Surely this is a good thing. Operational Capability has been delayed at the hands of airworthiness process. Job is truly jobbed.

downsizer:-
The MAA should have cold feet wrt to the MAA! So far it's claim to fame seems to be to scrap fleets because of concern over their airworthiness or as here before they even get an RTS.

They are incapable of ensuring the airworthiness of such fleets, or indeed of any fleets because the system was effectively sabotaged in the late 80's by the malevolent actions of Air Officers, mainly by replacing highly skilled, properly trained, and experienced engineers with unskilled, untrained, and inexperienced equippers who were ordered to suborn the Regulations, and did so.

The MAA is thus compromised still and unable therefore to do its job. It needs to be wrested from the MOD, and made completely independent of it. Ditto the MAAIB, which in turn must be independent of the MAA. Then and only then can the slow reform of Military Air Regulation and Investigation begin. The competency problem will remain and will require the "sistering" of these two functions with the CAA and AAIB respectively, with Civilian DG's to head them. Or we can just carry on and wait for the Airworthiness Related Accidents to continue...

Stuff the SIGINT systems, I reckon it'll be the total lack of access to design and qualification data for the airframe that's got the MAA's back up.

The only way you could satisfy today's post Hadden Cave airworthiness requirements is to start with a modern design not one that started out life on a 1940's drawing board.

Forgive me for being stupid, but is anyone empowered to read across the USAF RTS to the RAF? I seem to recall being told that this was what happened with the C-17, and was the reason/excuse for 99 Sqn crews to wear US flying suits.

S41

That is of course if such data still exists and/or is still accessable?

S41

I can't answer your question , but
The reason for the US flight (should that be flight?) suits was because we were renting the aircraft. Under the contract they had to be operated in the same way as any USAF ac and that included flying suits and head sets. Not sure what the excuse is now though - maybe we really don't want to lift that stone!!

I might have the wrong end of the stick here but surely the point is that the pre and post Haddon Cave requirements need not have changed. It was the implementation that was wrong, not the regulations. But the MAA has started rewriting the regulations for no apparent reason. People now infer the poor regulations were to blame, not those who ignored them. In other words, the MAA exists to help some senior people cover their arses. I still think this summary has got it pretty much right.

https://sites.google.com/site/milita...-authority-maa

Hammer, Nail, Head, dervish! The RAF has two choices, to protect its aircrew and pax, or to protect retired and serving Air Officers and their Staffs. So far it has chosen the latter option for the past 26 years, at the cost of many Airworthiness Related Fatal Air Accidents.
It shows no sign of changing, hence the compromised Haddon-Cave report, hence the compromised MAA, hence the absence of effective UK Military Airworthiness Regulation, hence unairworthy military airfleets. That has nothing to do with the Regulations, but everything to do with those who cannot or will not enforce them.
Rebadging and rewriting is simply rearranging the deck chairs as the water rises ever higher. The RAF, as the major military air operator, has to bite the bullet and realise that self regulation doesn't work and in aviation it kills!

The RAF has one choice - to maintain Operational Effectiveness to do any task asked of it by HMG.

Nothing more, nothing less.

Chugalug states

"They are incapable of ensuring the airworthiness of such fleets, or indeed of any fleets because the system was effectively sabotaged in the late 80's by the malevolent actions of Air Officers, mainly by replacing highly skilled, properly trained, and experienced engineers with unskilled, untrained, and inexperienced equippers who were ordered to suborn the Regulations, and did so".

As a current PT Engineer Officer I often find myself wondering about what existed before and the real reason we find ourselves in the apparently crazy position we are today. Please forgive the thread drift but perhaps some one could elaborate on the pre "late 80's" airworthiness system and explain exactly what it was that was done to that system.

Corrona:-
Someone already has:-
https://sites.google.com/site/milita...-authority-maa
dervish had already posted the link above my post. With the nights drawing in I commend it to anyone who wants, like you, to understand
It was nothing less than deliberate sabotage of UK Military Airworthiness, perpetrated at the highest levels of the Royal Air Force in order to achieve a short term financial solution to fiscal incompetence... also perpetrated at the highest levels. Its long term consequences have been tragic and profound, witness as you say the chaotic situation that pertains today.
What's to be done? First, the RAF has to face up to and own up to what was done, the cover up has to end now, and the MAA and MAAIB have to be made independent of the MOD and of each other. Then, and only then, can the work of airworthiness reform begin. It will take a long time to do that, which is ironic given that the damage was done by just a few men issuing a few illegal orders over 25 years ago.

Organizational Self-Justification
 

Bravo Sierra! Once again a newly established governmental organization must justify itself by harassment, micromanagement, delay and "officiousness". Only then will everyone take them 'seriously'. "We must correct the errors of the past by being a**h**** today, no matter that we are attacking the wrong issue."
It is the same on the US side of the Atlantic wrt "new" offices.

