Super Seasprites – who is responsible?
Join Date: Jan 2006
Location: Oz
Posts: 55
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Not all the big ticket issues were on the table. That's my point, there were far more that weren't necessarily on the big table in Canberra, but they were there in reality.
My politics 101 comes from the other side of the fence, but rather than to try and be a politician, I am saying it for what it is as someone who was there, not someone who thinks he has all the issues on it.
I stand by my word, $150 Mil was not going to do it, and if anyone thinks only $1 bill was "wasted" they are dreamng as well. The real monetary figure would have had to have been far more than that. There was a lot more than just the Project costs flushed away here...lots more. Things have gone quiet for a very good reason, because if the real figure of waste was ever determined it would be very ugly.
As I said, I was there, plenty left, and not many were willing to fly it. It was a monumental stuff up from every angle and best dumped, regardless of your distant interpretation of what the Minister could have said.
My politics 101 comes from the other side of the fence, but rather than to try and be a politician, I am saying it for what it is as someone who was there, not someone who thinks he has all the issues on it.
I stand by my word, $150 Mil was not going to do it, and if anyone thinks only $1 bill was "wasted" they are dreamng as well. The real monetary figure would have had to have been far more than that. There was a lot more than just the Project costs flushed away here...lots more. Things have gone quiet for a very good reason, because if the real figure of waste was ever determined it would be very ugly.
As I said, I was there, plenty left, and not many were willing to fly it. It was a monumental stuff up from every angle and best dumped, regardless of your distant interpretation of what the Minister could have said.
Last edited by Agony; 24th Apr 2008 at 07:12. Reason: spelling......
But PAF, I read Agony's email as saying that it was never going to get there, for any money. If he's right, the Minister passed up the political opportunity to say he saved infinite millions. That sounds a little silly to me.
Perhaps the provenance of the number is more prosaic. Perhaps the number represents the number the previous government, very late in its life, announced it had approved for further work, plus what little was left in the previously approved funds for the project? You appear to have inside knowledge of the technical details. Do you have inside knowledge of what funds were approved for the project?
Perhaps the provenance of the number is more prosaic. Perhaps the number represents the number the previous government, very late in its life, announced it had approved for further work, plus what little was left in the previously approved funds for the project? You appear to have inside knowledge of the technical details. Do you have inside knowledge of what funds were approved for the project?
Join Date: Nov 2004
Location: Orstralia
Posts: 171
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
If professional pilots can operate in Class G airspace in cloud without it being “one in, one out”, then why can’t air traffic controllers operate in this airspace with the same rules?
Last edited by jumpuFOKKERjump; 24th Apr 2008 at 09:40.
Thread Starter
JFJ, You don't appear to be able to open your mind to fact that we can change our 1950's procedural standards to those that have been proven safe in other modern aviation countries.
All instrument approaches in the USA are in a minimum of class E controlled airspace yet over 50% of those approaches commence below radar coverage. The system works superbly so why can't we at least try it at one airport in Australia?
We will one day and it will work well! In fact Airservices have told me they intend to trial low level class E at Ballina
But don't hold your breath- there are not many people at AA who can actually manage change!
All instrument approaches in the USA are in a minimum of class E controlled airspace yet over 50% of those approaches commence below radar coverage. The system works superbly so why can't we at least try it at one airport in Australia?
We will one day and it will work well! In fact Airservices have told me they intend to trial low level class E at Ballina
But don't hold your breath- there are not many people at AA who can actually manage change!
Thread Starter
Following my first post of 18 April, some 9 weeks ago, and virtually nothing coming forward on how the error was made, I repeat this line:
I have decided to go ahead with offering a $50,000 award for the best investigative article or documentary on this fiasco (see here).
By the way, I have recently heard that another businessman will be offering $50,000 as well, so the award will be $100,000.
Wouldn’t it be great if some of the better writers on PPRuNe could prepare a full investigative article and have it published? Not only will they be adequately rewarded, but hopefully the mistakes shown will not be repeated in the Joint Strike Fighter project.
The most important issue is not to make the mistake again, however I can see it being repeated – probably with the Joint Strike Fighter.
By the way, I have recently heard that another businessman will be offering $50,000 as well, so the award will be $100,000.
Wouldn’t it be great if some of the better writers on PPRuNe could prepare a full investigative article and have it published? Not only will they be adequately rewarded, but hopefully the mistakes shown will not be repeated in the Joint Strike Fighter project.
$100,000 prize for whoever cracks the Seasprite story.
From today's edition of crikey.com.au
$100,000 prize for whoever cracks the Seasprite story. Gary Johnston, Sydney businessman and owner of electronics chain Jaycar, thinks $50,000 is not enough of an incentive for journalists to look into the bungled Seasprite helicopter deal. That was the reward being offered by entrepreneur Dick Smith for the best investigative story covering the issue – as reported in The Age. Crikey can now reveal that Johnston has decided to add $50,000 to make the reward a substantial $100,000. Johnston told Crikey today he wants to make "all those so-called bureaucrats who make dopey decisions" accountable for their actions. The Government spent over $1 billion on the deal over eleven years before cancelling the contract this year. None of the helicopters were delivered. The project constantly ran into trouble, passing between different contractors and running well behind schedule. Defence insiders were critical of the deal, suggesting the Seasprite helicopters were the wrong choice to begin with and that other models would have been far more useful. "No one's going to get the blame for it. If they worked for a corporation they'd get fired, but these people have probably been promoted," says Johnston. The winner of the competition will be decided by a panel of three judges chosen by Smith.
