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Not always the case, the last one at Camden
To which I might add, Trevor Brougham, another fine gentleman, friend and aviator, who came to grief at Port Lincoln.
Last edited by Brian Abraham; 31st Jul 2010 at 00:56. Reason: Trevor
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If anybody was to read the full article (very well summarised by Brian) you would wonder in god's name why anybody would mess with those figures by deliberately failing an engine so close to the ground rather than setting zero thrust 
And to have the regulator re-inforceing such practice is mind boggling. One would think that at some time in the future when it next happens (and it will) that anybody related to the 'victims' will sue the regulator.
What a disgraceful practice.
And to have the regulator re-inforceing such practice is mind boggling. One would think that at some time in the future when it next happens (and it will) that anybody related to the 'victims' will sue the regulator.
What a disgraceful practice.
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Do they read their own material?
CAAP 5.23-2(0): Multi-engine Aeroplane Operations and Training
3.1 Why this CAAP is issued
3.1.1 An Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) Aviation Research Report analysed accidents and incidents over a ten-year period caused by power loss in twin-engine aircraft weighing less than 5700 kg. Of the 57 accidents investigated, one third were double engine failures, the majority caused by fuel exhaustion due to mis-management. Eleven of the accidents were fatal and 10 of the fatalities were caused by loss of control of the aircraft. Forty-six percent of the engine failures happened during take-off, rather than any other phase of flight. Additionally, 16% of reported multi-engine accidents were associated with planned power losses during training.
3.6.4 At practical operating weights, light multi-engine aeroplanes do not have climb capability with one engine inoperative after take-off. It is usually not until the propeller has been feathered, the aeroplane’s undercarriage and wing flaps have been retracted and it’s airspeed reaches the optimum speed (VYSE) that light multi-engine aeroplanes have the capability to climb with one engine inoperative.
3.6.5 This is most significant for pilots of light multiengine aeroplanes. It means that if the aeroplane suffers an engine failure shortly after take-off it is unlikely to be able to climb. It is more likely that the aeroplane will descend and the pilot will have no alternative other than a forced landing.
4.17.6 Any flight operation at low altitude has potential dangers. Trainers have debated over the decades on the value of practicing engine failures after an actual take-off, that is, near the ground. The general consensus is that despite the risks, pilots must be trained to manage these situations in multi-engine aircraft.
However, instructors should consider not simulating engine failures below 400 ft AGL to provide a reasonable safety margin.
5.5.1 ……..Do not simulate an engine failure using procedures that may jeopardise the restoration of power. It would be folly to simulate an engine failure at low level by selecting the mixture to idle cut-off or turning the fuel selector off.
5.8.1 Flight instructors often simulate an engine failure by rapidly closing the throttle or moving the mixture control to idle cut-off. The latter method should never be used at low altitude.
ATSB study "Power loss related accidents involving twin-engine aircraft"
http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/36444/P...e_aircraft.pdf
CAAP 5.23-2(0): Multi-engine Aeroplane Operations and Training
3.1 Why this CAAP is issued
3.1.1 An Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) Aviation Research Report analysed accidents and incidents over a ten-year period caused by power loss in twin-engine aircraft weighing less than 5700 kg. Of the 57 accidents investigated, one third were double engine failures, the majority caused by fuel exhaustion due to mis-management. Eleven of the accidents were fatal and 10 of the fatalities were caused by loss of control of the aircraft. Forty-six percent of the engine failures happened during take-off, rather than any other phase of flight. Additionally, 16% of reported multi-engine accidents were associated with planned power losses during training.
3.6.4 At practical operating weights, light multi-engine aeroplanes do not have climb capability with one engine inoperative after take-off. It is usually not until the propeller has been feathered, the aeroplane’s undercarriage and wing flaps have been retracted and it’s airspeed reaches the optimum speed (VYSE) that light multi-engine aeroplanes have the capability to climb with one engine inoperative.
3.6.5 This is most significant for pilots of light multiengine aeroplanes. It means that if the aeroplane suffers an engine failure shortly after take-off it is unlikely to be able to climb. It is more likely that the aeroplane will descend and the pilot will have no alternative other than a forced landing.
