Footster

Thank you for your condolences they are appreciated.

The bottom line is statistics on air crashes means little to most people unless you or your loved ones happen to be on an aircraft that crashes.

Ben used to say statistically he was more likely to be killed in a road accident than flying in a Nimrod .So I agree with Footster statistics in this case and to me personally mean very little. Apart from the fact I have got to know more guys who are flying them now and couldn't bear to hear about another Nimrod being lost due to a fuel leak.

Expectations
 

I've been involved closely with a BOI on a very different aircraft & circumstansces which came out with an outrageous verdict; it was sorted well in the end but took 5 years.

Tappers Dad, I can only guess how you must feel, but it takes a long time to sort out - a blame exercise is no good to anyone, no-one meant it to happen & designs in haste tend to be put up with once they work, even though the engineers responsible thought they were doing a quick temporary fix - if indeed that's what happened, as I say I'm not Nimrod.

There are 2 important factors as I see it;

A, No blame is apportioned to the crew - I am not a Nimrod expert by any means, but it seems there were snags way beyond their control.

B, Learn by it & incorporate mod's so it doesn't happen again.

Justice, as in cleared names let alone compensation, takes a lot of time & stamina, conserve your energy !

In a way there's one good thing, if it can be called that; no-one has had the crass nerve to call this pilot error.

Gentlemen,
I am happy to take all the stick that you want to give me, but please don’t read me the rules for pprune and then ignore them yourselves. You will all see, that it was infact safeware who began the personal insults – but enuf said.
Let me begin by saying that I know very little about the MR4 other than what I read on here and the info I get from some mates at BAe and ISK. I do however, still remember quite a bit about the MR2 and the aircrafts systems, fuel, engines, hydraulics blah, so I’m not a complete ‘numpty’ on the aircraft. So let me just go through a couple of points if I may……
In an earlier posting from SFO, he stated: “Where you are not correct is in giving the impression that the fuel pipework et al is refurbished. It is of a similar/same design but, apart from the fuselage (and one or two minor items) the rest of the aircraft (and pipework) is new build. Indeed, around the important areas (engine bays etc) the fuel pipework will be double skinned.” Is it not right therefore to assume that given the AAR system is a ‘new build’ that all of the AAR pipework should have been double-skinned?
Distant Voice says: “And Safeware, I am not sure what the risk factor is for one accident and two major incidents involving AAR in four months (Sept, Nov & Dec). I suspect it is worse than 1:1000” How can anyone disagree with that? Is that not, at the very least, sufficient cause to re-think the AAR system?
Now lets talk about Bomb Bay fire fighting.
It is a fact that MR2 has NO fire fighting capability in the bomb bay. It is equally true that MR4 will have NO fire-fighting capability in the bomb bay either. Now many on here say that its down to cost, and I would agree entirely. But others claim that it isn’t needed, because the incident rates for bomb-bay fires are small. I would just refer you to my earlier post when I said that any form of extinguishant in the bomb bay might just have afforded XV230 a few extra vital minutes to get the jet safely on the ground. IMHO that is worth serious consideration and should be incorporated in MR4 (I even agreed that to retro fit MR2’s was a non- starter)
Biggus says that:
“The design was 'frozen' before bomb bay extinguishers and fuel tank protection were considered issues. Yes, no doubt they could be added”
Nigel Gilb says:
“Mr Boeing provides 215 minutes worth of fire extinguishant in the FWD/AFT Cargo hold of a 747. Mr Boeing is also fitting state of art fuel tank protection to the latest Boeing airliners coming off the line. There have been about 5 attributed fuel tank explosions in airliners in the last 25 years or so. The RAF has had probably 4 in the last 30 months in it's tiny inventory”
The Winco wrote:
“What the public will not be told however, is that the aircraft will NOT have foam in the wings, it will not have state of the art fire suppressant. Infact, it won't even have a single fire extinguisher located in the bomb bay” Now feel free to ignore me and ridicule me, but are we all wrong about our concerns?
And finally, lets talk about airliner safety. I am not an airline pilot, when I left the mob, I stayed flying, but I do not fly for an airline. But ’the winco’ appears to be an airline pilot, and yet he has also come in for criticism about his comments regarding airline safety. Infact, SFO said the following: “If you seriously believe that Boing or Funbus make aircraft that are as safe as they can be, no matter what the financial implications are, why have there been so many accidents and incidents in commercial aircraft over the years, or is it just that they do not show the 'Aircrash Investigations' programme on your home planet?” (Betty S, do you remember what you said to me: "Be Courteous! Don't attack others. Personal attacks on others will not be tolerated. Challenge others' points of view and opinions, but do so respectfully and thoughtfully... without insult and personal attack.")
Anyway, it was my response to this which has clearly upset some of you, and for that I apologise. But I still think it the wrong thing for SFO to say. How you feel that the loss of a Nimrod, one of only a dozen or so, flying very little, can possibly be compared to the airline industry is beyond me. At best, if all 12 Nimrods flew one trip a day (5 day week) we are looking at very best, at about 3000 trips a year. I think the table I posted, showed tens of millions of trips a year from the airline industry! I’ll leave you all to draw your own conclusions from that.
Gentlemen, I apologise if my mocking of SFO has offended anyone, including SFO (apologies). I would only reiterate that I feel passionately about the state of the fleet and things at ISK in general aswell as for the safety of friends still there. I knew most of the crew on XV230. I had flown with most of them on countless occasions and was as devastated as everyone else at their loss. We all know that the safety of military aircraft is largely governed by the bean-counters, but that doesn’t make it right, and it doesn’t mean that we have to accept it. We must keep plugging away at the safety argument and not just role over and accept it as a ‘done deal’ It isn't!
Difar69:
You and I have also flown together on countless trip during the 80’s and 90’s. I have explained that I am not an expert on MR4 at all. But is anything I have said about MR2 or MR4 factually incorrect? I haven’t heard anyone say it is yet. Like Tappers Dad, I couldn't couldn't bear to hear about another Nimrod being lost due to a fuel leak.
TSM

