No Correlation At All
 

I fail to see the correlation between an accident, reason undefied, for a KC-135 at a foreign base, taking off into a known bad weather and a brand new RC-135W being purchased by the MoD.
That would be similar to relating the original Comet 1 accidents to the Nimrod catastrophe in the Afghan AOR a few years ago. Same basic airframe but absolutely nothing in common about the particular causes.

You must understand, the RC airframes, especially these new conversions, are essentially new aircraft. Not zero-timed, but absolutely everything is inspected, updated and ready to go. After all, the RCs have been flying, in various models, since the late '60s. All of the accidents to any model have been from pilot error, not the airframe.

At what point do you folks give up on the "age of the airframe" argument? Has nothing to do with the RCs, given the ongoing upgrade cycle. It is unlike anything that is done in the commercial aviation community.

I wonder if the RAF will spend money erasing the perfectly legible "ROYAL AIR FORCE" and apply the stylised version that other RAF aircraft have, c/w slanty "Y"?

Or perhaps the terms of the supply contract forbid such nonsense?

NoVAnav

I don't want to go over old ground, but would reflect on MoD's assertion that the Chinook HC Mk1 and HC Mk2 were unrelated (stated by Adam Ingram, Minister for the Armed Forces, under advisement by MoD), and that this utterly clueless statement led directly to the papers being revealed that MoD knew, 21 years ago, that neither was airworthy.

What you've said about the differences between the KC-135 and RC-135W is exactly what was said when comparing Nimrod MR2 and MRA4, yet the latter was cancelled and scrapped precisely because the audit trail tracking the evolution of the Comet > MR1 > MR2 > MRA4 was not seamless, so ultimately no-one was prepared to sign for airworthiness.

This time, I sincerely hope MoD has not ignored these basics and the MAA is satisfied. My main worry would be where did MoD find such a person, given the discipline has been ignored, as a matter of policy, since 1991.

I know absolutely nothing about airworthiness regulations, but if the item in question is ubiquitous with millions of hours of service, then surely that can be leveraged?

My thought train goes like this: A bicycle is a simple, inexpensive device that can be inspected, fitted with operable brakes, reliable bearings and chain, and can be declared safe. The consequences of a failed bicycle are generally minor injury, but with the potential of more serious injury or even death, rarely.

A car is more complex than a bicycle, but can be engineered safely, and the lessons of thousands of designs have been learned over the years to make a safer motor car. If a part fails in service, it is replaced, even if that requires a recall of hundreds of thousands of vehicles. The consequences of a safety failure in a car are likely severe injury or death.

Are not aircraft safety regimes much the same? The consequences of failure are almost certainly death, so it is that much tougher. But with millions of hours of operation of the 707 and derivatives, surely the delta from a bog-standard airframe is the prime area of concern rather than the whole thing?

I appreciate this is a vastly more complicated affair than I simplistically illustrate above, but for the MRA4, with a genesis period of over 10 years and billions of pounds spent on a tiny fleet, it seems that it could have been signed off, but for the want of a bit of reasoned thought and risk analysis. Even the safest aircraft may have an accident due to incorrect fuels/oils being used, or dare I say, crew error. It's always a risk going aviating.

R280

I was very careful just to state facts, as I know nothing of the 135 variants. I wanted to point out the flawed argument used by MoD over many years, especially very recently on Nimrod, was being repeated. I wouldn't like to see other history repeating itself. I'd like to think the MAA will ensure it isn't, but given their proven inability to learn lessons, and lack of original thinking, one can never be sure.


PS By my reckoning, the MRA4 genesis period was well over 20 years! The tendering was under way in 1993, so there would have been substantial effort well before that. I attended a Design Review for the radar upgrade on the day Maggie left #10!

NoVANav:-
That would be as determined by the Air Accident Investigation Authority, which is the same as the Airworthiness Authority, which is the same as the Owner/Operator? Yeah, right...

I think the RAF Rivet Joint will get some sort of RTS when it is delivered by the USAF. HOWEVER, I think it will be because the embarrassment of not clearing it for RAF use will out weigh the risk. I hope the Duty Holders stand in front of the new aircraft and crews and have their picture taken so we all know who made the decision.

The MOD has been adept in the past at issuing "some sort of RTS", to the extent of one restricted to Switch On purposes only. That should have restricted it to ground training use. Sadly that small detail was not imparted to the Squadrons who flew it operationally until the inevitable happened. The small detail cost 29 lives...

NoVanNav said "...can really be considered new airframes..."


ermmm....NO!

I don't know how many times you've bought a 50,000-mile car and considered it "new", but I've never.

These are OLD airframes that have been repaired and reworked - not rebuilt and renovated - and also heavily modified from their original design structural and electrical loadings and other parameters. Technically they may not be much safer, structurally, from many over-modified ex-Nimrods.

The very best of designers can cock things up - look at any new aircraft design you like to see my point. The only difference here is that we hope that someone will sign something to state that they are fit for purpose and possibly airworthy too. And possibly the MAA may wait til after the designers say so?

Rant off.


Added bit:
"It is unlike anything that is done in the commercial aviation community. "
Ever wondered why?