4.17.6 Any flight operation at low altitude has potential dangers. Trainers have debated over the decades on the value of practicing engine failures after an actual take-off, that is, near the ground. The general consensus is that despite the risks, pilots must be trained to manage these situations in multi-engine aircraft.
However, instructors should consider not simulating engine failures below 400 ft AGL to provide a reasonable safety margin.
5.5.1 ……..Do not simulate an engine failure using procedures that may jeopardise the restoration of power. It would be folly to simulate an engine failure at low level by selecting the mixture to idle cut-off or turning the fuel selector off.
5.8.1 Flight instructors often simulate an engine failure by rapidly closing the throttle or moving the mixture control to idle cut-off. The latter method should never be used at low altitude.
ATSB study "Power loss related accidents involving twin-engine aircraft"
http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/36444/P...e_aircraft.pdf
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A thorny issue indeed
Perhaps in this case, where a worthless or Dubious FOI continue to attempt to impose their opinions,not regulation, and force us to conduct training in an unsafe manner a little passive resistance may be in order. Technically a multi engine aircraft with one engine feathered is in an emergency situation, therefore it follows that prior to every single engine training event a May Day call is made, and ATC advised that the aircraft is about to be placed in an emergency situation. Once the engine has been successfully unfeathered and restarted the MAYDAY can be downgraded.
Me thinks a paper work war would subsequently occur, and I'm sure the ATSB would be really pissed, and just maybe the press might start asking some sensible questions for a change
Me thinks a paper work war would subsequently occur, and I'm sure the ATSB would be really pissed, and just maybe the press might start asking some sensible questions for a change
Clinton:
Wrong question. I don't care if it produces a fuel proof seal, all I know is that every time I've pulled to ICO from ground idle, the noise has stopped within Two seconds.
I somehow think our CFI would be annoyed if he heard me do it while airborne. I have never had an instructor pull to ICO on a PFL either, but that is with a single engine.
As a matter of interest, who believes that the mixture control on all GA piston engines creates a fuel-proof seal when set to ‘idle cut-off’?
I somehow think our CFI would be annoyed if he heard me do it while airborne. I have never had an instructor pull to ICO on a PFL either, but that is with a single engine.
Maybe it’s more about the altitude at which the failure is simulated, the (non-)performance of the aircraft when the failure is simulated, not the method of simulating the failure
66.3 Circuit Training Operations at Night
66.3.1 Aircraft engaged in training operations at night in the circuit area
must not, when below 1,500FT AGL, carry out any manoeuvres
which involve:
a. the simulation of failure of an engine; or
b. flight in a simulated one‐engine‐inoperative condition; or
c. the intentional shut‐down of a serviceable engine.
66.3.1 Aircraft engaged in training operations at night in the circuit area
must not, when below 1,500FT AGL, carry out any manoeuvres
which involve:
a. the simulation of failure of an engine; or
b. flight in a simulated one‐engine‐inoperative condition; or
I think all multi-engine trainees should complete at least one shut down and feather in flight with a restart in each aircraft they are endorsed. If a proper type simulator is available use it. If in the real aircraft do it on a good weather day at 3000agl or above and fly around on the engine through a few maneuvres to see how it performs, especialy in climb. In a 4 seater like the Seminole or Dutchess you can load the aircraft to MTOW quite easily with two on board, full fuel and some ballast.
There is no need to return to land with one feathered. If you really need to just do a simulated circuit at altitude.
Do not practice any near stall manuevres or VMC recovery while actually on one engine.
If the student has bad habits like picking the wrong engine don't enter the circuit until they have proved they can handle the situation at altitude.
Never play tricks on the trainee, especially during circuits.
If you are a multi-engine instructor or trainee have a good read of the CAAP.
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The inconsistencies across CASA are astounding. One CASA rep, who had been involved in the instruction standards revamp, ridiculed parts of the CAAP claiming it had been written by a jet-jock with no real multi-engine training experience in pistons. He was particularly frustrated with the notion of setting idle power rather than mixture ICO - pulling the mixture was 'better' for the engine, provided a more realistic training experience (particularly the whole identify/confirm part of the drill) and power could be quickly restored by setting rich (no safety issue). Many pilots, particularly single engine pilots, are a little reluctant to pull the mixture as they think the engine will stop dead - fortunately it doesn't.
