Nine Dead in Fox Glacier Crash, New Zealand
Join Date: Dec 2004
Location: ChCh NZ
Posts: 402
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Having worked on both sides of the ditch recently, NZ has a much better regulatory system to work under & a far more approachable regulator.
The entire NZ system is worlds ahead. Even more so on the engineering side.
I agree that the NZ system is possibly better than the way things are done in Oz. I figure with SMS and good surveillance and industry education promoted by regulators, terrible accidents like this can be prevented. We are all responsible for aviation safety, not individuals.
The so called story shown on Australian 60 minutes was, as far as the accident goes....rubbish. But what else could you expect from the media. They just don't seem to be able to do any proper research on anything to do with aviation.
No words can possibly describe what the victims families have been going through for the past two years. My comments here relate only to the actual accident.
I find it mind boggling the CAA can just turn around and blame EVERYTHING on the pilot and operator. I honestly didn't know that was their opinion.
60 minutes based their story on the TAIC report. The opinions of their expert were based on the TAIC report.
Would it surprise anyone to know that in an investigation into an accident in which Nine people lost their lives, that not all of the aircraft was recovered for proper investigation.
No person in the investigation team had even the slightest knowledge of the Fletcher FU24 type aircraft. There were plenty of qualified people available who did, including qualified accident investigators and engineers with enormous experience on type, but their services were apparently not required.
The accident was clearly a loss of control accident. The control column was found to be broken off and was found in the cockpit. The control lock was torn out but not found, even though it is clearly visible in photos post accident.
These items were buried on site along with the remains of the fuselage and wings. No proper testing was carried out on the control column or lock, such as testing by appropriate persons as to what caused the fracture, or why and how the lock was torn out. DSIR I imagine could have studied the control column?
A few months ago an exact same control column (cresco) broke off in flight, luckily the aircraft was dual and the pilot was able to land safely.
There is so much wrong with that report it is not funny.
Anyone who watched the Coroners inquest, which was screened live, and hearing all the expert witness's, should be convinced that C of G had no part in the CAUSE of this accident. Although even when faced with overwhelming evidence some "experts" refuse to change their opinion. Seems to be quite a few on this site who are quick to lay blame with absolutely NO knowledge of this accident. The Coroners report has not been released yet.
In independent CAA approved and monitored flight tests, in the same type of aircraft, with the same load and C of G position, the aircraft was fully controllable in all flight conditions. It didn't matter where the trim was set, it could be fully aft, the aircraft was still easily controllable through all stages of the take off. The aircraft had strain gauges and inclinometers fitted. All testing was carried out by a qualified test pilot and design engineer, it was done bearing in mind the average pilots ability. This is all documented.
The aircraft had completed 78 previous flights with the same loadings with no hint of being marginal, it flew perfectly. Other aircraft of the same type have carried greater loads in the skydiving industry for thousands of flights over more than ten years with no problems whatsoever. None of this information was taken into consideration.
We will now never know what the primary cause was, but in my opinion it was either a control breakage or jam of some sort, and beyond the pilots capabilities to regain control, even though he did manage to get it back to level flight and facing back towards the runway on a north easterly heading before the final wing drop.
No words can possibly describe what the victims families have been going through for the past two years. My comments here relate only to the actual accident.
I find it mind boggling the CAA can just turn around and blame EVERYTHING on the pilot and operator. I honestly didn't know that was their opinion.
60 minutes based their story on the TAIC report. The opinions of their expert were based on the TAIC report.
Would it surprise anyone to know that in an investigation into an accident in which Nine people lost their lives, that not all of the aircraft was recovered for proper investigation.
No person in the investigation team had even the slightest knowledge of the Fletcher FU24 type aircraft. There were plenty of qualified people available who did, including qualified accident investigators and engineers with enormous experience on type, but their services were apparently not required.
The accident was clearly a loss of control accident. The control column was found to be broken off and was found in the cockpit. The control lock was torn out but not found, even though it is clearly visible in photos post accident.
These items were buried on site along with the remains of the fuselage and wings. No proper testing was carried out on the control column or lock, such as testing by appropriate persons as to what caused the fracture, or why and how the lock was torn out. DSIR I imagine could have studied the control column?
A few months ago an exact same control column (cresco) broke off in flight, luckily the aircraft was dual and the pilot was able to land safely.
There is so much wrong with that report it is not funny.
