Don't lower yourself
 

Winco,

You will be pleased to know that in a battle of wits I never fight with the unarmed.
I was merely pointing out to TSM that his personal attack on SFO was a piece ‘sh1t’.
This is not an opinion held by me alone.
I was making the point that TSM need not fear getting his head shot off as long as he refrained from insulting people. I made no personal insult. Well, not what I would consider an insult…. this is what I would consider a personal insult:
“You are an utter disgrace to yourself, your service and this country as a whole. How on earth did you slip through the net?
You are nothing short of contemptable, and I too am ashamed of you.
The Winco”

Good job you’d never stoop to that level eh :rolleyes:

Not considered to be practicable
 

Thanks Da4orce

It would appear that the recommendations have not all been carried out then 3 years later.

Recommendation
A maintenance policy should be instigated for the ruptured duct and all similar ducts.
Action Taken
A study into the need for a preventative maintenance/lifing policy for this and similar ducts has been concluded by the Designer (BAE Systems). Their report, which is due to be issued imminently, is based on the results of a detailed analysis of a sample of ducts taken from a number of MR2 aircraft. This analysis has taken time to complete, but the report is expected to recommend that a lifting policy be introduced. Ducts due for replacement would be replaced during scheduled maintenance activities and it is anticipated that such a duct replacement programme would be in place by December 2007. Action ongoing.

So no duct replacement until after December 2007 them Mmmm

Recommendation
The extent of the hot air leak warning system is reviewed to ensure that all possible duct failures are covered.
Action Taken
Recommendation closed. A review of the aircraft warning systems revealed that the affected Supplementary Cooling Pack Duct was the only duct whose failure would not have been detected.

So despite the fact that they recommended extending the warning system to ensure it covered all duct failures, nothing was done Mmmm

Recommendation
A hot air leak warning system is introduced for the ruptured duct and cross-air bleed ducts.
Action Taken
Recommendation rejected. The duct failure was an isolated incident and was in the only part of the system where a leak would not have been detected. All of these ducts have been replaced with newly manufactured items that, based upon the previous 25 fault-free years that the original duct had been fitted, are expected to last well beyond the planned MR2 Out of Service Date (early part of the next decade). Moreover, fitting a discrete hot air leak warning system would be a complex modification that would have to be embodied across the fleet during its maintenance cycle and therefore take several years to embody. Considering the Out of Service Date of the Nimrod MR2, the fitting of such a system was not considered to be practicable. Action closed.

So no hot air leak warning system then Mmmm

It appers then that the unit inquiry didn't make much difference to safety then. Lets hope the BOI's findings don't go down the same way then.After all the Consideried Out of Service Date of the Nimrod MR2 is even closer now , so I wonder if making any changes will be deemed as not considered to be practicable.

Until then I wait, I listen, I learn, I collect factual information , I ???????

Years ago, I was being shown around a Hercules (it must have been a long time ago - it was still in that 2 shades-of-$hit camouflage). The guy showing me around showed me a 'bleed air pressure gauge' (or something like that) and told me it was an essential item to monitor whether there could be a hot air leak....

Roll forward several years and I was on the mighty Tin Triangle. I asked how one could be certain that, with all the engine air switches off, the duct was depressurised as there was no gauge. I was told that it wasn't possible; however, I invented a check of my own involving a check of no Air Ventilated Suit flow with engine airs off. This was easy, as the engines were brought up above 80%, just press the valve on the Personal Equipment Connector and check that there was no airflow. If there was, throttle back each engine in turn to find the culprit. One night I did this as we were about to set off for Cyprus - and we found a stuck air valve as a result. This would have meant that, in the event of a hot air leak, we wouldn't have been able to stop the leak apart from shutting down the associated engine.... So the captain wisely elected to shut down the offending engine and taxi back in.