Review: KC/RC-135s are scheduled to operate through 2042; E-Systems/Raytheon/L-3 Com facility at Greenville have maintained and modified the RC-135 fleet for over 40 years. The Big Safari Project Office has managed this program and others (U-2s, RPV, all other "special" USAF aircraft programs). Specific RC-135s have flown over 40000+ hours without any major problems. (I don't remember any airframe problems with any -135. Most accidents are due to mistakes by the aircrew.)

I can understand the USAF telling the MAA offices to stuff it. Perhaps the MoD can do a quick overpaint of the RAF markings, slap on stars and bars, fly the Airseeker to Mildenhall and begin ops training under a "false flag", or with a token USAF body on-board. After all, at present the RAF long-range SIGINT capability is zip, zero, nada (as we say over here).

(4000 hours in KC/RC-135s; survivor of KC-135 - F-4C Phantom mid-air collision; RC-135U Air Staff program manager)

Back to the C-17 question, why wouldn't aircrew want to wear flight suits, as its operational and combat flying and landing near the front line. Were the Lyneham WIng, and Brize squadrons all wearing no.2 during operations from Corporate to Granby and Deny Flight to Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom?

I'm guessing that the then Lyneham lot wore flight helmets for the likes of delivering aid to Sarajevo etc etc like our American cousins did. If you look at Tim Laming's publication on the Bosnia Air War, a good photobook (done with help from an ex gf's brother whose a professional photographer) , there's a nice photo of a Ramstein Fat Albert pilot with CS vest, nice little automatic and HGU-55P. The same b/w photo was used in the USAF Yearbook 1993 published by the RAFBF.

Unless one is 007 and arrive in a penguin suit into a firefight :cool::E

In a Hollywood type National Lampoons or Hotshots production one could imagine a crew of Air Seeker / Rivet Joint, decked out in penguin suits and a red rose in the lapel :ugh::ok::E:p

Cheers

If I recall correctly, after a Hercules operational accident one of the aircrew was delayed in evacuating from the wreckage because his CS95 caught on something? There were no DPM flying suits available back then, so use of CS95 had been approved - but no-one had done a compatibility assessment.

If US flight suits have been fully assessed for compatibility with the C-17, what would be gained by spending a lot of time and effort, not to mention money, on re-assessing UK flying suits / AEA for use in the aircraft?

And the US winter cold weather flying jackets are rather nice and warm.

Beags,
It was not the CS 95 but the garment he had on top that caused the problem.

It is true that CS 95 was included in the back of the MAR before it became the RTS. but this was highly caveated "at the discretion of the CO or simmilar" It might even have been a Service Deviation. The main issue with CS95 was fire retardance (or lack of).

The choice was: you might fry in a crash or look like the blokes in the back during any escape and evasion. The CO had to decide which scenario was most likely.

Not seen any 1 piece DPM flying kit but a FR two piece that looked like CS95 was introduced for the RW boys. Not sure if any of the FW crews were scalled for this.

I am guessing but was the US grow bag more comfortable to wear for a long duration on a C17. Do they offer the same level of protection in a fire?

I think what is important to note about this so far as Clearances/Airworthiness/Flight Safety matters are concerned all these things should be considerd in the round. I believe the main thing folks on here are worried about with this 135 is will the wings fall off? It will not matter if the crew are equipped with UK or US Growbags.

One of my ILAFFT moments concerns gloves. Down the back of our R you can imagine gloves did not help the knob twiddleing and button pressing. We had an emergency evacuation on landing at Wyton once and my mate burned his hands baddly comming down the rope. He fell off and would have been flattened by the rest of the formation eating team following (OK I embelished that last bit). After that I always wore my gloves during take off and landing. Having worked along side some of the AEA team and seen the RAFCAM films all I can say is the flying kit our guys are issued with is far beter now than it was 10 years ago.

Fire protection properties of USAF flight suits is better than RAF flight suit.

Thanks JIV, If that is the case who signs the AECs to say the UK ones are ALARP?

Sorry, I know this does not answer the question about the wings falling off the RJ.

I am tending towards the view of NoVANav.

I did have to laugh about the Pocock article and the mention of QQ being referred elsewhere by the USAF. I wondered why our MoD are sub contracting their responsibilities again. Lend me your watch and I will tell you the time. What happened to the Structural Integrity Group we had in the Royal Air Force?

NoVANav said:

Completely agree that the UK should read it the USAF RTS across, but weren't there some problems with the tails (hence the use of ex-airline 707 tails)? And on a pedantic point, wasn't RIVET AMBER assessed to be an airframe problem leading to its loss?

S41

Drag artist. You make a good point which has not been missed by the Aircrew, FC, AI and AT at Waddo.