down inthreeegreen

I've flown from many crummy runways, even dirt strips...and I have no desire to fly in the middle east, africa or anywhere but the good old USA (Canada is quite fine too).

I said they should be great runways...how much money does it really cost do things right?

ATC does 'offer' G/A's or missed approachs - "You guys going to make it from there? Or do you need to go-around?" etc, etc.

SK8TRBOI - We don't know if the weather was so bad that even your mentor wouldn't have landed. It had rained for hours, several flights had landed in the previous hour, and the videos after the accident showed significant rain.

Sometimes rain is just rain. And it can last for hours with little risk to aviation.

Sounds ominously similar to the AF crash in Toronto.

Sometimes rain is just rain
 

Yes, and sometimes the accompanying colder air, which may, or may not, be providing an increasing tailwind is a killer.
l obviously have no clue as to the real prevailing conditions but l`ve certainly had a few shocks over the years, and not all warned by lightening.

The Honeywell "Smart Runway" system (formerly RAAS), is one of the most incredible safety programs in recent memory. All an "add on" to EGPWS (GPS direct to EGPWS required).

In recent history, would have kept Comair from taking off on inappropriate runway, Delta landing on taxiway at ATL, Continental landing on taxiway at EWR, and would have helped/prevented AA at Jamaica.

But with today's economic climate, few airlines will expend funds for non-mandated equipment.

Sad......

Airbus has introduced a similar system called BTV ROW/ROP possibly one notch up (smarter :-) ) from the HW version.

EASA certifies "Brake To Vacate" (BTV) and "Runway Overrun Warning and Prevention" (ROW/ROP) systems on the Airbus A380

It will continuously assess the aircraft's energy state during the approach and compare it to the runway length stored in the OANS database to see if a stop can be accomplished in a dry or wet runway scenario.

The BTV function allows the autobrake to modulate the braking as required to allow the aircraft slow down to a safe vacating system at an exit previously selected by the pilot.

The A380 visit to AirVenture 2009 (Oshkosh) was an example of this. Only 1 r/w exit could accommodate the A380 and the r/w was too narrow for a 180 and taxiback. They did their sums quite well, thank you, and made an appropriately spectacular arrival.

gadgets, gadgets, gadgets
 

so, we have pilots missing MSP 'because they are working on laptops.

and now we need gadgets to tell us if we are going to stop on the runway in time.

what a waste...what would you do if you had to MEL your runway judgement gadget?

sure, have proper lighting that tells you where you are on the runway...but so many gadgets will bring even more problems.

A major limitation of high-tech solutions (#212, 213) and humans is that they do not know the exact conditions on the runway.

The Smart Runway / Smart Landing systems provide alerting for an unstable approach and the potential for a long landing; the alerts should enable the crew to fly a go-around.

Although the Airbus system allows the crew to select braking parameters corresponding to the reported runway condition, once on the runway the system cannot achieve any greater maximum deceleration than could the crew. Thus if the runway condition is not as expected, then the calculated landing performance may not be met. In extreme, the system would not be able to prevent an overrun. Also, the crew’s realization of poor conditions could be too late to allow a go-around.
The other warnings (ROW/ROP) appear to be similar to the Honeywell systems, and have the ominous note that pilots can override (ignore) alerting information.

Part of the solution for reducing the risks of an overrun is to provide crews with better descriptions of runway braking conditions, but this is a complex and difficult task, which IMHO is unlikely to be solved in the immediate future.
A more significant item is to provide crews with better guidance of how to implement the regulations, interpret the calculated landing performance, and how to judge the many variables which provide a margin of safety during approach and landing – what do these things mean and ‘how’ should they be used in the decision to land, i.e. how do we teach ‘experience’, how do we manage risk.

In situations like Jamaica and Toronto, pilots often over focus on the immediate tactical decision associated with Cbs – airborne problems; avoiding turbulence, windshear, lightning etc.
Crews should consider more aspects of the ground phase of the approach and landing – have a strategic plan; e.g. what is the effect of heavy rain on the runway, how quickly does it drain, physical runway state, RESA, likely wind shifts, and any other aspects affecting landing performance safety margins.