Anyone who watched the Coroners inquest, which was screened live, and hearing all the expert witness's, should be convinced that C of G had no part in the CAUSE of this accident. Although even when faced with overwhelming evidence some "experts" refuse to change their opinion. Seems to be quite a few on this site who are quick to lay blame with absolutely NO knowledge of this accident. The Coroners report has not been released yet.
In independent CAA approved and monitored flight tests, in the same type of aircraft, with the same load and C of G position, the aircraft was fully controllable in all flight conditions. It didn't matter where the trim was set, it could be fully aft, the aircraft was still easily controllable through all stages of the take off. The aircraft had strain gauges and inclinometers fitted. All testing was carried out by a qualified test pilot and design engineer, it was done bearing in mind the average pilots ability. This is all documented.
The aircraft had completed 78 previous flights with the same loadings with no hint of being marginal, it flew perfectly. Other aircraft of the same type have carried greater loads in the skydiving industry for thousands of flights over more than ten years with no problems whatsoever. None of this information was taken into consideration.
We will now never know what the primary cause was, but in my opinion it was either a control breakage or jam of some sort, and beyond the pilots capabilities to regain control, even though he did manage to get it back to level flight and facing back towards the runway on a north easterly heading before the final wing drop.
Last edited by Weheka; 22nd Dec 2012 at 20:29.
Join Date: Dec 2007
Location: Pacific
Posts: 21
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
even though he did manage to get it back to level flight and facing back towards the runway on a north easterly heading before the final wing drop.
The quality of this TAIC investigation stinks like that of the ATSB investigation into the Westwind at Norfolk. Poor.
A final conclusion made even before the investigators turned up at the site.
Hmmm, I wonder what CAA were doing getting involved in this flight testing?
A final conclusion made even before the investigators turned up at the site.
Because of the nature of the flight testing I would assume it required CAA approval. The fact is this testing should have, and could have been undertaken by TAIC, if they were interested in finding the true cause of the accident.
For a start, at the inquest the CAA's chief investigator essentially got up and said the TAIC report was crap and that W & B was not a causal factor. Perhaps the CAA wanted to back this up by going out and getting hard evidence through flight testing ?
I suspect they were trying to cover their backside against potential legal liability by attacking the TAIC report and getting involved in the flight testing. Who actually instigated the flight tests Weheka mentions?
I agree there was some unseemly haste with parts of the investigation and TAIC missed the mark in some areas. Examination of the control column etc would certainly be helpful though I don't think this is the root cause but maybe a subsequently contributing cause.
There is no question the aircraft was being operated outside the C of G envelope. This might be OK when things are normal but when something out of the ordinary occurs then it could well be the straw that breaks the camels back. The flight testing proves nothing in my opinion.
Examination of the control column etc would certainly be helpful though I don't think this is the root cause but maybe a subsequently contributing cause.
Do you think any other Aircraft Accident Investigator in the developed world would dispose of these critical items without proper examination in such a major accident?
Why wasn't the control lock even found? It is plainly visible in the photos. Did they not know what it was?
The flight testing proves nothing in my opinion.
So if the control column broke off at lift off or just after you don't think this would cause an accident? You are aware it was a single control aircraft?
Sure a broken control column would have resulted in a crash landing but in properly loaded and trimmed aircraft, it shouldn't have have resulted in the attitude this aircraft was reported to have assumed just after take off thus resulting in the impact that happened.
All the flight testing proved was the aircraft could be operated adequately in an aft C of G situation under normal conditions nothing more nothing less. I think it's safe to assume that conditions for the accident flight weren't normal.
Hopefully your opinion doesn't count for anything in this case.
It will be interesting to see what the Coroners report says.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Weheka,
Counts about as little as your opinion. Perhaps you could advise what your aeronautical experience is that enables you to come out with such profound statements.
It may well have been, but it is not the load and C of G that is likely to have caused the problem. It was the position of the trim control at the commencement of the take off run, and at lift off, in conjunction with the aft c of g, which would have caused a major pitch up, and caused the pax to move even further aft and accentuate the problem until it became not recoverable.
Having been caught a few times myself, not remembering to reset the trim from the landing position to take off position, I am well aware ot the stick load that has to be overcome to keep the nose down at lift off. The FU24 has a large elevator trim tab, combined with a fully flying tail plane creating a very powerful force if not trimmed correctly.
Hard to believe anyone could seriously think that. Hopefully your opinion doesn't count for anything in this case.
