Super Seasprites – who is responsible?
Thread Starter
Super Seasprites – who is responsible?
I am fascinated (as I think many others are) about the Super Seasprite debacle, where over $1 billion of taxpayers’ money has been written off.
What interests me more than anything else is how journalists have not mentioned who is responsible. Was it a committee that actually made the decision, or was it an individual? Who was the Chief of Defence at the time the decision was made? Was this person considered a capable person and was he misled? Who was the responsible Minister at the time?
I would imagine one of the prime reasons that the mistake was made was because those in decision making positions did not ask for advice from people who had expertise - i.e. if they had asked if it was sensible to purchase helicopters which relied on 30 year old airframes that were sitting in the Arizona Desert, they may have made a different decision.
The most important issue is not to make the mistake again, however I can see it being repeated – probably with the Joint Strike Fighter.
I will look forward to some of the more knowledgeable posters on PPRuNe advising on why they believe this error was made, and if they believe anything was learnt from it. After all, $1 billion is a lot of money that could have been used effectively somewhere else. I would imagine that most of the money ended up in the United States, which is already the wealthiest country in the world.
What interests me more than anything else is how journalists have not mentioned who is responsible. Was it a committee that actually made the decision, or was it an individual? Who was the Chief of Defence at the time the decision was made? Was this person considered a capable person and was he misled? Who was the responsible Minister at the time?
I would imagine one of the prime reasons that the mistake was made was because those in decision making positions did not ask for advice from people who had expertise - i.e. if they had asked if it was sensible to purchase helicopters which relied on 30 year old airframes that were sitting in the Arizona Desert, they may have made a different decision.
The most important issue is not to make the mistake again, however I can see it being repeated – probably with the Joint Strike Fighter.
I will look forward to some of the more knowledgeable posters on PPRuNe advising on why they believe this error was made, and if they believe anything was learnt from it. After all, $1 billion is a lot of money that could have been used effectively somewhere else. I would imagine that most of the money ended up in the United States, which is already the wealthiest country in the world.
Last edited by Dick Smith; 18th Apr 2008 at 07:19.
Thread Starter
Pass-A-Frozo, they are all very good points, but can someone answer my second paragraph? I quote it again here:
What interests me more than anything else is how journalists have not mentioned who is responsible. Was it a committee that actually made the decision, or was it an individual? Who was the Chief of Defence at the time the decision was made? Was this person considered a capable person and was he misled? Who was the responsible Minister at the time?
Join Date: Dec 2000
Location: Sydney NSW Australia
Posts: 3,051
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The sea sprite decision is totally a political one..
talking to a few people in 805 today, the Sprites have been airworthy for 5 yrs! and the 30 yr old airframe business is just an excuse thought up by the beaurocracy (govt) Just look a the Hercules! Orions, Sea Kings, even the F18 is 20 yrs old!
the decision to ground the aircraft was from the darkness of the beaurocrats in Canberra, whee they get their advice from who knows, DMO?
Kayman have been suffering the same old Navy contract system as every other contractor faces, the navy will not settle on tight contracts, and constantly change contracts to suit themselves and make the job of the contractor as difficult as they can, i know, i have been working in the system now for 12 months! and in that time, our contracts has been changed 2 times. and continually amended, the Navy just wont come to the table to agree to a solid long term contract. where this comes from i dont know, but this is what has been causing the majority of the delays for kayman.
its like being told to start work building a house, then told to not pour a slab, then get half way through, and told to move the slab, then not put up walls, then the walls are changed, etc etc etc. so of course, the delays quickly blow out to years!
eg, the latest update to our contract stipulates that every qualified tradesperson has to be directly supervised, and now the supervisor has to be directly supervised by an independent inspector, so for a simple 1 person job, there are 2 supervisors...remember, all this supervision is for a certified and fully qualified tradesperson!!!... im sure you can all imagine the cost changes and delays caused by this alone when it comes to getting work out the door!
so why have we wasted Millions?? ask Canberra! and good luck with that..
talking to a few people in 805 today, the Sprites have been airworthy for 5 yrs! and the 30 yr old airframe business is just an excuse thought up by the beaurocracy (govt) Just look a the Hercules! Orions, Sea Kings, even the F18 is 20 yrs old!
the decision to ground the aircraft was from the darkness of the beaurocrats in Canberra, whee they get their advice from who knows, DMO?
