Mike Pence's plane skids off runway at LGA

[JammedStab]

A good thing to review in a situation like this is what the hand maneuvers will be after touchdown. Especially if you were never on the old style manual deployment aircraft or haven't done it in a long time.

[Airbubba]

Looks like Eastern kept the contract after this overrun.

Vice President-elect Pence is enroute DSM-IND at the moment on the sister plane N277EA, a B-738, using the callsign of 'TYSON TWO'.

President-elect Trump is enroute DSM-LGA on 'TYSON ONE', N757AF.

[HundredPercentPlease]

Should have gone around... (CVR)

https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/h...=0&TXTSEARCHT=

[Airbubba]

Thanks for posting this. A lot of detail is in these dockets.

I think this link will take you directly to the CVR report:

https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/59500-59...915/604111.pdf

Some excerpts from the CVR transcript:

18:48:22.5 CAM-2 i-l-s one three please. autobrakes three. flaps thirty.

18:48:26.8 HOT-1 (you have to go) flaps forty don't ch'ya?

18:48:28.8 CAM-2 na-ahh.

18:48:29.3 HOT-1 seven thousand feet.

18:48:30.4 CAM-2 we don't need it. autobrakes three will do it.

18:48:34.0 HOT-1 alright.

18:48:49.2 CAM-2 when you landed back there...you still had a lottttt of runway after we stopped.

...

18:52:53.5 HOT-1 oh well. # happens. life’s a #.

...

19:01:43.7 CAM-2 autobrakes three. flaps ah thirty. questions

19:01:47.5 HOT-1 no questions.

19:01:48.2 CAM-2 alright.

19:01:48.6 HOT-1 live long and prosper ha ha ha.

...

19:25:54.1 HOT-2 what an interesting trip.

19:25:58.5 HOT-2 the most important thing is that we're safe. you know. we've been safe all the time. so.

19:26:03.3 HOT-1 ah these two are pretty good girls. you know. they try really hard.

19:26:06.4 HOT-2 yeah.

19:26:08.9 HOT-2 you know what this lady said. that they are here because of the (pretty) faces. she said that.

19:26:15.6 CAM-2 so wrong man. she's.

19:26:17.5 CAM-1 @?

19:26:18.2 CAM-2 yeah. she said that.

19:26:18.8 CAM-1 wow.

19:26:20.2 HOT-2 they're here because of the pretty faces.

19:26:22.7 HOT-2 well. guess what. they hired ugly people here too.

...

19:40:09.8 CAM-1 raining like a mother #.

19:40:12.3 HOT-2 okay autopilot's coming off.

19:40:12.9 AWM [sound of three low to high frequency tones, similar to autopilot disconnect]

19:40:13.5 EGPWS approaching minimums.

19:40:17.5 CAM-1 cleared to land.

19:40:21.1 EGPWS minimums.

19:40:22.2 HOT-2 landing.

19:40:22.9 HOT-1 roger that.

19:40:27.4 HOT-1 that's slightly left.

19:40:31.6 EGPWS one hundred.

19:40:35.1 EGPWS fifty.

19:40:38.2 EGPWS thirty.

19:40:40.3 EGPWS twenty.

19:40:43.3 CAM-1 ** down.

19:40:46.0 EGPWS ten.

19:40:46.6 CAM-1 down down down down you're three thousand feet remaining.

19:40:52.1 CAM [sound of rumble, similar to touchdown]

19:40:57.3 HOT-2 manual braking.

19:41:00.6 CAM-?**.

19:41:00.7 TWR Eastern stop stop Eastern.

19:41:01.9 CAM [sound of increased background sound, similar to thrust reverser application]

19:41:03.4 CAM [sound of click]

19:41:05.3 HOT-1 ahhhh.

19:41:07.4 HOT-1 errhm [sound of exertion].

19:41:08.3 CAM [sound of rattle and rumble, similar to exiting runway]

19:41:11.2 HOT-1 #. **.

19:41:13.5 TWR we have an issue on the ah airport.

