MD-83 RTO Overrun at KYIP
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Link to NTSB Press release.
Expanding on Dave Reid's post, here is the link to the NTSB press release (with pictures.)
https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-rele...R20170322.aspx
Considering how fast this aircraft was going when they found that it would not rotate, I doubt that there were any better options available. This crew gets an attaboy in my book.
The DC-9/MD-80 elevators have a mind of their own at rest since there is no direct connection to the elevator from the control column. Jet blast and wind can move them to extreme positions. If one knew to look for the bent piece in the NTSB picture, then you could discover the problem before flight. As old as this series of aircraft is, there should have been some prior experiences with the problem. It will be interesting to see what the NTSB says about this.
https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-rele...R20170322.aspx
Considering how fast this aircraft was going when they found that it would not rotate, I doubt that there were any better options available. This crew gets an attaboy in my book.
The DC-9/MD-80 elevators have a mind of their own at rest since there is no direct connection to the elevator from the control column. Jet blast and wind can move them to extreme positions. If one knew to look for the bent piece in the NTSB picture, then you could discover the problem before flight. As old as this series of aircraft is, there should have been some prior experiences with the problem. It will be interesting to see what the NTSB says about this.
Good case in point for the naysayers about post V1 aborts
Trash du Blanc
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If the wreckage had been consumed by fire, the failure evidence would have been destroyed. And the accident would have been blamed on the flight crew.
When in reality, they knocked it out of the park. As did the cabin crew and first responders.....
When in reality, they knocked it out of the park. As did the cabin crew and first responders.....
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Since Vr follows V1 and your aircraft refused to rotate, what do you think ANY pilot is going to do? I mean, really?
I'd rather take my chances with the abort though, unless perhaps faced with an obstacle like a deep ravine or something else equally unsavory.
If the wreckage had been consumed by fire, the failure evidence would have been destroyed. And the accident would have been blamed on the flight crew.
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I recall a similar DC 9 / MD incident many years ago. The pre takeoff control check was completed at the hold; take off clearance was given to 'quickly' follow the departing aircraft, such that the departing jet blast disturbed debris / stones which jammed the elevator which was not detected until rotate.
Follow-on activity including the need for a control check after lining up, and advice as to detect a jammed elevator, vice servotab, in a free moving system.
There may have been regulatory change re ability to fly with one side jammed ( elevator or tab? ) and the need / operation of an automatic control split to continue flight - again a split system may only account for a servotab jam depending on design
Follow-on activity including the need for a control check after lining up, and advice as to detect a jammed elevator, vice servotab, in a free moving system.
There may have been regulatory change re ability to fly with one side jammed ( elevator or tab? ) and the need / operation of an automatic control split to continue flight - again a split system may only account for a servotab jam depending on design
"Mildly" Eccentric Stardriver
Back in the mid-nineties my company had a Fokker 100 abandon after V1. The details are a bit hazy after this length of time, but somehow the hydraulic feed to the elevators wasn't there. The abandon was successful. It was suggested by engineering that a force some six times normal would have enabled the aircraft to fly, as noted in the in-flight emergencies section of the manual. Like you're going to try that, post V1?
DOVE
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The Stabilizer Trim can be moved with electric motors one is the same of the pitch function of the A/P and a more powerful one.
Last edited by DOVES; 23rd Mar 2017 at 12:28.
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Yep, I was thinking that it's pretty common to see the split horizontal tail surfaces on a parked DC-9 or MD-80. Anybody know if there is anything that you check up there on the walk around?
"Mildly" Eccentric Stardriver
Doves. If you're referring to the F100, yes, I agree with you. It's the way of dealing with a jammed elevator. But would you want to start trying that after V1?
DOVE
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Sorry Herod. My fault.
I was talking about MD 80 series.
Yes! First of all it's not an attempt. 'Many pilots used to Change/Maintain Attitude/Altitude with then trim' (when there was still a trim); and rather than going to nowhere land staying on the ground after V1...
from safetypee
I could not agree more
During last period as an airline commander I Always did such a check just before the take off run.
I was talking about MD 80 series.
‘But would you want to start trying that after V1?’
from safetypee
I recall a similar DC 9 / MD incident many years ago. The pre takeoff control check was completed at the hold; take off clearance was given to 'quickly' follow the departing aircraft, such that the departing jet blast disturbed debris / stones which jammed the elevator which was not detected until rotate.
Follow-on activity including the need for a control check after lining up, and advice as to detect a jammed elevator, vice servotab, in a free moving system.
Follow-on activity including the need for a control check after lining up, and advice as to detect a jammed elevator, vice servotab, in a free moving system.