Kayman have been suffering the same old Navy contract system as every other contractor faces, the navy will not settle on tight contracts, and constantly change contracts to suit themselves and make the job of the contractor as difficult as they can, i know, i have been working in the system now for 12 months! and in that time, our contracts has been changed 2 times. and continually amended, the Navy just wont come to the table to agree to a solid long term contract. where this comes from i dont know, but this is what has been causing the majority of the delays for kayman.
its like being told to start work building a house, then told to not pour a slab, then get half way through, and told to move the slab, then not put up walls, then the walls are changed, etc etc etc. so of course, the delays quickly blow out to years!
eg, the latest update to our contract stipulates that every qualified tradesperson has to be directly supervised, and now the supervisor has to be directly supervised by an independent inspector, so for a simple 1 person job, there are 2 supervisors...remember, all this supervision is for a certified and fully qualified tradesperson!!!... im sure you can all imagine the cost changes and delays caused by this alone when it comes to getting work out the door!
so why have we wasted Millions?? ask Canberra! and good luck with that..
But PAF, your ostensibly sensible logic has lead precisely to where the project got.
Your whole argument is based on the validity of the assumption that, with just a little more money – only another $150 million or so – and just a little more time – only another 2 years or so - they’d have got there.
Would they?
What would you advocate if, in a year’s time, having spent another $125 million (sunk costs well in excess of $1.2billion), the news is that they just need another $75 million and 18 months? You decide, as a consequence of all those ‘sunk costs’, to commit another $75 million and wait another 18 months. And a year later, lo and behold, surprise surprise, the news is that they just need another $50 million and another year to get there.
As the sunk costs increase, so you must continue to spend money and wait.
How long and how much, PAF?
If you give me a price or a date, you’ve merely done what the new government has done. If you don’t provide a price or a date, I commend to you a career as a DMO project manager.
Dick:
(1) No one is responsible. That’s why these messes happen.
(2) A journalist’s job is to produce cheap pap for daily consumption by unsophisticated punters. Any detailed analysis of the cause of these messes, and any resulting story, is far too expensive and far too complicated.
Your whole argument is based on the validity of the assumption that, with just a little more money – only another $150 million or so – and just a little more time – only another 2 years or so - they’d have got there.
Would they?
What would you advocate if, in a year’s time, having spent another $125 million (sunk costs well in excess of $1.2billion), the news is that they just need another $75 million and 18 months? You decide, as a consequence of all those ‘sunk costs’, to commit another $75 million and wait another 18 months. And a year later, lo and behold, surprise surprise, the news is that they just need another $50 million and another year to get there.
As the sunk costs increase, so you must continue to spend money and wait.
How long and how much, PAF?
If you give me a price or a date, you’ve merely done what the new government has done. If you don’t provide a price or a date, I commend to you a career as a DMO project manager.
Dick:
(1) No one is responsible. That’s why these messes happen.
(2) A journalist’s job is to produce cheap pap for daily consumption by unsophisticated punters. Any detailed analysis of the cause of these messes, and any resulting story, is far too expensive and far too complicated.
Join Date: Dec 2000
Location: Sydney NSW Australia
Posts: 3,051
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Your whole argument is based on the validity of the assumption that, with just a little more money – only another $150 million or so – and just a little more time – only another 2 years or so - they’d have got there.
the decisions to keep them grounded, and delay the programs, have come from the bureaucracy
Ultralights: You obviously know more about the particular aircraft and the particular technical issues than I do, so I won’t argue with your point. However, I note that there’s a difference between airworthiness and fightworthiness. The Australian taxpayer was paying for both, not just the first.
PAF: I only referred to ‘sunk costs’ because you did.
But let us never refer to ‘sunk costs’ again, if that is now your wont.
So you’d commit to the extra $150 million and, presumably, the extra 2 years.
How much more and how much longer after that, PAF?
The flaw in your logic is that you compare the costs of a fact with the costs of an assumption that may never be valid.
Fact: an-off-the shelf Cessna 152 can do the things described in the POH, and can be maintained in accordance with, and at the costs arising from the procedures described in, the maintenance and pilot’s operating manual
Assumption: we can build a Super Cessna 152, that will detect and kill submarines, at X price in Z years.
Errmmm, no, not quite. I’m hoping there are lots of contracts in which Defence sets time and cost limits and is smart enough to stick to them, and has contingency plans in the event that they aren't.
PAF: I only referred to ‘sunk costs’ because you did.
But let us never refer to ‘sunk costs’ again, if that is now your wont.
So you’d commit to the extra $150 million and, presumably, the extra 2 years.
How much more and how much longer after that, PAF?
The flaw in your logic is that you compare the costs of a fact with the costs of an assumption that may never be valid.
Fact: an-off-the shelf Cessna 152 can do the things described in the POH, and can be maintained in accordance with, and at the costs arising from the procedures described in, the maintenance and pilot’s operating manual
Assumption: we can build a Super Cessna 152, that will detect and kill submarines, at X price in Z years.
If you were a Project Manager and applied your logic Creampuff you'd probably cancel everything and we'd have no Defence Force.
the project team were in the situation where they had near 100% certainty on their budgetary requirement and schedule (quality has not changed).