Anyway, regardless of what instructions were passed down to me from FOIs, CAAPs, CFIs and Ops Manuals, I set my own limitations:
It is disgusting if the allegations about FOIs on previous posts are true.
Anyway, regardless of what instructions were passed down to me from FOIs, CAAPs, CFIs and Ops Manuals, I set my own limitations:
- No simulated engine failures below 400ft
- No feathering below 2000ft
- No simulated engine failures without sight of the ground, or at night
- No playing 'tricks' i.e. turning off pumps, tanks etc (and every simulated engine failure was announced).
- No pushing Vmca demonstrations
It is disgusting if the allegations about FOIs on previous posts are true.
I've had the mixture control on an engine jam in the ICO position on a mulit engine aeroplane.
Luckily it was after shutdown on the ground and I just couldn't get the engine restarted. It would have been less of a non event if it were an intentional shutdown in flight for assy training.
Luckily it was after shutdown on the ground and I just couldn't get the engine restarted. It would have been less of a non event if it were an intentional shutdown in flight for assy training.
One CASA rep, who had been involved in the instruction standards revamp, ridiculed parts of the CAAP claiming it had been written by a jet-jock with no real multi-engine training experience in pistons.
Gung-Ho again ---- maybe, just maybe, the CAAP was written by a highly experienced pilot, across all types of propulsion --- but clearly wiser than the CASA FOI mentioned.
the whole identify/confirm part of the drill) and power could be quickly restored by setting rich (no safety issue)
I worked for an organization with an excellent safety record. Their rules for base training were simple --- and this all well, well before Level 5 simulators.
1) No shutting down and feathering engines below 3000' AGL.
2) No shutting down engines at night. On pistons, no practice/training asymmetric at night --- at all.
3) Very great care in planning an exercise if there was ANY crosswind
4) The Check Captain "blocking" the rudder pedals so "wrong rudder" cannot be applied.
5) Extensive and careful training and indoctrination of the Check Captain ---- and anybody who didn't stick to the script went back to the line.
Thus, all low level asymmetric training training was conducted well above Vmca, and with a power setting that was "not quite zero thrust", to further reduce the probability
of low level loss of control.
That ramping up the risk produces "training value" is quite simply unsupportable.
But, as most of us know there is a dangerous percentage of pilots in both CASA and industry who are still gung ho ---- actually justifying that they are still alive as "testimony" to the fact that you are a wuzz if you don't do "V1 Cuts" on light twins that are not certified with a capability which includes such concepts as V1 and continue with the takeoff.
A close study of the FAA recommendations across the subject is instructive, including advice to "Close the throttles and land straight ahead" ----- treating a light twin the same was as a single ---- with a greater chance of returning to earth in control, rather than out of control.
Would anybody like to dig out the statistics for survivable engine failure on takeoff for singles versus twin. My memory tells me the FAA did, years ago, the benefit was with the singles, hence the "close the throttles and land straight ahead" recommendation.
But according to a former CASA Assistant director, " What would the FAA know".
The fact that the US record for safety outcomes for GA shows half the rate of Australia (comparing like for like) was dismissed by this "gentleman" as FAA/NTSB not being as keen as Australia in ensuring all accidents were recorded.
Sunfish,
Missed that line, I also knew Les Morris well.
Clinton,
Every twin training accident, with which I have had some involvement, has been asymmetric loss of control. None were ever shown to be some cause other than the pilot(s) mishandled the exercise.
As you know, the Vmca of these aircraft are certified with 5 degrees of bank, "dead engine high", it is instructive to understand how fast the Vmca increases at wings level, and with any bank towards the "dead" engine.
The loss of the RAAF B707-338C at East Sale is an extreme example of what happens when you get below Vmca.
Tootle pip!!
Last edited by LeadSled; 1st Aug 2010 at 05:58.