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: Canberra
Posts: 382
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Love to be a fly on the wall of various offices when the story of this offer came out.
I wonder if PM Rudd is this serious about open Government? even opening up the can of worms that is the Australian Seasprite fiasco.
Either way the book should be a fascinating read.
I wonder if PM Rudd is this serious about open Government? even opening up the can of worms that is the Australian Seasprite fiasco.
Either way the book should be a fascinating read.
The "problems " with the Seasprite and other defence projects arise, from what I've seen, from the difficult interface between public servants, who are necessarily risk averse to survive, and the military, who are prepared to take risks, and have to, in order to survive.
Throw into this mix the Treasury - who is against everyone and anyone spending public money, a few grandstanding politicians like Blowhard Beazley, and a few corporate shills and you have a recipe for very poor decisionmaking.
Case in point the Wamira basic trainer. The RAAF swore blind they wanted something that was among other things, airconditioned (from a PT6!) and whose undercarriage could survive a drop from umpteen metres. They briefed the Minister that they wanted the Wamira in preference to the PC7 and they definitely didn't want the PC9 since flying it turned some of their most promising pilot candidates white as a sheet.
Guess what they got? Beazley said "you are getting the PC9" - the Bankstown boyz had the fix in.
As for the Seasprite, I'm not totally up to speed, but my understanding is that they basically wanted to fit an Australian defence IT architecture into it, when it was designed in the US for an entirely different architecture where the computing power resided in the ship and the chopper was relatively "Dumb", and of course we wanted it the other way around - at great cost. I'm buggered if I know whether it would ever work.
As for who was responsible? We will never know because of what is known as "diffusion of responsibility".
If you want to see this process in action, read the Coroners report into the "Westralia" fire. The moron who didn't understand why Sulzer diesels have double walled steel injection lines (the outer one has a pressure gauge attached to let you know when the inner one has finally cracked) should be in jail.
Then of course there is always the allure of an overseas posting for the lucky officer supervising the purchase of some lovely bit of kit from France or America - perhaps another reason that certain stuff gets bought.
The only thing sure in Defence is that within a few years of taking delivery of the JSF, there will be proposals to fit it with a Swedish cannon, or a Spanish radar, and the whole silly process of integrating chalk with cheese will begin over again.
Throw into this mix the Treasury - who is against everyone and anyone spending public money, a few grandstanding politicians like Blowhard Beazley, and a few corporate shills and you have a recipe for very poor decisionmaking.
Case in point the Wamira basic trainer. The RAAF swore blind they wanted something that was among other things, airconditioned (from a PT6!) and whose undercarriage could survive a drop from umpteen metres. They briefed the Minister that they wanted the Wamira in preference to the PC7 and they definitely didn't want the PC9 since flying it turned some of their most promising pilot candidates white as a sheet.
Guess what they got? Beazley said "you are getting the PC9" - the Bankstown boyz had the fix in.
As for the Seasprite, I'm not totally up to speed, but my understanding is that they basically wanted to fit an Australian defence IT architecture into it, when it was designed in the US for an entirely different architecture where the computing power resided in the ship and the chopper was relatively "Dumb", and of course we wanted it the other way around - at great cost. I'm buggered if I know whether it would ever work.
As for who was responsible? We will never know because of what is known as "diffusion of responsibility".
If you want to see this process in action, read the Coroners report into the "Westralia" fire. The moron who didn't understand why Sulzer diesels have double walled steel injection lines (the outer one has a pressure gauge attached to let you know when the inner one has finally cracked) should be in jail.
Then of course there is always the allure of an overseas posting for the lucky officer supervising the purchase of some lovely bit of kit from France or America - perhaps another reason that certain stuff gets bought.
The only thing sure in Defence is that within a few years of taking delivery of the JSF, there will be proposals to fit it with a Swedish cannon, or a Spanish radar, and the whole silly process of integrating chalk with cheese will begin over again.
Dawg, that was the word around CAC anyway. Who wants to get posted to Fisherman's Bend? Sunny Switzerland or St. Louis, much more fun.
Ever worked with Defence on a project? Seen the politics at work?
BTW, the stuff about the PC9 comes from someone present at the meeting, and the saga of the Wamira is CAC corporate history. Airforce swore blind that they wanted a purpose built, unique Australian design Then CAC and RAAF got F***ed over and got the PC9 foisted on them.
Ever worked with Defence on a project? Seen the politics at work?
BTW, the stuff about the PC9 comes from someone present at the meeting, and the saga of the Wamira is CAC corporate history. Airforce swore blind that they wanted a purpose built, unique Australian design Then CAC and RAAF got F***ed over and got the PC9 foisted on them.