Some months later, a Waddington (second division) crew were flying to Goose, then Offutt. They received the classic symptoms of a hot air leak, but seemingly didn't know how to confirm whether the engine airs were working properly. However, they pressed on.... On the way into Goose the fuel readings were all over the place - some tanks had seemingly gained 1000 lb of fuel. Later, serious damage was found to have occurred; I think that the aircraft was later donated to Goose as a mascot.

Hot air leaks, and the inability to detect whether a bleed air duct is pressurised, are very serious. The old excuse of 'not practicable due to impending OSD' was often trotted out in V-force days - yet the aged jets kept going for years after the TSR2 was supposed to have been in service.

It seems that the lessons of the past have not been properly 'identified', let alone learned.

Keep up the good work, T's D - and don't let the squirming airships wriggle off the hook!

Beagle………

“Hot air leaks, and the inability to detect whether a bleed air duct is pressurised, are very serious. The old excuse of 'not practicable due to impending OSD' was often trotted out in V-force days - yet the aged jets kept going for years after the TSR2 was supposed to have been in service”.


I agree with this wholeheartedly. The OSD issue used to be formalised in the “Five Year Rule”. That is, if you could not demonstrate 5 years useful life, you could not get the funds. This would be open to interpretation. We (HQ staffs) would, for example, bid for the money in 1980, and simply say the a/c will still be in service in 1985. Sometimes we got away with it, but more often than not the beancounters would say “Bid – 1980, LTC approval – 1981, Contract award – 1983, In Service Date – 1987, Full fleet embodiment – 1989…. Plus 5 = 1994. Sorry, OSD is 1993, forget it”. Inevitably, the OSD would slip, but we needed at least a two year slip to get approval. So, announcements were often one year at a time.

The exception was always safety issues. Until 1991 of course, when as a matter of policy funding was no longer automatically available to investigate/rectify safety problems. As I’ve said elsewhere, we were routinely instructed to ignore safety problems. This is still the case.

This was nothing to do with procurement. All the decisions were taken before procurers got involved.

You never hear this talked about now, mainly because it involves a head and a parapet.

TD - it might be worth re-reading the recommendations about the ducting and noting the following:


Recommendation
The ruptured duct is replaced with new manufactured items on a fleet-wide basis as soon as possible.
Action Taken
Recommendation closed. All such ducts fitted to in-service aircraft have been replaced with newly manufactured items.


The way I read it, all such ducting on in service Nimrods were replaced in the aftermath of the investigation. The later paragraph you quoted that refers to a replacement program starting in Dec 07 refers to the lifing of the new ducts - therefore the ducts that were replaced after the investigation will be lifed, and replacement of the new ducting will start from late this year.

Sarsteph: I do not think you are reading the second recommendation correctly. It refers not just to the section of piping that ruptured, but all similar piping in the a/c system.

By the way, I undestand that the BOI has been reconvened. Any thoughts, anyone?

DV

CS wrote
Hear hear! So let's alleviate that pressure, CAS, and institute these safety mods that are so obviously required to this very important component of the UK military air fleet. I find it alarming that the shortcomings in the airworthiness of front line operational types (Nimrod, Hercules, Chinook) are seen as unacceptable, not by the MOD, nor by the Senior Commanders of the RAF, but by those at the work face, both serving and ex, and honourable examples such as Tucumseh who can tell us how the system throws up scandals such as these and then perpetuates them. His quote tells us of the extent of this scandal:
In 1965 Hastings TG577 crashed on take off at Abingdon for a training paras drop. All 41 on board died. The entire world wide fleet was grounded, and an expensive and extensive repair of the aircraft tails initiated. Within 3 years that transport fleet was gone, in favour of the Hercules, but safety was paramount. A far more expensive mod was of course done to the Concordes after the tragedy at CDG, only to be followed by their complete withdrawal within a few years. These actions were not wasteful and reckless expenditures, but the proper and prudent reaction to technical deficiencies that had caused or augmented the causes of aircraft accidents. To do otherwise is unprofessional and reckless. It seems that policy has been to do otherwise for some 16 years. That is a scandal!

sarsteph wrote:

The second recommendation that you refer to states:

A maintenance policy should be instigated for the ruptured duct and all similar ducts.