Footser

Good post.

You say “looking at the overall situation from the outside looking in the RAF seems to have taken the brunt of the cutbacks”.

When this subject comes up, especially in the air domain (with apologies to the sailing Navy and ground Navy/Army/RAF), I immediately think of the Halifax savings of 1987. The RN (FAA) took a cut in support funding (and this is what people are actually complaining about here) of a whopping 33%. Permanently. This is huge by anyone’s standards. While the Chief of Fleet Support did not share his thoughts with me (!) it was my opinion this cut was to facilitate the 103 Merlins planned at the time.

However, a few years later, when the FAA’s support and, importantly, their support funding, was under RAF stewardship at Wyton/Brampton, and the RAF were being pressurised into accepting a similar cut, guess who took a double whammy? The FAA. The RAF didn’t take a fair share of the cut and what funding remained was first come, first served – and when it resides at an RAF station where the senior RN rank was a CPO……… You get the picture.

Same old problem. Two year tours, no-one even remembered “Halifax” and when they were told no-one would challenge the airships. Lesson? Continuity is important. If anyone says “It’s water under the bridge”, take a look downstream. There’s a ******* great dam and it’s about to burst.

Fire-fighting
 

As I say I'm no Nimrod expert - though I used to sail with someone who is ( but he will have his hands tied ) as far as I know the days of dropping flares etc from the bomb bay are gone, I would think fire fighting in the bomb bay pretty unnecessary & bolting the door after the nag has gone, but attention to the AAR from what little I've read seems a good idea - more static discharge prevention, double skinning, for a start ?

Even double skinning has it's own risks, this is not a simple mod' as is proven by the number of posts.

Tucusmeh
Thankyou for your comments.
Obviously you are more informed than I am and I appreciate what you are saying.As a civvy my comments were made on reactions to what I have been reading here and in the press etc. The bottom line is that if you want armed forces and highly skilled ones at that which we have you can not keep making cutbacks to their budgets no matter the service.Eventually you end up compromising safety issues . And as I have already said this seems tobe the case in question here.There should be no value for a persons safety it should be of paramount importance.

I have watched and read this thread with a great deal of interest, both as an ex Nimrod engineer, and now as a Safety Engineer. Some of the comments made on the thread show a real lack of understanding of the whole airworthiness and safety engineering process.

Safeware, who I know very well, has come in for a lot of stick from people who quite obviously do not know what they are talking about, despite their claimed thousands of flying hours etc. It may not have come across in the best possible way, but what Safeware has said is indisputably correct.

Where does all this nonsense about aircraft being as safe as possible come from ? How many of you commenting on here are familiar with JAR25, CS25, ARP4754, AR4761, DO-178B/ED109, DO-254/ED80 JSP553, Def Stan 00-970, Def Stan 00-56 etc, etc ?

Ask yourself if you understand the ALARP principle, its background, the difference between broadly acceptable, tolerable and intolerable. Do you understand how an ALARP judgement is made, how disproportionality has to be demonstrated, and how the ratio varies according to the risk.