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: Victoria
Age: 62
Posts: 984
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It's really a waste of time and effort trying to apportion blame. People have long since moved on. However I guess it could be a the subject of one those typically hysterical and poorly researched articles one reads in the complete waste of paper that passes for the weekend papers in this country!
What Defence must do is learn the lessons from this debacle and apply them to future contracts.
What Defence must do is learn the lessons from this debacle and apply them to future contracts.
Join Date: Feb 2006
Location: Oz
Posts: 89
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Dick, what CSD said is spot on. It is "impossible" to apportion blame to a faceless public service. This is the whole reason a bureaucracy exists so that no one person is to blame.
I have to disagree with PAF somewhat in that he said there are lots of projects that deliver capability on time and budget. This may be the case for very very simple systems and capabilities, however anything more complicated invariably cost more money. Where is this line in the sand draw? Well that is a very very easy question to answer. If something is off the shelf and NOT changed ie not "Australianised" then it more often than not runs pretty much to schedule and budget. Where Australia decides to change ANYTHING then invariably the risk of the project blowing out (either time or money) increases exponentially with that "Australianisation".
PAF was spot on where he said if we buy off the shelf then the capability we get is only off the shelf capability that essentially anyone can by and so we never get the "edge". The C17 is a case in point. probably the poster child in procurement of how to do something right as Australia changed nothing but the country markings. However the reason this was also successful is because essentially it was of a very short timeframe and driven by the govt and we had a defence Minister that just said "this is what we re doing" (Obviously after various briefs etc). There is more to this, but it largely irrelevant. The other reason this was successful is that we are not trying to "beat" anyone in the region, we simply have our requirements for airlift and we do not need to maintain an edge over anyone in airlift in the region, it is solely an intrinsic "edge" we need to maintain.
Now compare this to the Wedgtail project. The Wedgtail is extremely high risk. Whilst the airframe is largely low risk the airframe is irrelevant in the scheme of things, it is the electronics, the radar, the link system etc which is important. NONE OF THIS EXISTED before Australia ordered it. Issues with integration, different systems talking to one another etc. This is where the risk lies and so we currently have a four year blow out in this capability being delivered as the risk was so much greater. but the point here is, the ADF is willing to wear this risk as the edge in capability it gives us is so far ahead of the next competitor that it is worth it.
Now take the JSF for example. This is also a very risky program, but in order for us to maintain the "edge" in capability in the region we MUST take this course. Due to the increase in risk, because the aircraft is only developmental, then there will be delays, there will be cost increases. But this is the risk we have of getting the best capability we possibly can. The JSF is not a white elephant, it does suit what Australia needs. I am not saying that a mix with F22's would not be nice, but Australia cannot afford F22's. Various people in the media love talking about the F22 cost has come down and the JSF is increasing, but the difference between the airframes is still US$100M each and will remain so. Plus the F22 simply does not do what we as Australia need an aircraft to do. That is put bombs on target on time. The JSF does this through stealth and various other systems that network and integrate with various other systems we have in all three services to provide a total capability across the board. This gets lost when various discredited, so called analysts talk of keeping the pig going etc. They simply have no idea how modern warfare is fought and are thinking of each platform as a standalone capability. To consider the JSF or any of our future systems as a standalone piece is wrong, it must be considered in how it integrates into the whole capability of the entire ADF.
Anyway to answer your question, as I said at the beginning, no one is responsible. As PAF said the only person that can be responsible right now is the current govt and Mr Rudd is ultimately responsible there.
The funny thing is the original reason the Sea Sprites were procured has largely gone away as we are procuring larger ships with larger landing areas on them than what was thought when the contract was originally signed. PAF’s question about what is replacing them and how much will it cost? Well I believe nothing will replace them so perhaps the govt did save $150m?
Cheers
Mr B
I have to disagree with PAF somewhat in that he said there are lots of projects that deliver capability on time and budget. This may be the case for very very simple systems and capabilities, however anything more complicated invariably cost more money. Where is this line in the sand draw? Well that is a very very easy question to answer. If something is off the shelf and NOT changed ie not "Australianised" then it more often than not runs pretty much to schedule and budget. Where Australia decides to change ANYTHING then invariably the risk of the project blowing out (either time or money) increases exponentially with that "Australianisation".
PAF was spot on where he said if we buy off the shelf then the capability we get is only off the shelf capability that essentially anyone can by and so we never get the "edge". The C17 is a case in point. probably the poster child in procurement of how to do something right as Australia changed nothing but the country markings. However the reason this was also successful is because essentially it was of a very short timeframe and driven by the govt and we had a defence Minister that just said "this is what we re doing" (Obviously after various briefs etc). There is more to this, but it largely irrelevant. The other reason this was successful is that we are not trying to "beat" anyone in the region, we simply have our requirements for airlift and we do not need to maintain an edge over anyone in airlift in the region, it is solely an intrinsic "edge" we need to maintain.