In independent CAA approved and monitored flight tests, in the same type of aircraft, with the same load and C of G position, the aircraft was fully controllable in all flight conditions.
Having been caught a few times myself, not remembering to reset the trim from the landing position to take off position, I am well aware ot the stick load that has to be overcome to keep the nose down at lift off. The FU24 has a large elevator trim tab, combined with a fully flying tail plane creating a very powerful force if not trimmed correctly.
The question that will never be answered is why the aircraft pitched up to 45/50 degrees after lift off, forget vertical. Some unknown event caused this.
Another important piece of information that was ignored is this.
In my view the aircraft is most vulnerable to running out of forward stick when on the jump run. The aircraft is relatively slow, low power setting, and the first pair to exit have to come back to the door at least 12 to 18 inch's. The pair at the very back are the second to exit. This is where you would expect the aft C of G to become evident, and yet there was no problem. On ratings in the Fletcher, and I would imagine the Cresco and XL as well, this is something that is pointed out, to monitor speed and nose attitude on jump run.
On the other hand take off is perfectly normal. Take off with trim a couple of turns back from fully forward, after take off get rid of flap and trim back to about 3/4 forward and then pull nose up to maintain the 90 knots for best initial climb. Not something you would be doing on 78 previous flights with a similar load in this particular aircraft, and tens of thousands in other aircraft of the same type if the flights were barely controllable as TAIC suggests.
Another important piece of information that was ignored is this.
In my view the aircraft is most vulnerable to running out of forward stick when on the jump run. The aircraft is relatively slow, low power setting, and the first pair to exit have to come back to the door at least 12 to 18 inch's. The pair at the very back are the second to exit. This is where you would expect the aft C of G to become evident, and yet there was no problem. On ratings in the Fletcher, and I would imagine the Cresco and XL as well, this is something that is pointed out, to monitor speed and nose attitude on jump run.
On the other hand take off is perfectly normal. Take off with trim a couple of turns back from fully forward, after take off get rid of flap and trim back to about 3/4 forward and then pull nose up to maintain the 90 knots for best initial climb. Not something you would be doing on 78 previous flights with a similar load in this particular aircraft, and tens of thousands in other aircraft of the same type if the flights were barely controllable as TAIC suggests.
Last edited by Weheka; 22nd Dec 2012 at 20:33.
It may well have been, but it is not the load and C of G that is likely to have caused the problem. It was the position of the trim control at the commencement of the take off run, and at lift off, in conjunction with the aft c of g, which would have caused a major pitch up, and caused the pax to move even further aft and accentuate the problem until it became not recoverable.
I don't think there would have been any load shift until a very late stage of the climb.
Guest
Posts: n/a
The question that will never be answered is why the aircraft pitched up to 45/50 degrees after lift off, forget vertical. Some unknown event caused this.
That statement is correct, it will never be known with certainty. But I can say, after some 7,000 hrs flying FU24 on Ag Ops, with many thousands of t/o's, that the behaviour of the aircraft immediately after t/o points very strongly to the trim being left in the landing position and not set for t/o.
Last edited by prospector; 10th Oct 2012 at 07:50.
that the behaviour of the aircraft immediately after t/o points very strongly to the trim being left in the landing position and not set for t/o.
Join Date: Dec 2007
Location: Pacific
Posts: 21
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Examination of the control column etc would certainly be helpful though I don't think this is the root cause but maybe a subsequently contributing cause.
In a properly loaded aircraft that was trimmed correctly, No,
Sure a broken control column would have resulted in a crash landing but in properly loaded and trimmed aircraft, it shouldn't have have resulted in the attitude this aircraft was reported to have assumed just after take off thus resulting in the impact that happened.
Sure a broken control column would have resulted in a crash landing but in properly loaded and trimmed aircraft, it shouldn't have have resulted in the attitude this aircraft was reported to have assumed just after take off thus resulting in the impact that happened.
This was a very real possibility considering the control column in EUF was broken of and resting on the floor of an otherwise relatively intact cockpit section.
This option was not considered. The stick was chucked away soon after the accident, buried along with any other evidence, on site.
There's this AD on the same control column in EUF:
http://www.casa.gov.au/ADFiles/under...-CRESCO-18.pdf
There is no question the aircraft was being operated outside the C of G envelope. This might be OK when things are normal but when something out of the ordinary occurs then it could well be the straw that breaks the camels back. The flight testing proves nothing in my opinion.