19:41:15.9 CAM [sound of decreased background noise, similar to reduction of thrust reversers]

19:41:18.1 CAM [sound of thump, thump, thump, similar to wipers, continues for next 9 seconds]

19:41:24.5 HOT-2 should have go around.

19:41:25.2 PA-1 remain seated. remain seated.

19:41:27.4 HOT-1 see that's what.

19:41:30.5 HOT-1 # me.

19:41:35.4 CAM-1 my career just ended.

19:41:37.3 HOT-2 we should have went around.

19:41:38.3 HOT-1 yeap.

19:41:40.0 HOT-2 #.

...

19:47:56.0 CAM-1 see unfortunately. I should have gone straight ahead and we would have been fine. when I made the turn is when I screwed up.

19:48:00.6 CAM-2 yeah I was- I was- I was fighting you. because I was trying to stay on the centerline.

19:48:05.1 HOT [sound of siren]

19:48:06.2 CAM-2 I was- I was trying to stay on the centerline and-

19:48:10.7 CAM-1 well.

19:48:13.7 CAM-2 we would have been fine. I- I- *** stay on centerline. you were fighting.

19:48:22.0 CAM-2 we would have broken just a few lights and that's it.

[Airbubba]

I've never flown the 737 and some of this stuff depends on the regs and aircraft certification. But wouldn't the crew be required to do some sort of slippery runway inflight landing performance assessment?

In the larger Boeings I would have to go to a QRH table for minimum flap and autobrake settings for actual conditions and reported braking action.

Also, a new runway condition reporting scheme came into effect a few weeks before this mishap, don't know if this will be a player in the analysis.

To me the CVR sounds like an experienced crew trying to get it right. They will inevitably be gigged for a little non-pertinent conversation below FL 180. Landing with flaps 30 instead of flaps 40 will be questioned.

As they repeatedly observed in their post-landing assessment, a go-around was definitely indicated.

Also, sounds like the captain got on the controls on rollout perhaps trying to take the plane off the right side of the runway instead of going into the localizer antenna and the expressway.

[Airbubba]

Here's the preliminary Boeing FDR analysis sent to the NTSB on November 17, 2016:

Preliminary Data Observations:

• F30 approach to Runway 22 at LaGuardia (LGA) with a runway length of 7001 feet, at a gross weight of 116,560 lb. at landing (Max Landing Weight [MLW]=129,200 lb.).

• Turbulent atmosphere with an increasing tailwind as the airplane approached the runway. At touchdown, the tailwind was approximately 10 knots.

• Autopilot was disconnected at approximately 300 feet radio altitude, with the autothrottle disconnected approximately 7 seconds later at 200 feet radio altitude.

• Shortly after autopilot disconnect, the glideslope deviation began to increase indicating the airplane was deviating above the glideslope beam.

• The airplane crossed the runway threshold at a radio altitude of 66 feet with the glideslope deviation increasing beyond 4 dots and a descent rate (negative vertical speed) of approximately 750 ft/min.

• The descent rate was reduced to near zero by 2500 feet beyond the runway threshold, resulting in the airplane floating down the runway.

• The initial touchdown occurred at: 1) approximately time 9127.5 seconds, 2) a distance of 4242 feet beyond the runway threshold (~1900 feet beyond the recommended touchdown zone), 3) an airspeed of 123 knots (Vref-4), 4) a ground speed of 130 knots, 5) a sink rate of 3.3 ft/sec.

• Upon main gear touchdown, maximum manual wheel brakes were commanded.

• The nose gear touched down approximately 2 seconds after main gear touchdown, but then rebounded back into the air due to commanded aft control column. The nose gear was held off the ground until it touched down a second and final time approximately 5 seconds after main gear touchdown.

• Speedbrakes were manually extended to full approximately 4.5 seconds after main gear touchdown (the speedbrakes were not armed for automatic extension upon landing). After initial touchdown, the airplane traveled approximately 1250 feet down the runway before the speedbrakes were extended to full deflection.

• Max reverse thrust was commanded by time 9135.5 seconds (8 seconds after initial touchdown). From initial touchdown to max reverse command, the airplane had traveled approximately 1650 feet down the runway.