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C.McK -
Clinton - well said - another scenario not discussed is that from a simulated engine failure, using the power lever, and having the aux boost pump on, particularly on PA 31 types, there is a very real chance that the engine will not accelerate due to the over rich mixture when power is applied.
The engine will not accelerate, and will tend to stall (ie not do anything) other than run rough, coff, farrt, etc - everything except supply power. I make mention of this from first hand experience. To the extent that, although the pre take off check list calls for "pumps on", I do not turn the pumps on until the engines have achieved at least 20"of MP. The alternative is to run the very real risk of being 1/4 way down the runway, and still be waiting for the engine(s) to come up to t/off power.
Too much fuel can have the same effect as no fuel, ie - the engine floods, the fire goes out, no power.
Your comments??
The engine will not accelerate, and will tend to stall (ie not do anything) other than run rough, coff, farrt, etc - everything except supply power. I make mention of this from first hand experience. To the extent that, although the pre take off check list calls for "pumps on", I do not turn the pumps on until the engines have achieved at least 20"of MP. The alternative is to run the very real risk of being 1/4 way down the runway, and still be waiting for the engine(s) to come up to t/off power.
Too much fuel can have the same effect as no fuel, ie - the engine floods, the fire goes out, no power.
Your comments??
Clinton - well said - another scenario not discussed is that from a simulated engine failure, using the power lever, and having the aux boost pump on, particularly on PA 31 types, there is a very real chance that the engine will not accelerate due to the over rich mixture when power is applied.
The engine will not accelerate, and will tend to stall (ie not do anything) other than run rough, coff, farrt, etc - everything except supply power. I make mention of this from first hand experience. To the extent that, although the pre take off check list calls for "pumps on", I do not turn the pumps on until the engines have achieved at least 20"of MP. The alternative is to run the very real risk of being 1/4 way down the runway, and still be waiting for the engine(s) to come up to t/off power.
Too much fuel can have the same effect as no fuel, ie - the engine floods, the fire goes out, no power.
Your comments??
The engine will not accelerate, and will tend to stall (ie not do anything) other than run rough, coff, farrt, etc - everything except supply power. I make mention of this from first hand experience. To the extent that, although the pre take off check list calls for "pumps on", I do not turn the pumps on until the engines have achieved at least 20"of MP. The alternative is to run the very real risk of being 1/4 way down the runway, and still be waiting for the engine(s) to come up to t/off power.
Too much fuel can have the same effect as no fuel, ie - the engine floods, the fire goes out, no power.
Your comments??
With a Navajo and only the engine pumps and boost pump combo as soon as she was hot the engines would stall on the ground without the boost pumps on. As soon as you started hot engines you needed them turned straight on especially in very hot weather. After takeoff when you turned them off sometimes the engines would get rough again and required them to be turned straight back on. Sometimes in the 40 degree heat you would leave them on well into the cruise after a long climb else rough running would soon result again.
In the Chieftain model it had 2 sets of boosts pumps. One that was always on although you disabled them by pulling the CBs and the standard boost pumps as per the Navajo. The boost pumps were not required on the ground if the CBs where in on the constant boost pumps. I never had any problems with the boost pumps on takeoff which where always turned on as I did my TIMPFISH before I rolled. Sometimes with these boost pumps on during taxi however it would overfuel and run rough, but only in the 350s, not the 310 models.
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GG
My apologies - all my references were to the 350's - your comments re hot engines are correct - I did not, however, make reference to that scenario - well done - perhaps in the light of your comment that they sometimes "run rough" you might like to moderate your disagreement!
My apologies - all my references were to the 350's - your comments re hot engines are correct - I did not, however, make reference to that scenario - well done - perhaps in the light of your comment that they sometimes "run rough" you might like to moderate your disagreement!
Perhaps that is why the 350 model had the permanent boost pumps installed.
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Is the law is an ass ??.
All of the preceding are notes on OEI present balanced, reasoned approaches to a high risk element of flight training. No argument that some clever people and seasoned pilots, with a deep seated interest in safety have developed various techniques and methods from their own experiences and those of others. Many threads on a vast number of topics clearly prove that for the most part, every one wants to improve, standardise and develop training and operational safety.