Noted the ducts have been replaced but still no maintenance programme and it's not clear whether just the ruptured duct was replaced or all similar ducts.

Lets hope that the press and 'MOD insiders' are wrong in attributing the ignition source in XV230 to a hot air duct failure otherwise there have to be serious questions asked as to whether the failure could have been prevented by the implementation of a maintenance programme as recommended some two years prior to the loss of XV230 along with 200 years of combined RAF experience in the shape of crew 3.

Da4orce

“Lets hope that the press and 'MOD insiders' are wrong in attributing the ignition source in XV230 to a hot air duct failure otherwise there have to be serious questions asked as to whether the failure could have been prevented by the implementation of a maintenance programme as recommended some two years prior to the loss of XV230 along with 200 years of combined RAF experience in the shape of crew 3”.


While I don’t know anything at all about this aspect of Nimrod, this is precisely what I was advocating a few posts ago. We often read BOI reports which present recommendations as novel ideas (look how honest and clever we are), yet scrape away the thin veneer and you find that very serious issues have been known about for years and ignored. You never see this mentioned in the reports, and it more or less follows that it never gets raised at Coroners’ inquests. That is, MoD can tailor the BOI report to avoid embarrassment, and effectively pre-determine the inquest verdict. I have chosen my words very carefully. There are cases where the problem has been known about, but not fixed for good reason following a risk assessment. But very often it is swept under the carpet as to fix it would embarrass senior staffs or “chosen ones” who have waived safety in order to meet time and cost targets. Remember, this has been condoned in the past by CDP and above.

If you want to check what I’m saying, have a look at the BOI reports from previous fatal “accidents” during GW2. Redacted versions are on the MoD site. Look at the recommendations. One calls a certain system “not fit for purpose” as it blinds and disorientates the pilots, yet the obvious questions - “So who, and what flawed process, allowed it to be fitted in the first place?” and “Why was it removed, and then refitted?” are not asked. Nor were they, apparently, by the Coroner. This is not a state secret. You just have to be able to assimilate open source data from various sources, not just what the MoD wants you to read. (In this case, a picture speaks a thousand words). Or another report which recommends a safety feature is actually integrated properly, so it works. Instead of leaving it at that, why not ask why it wasn’t integrated in the first place, leaving the a/c unsafe, and whether or not the problem had been flagged (rumour has it) 9 months and 3 years before the “accident”, both times to 2*. And whether the same problem had occurred on other a/c requiring precisely the same safety features. And why they were fixed.

If you ask each IPT about these “accidents” they will invariable trot out some stats that show it to be an isolated case on their a/c. Stovepiping in MoD means they are blissfully unaware of cases with similarities or common denominators. Visibility of all the cases I mention only comes at 2* level, minimum. Precisely the level that has ruled safety is optional on these a/c. Well, they’re not going to dob themselves in to a BOI comprising minions, are they?

The solution? Simple application of what are, supposedly, mandated rules. The relevant Def Stan is extant. It hasn’t really needed amending for 17 years, partly because it’s so robust; but mainly because it’s fallen into disuse as its purpose – maintaining the build standard, including safety - is poorly funded and widely ignored.

Do I have faith in BOIs? No. But I do think matters will gradually improve, as the penny has dropped with MoD that the internet and FOI, along with the likes of TD, can be a force for good.

A rather remarkable fact has come to my attention in the last few days- the MRA4 actually has less protection than MR2. MR2 has a nitrogen inerting system in the AARprobe to prevent a possible explosive situation developing due to the presence of fuel vapours. I understand that this sensible safety feature has been removed in the MRA4. Presumably, someone thought it a good idea to save a few more pennies?