Now compare this to the Wedgtail project. The Wedgtail is extremely high risk. Whilst the airframe is largely low risk the airframe is irrelevant in the scheme of things, it is the electronics, the radar, the link system etc which is important. NONE OF THIS EXISTED before Australia ordered it. Issues with integration, different systems talking to one another etc. This is where the risk lies and so we currently have a four year blow out in this capability being delivered as the risk was so much greater. but the point here is, the ADF is willing to wear this risk as the edge in capability it gives us is so far ahead of the next competitor that it is worth it.
Now take the JSF for example. This is also a very risky program, but in order for us to maintain the "edge" in capability in the region we MUST take this course. Due to the increase in risk, because the aircraft is only developmental, then there will be delays, there will be cost increases. But this is the risk we have of getting the best capability we possibly can. The JSF is not a white elephant, it does suit what Australia needs. I am not saying that a mix with F22's would not be nice, but Australia cannot afford F22's. Various people in the media love talking about the F22 cost has come down and the JSF is increasing, but the difference between the airframes is still US$100M each and will remain so. Plus the F22 simply does not do what we as Australia need an aircraft to do. That is put bombs on target on time. The JSF does this through stealth and various other systems that network and integrate with various other systems we have in all three services to provide a total capability across the board. This gets lost when various discredited, so called analysts talk of keeping the pig going etc. They simply have no idea how modern warfare is fought and are thinking of each platform as a standalone capability. To consider the JSF or any of our future systems as a standalone piece is wrong, it must be considered in how it integrates into the whole capability of the entire ADF.
Anyway to answer your question, as I said at the beginning, no one is responsible. As PAF said the only person that can be responsible right now is the current govt and Mr Rudd is ultimately responsible there.
The funny thing is the original reason the Sea Sprites were procured has largely gone away as we are procuring larger ships with larger landing areas on them than what was thought when the contract was originally signed. PAF’s question about what is replacing them and how much will it cost? Well I believe nothing will replace them so perhaps the govt did save $150m?
Cheers
Mr B
Join Date: Dec 2000
Location: Sydney NSW Australia
Posts: 3,051
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
i know the difference between airworthiness status and mission ready status, even with the few things left to sort out, the sprites were mission capable. of the armament they can carry, all but one system was 100% ready. being public forum, im not going to discuss mission capabilities or the issues for that side of things with anyone.
as for the F22, its not a case of not being able to afford the capability, but a case of you cannot buy what is Not for sale.
regardless of who was responsible, the decision has sadly been made...
what will be replacing the Sprites is 10 more Seahawks and a rumored increase in the order of the MRH90
as for the F22, its not a case of not being able to afford the capability, but a case of you cannot buy what is Not for sale.
regardless of who was responsible, the decision has sadly been made...
what will be replacing the Sprites is 10 more Seahawks and a rumored increase in the order of the MRH90
Join Date: Nov 2004
Location: Orstralia
Posts: 171
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I have no first-hand knowledge here, but my Navy sources tell me there was never a requirement for the Kaman, the Anzac frigates were capable of running the Seahawk with minor changes, but the bean counters would rather buy a new helicopter that do it. There was another reason to do with the Kiwi frigates, but I forget the details.
I'm sure it's shortcomings as a weapon could be overcome if enough money was thrown at it, but I have heard it is already too heavy for it's undercarriage, bending same in sea trials. It is just a dog.
Yep, it was a mistake to paint a bunch of surplus F-105's grey and rebrand them as the F-35...
Completely on a tangent, I get the idea that the ship-driving part of the Navy, while grudgingly appreciating the capabilities of helicopters, basically despise having the things on ships and really enjoy the indoor barbeques and indoor workouts that result from the Wokka not being quite right yet
On another tangent, I know they have had a lot of problems with cracks on the airframe: http://img127.exs.cx/img127/271/anew...ic188129xt.jpg
I'm sure it's shortcomings as a weapon could be overcome if enough money was thrown at it, but I have heard it is already too heavy for it's undercarriage, bending same in sea trials. It is just a dog.
The most important issue is not to make the mistake again, however I can see it being repeated – probably with the Joint Strike Fighter.
Completely on a tangent, I get the idea that the ship-driving part of the Navy, while grudgingly appreciating the capabilities of helicopters, basically despise having the things on ships and really enjoy the indoor barbeques and indoor workouts that result from the Wokka not being quite right yet
On another tangent, I know they have had a lot of problems with cracks on the airframe: http://img127.exs.cx/img127/271/anew...ic188129xt.jpg
Evertonian
I just love the polly spin on this.
"I saved you all $150 million" not "I have just written off $1 billion in order to save $150 million."
If I cancelled my lay by at Target with 10% to go, am I really ahead?
"I saved you all $150 million" not "I have just written off $1 billion in order to save $150 million."