The tragic part is that the current topic has been generated by an individuals bloody minded, pedantic rigid determination to conduct operations strictly in compliance. Almost every preceding OEI post here "could" be construed as operating outside the legislation and have the perpetrator branded as a dangerous rogue.
The way CAO 40.1 is written is prescriptive and flawed. The requirements do not enhance the training experience or reflect current best practice. In industry hands, we have learned to adapt and to avoid the lethal traps that 'absolute' compliance requires.
Until the industry insists on rules which can be readily understood, translate into best practice and can provide competency based outcomes nothing will change.
It is sad but true that the words of the law are often used against the spirit and intent of the regulation. When it suits.
The tragic part is that the current topic has been generated by an individuals bloody minded, pedantic rigid determination to conduct operations strictly in compliance. Almost every preceding OEI post here "could" be construed as operating outside the legislation and have the perpetrator branded as a dangerous rogue.
The way CAO 40.1 is written is prescriptive and flawed. The requirements do not enhance the training experience or reflect current best practice. In industry hands, we have learned to adapt and to avoid the lethal traps that 'absolute' compliance requires.
Until the industry insists on rules which can be readily understood, translate into best practice and can provide competency based outcomes nothing will change.
It is sad but true that the words of the law are often used against the spirit and intent of the regulation. When it suits.
Clinton,
I was really only trying to make two points:
1) You shouldn't shut down engines at all, zero thrust is all that is required ---- but such practice seems to have been "informally" banned by CASA at one district office, because it is non-compliant with the previously mentioned CAO --- which "requires" an engine shut down.
2) Mechanical failure in an artificially induced asymmetric situation as the root cause of the crash, compared to pilot mis-handling, is a non-starter.
Re. the RAAF B707-338C, we know exactly what happened ---- with asymmetric thrust ( two on one side at idle) , the rudder boost was switched off, immediately putting the aircraft well below the Vmca2, rudder boost out, a figure not published by Boeing, as it was regarded as being too high for any practical application.
From memory, the Vmca3, rudder boost off, was about 181 kt, compared to 121kt rudder boost on.
Vmca2, rudder boost on was about 166 kt ( ARB) or 173 kt (FAA), with JT3B-3D engines. Don't anybody hold me to the exact figures, it was all a long time ago, but the above are close enough for Government work.
The aeroplane at East Sale flicked so hard, at least one engine detached from its pylon.
The very first accident I ever saw, was a pilot ( and close friend) practicing solo circuits, ran a tank dry on takeoff, turned in the circuit direction --- which was in the direction of the failed engine, got below Vmca, the aeroplane flicked, and went through the roof of an RAF hospital. Alastair, the pilot, was the only fatality.
Tootle pip!!
I was really only trying to make two points:
1) You shouldn't shut down engines at all, zero thrust is all that is required ---- but such practice seems to have been "informally" banned by CASA at one district office, because it is non-compliant with the previously mentioned CAO --- which "requires" an engine shut down.
2) Mechanical failure in an artificially induced asymmetric situation as the root cause of the crash, compared to pilot mis-handling, is a non-starter.
Re. the RAAF B707-338C, we know exactly what happened ---- with asymmetric thrust ( two on one side at idle) , the rudder boost was switched off, immediately putting the aircraft well below the Vmca2, rudder boost out, a figure not published by Boeing, as it was regarded as being too high for any practical application.
From memory, the Vmca3, rudder boost off, was about 181 kt, compared to 121kt rudder boost on.
Vmca2, rudder boost on was about 166 kt ( ARB) or 173 kt (FAA), with JT3B-3D engines. Don't anybody hold me to the exact figures, it was all a long time ago, but the above are close enough for Government work.
The aeroplane at East Sale flicked so hard, at least one engine detached from its pylon.
The very first accident I ever saw, was a pilot ( and close friend) practicing solo circuits, ran a tank dry on takeoff, turned in the circuit direction --- which was in the direction of the failed engine, got below Vmca, the aeroplane flicked, and went through the roof of an RAF hospital. Alastair, the pilot, was the only fatality.
Tootle pip!!