During last period as an airline commander I Always did such a check just before the take off run.
"Anybody know if there is anything that you check up there on the walk around?"
Airbubba,
Not really. Look up...count elevators. Two is a good number.
The split is very common. I lost track of the number of times I explained that to nervous pax. ;-)
Airbubba,
Not really. Look up...count elevators. Two is a good number.
The split is very common. I lost track of the number of times I explained that to nervous pax. ;-)
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I recall a similar DC 9 / MD incident many years ago. The pre takeoff control check was completed at the hold; take off clearance was given to 'quickly' follow the departing aircraft, such that the departing jet blast disturbed debris / stones which jammed the elevator which was not detected until rotate.
https://aviation-safety.net/database...?id=19700908-1
https://www.fss.aero/accident-report...09-08-2-US.pdf
Executive Summary:
A Trans International Airlines Douglas DC-8-63F, K4863T, Ferry Flight 863 crashed during takeoff at John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York, at 1606, September 8, 1970.
Approximately 1,500 feet from the initiation of the takeoff roll , the aircraft was observed rotating to an excessively nose-high attitude. The aircraft became airborne about 2,800 feet down the runway after which it continued to rotate slowly upward to an attitude estimated to be between 60' and 90' above the horizontal, at an altitude estimated to be between 300 to 500 feet above the ground. The aircraft rolled about 20' to the right , rolled back to the left until it reached approximately a vertical angle of bank, and then fell to the ground in that attitude. The aircraft was destroyed by impact and postimpact fire. All 11 crewmembers, the only occupants of the aircraft, died in the accident.
The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was a loss of pitch control caused by the entrapment of a pointed, asphalt-covered object between the leading edge of the right elevator and the right horizontal spar web access door in the aft part of the stabilizer. The restriction to elevator movement, caused by a highly unusual and unknown condition, was not detected by the crew in time to reject the takeoff successfully. However, an apparent lack of crew responsiveness to a highly unusual emergency situation, coupled with the captain's failure to monitor adequately the takeoff, contributed to the failure to reject the takeoff.
The Board has recommended to the Federal Aviation Administration that all DC-8 operators be advised of the circumstances of this accident; that takeoffs in DC-8's should be rejected when premature or unacceptable rotation of the aircraft occurs during takeoff; and that provisions for the detection of jammed elevators and determination of elevator position be provided to DC-8 crews.
The FAA replied that engineering evaluations are being completed and they will advise the Board of the results. The FAA also requested further data regarding the recommendation that takeoffs should be aborted when premature or unwanted rotation was experienced in the DC-8.
The Board also recommends that a review should be conducted on the subject of rejected takeoff procedures in air carrier operation with a view to amplifying, clarifying, and standardizing each pilot's role in that procedure. More specific information regarding the dynamics of rejected takeoffs and pre-takeoff briefings should also be considered.
A Trans International Airlines Douglas DC-8-63F, K4863T, Ferry Flight 863 crashed during takeoff at John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York, at 1606, September 8, 1970.
Approximately 1,500 feet from the initiation of the takeoff roll , the aircraft was observed rotating to an excessively nose-high attitude. The aircraft became airborne about 2,800 feet down the runway after which it continued to rotate slowly upward to an attitude estimated to be between 60' and 90' above the horizontal, at an altitude estimated to be between 300 to 500 feet above the ground. The aircraft rolled about 20' to the right , rolled back to the left until it reached approximately a vertical angle of bank, and then fell to the ground in that attitude. The aircraft was destroyed by impact and postimpact fire. All 11 crewmembers, the only occupants of the aircraft, died in the accident.
The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was a loss of pitch control caused by the entrapment of a pointed, asphalt-covered object between the leading edge of the right elevator and the right horizontal spar web access door in the aft part of the stabilizer. The restriction to elevator movement, caused by a highly unusual and unknown condition, was not detected by the crew in time to reject the takeoff successfully. However, an apparent lack of crew responsiveness to a highly unusual emergency situation, coupled with the captain's failure to monitor adequately the takeoff, contributed to the failure to reject the takeoff.
The Board has recommended to the Federal Aviation Administration that all DC-8 operators be advised of the circumstances of this accident; that takeoffs in DC-8's should be rejected when premature or unacceptable rotation of the aircraft occurs during takeoff; and that provisions for the detection of jammed elevators and determination of elevator position be provided to DC-8 crews.
The FAA replied that engineering evaluations are being completed and they will advise the Board of the results. The FAA also requested further data regarding the recommendation that takeoffs should be aborted when premature or unwanted rotation was experienced in the DC-8.