A simple rule of thumb could be to delay landing for 15 min after a red WXR area has cleared the runway; this provides a reasonable time to the surface to drain. However even this rule may require modification for particular airports or specific weather conditions, e.g. runway slope / crosswind damming water drains, or ‘dished’ concrete surfaces.

Jeepers! I guess that won't be flying again. Pax had a very lucky escape there.

From the new, aerial, photos, it seems that the he was considerably to the left of the centreline. It also appears that there is very little damage to the fence, given the distance between the two engines. Is it possible that he porpoised from the threshold of 30 and the beach?

Please do not consider these questions as any criticism or un-informed opinion. I am simply asking and those who would know may be able offer a clarification.

Possibly down to the fact it swerved to avoid the approach lights once the overrun was inevitable.

"In situations like Jamaica and Toronto, pilots often over focus on the immediate tactical decision associated with Cbs – airborne problems; avoiding turbulence, windshear, lightning etc.
Crews should consider more aspects of the ground phase of the approach and landing – have a strategic plan; e.g. what is the effect of heavy rain on the runway, how quickly does it drain, physical runway state, RESA, likely wind shifts, and any other aspects affecting landing performance safety margins."

Excellent comment. This is why forward, critical thinking and preparedness is such a crucial part of any decision making in all phases of flight and in particluar take off and landing. While I am not going to pass judgement on these Pilots at this time, I have seen and am familiar with similar scenarios in the past. It is disturbing for me to see these types of occurences take place. When the proper details and data are released, this will serve as a valuable learning tool for many. One should never let their experience work against them. Every piece of the situation that you miss, ignore, or assume, makes for unexpected and sometimes, disastrous consequences.

I think pilots are fully aware of the runway they need. Getting there when conditions are right come after you know you can legally land on that runway. I think they were legal to land and we will have to see why it didn't work that night.

All things equal landing in a tailwind gives an airspeed increase due to shear (reducing tailwind). So you are already landing with a tailwind and then you can end up a few knots fast - something to watch for.

Also the energy is proportional to the speed squared so a few knots fast makes a big difference in terms of stopping. Throw in a wet limiting runway with poor drainage and you may not make it.

No one should be surprised...APA initially supported the crews actions at Little Rock and with the A300-600 accident ex-JFK.
After all, APA considers their guys can do no wrong...:rolleyes:

Very pertinent, especially if the runway is effectively only 4,900' (<1,500m) long by the time you touch down. I'd think the wet/contaminated plus tailwind figures for that length would be marginal if not a guaranteed overrun.

I think some of the problem is that rejecting a landing, i.e. a G/A after T/D, is a difficult manoeuvre to initiate psychologically, especially if you've never attempted it before or haven't discussed the option previously. I did a sim module recently combining theory and practice and it was most educational; shortly afterwards I came within seconds of doing it for real after a poor & floaty attempt of mine at landing.

There's a "I'm going to land" mindset that (I find) develops during the approach as you put the gear down, are given landing clearance, get the appropriate reference at "decide", pass over the threshold, retard the thrust levers, etc. Each of those events in the past were normally associated with a successful landing, so they act as a sort of reassurance that all is well. It's bordering on hypnotic and I have to almost sit on my own shoulder and say to myself: "No, something could still happen to mess up this landing - be prepared to throw it away, even after T/D." I have to say it's easier said than done...

As stated by 411A


You know??? I find it fascinating how the unions, groupies, and wannabees are the first to jump on the “it was fatigue”, or “weather was the primary cause of the accident” band wagon.

The crew was aware of the prevailing conditions, and the amount of runway that wizzed by before they decided to continue the landing phase.

So I ask the groupies, wannabees, staunched union supporters, and pundits alike, let’s hear the defence.