 0.122m rear of the aft limit, the centre of gravity on the accident flight was possibly the most rearward centre of gravity of any of the aeroplane owner’s previous flights
The impression I am getting is that it is OK to go outside the aft limits because it had been done before.
But when you go so far outside the aft limits it bites you, then it must have been something else.
What is going to be proven by digging up wreckage after being buried for years? What extra damage to components could have occurred during the burial and the uncovering these parts.
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Are you saying that the quoted figures are incorrect?
The impression I am getting is that it is OK to go outside the aft limits because it had been done before.
But when you go so far outside the aft limits it bites you, then it must have been something else.
What is going to be proven by digging up wreckage after being buried for years? What extra damage to components could have occurred during the burial and the uncovering these parts.
The impression I am getting is that it is OK to go outside the aft limits because it had been done before.
But when you go so far outside the aft limits it bites you, then it must have been something else.
What is going to be proven by digging up wreckage after being buried for years? What extra damage to components could have occurred during the burial and the uncovering these parts.
Prospector sit in the back with a full load of tandems and rigs, and see what is the furthest you can move unrestrained.
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Quote:
Quote:
4.2.16. At 0.122m rear of the aft limit, the centre of gravity on the accident flight was within the 5% grouping, and therefore likely to have been further aft than the centre of gravity on nearly all previous flights with 8 parachutists. At a minimum of 0.122m rear of the aft limit, the centre of gravity on the accident flight was possibly the most rearward centre of gravity of any of the aeroplane owner’s previous flights
Are you saying that the quoted figures are incorrect?
The impression I am getting is that it is OK to go outside the aft limits because it had been done before.
But when you go so far outside the aft limits it bites you, then it must have been something else.
What is going to be proven by digging up wreckage after being buried for years? What extra damage to components could have occurred during the burial and the uncovering these parts.
Quote:
4.2.16. At 0.122m rear of the aft limit, the centre of gravity on the accident flight was within the 5% grouping, and therefore likely to have been further aft than the centre of gravity on nearly all previous flights with 8 parachutists. At a minimum of 0.122m rear of the aft limit, the centre of gravity on the accident flight was possibly the most rearward centre of gravity of any of the aeroplane owner’s previous flights
Are you saying that the quoted figures are incorrect?
The impression I am getting is that it is OK to go outside the aft limits because it had been done before.
But when you go so far outside the aft limits it bites you, then it must have been something else.
What is going to be proven by digging up wreckage after being buried for years? What extra damage to components could have occurred during the burial and the uncovering these parts.
Prospector. In 12 years of being a daily pprune follower, in general I have respected and agreed with the majority of your posts.
Now however, I have determined one of two things:
1) You are simply taking the piss, for a laugh.
or
2) You are a complete idiot.
I'm not sure how many times it needs to be said, or has been said, but I'll say it just once more,- for the record.
There have been thousands upon thousands of flights in this Weight and Balance configuration,- or WORSE with no problem.
THIS WAS NOT THE MOST REARWARD C OF G THAT THE FLETCHER HAS TAKEN OFF WITH
This was a standard load, no different to any previous, or if anything lighter as the people on board were not big at all. There is a record (that I know of) of 10 people in the back, though not in this particular fletcher. This flight had 8.
Also
IT HAS BEEN PROVEN IN TEST FLIGHT CONDITIONS THAT WITH THE ABOVE C OF G THE FLETCHER IS PERFECTLY NORMALLY CONTROLLABLE AND TO MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT IT WAS ALSO TESTED WITH THIS C OF G A TAKE OFF WITH FULL AFT ELEVATOR TRIM AND IT WAS FINE !!
I put in capitals so maybe you have more chance of understanding these simple concepts.
This is where I step off, unless someone else has something more to add.
LM
That is all very well. However at the stall or the approach to the stall, where the elevator may stall before the main planes for example, then the a/c can become very unpredictable very quickly with an aft C of G. Certainly there will be longitudinal instability at the very least.
That is all very well. However at the stall or the approach to the stall, where the elevator may stall before the main planes for example, then the a/c can become very unpredictable very quickly with an aft C of G. Certainly there will be longitudinal instability at the very least.
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LM
That is all very well. However at the stall or the approach to the stall, where the elevator may stall before the main planes for example, then the a/c can become very unpredictable very quickly with an aft C of G. Certainly there will be longitudinal instability at the very least.