Do people really believe that aircraft are built to be as safe as possible ? Some of these people appear to be very experienced, and probably formerly fairly senior, aircrew. Can they be that niaive ?

I would suggest for some of the idiots (and you know who you are) who have posted on here, that they download EASA Compliance Specification CS25 (formerly JAR25), it’s free ! Then read clause CS25.1309, and then read clause AMC25.1309 in the Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC). This will give you a very good idea of the safety targets that large civil aircraft have to meet. Some of the principles are basically the same for the military, but we have also thrown ALARP in to make things more subjective.

I would like to add this to the discussion though. In my experience it is often very difficult for an IPT too properly demonstrate that they should not incorporate major safety modifications. However, in many cases they don’t understand what they are doing, they don’t have the money and they will make some very odd assumptions, particularly those relating to the remaining life of an aircraft, which will have massive implications on the cost benefit analysis.

There is some very good discussion on here particularly from the likes of Safeware and Tucumseh, as ever, but others seem to think that they can just bully others into submission with ill informed rubbish and abuse, dragging a serious debate into disrepute.

Safety_Helmut
Senior Safety Engineer
MSc (Safety Critical Systems Engineering)

TSM
Whilst your huge post covered a multitude of issues, I find it reprehensible that you feel it appropriate to throw mud, then withdraw a few days later.
In these computer driven days, its real easy to point accusation, make over-sentimental claims, then say sorry a few hours after the event. Were we ever to have such a discussion in the Scruffs bar at ISK, I for one would have probably asked you outside, away from the view of the visiting P-3 crew and the UAS on Summer Camp and put you to rights. I hope you can understand that you have more than put a few noses out of joint.
I remain in the RAF, not through a sad, boyish dream of bravado, rather that I firmly believe in what I do, and more importantly those that I work with. I believe, warts and all, problems, of which there are many I acknowledge, the MRA4 will, eventually, do what it says on the tin. We WILL get there. We have to. I so understand, as much as I can, the anguish souls like TD must be going through.
That said, we have to be realistic. With the resources, of which money is one, that are available to us, we will do what we can. That is not a "company line", or a "thats what their airships want to hear". We are trying, awfy hard to make this difficult situation a bit better. Please understand that.
My co-workers are, I know of the same opinion. We don't sit on our fat ar$es accepting a sub-standard aircraft. Yes, we have challenges, but which company in 2007 doesn't. The situation is not, as some have said here, untenable. We are doing the best we can (believe you me we are), and the product will, if somewhat late, do the business.
You should take a deep breath and consider your response th SFO and Difar69.

Good post Footster, your mention of the possible differences between the Service and Civilian approach to health and safety reminded me that the Health and Safety at work Act is binding on the Crown (although the Secretary of State may overide certain requirements). An employer is required to provide, so far as is reasonably practicable, a safe place of work, safe systems of work, safe plant or machinery, etc. But what is "reasonably practicable"?
Reasonably practicable implies that a computation must be made in which the quantum of risk is placed on one scale and the sacrifice ( whether in terms of time, money, effort, etc) necessary to avert the risk on the other. If the sacrifice is dissproportionate to the risk the duty is discharged.

When managing risk both the likelyhood of the happening and the severity should it occur must be considered
Was a valid risk management exercise undertaken?

When the outcome was 14 deaths plus the loss of a £30m(?) aircraft what sacrifice would have been necessary in preventative measures before they were considered dissproportionate

This is not meant to imply that those on the ground were not doing their job but that the policy makers who control the purse strings take a lot of convincing.

Betty,
I have only apologised for taking the pi$$ out of SFO, nothing else. I stand by all my comments about you guys flying in an aircraft today that has had, and continues to have major fuel leak problems. Why are you so angry about that?

Why are you angry about my comments of NO bomb bay extinguishant on a new aircraft coming into service? Why is there no foam in the wings etc? When Art S put the jet into the Moray firth, several of the seats detached in the crash. The BoI stated something along the lines of ...'anyone over 12 stone (or whatever) should not fly in Nimrods for fear of the seats detaching in a crash' Do you know how long it took the RAF to implement that recommendation? It finally came in early last year I think it was! That shows the kind of system that you chaps are up against.

Foam in wings - when the C-130 was lost, the BoI stated all kinds of things about foam in the wings blah. As Nimrod is a 'new build' (kind of I know) why are you guys NOT getting that level of protection in a new jet? Don't you think you deserve it? You are claiming that you are spending more and more time out in high conflict areas, where our aircraft have been shot down, so INHO you absolutely deserve all the protection that you can get.