The Board also recommends that a review should be conducted on the subject of rejected takeoff procedures in air carrier operation with a view to amplifying, clarifying, and standardizing each pilot's role in that procedure. More specific information regarding the dynamics of rejected takeoffs and pre-takeoff briefings should also be considered.
Obviously, the DC-8 tail is different from the DC-9 and MD-80 series tails, e.g. two jackscrews instead of one for example. But I believe the control tabs are similar.
Seems like there was an elevator control check on taxi out in the DC-8 where the FE announced 'drop-rise, drop-rise' (or 'double drop-rise' at United I believe). Also, I think the yoke was cycled in pitch at 80 knots on the takeoff roll to ensure that a foreign object had not caused a jam as in the JFK crash.
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Thanks Airbubba; I strongly believe that the earlier incident involved a DC9 / MD because of its servotab control system, which at that time related to the aircraft in my operation (146 / RJ), 1980-90s.
Was the DC8 elevator / pitch control a conventional aerodynamic servo tab system?
Based on the photos so far, it is difficult to understand how a restriction so significant that it prevented rotation, could not be detected before flight.
Was the DC8 elevator / pitch control a conventional aerodynamic servo tab system?
Based on the photos so far, it is difficult to understand how a restriction so significant that it prevented rotation, could not be detected before flight.
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On the MD-80 series a third set of 'anti-float' tabs was added outboard of the geared tabs.
Here's a great online guide to subtle external differences in the DC-9 and twin MD variants:
AIRLINERCAFE.COM - Ultimate DC-9/MD-80/MD-90/MD-95 Guide
I was also thinking of a DC-9 incident with an elevator jammed by a stone on takeoff but I can't seem to find it. The DC-8 at JFK was given an immediate takeoff clearance after landing traffic. The plane did an uncommanded rotation at about 80 knots and instead of chopping the power, the crew tried to figure out what was going on as the nose kept rising.
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NTSB Accident Docket opened here:
https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/d...013&mkey=94839
CVR transcript:
https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/61000-61...013/613633.pdf
https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/d...013&mkey=94839
CVR transcript:
https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/61000-61...013/613633.pdf
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The NTSB report has been published, kudos to the crew. 
https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/NR20190307.aspx
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1901.pdf
The flight crew completed all preflight checks, including a test of the flight controls, and found no anomalies before initiating the takeoff roll on the accident flight. The NTSB said that there was no way that the pilots could have detected the flight control jam until it was too late.
“This is the kind of extreme scenario that most pilots never encounter – discovering that their plane won’t fly only after they know they won’t be able to stop it on the available runway,” said NTSB Chairman Robert L. Sumwalt. “These two pilots did everything right after things started to go very wrong.”
Investigators said that the captain’s quick decision to abort the takeoff and the other crewmember’s coordinated efforts to assist him had likely contributed to the survivability of an accident in which there were no serious injuries among the 110 passengers and six crewmembers. The Ameristar Charters Boeing MD-83, which was transporting the University of Michigan basketball team to Washington, D.C., was substantially damaged.
“This is the kind of extreme scenario that most pilots never encounter – discovering that their plane won’t fly only after they know they won’t be able to stop it on the available runway,” said NTSB Chairman Robert L. Sumwalt. “These two pilots did everything right after things started to go very wrong.”
Investigators said that the captain’s quick decision to abort the takeoff and the other crewmember’s coordinated efforts to assist him had likely contributed to the survivability of an accident in which there were no serious injuries among the 110 passengers and six crewmembers. The Ameristar Charters Boeing MD-83, which was transporting the University of Michigan basketball team to Washington, D.C., was substantially damaged.
https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/NR20190307.aspx
The NTSB determines that the probable cause of this accident was the jammed condition of the airplane’s right elevator, which resulted from exposure to localized, dynamic wind while the airplane was parked and rendered the airplane unable to rotate during takeoff. Contributing to the accident were (1) the effect of a large structure on the gusting surface wind at the airplane’s parked location, which led to turbulent gust loads on the right elevator sufficient to jam it, even though the horizontal surface wind speed was below the certification design limit and maintenance inspection criteria for the airplane, and (2) the lack of a means to enable the flight crew to detect a jammed elevator during preflight checks for the Boeing MD-83 airplane. Contributing to the survivability of the accident was the captain’s timely and appropriate decision to reject the takeoff, the check airman’s disciplined adherence to standard operating procedures after the captain called for the rejected takeoff, and the dimensionally compliant runway safety area where the overrun occurred.
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1901.pdf
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Wow thanks for sharing. I flew the MD88/90 for many years and never encountered anything like this. Sounds like the crew did all they could. Interesting findings for sure. I certainly am glad not to fly that airplane anymore.