RC-135 Accidents
 

Since most posters do not know the airframe history I will assume cannot comment on my comments are only general in nature and not specifically directed at the RC-135 jets.
There have been no RC-135 accidents that were not attributable to anything other than pilot error, with one exception. The RC-135E, Rivet Amber, disappeared in a flight between Shemya and Eielson AFBs without a cause every being identified. This was a one-off specially modified program, lost many years ago, and no relation to today's Rivet Joints.

RC airframes are not only re-worked but, in many areas, are new over the years. All -135 wing skins were replaced in the '80s-'90s; the engine pylons were replaced when the F108s were hung, along with landing gear upgrades. RC-135 fuselage skins are replaced where necessary and the addition of external antennas, cheeks, extended nose, internal equipment results in many components being replaced to accommodate the heavier equipment and airframe changes.

You cannot compare this mod to the Nimrod upgrade to the MRA4. From my sources at RAF and the company the MRA4 conversion was costing a huge amount of money as each airframe upgrade was actually an individual custom-fitted kit, as the original airframes were not to a standard build. The Airseeker original airframes were near the last of 820 -135s built and are pretty standardized. There are now 20 conversions to Rivet Joint standard and others to the various RC-135S, U, and X models. Quite a bit more experience than four attempted MRA4s.

I'm am not familiar with the official certification hoops within MoD but the contracts would not have been signed if there were a problem.

And, back to the original question: there is still no correlation between the latest KC-135R accident in the AOR and the airworthiness of the RC-135.

No, I'm assuming the ground is wet because they've just washed the aircraft for the photo.

NoVANav,

Your statement,

I'm am not familiar with the official certification hoops within MoD but the contracts would not have been signed if there were a problem.

Unfortunately, contracts are signed by the MoD, when significant issues have not been resolved. The lack of information, resistances to share information and legal constraints can make RTS extremely difficult.

There have been many near misses with the RJ over the years from which the USAF has learnt valuable lessons. Will we benefit from these lessons or have to relearn them?

Examples familiar to most here:

Nimrod AEW
Nimrod 2000/RMPA/MRA4 (in fact, any Nimrod contract!)
Chinook HC Mk2
Chinook HC Mk3 (in fact, any Chinook contract!)


and so on, and on.....


In each case, an upgrade contract was signed knowing the aircraft to be upgraded was not airworthy. It follows that delays were inevitable, and predicted, because without that stable baseline any programme is built on sand.

I'm not claiming the 135s satisfy this MoD policy :E but I have no confidence whatsoever that anyone in the MoD has had the balls to ignore this policy, which the MAA has consistently stated itself to be content with.

Conversely, successful MoD aircraft and equipment upgrade programmes share one common denominator - the Build Standard, Safety Case and Airworthiness certification have been stabilised and verified, as the #1 Risk Reduction activity.

for the record:-

Rivet Amber was a special, somewhat experimental and very costly ($35 million in 1960's dollars) RC-135E, highly modified with a large section of the metal fuselage having been replaced with fiberglass to house a large, state-of-the-art and very unique phased array airborne radar built by Hughes Aircraft that was capable of transmitting seven megawatts

NoVANav:-
Well so you keep saying, but attributed by who? You? The USAF? Boeing? With all due respect none of those are proven impartial accident investigators. Indeed they seem to have as much partiality as the RAF and the MOD, who have a track record of finding by default the first people on the scene of an accident to be responsible for it. Pilot error saves a whole lot of trouble; to aircraft manufacturers, operators, and in particular to airworthiness authorities. Given the present military aircraft arrangements I wouldn't buy a used car, let alone an aircraft, from any of them on either side of the pond.
The most impartial review of 135 accidents easily available is Wikki (and doesn't that say a whole lot about where we're at?) With engine and tail separations alone a noted feature, you seem to demand a lot of your pilots and little of their superiors.
Self Regulation Doesn't Work and in Aviation It Kills!

Designing airframes, engines, avionic and electrical circuitry and their subsequent modifications is one of the worlds best guessing games based mainly on lessons learned from previous accidents and incidents where resulting investigations could reliably form positive root causes.

The mere fact that these particular frames have undergone bridging checks in order to transfer ownership as well as (properly approved) heavy modifications does not make them perfect. They can only be considered less imperfect than they were before the Mods / Checks.

The fact that the 707/135 series has (as stated on this thread) undergone so many severe structural changes during their normal development life is..."a concern" to me.

But then, what do I know? I won't be flying in them or responsible for them in any way. I have enough other "used" aircraft to care about.

however many committees and studies we have you can't guarantee safety

You have to take a balanced view - is the additional capability worth the risk?

You get different answers in war-time - just remember how fast various systems were designed & issued in the Falklands War, and Gulf War 1 & 2

HH, it isn't per se the additional capacity that brings risk, it is whoever assesses that risk. If they be objective professionals, free of all pressure to bend to the will of others, whether manufacturers or operators, then that risk can be reduced to a minimum. If they be one and the same as the operator, who also investigates its own accidents and risk assessments, then it can't.
Unless and until the regulatory and investigation authorities are separate from, and independent of, the operators (as they are in civil aviation) risks will be unnecessarily high, leading to more and more avoidable accidents and fatalities.
Self Regulation Doesn't Work and in Aviation it Kills!