All the flight testing proved was the aircraft could be operated adequately in an aft C of G situation under normal conditions nothing more nothing less. I think it's safe to assume that conditions for the accident flight weren't normal.
This is indisputable evidence. Remember, the TAIC concluded that the pitch up and loss of control was caused by the excessive rearward C of G. Not an incorrectly set trim, not control failure, not nothing but C of G.
This is rubbish but it is the official report.
Another thing that came out at the inquest was the fuel loading. When I read the TAIC report, they had fuel figures which didn't seem enough to even complete a flight considering (unusable and skydive flight attitudes) let alone reserves. Basically the impression I got, those numbers in the report were not standard practice and it would have had significantly more fuel, probably enough for two or more flights plus reserve plus unusable. Don't know where TAIC got those figures from. But what does this do to the C of G ?? It moves it forward.
The simple fact is, the Fletcher aircraft has operated successfully outside the C of G envelope for the past 50 years. Especially so in the last 13 years in the Walter powered variant with the larger hopper attempting to operate as a cheaper alternative to the Cresco. With the amounts routinely squeezed into the hopper, do an accurate W & B on those. The C of G is nowhere to be found. Its somewhere out the arse, up the strip by the bins. Yet, for an uncountable number of take-offs, the type has been fine. On top of that, they can have double + the payload of EUF on the accident flight.
Granted, not legally, but thats not the point.
I've watched these aircraft operating in the skydive role with 9 in the back, I've head of 10 stuffed in there regularly. I've heard of more than one occasion of a skydive Fletcher taking off inadvertently with a full aft trim and a huge load in the back. I've watched them taxi around with such an aft C of G that the nose wheel is spending the majority of the taxi clear of the ground. I've even heard a story of the aircraft operating in the standard passenger category in the pacific back in the day, filling the aircraft with Samoans and it actually resting on the tail, it would not come off the tail onto the nose until the engine was started.
Make no mistake, the FU24 is a highly capable aircraft in it's various forms. In my no-good opinion, the aircraft is not capable of producing such a terrible accident with these given conditions without influence from some major abnormal factor which has not yet been determined, and may never be.
It is the job of the TAIC to determine the cause of this accident. They said it was the C of G. Thats rubbish, and proven. In my opinion they have not done their job.
There was another accident at Taumarunui in 2001 involving an Iroquois, in which three people lost there lives. It appears TAIC used the same "blinkered" approach to this investigation.
After the Coroners report, and one or more of the victims Families own investigating efforts, also I think Political involvement, the Accident Report was forced to be withdrawn. A new one has yet to surface as far as I am aware.
Not sure how to do links but a google search of New Zealand Herald for an article by Stuart Dye titled "Coroner slams crash reports" makes interesting reading.
Apart from the obvious grief and suffering caused by the accident itself, the report can also have a major effect on all the people involved, one way or another.
After the Coroners report, and one or more of the victims Families own investigating efforts, also I think Political involvement, the Accident Report was forced to be withdrawn. A new one has yet to surface as far as I am aware.
Not sure how to do links but a google search of New Zealand Herald for an article by Stuart Dye titled "Coroner slams crash reports" makes interesting reading.
Apart from the obvious grief and suffering caused by the accident itself, the report can also have a major effect on all the people involved, one way or another.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Assuming the aircraft was trimmed correctly and the control column broke off on rotation,
Well lets assume that. If the aircraft was trimmed correctly why the nose up pitch as it got airborne? if the control column broke there would be no way of pulling the nose up, if it was trimmed correctly, with no control inputs it would no doubt have eventually pranged, but not from a steep climb upon rotation
The aircraft should have been controllable around the lateral axis with the trim and along with the use of power I would expect a survivable crash landing would have been possible if the control column did in fact break at rotation.
Last edited by 27/09; 11th Oct 2012 at 23:27.
Join Date: Sep 2011
Location: Centre
Age: 42
Posts: 90
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The stick could have broken off during a hard check of an over rotation? Although with that sort of load on I doubt it would be anything other than a gentle rotation lifting off with flap? There seems to be a rash of AD's (Control stick) and SB's on Fletchers and Cresco's after that incident, arse covering?
There seems to be a rash of AD's (Control stick) and SB's on Fletchers and Cresco's after that incident, arse covering?
In my mind there is some arse covering going on re the Fox crash but not to do with the control column.