That is all very well. However at the stall or the approach to the stall, where the elevator may stall before the main planes for example, then the a/c can become very unpredictable very quickly with an aft C of G. Certainly there will be longitudinal instability at the very least.
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IT HAS BEEN PROVEN IN TEST FLIGHT CONDITIONS THAT WITH THE ABOVE C OF G THE FLETCHER IS PERFECTLY NORMALLY CONTROLLABLE AND TO MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT IT WAS ALSO TESTED WITH THIS C OF G A TAKE OFF WITH FULL AFT ELEVATOR TRIM AND IT WAS FINE !!
Perhaps you could advise us who carried out this testing? and what, if any, connection they had to the parachute fraternity.
The aeroplane owner recalled that about 2 weeks before the accident the pilot had rejected a take-off part-way down the runway and returned to the loading area before taking off successfully on the second attempt. The pilot had later said that he had forgotten to reset the elevator trim for take-off after the previous landing. The error was detected early in the take-off roll so he had stopped the take-off, returned to the start point and reset the trim before taking off. As a result of the incident the operator placed a label on the instrument panel to remind the pilots to check the trim position before take-off.
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Maybe he thought that the problem was trim, but turned out to be something more serious that wasn't noticed until airborne on the second attempt?
Just throwing that out there.
Just throwing that out there.
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Lepper Messiah
From the accident report, have these figures been challenged?
Enough room for a few more sardines
Why then has CAA limited the load to 6 parachutists? if there is no problem with an aft C of G then surely this ruling would have been appealed? has it?
One can only surmise you must be part of the parachuting fraternity.
Any licensed pilot who would treat the C of G so lightly, especially with fare paying skydivers involved and then publicly brag about in on a public forum, I would return your comment
From the accident report, have these figures been challenged?
At a minimum of 0.122m rear of the aft limit, the centre of gravity on the accident flight was possibly the most rearward centre of gravity of any of the aeroplane owner’s previous flights
THIS WAS NOT THE MOST REARWARD C OF G THAT THE FLETCHER HAS TAKEN OFF WITH
There is a record (that I know of) of 10 people in the back, though not in this particular fletcher. This flight had 8.
In order to get 8 people and 4 tandem rigs into that tiny cabin they are packed in like sardines
of 10 people in the back
IT HAS BEEN PROVEN IN TEST FLIGHT CONDITIONS THAT WITH THE ABOVE C OF G THE FLETCHER IS PERFECTLY NORMALLY CONTROLLABLE AND TO MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT IT WAS ALSO TESTED WITH THIS C OF G A TAKE OFF WITH FULL AFT ELEVATOR TRIM AND IT WAS FINE !!
One can only surmise you must be part of the parachuting fraternity.
Any licensed pilot who would treat the C of G so lightly, especially with fare paying skydivers involved and then publicly brag about in on a public forum, I would return your comment
2) You are a complete idiot.
Last edited by prospector; 2nd Nov 2015 at 23:59.
Prospector, I don't know what the rules for parachute ops are in NZ but here in OZ, looking from the outside in, I suspect there must be an entirely different set of rule when it comes to parachute ops.
I haven't seen them written down anywhere but minimum fuel, MTOW, and definition of VMC seem different somehow from the normal aviation interpretation.
I haven't seen them written down anywhere but minimum fuel, MTOW, and definition of VMC seem different somehow from the normal aviation interpretation.
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entirely different set of rule when it comes to parachute ops.
Some operators in NZ have taken it upon themselves, as a good safety feature, to have these restraints installed in their aircraft.
It is not mandatory in NZ and unfortunately the accident in question the parachutists were not restrained in any way, apart from "being packed in like sardines"
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Perhaps you could advise us who carried out this testing? and what, if any, connection they had to the parachute fraternity.
Flight tests of Walter Fletcher aircraft — August 2012
[79] .....engaged for the purpose by Super Air Limited, carried out testing on 7 and 8 August 2012 to evaluate the pitch control on a Walter Fletcher. The flight testing required CAA approval, which was granted, for the issue of an experimental category certificate of airworthiness.
[81] The flight testing was carried out under controlled conditions by an experienced Walter Fletcher pilot who had undertaken previous test flights with Mr ..... Mr ..... said that the test pilot would be "testing the aircraft to the capability of an average pilot of average skill." "Obviously" the pilot would be expecting there might be some unusual flight control inputs. Appropriate aft weighting was applied to counteract the weight of two persons in the cockpit.