If I cancelled my lay by at Target with 10% to go, am I really ahead?
Join Date: Feb 2006
Location: Mel-burn
Posts: 4,875
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
When I did a Prince II project management course several years ago, one of the important things taught was to not necessarily keep throwing money and at the project in order to successfully finish it. It's not always the best solution and method of achieving a successful result.
Some times it's best for each party to mutually withdraw from the project.
For them to have canned the project it probably meant that a good ending was not obtainable in the forseeable future!
As much as I don't like to say it, the Liberals are solely to blame, whilst indirect responsibility would ultimately lie with the working committee of which the Defence Minister would be a part.
Some times it's best for each party to mutually withdraw from the project.
For them to have canned the project it probably meant that a good ending was not obtainable in the forseeable future!
As much as I don't like to say it, the Liberals are solely to blame, whilst indirect responsibility would ultimately lie with the working committee of which the Defence Minister would be a part.
Evertonian
And you are right XXX, it all happened "on their watch", so thats where it all started. We can only assume that the advice to can the project was right, & that it wasn't from the same source who advised to go ahead in the first place.
Join Date: Nov 2003
Location: australia
Posts: 76
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Hi ho, Hi ho its off to work I go.
Dick, as a business man you must know the answer to your own question from experience.
1. Navy, D of Defense not defining the requirement in absolutes at a given date/ time.
2. Government not over-sighting /defining the requirements in absolutes complete with late delivery/ failure to deliver penalties.
3.Tradition of 'mates' between Aust & US defense organisations and the ease and gullibility of the Aust. side in defense contracts procurement. (Political interferance and no 'guts'.)
4.As mentioned by others, many faceless people with no experience in business, handling millions/billions of dollars with no real accountability. What we have to understand here is that when the relationship of cause-effect is broken, then stuffing a billion dollar deal is no different to stuffing a one hundred dollar deal. We see this played out day after day by the CEOs of corporate Australia and other public and political figures. Take Peter Beaty and the Queensland Government as a political example and the corporate examples are everywhere.
5.So, no real accountability. ie No REAL consequences for failure. By real consequences I mean bankruptcy, gaol, destitution, or death.
6. Precedent-happens all the time.
So, as you know, the answer is simple and there is nothing you and I can do about it. Its a tragedy of democracy.
Care to come up with another system?
BP
1. Navy, D of Defense not defining the requirement in absolutes at a given date/ time.
2. Government not over-sighting /defining the requirements in absolutes complete with late delivery/ failure to deliver penalties.
3.Tradition of 'mates' between Aust & US defense organisations and the ease and gullibility of the Aust. side in defense contracts procurement. (Political interferance and no 'guts'.)
4.As mentioned by others, many faceless people with no experience in business, handling millions/billions of dollars with no real accountability. What we have to understand here is that when the relationship of cause-effect is broken, then stuffing a billion dollar deal is no different to stuffing a one hundred dollar deal. We see this played out day after day by the CEOs of corporate Australia and other public and political figures. Take Peter Beaty and the Queensland Government as a political example and the corporate examples are everywhere.
5.So, no real accountability. ie No REAL consequences for failure. By real consequences I mean bankruptcy, gaol, destitution, or death.
6. Precedent-happens all the time.
So, as you know, the answer is simple and there is nothing you and I can do about it. Its a tragedy of democracy.
Care to come up with another system?
BP
Join Date: Aug 2003
Location: Sale, Australia
Age: 80
Posts: 3,832
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Old thread at http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=316574
The Seasprites were originally a Labor initiative under Keating that were meant for a new class of Patrol Boat to be built with Malaysia who backed out of the boat project - and left the Seasprites without a platform. The negotiations for the Seasprites continued and the Howard government, who came to power in 1996, signed the contract in 1997. The only question is, without a platform why did Keating continue negotiations and the contract go ahead under Howard with the change in government?
From http://www.theage.com.au/articles/20...864378971.html
By Mark Forbes
June 17 2002
"We should never have bought them in the first place," said Aldo Borgu, an adviser to former defence ministers John Moore and Peter Reith and now a director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. The plan to build a unique helicopter was unrealistic and poorly executed, and was designed for a proposed Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) to be built jointly with Malaysia. The patrol vessel never got off the ground.
"Once the OPV didn't go ahead, the rationale for buying a smaller helicopter disappeared," Mr Borgu said.
The patrol vessel project was a favourite of the Keating government, proposed by major ALP donor Transfield (now Tenix). The Defence Force hierarchy was always wary of a project it believed was driven by a desire for export dollars, and its fears increased after the Coalition's election in March, 1996.
Put simply, said one senior official, the boat was "neither fish nor fowl", too big for a conventional patrol boat, too small to combat a frigate. To expand its range and firepower it needed a helicopter, but the vessel was too small to carry the Seahawks already planned for the Anzac frigates.