I think there is some misunderstanding of the measures implemented above. In a nutshell, the ducts (that have been in for 20+ years) have been assessed to require a life based mtn scheme. This is in the process of being set up properly. In the meantime as it says above ALL the ducts have been replaced with brand new components - hence the fleet has all new ducting, as they were built. The mtn policy will be in force from Dec 07, by which time a sensible lifing strategy will have been developed/implemented - now the DA will have looked at the corrosion etc. issues carefully and will recommend an appropriate lifing solution - this could for example be based on flight hours or years fitted. As the original ducting lasted 20+ years, it is quite possible that a safe lifing policy could see them remain in the fleet for 10/15 yrs, before replacement under a managed mtn programme. Hence the new ducting now flying may not need replacement until 2017 in the first refitted aircraft. These are example figures, but it seems pretty clear that the fact that specifics of a mtn policy will not be in place until Dec 07 is NOT a safety issue.

Hope this helps explain.

JFZ90; Are you sure you have got that right? It is my understandaing that the only piping that has been replaced is the section which caused the XV227 incident. Not ALL hot piping in the a/c; that is part of the "lifing" study.

DV

BOI Reconvened?
 

Well, we are constantly being told that we should not speculate but wait until the BOI reports. It is now reported that the BOI has been reconvened. Do any of you "MoD Insiders" know why? Is it something we have said on pprune?

DV

To be fair, I don't know and there is not enough information available, hence I will speculate no further as it is inappropriate. I was just trying to point out in my post that some of the conclusions above that "mtn policy not in place until Dec 07 = bad" is not necessarily a valid conclusion.

From what I can see above however, it appears that:

a) the issue has been taken seriously post BoI and tackled.

b) whilst the detail is not known to me, in broad terms the approach appears valid and robust and contains the kind of measures I would expect. By this I mean it is multifaceted - not just replacing offending pipes (as a car mechanic may do and send you off hoping it doesn't break again), but looking further to try and understand the failure mechanisms and put in place mitigating measures over the long term (as you'd expect a professional airworthiness outfit to do).

DV
I see that some BOI have in the past took notice of BBC programmes

http://www.publications.parliament.u.../486/48606.htm
Here's 2 extracts:

"As a result of a BBC programme raising doubts as to whether the incident was as a result of enemy fire, the Royal Military Police carried out two investigations............

"There has been considerable delay from completion of the Board of Inquiry to publication in some cases. In some cases, the time taken to publish the report took longer than the inquiry itself. In the case of the Royal Marine landing craft which came under friendly fire south of Basra in March 2003, the inquiry was complete by December 2003 but the finalised report was not published until February 2006, some 26 months later".

Could be in for a very long wait then.

Maybe thats why the have been reconvened because of Panorama or maybe the Sunday Times.

TD: I agree with you, so let's keep digging away.

DV

JFZ90:
But not swift. By the time the policy comes in force three years will have passed since the incident.

After the XV227 incident the "powers that be" thought they had all the time in the world to implement the recommendations for this "isolated case", then XV230 jumped up and bit them.

The XV227 case would not have been highlighted but for the Panorama programme, now its the main talking point.

DV

This is what I have been told about XV227 and the change in procedures following XV230.

"..we had an aircraft scrapped a year ago due to hot air leak
damaging the rear spar, the fuel tank possibly responsible for the ultimate
explosion on XV230 was significantly damaged and could have exploded due to residual fuel boiling. They made a bit of a mess of the whole inspection
procedure and it took some weeks to establish the extent of the damage. We now drain these tanks(7's) before flight and leave them empty, work is
underway to blank them off but the vent system uses the tank."

Let's say, for arguments sake, that persons X, Y and Z were found to be ultimately at fault for the loss of our colleagues, friends and families on XV230. What then?

I don't really see this is about blame. I see it as dragging the RAF and MOD into the 21st Century and forcing the issue of aircraft safety. We have all seen the result of getting by on a shoestring budget and ignoring sensible aircraft self-protection methods. No-one wants to see more unnecessary death. If the tragedy of XV230 is being seen as an isolated event, then people are deluding themselves. It is a matter of great sadness that bereaved families have deemed it necessary to take on the onerous task for themselves in the absence of any leadership or information from the RAF or MOD.