[82] The pilot utilised Walter Fletcher ZK-BHG, with the weight and aft centre of gravity assumed in the ZK-EUF's accident flight. Although the test aircraft had a hopper and was set up for agricultural operations, Mr .... said, "...for these types of tests the different configuration should not affect the general pitch characteristic being investigated."
[83] A number of lead weights were used to simulate the weight and aft centre of gravity assumed in the ZK-EUF's accident flight. Mr .... said these were placed "well aft in the aircraft... just forward of the elevator control systems or tail plane control systems." If they had not been secured there was a danger they could have interfered with the control systems. This compares to the situation in ZK-EUF where the rear bulkhead protected the control systems. Testing with unrestrained loads would have been "very dangerous" and would not have been permitted by CAA.
[87] In summary Mr .... said:
... the testing found that at the assumed weight and balance the aircraft was controllable, and did not appear to show a flight characteristic that was unpredictable. In addition, when the trim was set fully aft on take-off, the aircraft was controllable as the control stick forces were not beyond the capability of a normal person to control with their right arm, and were within those permitted by FAR 23.143 [which Mr .... explained as "...the permitted control stick forces for temporary and prolonged application."]
[106] Importantly, Mr .... said the August 2012 flight tests showed when the trim was set fully aft on take-off, the aircraft was controllable as the control column forces "were not beyond the capability of a normal person to control with their right arm". He said a pilot caught in this situation should be capable of maintaining effective control with one arm through the airspeeds used for take-off and climb out while they adjust the trim imbalance. He said normal lift-off speeds are 51-55 knots and climb out usually around 80 knots or less. "The speeds would be indicated airspeeds."
[79] .....engaged for the purpose by Super Air Limited, carried out testing on 7 and 8 August 2012 to evaluate the pitch control on a Walter Fletcher. The flight testing required CAA approval, which was granted, for the issue of an experimental category certificate of airworthiness.
[81] The flight testing was carried out under controlled conditions by an experienced Walter Fletcher pilot who had undertaken previous test flights with Mr ..... Mr ..... said that the test pilot would be "testing the aircraft to the capability of an average pilot of average skill." "Obviously" the pilot would be expecting there might be some unusual flight control inputs. Appropriate aft weighting was applied to counteract the weight of two persons in the cockpit.
[82] The pilot utilised Walter Fletcher ZK-BHG, with the weight and aft centre of gravity assumed in the ZK-EUF's accident flight. Although the test aircraft had a hopper and was set up for agricultural operations, Mr .... said, "...for these types of tests the different configuration should not affect the general pitch characteristic being investigated."
[83] A number of lead weights were used to simulate the weight and aft centre of gravity assumed in the ZK-EUF's accident flight. Mr .... said these were placed "well aft in the aircraft... just forward of the elevator control systems or tail plane control systems." If they had not been secured there was a danger they could have interfered with the control systems. This compares to the situation in ZK-EUF where the rear bulkhead protected the control systems. Testing with unrestrained loads would have been "very dangerous" and would not have been permitted by CAA.
[87] In summary Mr .... said:
... the testing found that at the assumed weight and balance the aircraft was controllable, and did not appear to show a flight characteristic that was unpredictable. In addition, when the trim was set fully aft on take-off, the aircraft was controllable as the control stick forces were not beyond the capability of a normal person to control with their right arm, and were within those permitted by FAR 23.143 [which Mr .... explained as "...the permitted control stick forces for temporary and prolonged application."]
[106] Importantly, Mr .... said the August 2012 flight tests showed when the trim was set fully aft on take-off, the aircraft was controllable as the control column forces "were not beyond the capability of a normal person to control with their right arm". He said a pilot caught in this situation should be capable of maintaining effective control with one arm through the airspeeds used for take-off and climb out while they adjust the trim imbalance. He said normal lift-off speeds are 51-55 knots and climb out usually around 80 knots or less. "The speeds would be indicated airspeeds."
From the accident report, have these figures been challenged
Fuel load/oxygen tanks
[48] Mr ...., for reasons set out in his evidence, included in his weight and balance calculations the installed oxygen system (11 kg) in the cockpit beside the pilot, and revised fuel loading for a total indicated of 160 litres, For the extra 50 litres, he allowed 39 kg.' This gave an indicative weight of 2271 kg, or 67 kg in excess of the allowable limit. He said: "this would not have caused the aircraft to crash."
[49] The extra weight (50 kg), shown in these calculations forward of the centre of gravity, had implications for the balance of the aircraft, given the likely weight of persons and parachute rig aft of the centre of gravity.