Tenders were called for a small, state-of-the-art helicopter. The former chief of navy, Don Chalmers, confirmed that the Seasprites were acquired for the patrol vessels, OPV, although it was also planned to place some on the Anzacs. Despite this, Defence and the government failed to formally link the Seasprite and patrol vessel projects.
In Senate estimates hearings this month, Air Vice-Marshal Ray Conroy attempted to fudge over when the patrol vessel project was dropped. "That was effectively abandoned in February, 1998, when Malaysia selected a German tender over the one submitted by the Australian company," he said.
At that point, the argument for buying the Seasprite instead of more of the larger Seahawk collapsed, Air Vice-Marshal Conroy admitted. But he said the argument was hypothetical as the Seasprite contract was signed earlier, in June, 1997.
In fact, Malaysia announced the patrol vessel decision in October, 1997, but earlier that year in March the Howard cabinet was told the deal would not go ahead and the vessel was unsuitable for the Australian Navy.
At a cabinet meeting in Pakenham on March 11, former defence minister Ian McLachlan presented a call from the then Defence Force chief, General John Baker, to suspend the patrol vessel proposal.
"I don't want to embarrass anybody, but we felt the thing was heading south," Mr McLachlan said this week.
"As well, we were in a position of having to buy some vessels that were not appropriate for replacing either the Fremantle patrol boats or warships and we didn't want to do that.
"All the information I could glean was the Malaysians were cooling off on the whole deal. It was a big order but got smaller as the months went on and we thought it might never come to pass and it didn't."
Government sources confirmed that the cabinet had effectively decided to suspend the patrol vessel project, but no decision was announced after strenuous objections by Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander Downer and fears that an announcement would be portrayed as scuttling Transfield's Malaysian tender.
"There was a problem with not connecting the helicopter purchase to the OPV purchase," Mr Borgu said. "When cabinet decided to kill off the OPV nobody thought about the Seasprites. It's adding an additional helicopter platform to the ADF unnecessarily as the Anzacs could take the Seahawks."
A senior member of the Seasprite project agrees the deal should have been scrapped. "It's smarter to get 27 Seahawks rather than 16 Seahawks and 11 Seasprites," he said.
Mr McLachlan said he has no recollection of the Defence Force ever telling him of the pivotal link between the patrol vessel project and the Seasprites.
One of Defence's most senior officials at the time also did not "recall a lot of discussion about cancelling the Seasprite when the OPV hit the fence. I don't think it was looked at carefully and that's perhaps where we made a mistake."
Despite the belief that the patrol vessel the Seasprites were designed for would never be built, Defence - never keen to reject already-committed funds - went ahead and signed the $660 million helicopter contract with Kaman.
That contract contained the seeds of today's fiasco, Defence insiders admit. Ever ambitious, Defence wanted to build a high-tech helicopter at a bargain price. The number of helicopters ordered had shrunk to fit under the price cap and it was determined to go for an option that would cut costs further, rebuilding surplus US navy helicopters up to 40 years old.
Mr McLachlan said: "I do remember a long series of discussions about the problem that now appears to have arisen, and that is: if you buy something with old frames, will everybody say they are old aircraft?"
The second-hand helicopter purchase has been pilloried, but those involved in the project are adamant the issue is overblown. A team of 10 has supervised the selection of helicopters from their shrink-wrapped storage in the Arizona desert and overseen the removal of corrosion from the frames.
Expecting Kaman to install a new, sophisticated weapons and avionics system into these "old birds" is where the project came to grief, insiders said.
Too much was expected of Kaman in too short a time. The Seasprite deal was Kaman's biggest ever and the company was no big-time defence player. Founded by eccentric inventor Charlie Kaman, who also designed the Ovation electric guitar, it has made more in recent years from musical instrument sales than aerospace. "The Commonwealth has signed up to an unachievable contract at an unachievable price," said one senior member of the project team. "The whole thing was set up for failure."
It was unfair to blame Kaman, said one official who played a key role in the contract. "Defence has to realise you can't lay all the risk and blame on this little company," he said.
The official said the contract had no damages clauses because liquidated damages on a deal this size would put Kaman out of business.
The head of the Defence Materiel Organisation, Mick Roche, has said the contract is "not the sort of contract we would wish to draw up these days". In a speech to a Defence seminar earlier this year he said Defence's project management should have ensured effective penalty clauses and prevented a key software contractor walking away, resulting in seven helicopters being delivered without a mission-control system.
Installing this sophisticated control system had been subcontracted to US firm Litton, a major military company that dwarfed Kaman. Soon after accepting the contract, Litton won a much bigger US deal and moved many key staff from the Seasprite project.
In 1999 Litton decided to walk away from the complex task, and under its contract won a settlement that cost Kaman $32 million. Australian firm CSC has now been contracted for the task, but the project is already more than three years' late.