• The airplane achieved good deceleration with speedbrake extension, maximum wheel brakes, and maximum reverse thrust, reaching 0.5 g’s of deceleration (negative longitudinal acceleration).

• Preliminary calculation of airplane braking coefficient indicates that during the period of friction-limited braking (beginning when the nose gear touched down at time 9133.5 seconds, 5520 feet beyond the threshold and ending as the airplane entered the EMAS) the calculated airplane braking coefficient varied between 0.2 and 0.4.

• As the airplane decelerated, increasing left control wheel was commanded, reaching 50 degrees of left control wheel by time 9145 seconds. The increasing left control wheel reduced the spoiler deflections on the right wing, per design.

• The calculated in-air crosswind component indicated there was a left crosswind of 7 to 8 knots, reducing to 3 to 5 knots before touchdown. The winds that were present while the airplane was on the ground could not be calculated, but a left crosswind would typically result in a right rudder pedal input to maintain centerline (and left control wheel if the crosswind magnitude was large enough).

• Some left rudder pedal was commanded as the airplane rolled down the runway, until it was removed and right rudder pedal was commanded at 6650 feet beyond the threshold. The airplane responded to the right pedal by deviating right of the runway centerline.

• The airplane departed the end of Runway 22 while deviating right of centerline at a ground speed of approximately 40 knots.

• The airplane crossed through the right corner of the EMAS and came to rest to the right of the EMAS, approximately 7180 feet beyond the runway threshold, and 114 feet right of centerline.

• Preliminary analysis of the data indicates all systems were operating as designed. The automatic speedbrake functionality could not be verified as the system was not armed for landing and was reportedly on the Minimum Equipment List (MEL) as inoperative.

https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/59500-59...915/604054.pdf

[atakacs]

The initial touchdown occurred at: 1) approximately time 9127.5 seconds, 2) a distance of 4242 feet beyond the runway threshold (~1900 feet beyond the recommended touchdown zone)

Wow ! Actually they are quite lucky that everyone walked from this one IMHO !

[B2N2]

Captain got demoted and FO got fired on this one.
Both should have been fired.

[Airbubba]

Some possible answers to 'what were they thinking?' in the pilot interviews here:

https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/59500-59...915/604022.pdf

[rottenray]

When asked if he had considered a go around at any point during the event, he said that he had but when he did the “moment had slipped past” and it was too late.

Wow. Just wow.

5,000 feet down the runway was too late for a go around?

Didn't remember the EMAS was there?

Actually, the whole last paragraph needs pasting here.

When asked if he had considered a go around at any point during the event, he said that he had but when he did the “moment had slipped past” and it was too late. He stated that the moment he rounded out they should have gone around. He said he is now going to now require at least 8,000 feet of runway length for first officers to land. He said that that if the landing would have been
firmer they would have stopped on the runway. He said he will reiterate with first officers in the future that they must land in the touchdown zone. He said again that he did consider a go around before touchdown but there was little time to verbalize it, and he said to “put it down” instead of Go around.

and

When asked if he had been terminated before, he said that he had been terminated from Arrow Air.

That would be a fun bit to learn about.

[framer]

There is a lesson in here specific to Captains as well as the myriad of lessons for all crew.
The Captain thought that flap 40 was the wise choice, enough so that he said

18:48:26.8 HOT-1 (you have to go) flaps forty don't ch'ya?

The f/o, ( with 220 hours on type) replies " nah, auto-brake three will do it" to which the Captain replies

18:48:34.0 HOT-1 alright.

Obviously not calling the go-around at the end of the touch down zone was a major mistake but that lack of assertiveness/command whatever you want to call it was evident during the briefing when the f/o didn't take the hint and the Captain failed to ensure the ship was configured how he thought was appropriate.

[JammedStab]

Originally Posted by rottenray

That would be a fun bit to learn about.

"When asked about the captain’s proficiency or for areas that could be improved, when compared to others he had flown with, he declined to answer."

"When asked if he had heard of any other crewmembers complain about flying with this captain he declined to answer."

[noflynomore]

Originally Posted by back to Boeing

Just an educated guess.