[50] Mr .... calculated the aft balance of this weight "during the initial stages of the take-off, in combination with the higher weight, should not have directly contributed to the accident." He said the balance was "possibly 4.3 inches (109.22 mm) aft of the rear limitation for the aircraft".
Analysis [52] It is likely that at take-off the aircraft was above its allowable weight limit as set out in the aircraft flight manual by some 67 kg, with the centre of gravity 0,109 m outside the maximum aft limit.
[48] Mr ...., for reasons set out in his evidence, included in his weight and balance calculations the installed oxygen system (11 kg) in the cockpit beside the pilot, and revised fuel loading for a total indicated of 160 litres, For the extra 50 litres, he allowed 39 kg.' This gave an indicative weight of 2271 kg, or 67 kg in excess of the allowable limit. He said: "this would not have caused the aircraft to crash."
[49] The extra weight (50 kg), shown in these calculations forward of the centre of gravity, had implications for the balance of the aircraft, given the likely weight of persons and parachute rig aft of the centre of gravity.
[50] Mr .... calculated the aft balance of this weight "during the initial stages of the take-off, in combination with the higher weight, should not have directly contributed to the accident." He said the balance was "possibly 4.3 inches (109.22 mm) aft of the rear limitation for the aircraft".
Analysis [52] It is likely that at take-off the aircraft was above its allowable weight limit as set out in the aircraft flight manual by some 67 kg, with the centre of gravity 0,109 m outside the maximum aft limit.
Quote:
In order to get 8 people and 4 tandem rigs into that tiny cabin they are packed in like sardines
Enough room for a few more sardines
Quote:
of 10 people in the back
In order to get 8 people and 4 tandem rigs into that tiny cabin they are packed in like sardines
Enough room for a few more sardines
Quote:
of 10 people in the back
Why then has CAA limited the load to 6 parachutists? if there is no problem with an aft C of G then surely this ruling would have been appealed? has it?
One can only surmise you must be part of the parachuting fraternity.
Any licensed pilot who would treat the C of G so lightly, especially with fare paying skydivers involved and then publicly brag about in on a public forum, I would return your comment
...significant anecdotal evidence from agricultural operators that the Walters have
been routinely operated well in excess of their agricultural overload provision
(6360/2860 kg). This, combined with diminished fuel loads, (due to lower unusable
fuel load than required) have allowed the aircraft to operate with a greater rearward
centre of gravity than EUF supposedly had on the accident flight. ...[T]he aircraft
type has historically operated well outside these considerations for most of its 57
years in service in New Zealand in its many variant stages.
been routinely operated well in excess of their agricultural overload provision
(6360/2860 kg). This, combined with diminished fuel loads, (due to lower unusable
fuel load than required) have allowed the aircraft to operate with a greater rearward
centre of gravity than EUF supposedly had on the accident flight. ...[T]he aircraft
type has historically operated well outside these considerations for most of its 57
years in service in New Zealand in its many variant stages.
Last edited by Lepper Messiah; 3rd Nov 2015 at 10:04.
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https://www.tianz.org.nz/content/lib...ox_Glacier.pdf
That finding from the coroner would appear to cover all bases.
There was no requirement for that, the load always went into the hopper, and the hopper was near as dammit on the centre of gravity.
245. Had commercial tandem parachuting operations been required to be certificated and subject to CAA audit as at 4 September 2010, there is more likelihood that the weight and balance problems with the carrying of eight unrestrained passengers in a Walter Fletcher would have been identified and acted upon. Without this responsibility for the safe operating of the aircraft in carrying unrestrained passengers to altitude for skydiving purposes rested primarily with the pilot.
246. It is unlikely that the cause of the crash will ever be fully understood. Something unusual such as inadvertent pilot error or engine malfunction, mechanical failure has occurred at Take Off. this coupled with the aircraft being overweight and loaded rearwards of the centre of gravity is consistent with the evidence and has been the immediate cause of the tragedy.
246. It is unlikely that the cause of the crash will ever be fully understood. Something unusual such as inadvertent pilot error or engine malfunction, mechanical failure has occurred at Take Off. this coupled with the aircraft being overweight and loaded rearwards of the centre of gravity is consistent with the evidence and has been the immediate cause of the tragedy.
I would like to think that you sat at the top of the strip and worked out a w & b for every load, making certain you were never a kg over weight or a mm out of balance...
Last edited by prospector; 8th Nov 2015 at 00:27.