Understood :)

Or is it…… BAE have kept the ability to reopen it albeit at a cost.

Errr... No.
Even if they could find enough production staff (Brough production which made many sub assemblies has closed and staff gone) who can produce the airframe, many of the systems components, flight computers, displays are out of production and unavailable. On top of that they need engines from RR/Safran (Turbomeca)who have struggled with supporting those still in service.
So, no. Out of production means just that

India was reportedly looking for local solutions to its Adour fanblade problems. The possiblility of reopening the HAL production line for a follow on Mk 132 order was allegedly being discussed in 22/23 but that like the advanced Hawk-i seems to have gone by the board in a favour of planned replacement with the supersonic HAL HLFT-42 from 2035. So that rules out another possible Hawk option.

Apart from being short of coin, Why dont we just order 25 M-346's tomorrow - for immediate delivery? It might not be the perfect aeroplane but is available now and the need is great

Public embarrassment? Political humiliation? Admitting we screwed up? All of the above?

It's embarrassing we can't design a new UK produced training aircraft, but then BAE has never designed a production airframe. Everything it's made since formed has either been based on legacy designs, collaborations or experimentals.

It's a won't, not can't situation. We airframe engineers are about, but those in charge won't let us get on with it.

It’s ok, BAE will ensure a highly efficient maintenance philosophy akin to Hawk T2 below and will definitely embed all those lessons around modifications from all other marks.

Oh wait….wing mod 2707, rear fuselage fatigue, tail plane approaching fatigue life, ERC mod 2474, obsolescence across the platform. It’s literally the 1970s and I expect Gene Hunt to come crashing around the corner in a Cortina mk III GXL!

200 Fg Hrs or 1 year = Primary
400 Fg Hrs or 2 years = Primary Star
800 Fg Hrs or 4 years = Minor
1600 Fg Hrs or 8 years = Minor Star
3200 Fg Hrs or 16 years = Major

Government responds to concerns over future of Hawk

While AERALIS represents a bold and innovative vision for a British-designed modular aircraft, the current evaluation of advanced jet trainer platforms must be grounded in clear assessments of technical maturity, industrial viability, and delivery risk, particularly with the urgent timeline of entry into service by 2030.

1. Viability and Technical Maturity

AERALIS’s modular aircraft architecture is conceptually compelling, promising lifecycle cost reductions and operational flexibility. However, as of 2025, the programme remains at a low Technology Readiness Level (TRL). It has not flown a demonstrator, undergone certification trials, or validated system-level integration of ANY key modules. In contrast, competing trainer platforms are fully developed, qualified, and in operational service with multiple nations.

The RAF cannot afford developmental uncertainty for a mission-critical training platform. Any delay or shortfall in aircraft availability would have direct consequences for pilot throughput and frontline readiness—risks that current military training providers and the MOD must minimise.

2. Export Potential and Market Claims

AERALIS has suggested a potential £100 billion export opportunity, though this estimate lacks substantiated market analysis and given trajectories with UJTS, FFLIT, Spain, and Japan the market they allude to vanishes. The global AJT market is already populated by proven, in-service systems such as the Boeing T-7A Red Hawk, Leonardo M-346, and KAI T-50, each backed by strong industrial and governmental partnerships.

Most air forces prioritising trainer acquisition within the next decade will not adopt an unproven platform without a sovereign customer. Without a confirmed RAF order or demonstrator flight, market traction remains speculative.

3. Deliverability by 2030

The RAF’s target to replace the Hawk from 2030 necessitates a platform that can be delivered, certified, and integrated within five years. This timeline includes factory readiness, flight testing, system certification, training system integration, and aircrew conversion.

Given the current state of development, AERALIS would face a compressed and high-risk delivery pathway. Even with significant investment, achieving Initial Operating Capability by 2030 is unlikely without compromising standards or schedule. The MOD must prioritise capability assurance over industrial aspiration.

4. UK Industrial Strategy and Balanced Capability

It is not the case that the UK is failing to support sovereign industrial ambition. The MOD’s investments in GCAP, Team Tempest, and initiatives like the Rapid Capabilities Office underscore a commitment to future airpower and industrial growth. AERALIS itself has received early-stage funding from the RAF, and the Government has signalled intent to nurture long-term domestic innovation.

However, acquisition decisions must be governed by operational imperatives and value-for-money assessments. AERALIS’s potential should be explored through a long-term developmental pathway, not as the cornerstone of a critical training system due in less than five years.

Conclusion

AERALIS presents an exciting prospect for the future of British aerospace, but its current status does not align with the RAF’s 2030 timeline for Hawk replacement. Consideration of the platform must be proportionate to its maturity, deliverability, and proven capability. The MOD can and should continue to support British innovation—but without compromising the near-term integrity of the UK’s military flying training system.

Disregarding Aeralis itself for the time being, how can any country develop industrial and technological capability with this attitude?

1) By planning and investing over a sufficiently long timeframe that novel low TRL approaches can get picked up and brought to high TRL in time to compete for major procurements.

2) By not over-programming so egregiously that every new financial year turns immediately into a bunfight over what expenditure can be deferred.

3) By not continually choosing to protect near term activity designed to make organisations look 'busy and relevant', or to spend money with existing 'strategic suppliers' who claim they need it now to preserve 'strategic capacity'.

4) By taking account of non-monetary value in Treasury investment cases.

Oh dear!

Also, linked to 3), this is UK defence aerospace we're talking about. If Aeralis was in any danger of producing something credible, BAES would have moved to buy them or make them go away by now. The fact that they haven't is its own data point.

Noticed the M-345 demonstrator (CPX624) arrived at Boscome Down on Friday, possible evaluation?

As an Alphajet replacement?

The Alphas were replaced by PC-21s in 2018

:oh:!!!!

I see that a 3 ship of Hawk T2 are due to participate in the Kings Birthday Flypast today.

Reliability must have improved, I guess?


Except that they didn't show up......

Surely given that this is the UK the most important feature is what will it look like in red paint , call it a Spitfire and its a done deal-the Daily Mail will see to that.

Seriously though the Hawk which seems to have done a great job has got to be approaching 50 years old which means it was a concept design 55 years ago . And is it much use for pilots going on to fly A400s a dn 330s

While I'm no expert on RAF pilot training (one will be along shortly), are RAF pilots not already streamed fast jet by the time they end up on the Hawk - so are unlikely to see an A-400 or A-330.

As for design concept date of aircraft in RAF service - 1960, Rivet Joint, 1966, Boeing 737 (basis of P-8 and Wedgetail).