But your not getting it, and it all comes down to cost.

Forget all the stuff about airliners, forget about my 'aggressiveness' and forget about all the other Red Herrings such as 'acceptable Risks' the fact is that you guys are at the centre of a major shooting war(s), and you are NOT getting the level of support you require or deserve, and I feel that is unacceptable.

We are all striving for the same thing here, its just that some of us, who are no longer serving, are prepared to voice our concerns at the continuing use of an unreliable aircaft that is well and truly past its sell-by date. Whats wrong with that?

Betty, I have never-ever said that you sit on your fat ar$es, and I have no doubt that you are doing the very best you can with what little you have got. Unfortunately you haven't got enough, and what you have isn't very good any more, Oh and you deserve better!

TSM

JFZ90 wrote: I'm willing to stand corrected but are you really saying you would not have any sort of incident? Ignoring the fact that you would probably struggle to find a serviceable Nimrod for an hour everyday I find that statistic extremely hard to believe in light of all the incidents that are emerging.

Gents I think it's clear that we agree on more points than we disagree on:

All the groundies and aircrew at Kinloss are doing their level best with the resources they have - agreed

Lack of funding by successive governments and poor decisions by the MOD are a major contributing factor to the current situation - agreed

In light of the lack of access to substantial remains of the jet the BOI is unlikely to provide all the answers - agreed

Gentlemen,

Those of you that know me, will also know that I rarely post on these forums. I love reading them and keeping up to date with what going on in the service since I left, however, the time has come I feel to ask you all for a period of reflection and calm over what has been written here, especially over the past few days.

I have no intention of defending anyone or putting anyone down. Things have been said that have clearly annoyed and upset some people and that is extremely regrettable under the circumstances. I do understand and agree with some of the things that The swinging Monkey has written, although I hope I would have chosen a slightly ‘better’ way of expressing it. The inputs from Safeware, ShortFatOne and other eminent experts such as Safety_Helmut are immensely interesting and have to be agreed with, as do the comments from the Groundcrew, who are far more up-to-date with the day-to-day goings on of the aircraft and their condition etc.than most of us are. But the intense personal attacks have got to stop.

All of us on this forum lost someone who was near and dear to us in XV230. I lost several good friends, and I am not too weak to openly admit that Jane and I have shed a few tears over those losses and others also (you get a bit like that with age I think!) But the dreadful in-fighting on this thread has got to stop chaps. If only for the memories of the crew and those loved ones we have lost, please lets call it a day as far as the ‘bad-mouthing’ is concerned. Keep the debate going by all means, even keep the speculating going, but please, no more slagging each other off. Lets all stop and just think of the crew for a few minutes and ask if they would approve?? I doubt it very much.

Thank you, and I look forward to seeing many of you at Waddo next week.
Kind regards
Terry K Rumble

TSM's remarks may have come through frustration. I know I have had to switch off my computer on a couple of occasions to prevent me from from posting something that I know I would regret at a later date.

However TSM has apologized and as others have said lets move on.

I for my part have been busying myself with applications under the FOI. For each new piece of evidence I have received I am becoming more convinced that the terrible accident in Sept could have been avoided.

XV230 was bought down due to a fire raging in the bomb bay.

A fire needs 3 elements Oxygen-Ignition-Fuel. Take away any one and the result is no fire.

Oxygen...As it has been pointed out the bomb bay is not air tight so the Oxygen can not be removed Fire extinguishers have been discussed throughly and although someone in the future may come up with a method would the RAF embrace it's use, I doubt it.

Ignition -I am not going to speculate on the cause of ignition I we await the BOI to tell us what the ignition

Fuel..Fuel can be wiring covering or any combustable material. In the case of XV230 the fuel for the fire was aviation fuel in the bomb bay. So if no aviation fuel had leaked, there would not have been a fire.

Conclusion ..To prevent further loss of life the Nimrods fuel leakage problem needs to be addressed.

In the Panorama programme Air Chief Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy, the Chief of Air Staff said the following :

JOFRE: Twenty-five fuel leaks in five months. Is that a lot?

Sir GlennTORPY: It's a lot. I would always like to see the figure reduced to the absolutely lowest minimum.

JOFRE: It sounds like a lot.

Sir GlennTORPY: If you look over the last ten years, the level of fuel leaks that we've had has remained pretty constant over those ten years.

JOFRE: But let's look at the five months up to March, there were 25 fuel leaks, some of them really quite serious. Are you concerned about that?


