Nine Dead in Fox Glacier Crash, New Zealand
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Yup, and when it's done right you don't have to play with it all the time
BTW you'd have gotten there quicker in a texas turbines machine
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I'll have to google this texas turbines thingo MVD71, ta 
It uses a -12 Garrett that is flat rated to keep the nose attached to the rest of the airframe.Cheers....
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Interim report Fox crash
Interim report out from TAIC, interesting investigation so far!
They have used and intital estimated weight of the passengers as 70kg. I'm unsure of any operators using a weight this light these days - with usual 'standard weights' between 77 and 84kg. They also estimate the parachute equipment at 20kg per set - it is more like 25-28kg in reality including the harness.
TAIC's suggestion that the a/c was 5kg over MAUW based on their calculations seems a bit odd. I suggest they should have either worked out the actual weight as best they could using actual weights of passengers or used a more realistic set of 'standard weights'.
The aft C of G condition was what most of us expected from the report.
Pitty the skydive industry did not get of its ass and bring in restraints for skydivers in aircraft below 10 pax when they had the opportunity a few years ago after the Motueka crash.
My suggestion is that the a/c was possibly well more that 5kg over weight and consequently more aft C of G than suggested. Thought it would take a bit more than the report suggests to push a Fletcher to near vertical straight after take-off.
They have used and intital estimated weight of the passengers as 70kg. I'm unsure of any operators using a weight this light these days - with usual 'standard weights' between 77 and 84kg. They also estimate the parachute equipment at 20kg per set - it is more like 25-28kg in reality including the harness.
TAIC's suggestion that the a/c was 5kg over MAUW based on their calculations seems a bit odd. I suggest they should have either worked out the actual weight as best they could using actual weights of passengers or used a more realistic set of 'standard weights'.
The aft C of G condition was what most of us expected from the report.
Pitty the skydive industry did not get of its ass and bring in restraints for skydivers in aircraft below 10 pax when they had the opportunity a few years ago after the Motueka crash.
My suggestion is that the a/c was possibly well more that 5kg over weight and consequently more aft C of G than suggested. Thought it would take a bit more than the report suggests to push a Fletcher to near vertical straight after take-off.
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I notice that the report states witnesses believed the aircraft was airborne at the usual point. Would a significantly aft C of G or a significantly reward trim in a Fletcher result in getting airborne earlier than usual?
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Considering the tourists would (should) have been weighed prior to jumping, and the weights of the crew would have been known, along with 4 tandem chutes plus a pilot's chute, I would think 70kg each is a little on the light side. I would pick closer to 95, maybe 100kg each.
A Fletcher can easily carry a ton, but in its ag days that would have ALL been sitting over the front spar.
A Fletcher can easily carry a ton, but in its ag days that would have ALL been sitting over the front spar.
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JimmyConway
I'm not sure it was overloaded but certainly out of C of G limits, I don't see what the tandem masters had to do with causing the accident.
As already posted other issues at play here. Also CAA might be lucky to get away without any of the families going after them.
An overloaded aircraft and two pot smoking tandem masters. I hope these clowns get taken to the cleaners by the affected families.
As already posted other issues at play here. Also CAA might be lucky to get away without any of the families going after them.
JimmyConway
I agree 100%.
matty
Perhaps more of a case of the pax sliding to the rear for some reason, making already aft C of G even worse and/or an incorrect trim setting for take off?
What I am suggesting here is the aft C of G and some other items referred to in the report and being focused on by the media weren't what ultimately caused the accident, they just made a bad situation even worse.
Remember this wasn't the first flight carrying this sort of load in this aircraft. While it probable the C of G was almost certainly aft of the rear limit for most take offs the aircraft had been successfully operated for a period of time prior to the accident flight. What was different about this flight? What else can be learned?
I do however think it is a disgrace that anybody responsible for the lives of others should be under the influence of drugs.
matty
Would this be a case of skydivers and customers crowding the door to get a look at the view?
What I am suggesting here is the aft C of G and some other items referred to in the report and being focused on by the media weren't what ultimately caused the accident, they just made a bad situation even worse.
Remember this wasn't the first flight carrying this sort of load in this aircraft. While it probable the C of G was almost certainly aft of the rear limit for most take offs the aircraft had been successfully operated for a period of time prior to the accident flight. What was different about this flight? What else can be learned?
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I don't see what the tandem masters had to do with causing the accident.
The main point about the drugs is that the presence of them in the blood of the two tandem jumpmasters is indicative of attitudes and practices in this part of GA. In my experience, a lot fo these companies focus on providing an adrenaline rush first and foremost, with safety coming a distant second. Not all of them, but a lot of them.
The situation is not helped by a reactive CAA that is constantly playing catch-up. You have to ask yourself how it is that the mod state of the aircraft was not picked up by the CAA...
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maybe they moved aft for some inexplicable reason.
If on the pre T/O checks the trim is not set back to the correct T/O position, even with the Cof G in the correct range, the nose will rear up and needs two hands to get the nose down, the trim is very powerful with the full flying tail plane/elevator.
If the people in the back are not restrained in any way, a combination of acceleration force, and having the floor suddenly tipped very steeply towards the tail would be quite capable of sending them to the rear of the cabin.
With the take off and flight path of the aircraft my money would be on this scenario. In fact that was my thoughts on this accident at the beginning of this thread. (Post 20 this thread.)
Last edited by prospector; 12th May 2012 at 00:52.
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3.5.6 and 4.2.12 of the report mention the possibility of the manual trim not being reset prior to the take-off.
Para 3.2.5 did say the handle was found to be in a position that would indicate full nose forward trim had been wound in. Being manual in operation the pilot probably would have been unable to wind it in after the premature rotate..
Para 3.2.5 did say the handle was found to be in a position that would indicate full nose forward trim had been wound in. Being manual in operation the pilot probably would have been unable to wind it in after the premature rotate..
The positions of the handle and screw jack were consistent with the trim having been set to the nearly full full-forward or nose-down trim position at the time of impact. The trim assembly in the empennage displayed no evidence of binding and the trim was able to be moved in both directions. Refer paragraph 3.5.4 for further information on the trim system.