Defence is trying to redraft Kaman's contract, despite having already paid out $960 million of the $1 billion budget. Last month Mr Roche told a Senate hearing the government was examining suing Kaman for breach of contract and could possibly recover that money, but then "we will not end up with the helicopters and will have to start again, that is the dilemma we are in".
Another dilemma remains for the navy. Even if it does receive working helicopters, the boats they were designed for do not exist. Putting the Seasprites on the existing Anzac frigates makes less sense. The Seasprites carry an anti-surface missile, the Penguin, originally intended to cover for the patrol vessel's lack of such a weapon, but the Anzacs already carry the Harpoon anti-surface missile.
A former defence official said the Seasprites created profound logistics and maintenance problems for the navy, with it having five different helicopters for five different uses. Air force chief Angus Houston has overall responsibility for air capability but pointedly refused to endorse the Seasprite purchase when interviewed. Asked if the Seahawk would have been a better choice with the patrol vessel off the scene and if the Seasprite was one helicopter too many for the military, Air Marshal Houston replied: "I'd prefer not to make a judgment on that, you can draw your own conclusions. I think we do have too many helicopter types."
"You can't dispute it's the wrong helicopter," Mr Borgu said. "There are obvious question marks over the Penguin anti-ship missile as opposed to the Harpoon, and the anti-sub capability isn't as good as the Seahawks. We should have got the Seahawks. On balance the ADF would have been better off."
the Liberals are solely to blame
From http://www.theage.com.au/articles/20...864378971.html
By Mark Forbes
June 17 2002
"We should never have bought them in the first place," said Aldo Borgu, an adviser to former defence ministers John Moore and Peter Reith and now a director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. The plan to build a unique helicopter was unrealistic and poorly executed, and was designed for a proposed Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) to be built jointly with Malaysia. The patrol vessel never got off the ground.
"Once the OPV didn't go ahead, the rationale for buying a smaller helicopter disappeared," Mr Borgu said.
The patrol vessel project was a favourite of the Keating government, proposed by major ALP donor Transfield (now Tenix). The Defence Force hierarchy was always wary of a project it believed was driven by a desire for export dollars, and its fears increased after the Coalition's election in March, 1996.
Put simply, said one senior official, the boat was "neither fish nor fowl", too big for a conventional patrol boat, too small to combat a frigate. To expand its range and firepower it needed a helicopter, but the vessel was too small to carry the Seahawks already planned for the Anzac frigates.
Tenders were called for a small, state-of-the-art helicopter. The former chief of navy, Don Chalmers, confirmed that the Seasprites were acquired for the patrol vessels, OPV, although it was also planned to place some on the Anzacs. Despite this, Defence and the government failed to formally link the Seasprite and patrol vessel projects.
In Senate estimates hearings this month, Air Vice-Marshal Ray Conroy attempted to fudge over when the patrol vessel project was dropped. "That was effectively abandoned in February, 1998, when Malaysia selected a German tender over the one submitted by the Australian company," he said.
At that point, the argument for buying the Seasprite instead of more of the larger Seahawk collapsed, Air Vice-Marshal Conroy admitted. But he said the argument was hypothetical as the Seasprite contract was signed earlier, in June, 1997.
In fact, Malaysia announced the patrol vessel decision in October, 1997, but earlier that year in March the Howard cabinet was told the deal would not go ahead and the vessel was unsuitable for the Australian Navy.
At a cabinet meeting in Pakenham on March 11, former defence minister Ian McLachlan presented a call from the then Defence Force chief, General John Baker, to suspend the patrol vessel proposal.
"I don't want to embarrass anybody, but we felt the thing was heading south," Mr McLachlan said this week.
"As well, we were in a position of having to buy some vessels that were not appropriate for replacing either the Fremantle patrol boats or warships and we didn't want to do that.
"All the information I could glean was the Malaysians were cooling off on the whole deal. It was a big order but got smaller as the months went on and we thought it might never come to pass and it didn't."
Government sources confirmed that the cabinet had effectively decided to suspend the patrol vessel project, but no decision was announced after strenuous objections by Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander Downer and fears that an announcement would be portrayed as scuttling Transfield's Malaysian tender.
"There was a problem with not connecting the helicopter purchase to the OPV purchase," Mr Borgu said. "When cabinet decided to kill off the OPV nobody thought about the Seasprites. It's adding an additional helicopter platform to the ADF unnecessarily as the Anzacs could take the Seahawks."
A senior member of the Seasprite project agrees the deal should have been scrapped. "It's smarter to get 27 Seahawks rather than 16 Seahawks and 11 Seasprites," he said.
Mr McLachlan said he has no recollection of the Defence Force ever telling him of the pivotal link between the patrol vessel project and the Seasprites.
One of Defence's most senior officials at the time also did not "recall a lot of discussion about cancelling the Seasprite when the OPV hit the fence. I don't think it was looked at carefully and that's perhaps where we made a mistake."