So whilst there had been an "incident" the crew decided to action the appropriate after landing scan/procedure. Also this would allow any fire services better access to wheel/engine areas.

Hence flaps retracted and thus why flaps not in the 40 position.

Very questionable practice, that. They've overrun into the bundhu, the aircraft is covered in mud and who knows what else and they retract the flaps without any engineering inspection, just hoping they were not damaged by debris and would do five times more damage on retraction?
On second thoughts, I'd call that grossly unprofessional, if that is what happened.
To allow fire services access! What a joke! Surely no one really "thinks" like that - do they???

But having read the rest of the reports/transcript I take that back. It is entirely in keeping with their level of "professionalism".
The people who should be fired along with them are the idiots that hired that company to fly Mr Pence and his entourage - or were thet secretly Democrats?

[Loose rivets]

. . . that thought crossed my mind.

When such a notion makes more sense than any other scenario, life seems almost surrealistic. Bewildering, doesn't come close.

[IcePack]

briefing when the f/o didn't take the hint and the Captain failed to ensure the ship was configured how he thought was appropriate.

Ah imho a result of poor CRM training. Whilst it was never the intention, some take the opinion it is now a democracy up the front.

[JCO7]

According to their statements they didn't train flaps 40 at the airline. The FO had probably never done a flaps 40 on the Boeing. I certainly wouldn't push my FO into a 40 if he is completely uncomfortable with it. Flaps 30 wasn't the problem here, they would've had plenty runway if technique was proper, 30 or 40.

[IcePack]

JC07 then doing the landing yourself would be appropriate. (As you thought 40 was prudent)
Ah but that "might" upset the CRM dynamic.
Just saying.

[RAT 5]

Whatever happened to 'captaincy' and accepting that is where the buck stops?

I hope to xxx that no-one claims this accident was caused by bad CRM.

[JCO7]

Originally Posted by IcePack

JC07 then doing the landing yourself would be appropriate. (As you thought 40 was prudent)
Ah but that "might" upset the CRM dynamic.
Just saying.

A big part of multi-crew flying is risk assessment. As a Captain some things you can compromise on if in your professional judgment it does not adversely affect safety. The Captain accepting a flap 30 would be a case in point - based on any performance graph no doubt flap 30 was more than adequate. Flap 30 is a perfectly acceptable landing flap setting in the 737.

The Captain was used to flaps 40 from his previous operation, but this company used 30 as standard. Also playing in his mind no doubt was that the FO exhibited excellent flying skills during the previous approaches and landings. These are all things a commander takes into account.

But by his own admission his failure was in not calling the go around after the float. I don't think this was a CRM failure. It was just a bad call during a very dynamic situation.

[framer]

I certainly wouldn't push my FO into a 40 if he is completely uncomfortable with it. Flaps 30 wasn't the problem here, they would've had plenty runway if technique was proper, 30 or 40.

I agree that with a wet runway, 7000ft, wind straight across( ie potential tailwind) , and an f/o with 220 hours on type, that pushing him into a flap 40 would be a bad idea. If the f/o didn't want to do a flap 40 then then do it yourself. The Captain clearly thought flap 40 was the best idea, yet he failed to translate that into reality. That's a problem.

As a Captain some things you can compromise on if in your professional judgment it does not adversely affect safety. The Captain accepting a flap 30 would be a case in point - based on any performance graph no doubt flap 30 was more than adequate. Flap 30 is a perfectly acceptable landing flap setting in the 737.

Would they have gone off the end if the Captain had said "I think flap 40 is the way to go here, tell you what, I'll do it and you can take us to Chicago tomorrow" ?
The answer is probably no.
Obviously not making a go-around as they left the landing zone is the main problem but, the lack of 'command' displayed as they sailed past the landing zone is ( imo) the same lack of command shown when the f/o , ( with 220 hours relevant experience) wrote off the Captains suggestion that flap 40 was the most appropriate.
In situations like this something along the lines of " yeah I'll tell you what, I'm stuck in my ways so we'll do it flaps 40 and then chat about it in the van on the way to the hotel" usually does the trick.