The excellent article posted by Brian earlier had the kicker line:
"Defence - never keen to reject already-committed funds - went ahead and signed the $660 million helicopter contract with Kaman."
A couple of decades in Defence exposed me to the general idea that committed funds nearly always got used for the 'approved purpose' (usually approved after arduous, lengthy and involved process and signoff), or the funds would be snaffled for another project. The trick in Defence is to get any project enough momentum and support by key staff to bubble up into the realm of consideration, then see where is goes. Once all the politics and approval is achieved (often years), the easy part is to start it off! However if the funds get gobbled up in development costs and there is not enough left for the final job, the politics of face-saving make cancellation (or downsizing) are far less risky than grovelling for more money (especially close to an election!)
The PC9 fleet avionics upgrade was a case in point....the system was developed and prototype flown, then the money not enough, an election was looming, so the project was amended to just do a couple of airframes and the fleet forgotten. Oh and all the parts were bought and are sitting on the shelves!
"Defence - never keen to reject already-committed funds - went ahead and signed the $660 million helicopter contract with Kaman."
A couple of decades in Defence exposed me to the general idea that committed funds nearly always got used for the 'approved purpose' (usually approved after arduous, lengthy and involved process and signoff), or the funds would be snaffled for another project. The trick in Defence is to get any project enough momentum and support by key staff to bubble up into the realm of consideration, then see where is goes. Once all the politics and approval is achieved (often years), the easy part is to start it off! However if the funds get gobbled up in development costs and there is not enough left for the final job, the politics of face-saving make cancellation (or downsizing) are far less risky than grovelling for more money (especially close to an election!)
The PC9 fleet avionics upgrade was a case in point....the system was developed and prototype flown, then the money not enough, an election was looming, so the project was amended to just do a couple of airframes and the fleet forgotten. Oh and all the parts were bought and are sitting on the shelves!
Chimbu that was the advice of one of the RAAF people involved in the whole affair who related the saga to me at a mess night. They apparently took some student from the plastic parrot and gave him a drive and he was somewhat "surprised" by the PC9.
My limited understanding of the PC9 is that it was positioned as a lead in to jets and is was not designed to be a particularly docile and forgiving aircraft, in fact mirroring jet behaviour as I was told.
My limited understanding of the PC9 is that it was positioned as a lead in to jets and is was not designed to be a particularly docile and forgiving aircraft, in fact mirroring jet behaviour as I was told.
Please don't get me started on Wamira. (It was AAC, Australian Aircaft Consortium, not just CAC) I mentioned it in a presentation to defence and industry recently as an example of the lessons still not learnt.
One view back in the '80's was that working with Defence was like playing Chinese baseball for which the rules were the same as American baseball except that at any time the ball is in the air, any player may move any base to any position.
Interesting that an early concept was based on a turbine CT-4. (It turned out to be a nice aeroplane.) Once they piled on any MIL spec they could find, Wamira needed something like a PT-6 and it became bigger and heavier.
I recall discussing horsepower over a red wine with a high ranking RAAF officer back then - when I said that we needed to go up from 550 to 750 he said it "would be too overpowered". We needed it to meet their specs.
One view back in the '80's was that working with Defence was like playing Chinese baseball for which the rules were the same as American baseball except that at any time the ball is in the air, any player may move any base to any position.
Interesting that an early concept was based on a turbine CT-4. (It turned out to be a nice aeroplane.) Once they piled on any MIL spec they could find, Wamira needed something like a PT-6 and it became bigger and heavier.
I recall discussing horsepower over a red wine with a high ranking RAAF officer back then - when I said that we needed to go up from 550 to 750 he said it "would be too overpowered". We needed it to meet their specs.
DjPil, when I was at CAC/HdH there were quite a few people (both CAC and RAAF) still sobbing about Wamira to anyone who would listen. I didn't know about the consortium thing.
Away for a couple of weeks up North soon, then back to try and make sense out of the stall turn in the A160. Haven't yet got used to exactly what happens after kicking the rudder hard. Barrel rolls and loops now a lot of fun.
I hope the Decathlon and your good self are well.
Away for a couple of weeks up North soon, then back to try and make sense out of the stall turn in the A160. Haven't yet got used to exactly what happens after kicking the rudder hard. Barrel rolls and loops now a lot of fun.
I hope the Decathlon and your good self are well.
No one is saying that the PC9 is not a good aircraft, what we are saying is that the RAAF asked for one thing and then was forced to buy something else that was nothing like what they promised us that they really wanted.
....But I still look in wonderment at how these things are designed and cobbled together compared to Mr. Boeing's products, but I guess having an ejector seat and three seconds warning to get out is enough safety margin for some people.
....But I still look in wonderment at how these things are designed and cobbled together compared to Mr. Boeing's products, but I guess having an ejector seat and three seconds warning to get out is enough safety margin for some people.
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: Canberra
Posts: 382
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Agreed Sunfish, PC-9 probably is a good aircraft, however it will be interesting to hear what the RAAF gentlemen at Pearce think if our friendly Singaporean Air Force peers let them have a yippee in the PC-21 when they get it.
That thing makes the '9 look like its standing still.
That thing makes the '9 look like its standing still.