Despite the belief that the patrol vessel the Seasprites were designed for would never be built, Defence - never keen to reject already-committed funds - went ahead and signed the $660 million helicopter contract with Kaman.
That contract contained the seeds of today's fiasco, Defence insiders admit. Ever ambitious, Defence wanted to build a high-tech helicopter at a bargain price. The number of helicopters ordered had shrunk to fit under the price cap and it was determined to go for an option that would cut costs further, rebuilding surplus US navy helicopters up to 40 years old.
Mr McLachlan said: "I do remember a long series of discussions about the problem that now appears to have arisen, and that is: if you buy something with old frames, will everybody say they are old aircraft?"
The second-hand helicopter purchase has been pilloried, but those involved in the project are adamant the issue is overblown. A team of 10 has supervised the selection of helicopters from their shrink-wrapped storage in the Arizona desert and overseen the removal of corrosion from the frames.
Expecting Kaman to install a new, sophisticated weapons and avionics system into these "old birds" is where the project came to grief, insiders said.
Too much was expected of Kaman in too short a time. The Seasprite deal was Kaman's biggest ever and the company was no big-time defence player. Founded by eccentric inventor Charlie Kaman, who also designed the Ovation electric guitar, it has made more in recent years from musical instrument sales than aerospace. "The Commonwealth has signed up to an unachievable contract at an unachievable price," said one senior member of the project team. "The whole thing was set up for failure."
It was unfair to blame Kaman, said one official who played a key role in the contract. "Defence has to realise you can't lay all the risk and blame on this little company," he said.
The official said the contract had no damages clauses because liquidated damages on a deal this size would put Kaman out of business.
The head of the Defence Materiel Organisation, Mick Roche, has said the contract is "not the sort of contract we would wish to draw up these days". In a speech to a Defence seminar earlier this year he said Defence's project management should have ensured effective penalty clauses and prevented a key software contractor walking away, resulting in seven helicopters being delivered without a mission-control system.
Installing this sophisticated control system had been subcontracted to US firm Litton, a major military company that dwarfed Kaman. Soon after accepting the contract, Litton won a much bigger US deal and moved many key staff from the Seasprite project.
In 1999 Litton decided to walk away from the complex task, and under its contract won a settlement that cost Kaman $32 million. Australian firm CSC has now been contracted for the task, but the project is already more than three years' late.
Defence is trying to redraft Kaman's contract, despite having already paid out $960 million of the $1 billion budget. Last month Mr Roche told a Senate hearing the government was examining suing Kaman for breach of contract and could possibly recover that money, but then "we will not end up with the helicopters and will have to start again, that is the dilemma we are in".
Another dilemma remains for the navy. Even if it does receive working helicopters, the boats they were designed for do not exist. Putting the Seasprites on the existing Anzac frigates makes less sense. The Seasprites carry an anti-surface missile, the Penguin, originally intended to cover for the patrol vessel's lack of such a weapon, but the Anzacs already carry the Harpoon anti-surface missile.
A former defence official said the Seasprites created profound logistics and maintenance problems for the navy, with it having five different helicopters for five different uses. Air force chief Angus Houston has overall responsibility for air capability but pointedly refused to endorse the Seasprite purchase when interviewed. Asked if the Seahawk would have been a better choice with the patrol vessel off the scene and if the Seasprite was one helicopter too many for the military, Air Marshal Houston replied: "I'd prefer not to make a judgment on that, you can draw your own conclusions. I think we do have too many helicopter types."
"You can't dispute it's the wrong helicopter," Mr Borgu said. "There are obvious question marks over the Penguin anti-ship missile as opposed to the Harpoon, and the anti-sub capability isn't as good as the Seahawks. We should have got the Seahawks. On balance the ADF would have been better off."
Join Date: Apr 2008
Location: Sydney
Posts: 179
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Just call the yanks and they will deliver some working helicopters next month.Why were the Aussies TRYING to build another NOMAD in chopper version we do not have the ability.
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: Canberra
Posts: 382
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Correct Heavy Cargo, although I'd properly get a price from the Poms for there New Lynx just for the sake of propriety.
The idiots that came up with and then implemented this plan are all long gone and you can bet most are sheltered by the old boys network.
What should have happened at the Kev fest 2020 is someone standing up and pointing out this country's extremely poor track record on defense procurement and analise ways to streamline defense procurement and finally cut out uneducated pollies medaling and interference in said procurement......yeah right!
The idiots that came up with and then implemented this plan are all long gone and you can bet most are sheltered by the old boys network.
What should have happened at the Kev fest 2020 is someone standing up and pointing out this country's extremely poor track record on defense procurement and analise ways to streamline defense procurement and finally cut out uneducated pollies medaling and interference in said procurement......yeah right!