Sir GlennTORPY: I am very concerned about it, and that's why we have made sure that we analysed every single incidence. There are no underlying themes.

So over the last 10 years Nimrods have been leaking fuel at a constant rate. WHY, what is the problem this is 2007 why can't the fuel leaks be stopped or at the least there should be less fuel leaks .
Air Chief Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy says there are no underlying themes????
I thought they were talking about Nimrods that had fuel leaks surely this is the main underlying theme THEY ALL LEAK !!!

There I have had my little rant and I have written only facts.So before I say more.

TAXI FOR TAPPERS DAD PLEASE.

Tappers Dad,

Sir, you never cease to amaze me with your attitude towards others. You have undoubtedly gained the respect of everyone on this forum, and I hold you in very high esteem.

Terry, you should also be commended for bringing this thread back to a degree of normality. I won't comment further on the things that have been said either, except to say that I have a certain amount of sympathy for people like TSM who clearly feel a great deal of understandable passion for the safety of his colleagues at Kinloss.

Clearly there are some serious problems with the Nimrod fleet, in poarticular continuing fuel leaks. Lets hope that a fix is found soon, for all concerned. I for one will now wait until the BoI publishes its' findings (assuming it will make some of them public) before I post again.

The Winco

TD Well Said.
The slagging off should really stop the important issue is peoples conception of how safe the aircraft is. The official figures at http://www.dasa.mod.uk/natstats/acci...m/acctab1.html for 2000-2006 are in fact at least 1 nimrod out unless they were produced before the ill fated XV 230. I believe the table fails to include XV227 which was written off after the damage shown on Panorama, albeit after it was fully stripped out and flown down to BAE (hats off to that crew). An unfortunate coincidence here was that Al Squires was the QFI on XV227 with Schwarbs as his student when that incident happened, lady luck was not on their side twice.
The inclusion of XV227, and there may be more like it I am unsure, would in fact increase the rate by 20% not good to have lost at least 6 out of a small fleet in the first place! Now how safe does the nimrod look on paper.
I stress the "on paper" as I for one firmly believe that the engineers are doing their best to keep the old lady flying. While fuel leaks are still an issue they are being found now and being rectified or dealt with as safely as possible whilst the aircraft gets on with an important operational role.

Unfortunately it is rarely the snag or fault that you know about that will cause the accident.

I really can't see how you can fly the fleet after the above statement ...... :confused:

History has shown us time and time again that accidents are almost never down to one single event, ie a snag or fault. The training that many of us on here have had from the RAF always emphasises a chain of events leading up to an accident, and there are often many oppurtunites to break that chain, and thus prevent an accident.

The accident we are discussing here, is the end consequence of a whole chain of events, which I suppose started with the original design concept. Decisions were made then which affected the outcome for XV230 and her crew. Many subsequent decisions and actions were undoubtedly part of that chain. Look up Rasmussen's Swiss Cheese Model for a good representation.

Another basic part of any safety management system is the analysis of incidents. Again, this is not unfamiliar territory for those in aviation. We are talking about a history of fuel leaks. They were there 10 years ago when I worked Nimrods. Incidents have also pointed to ignition sources in potential fuel leak areas. What has been done ? I wonder how comfortable the Nimrod IPT would be if asked to see the analyses following earlier incidents, and in particular the analysis that demonstrated that the risk had been reduced to acceptable levels.

Think of an iceberg, 90% below the waterline, analagous to incidents, 10% above the waterline, the accidents.

Safety_Helmut

Gents, a few points if I may.

The AAr system as currently installed on the MR Mk2P Nimrod (MRA2, if you wish!) is radically different to the original "falklands lash-up" of the early '80s.
The main feed is now a single pipe running from the rear end of the probe down through the pressure shell, going under the floor at the port rear of the cockpit and then through the pressure shell again into the bomb-bay, quite far forward.
This in itself is a vast safety improvement (risk mimimisation, regardless of whether any incidents had occurred or not) on the early twin rubber hoses that snaked their way down the inside of the crew compartment, constantly getting walked on etc. :\
This single-skinned but thick-walled pipe (metal, not rubber) now runs rearwards down the port side of the bomb-bay before splitting into two and going out into the rib 1 area at the front of the wings. From there, it basically runs rearwards down either rib 1 until it connects to the main refuel gallery. This has eliminated the "lash-up" that utilised some of the 7-tank pipework and valves as AAR valves, considerably shortened the length of fuel pipework (hoses and metal) involved (especially within the crew compartment) and minimised the ammount of fuel pipework routed near "hot zones".
Now, this had to be done for good reason, for the bean-counters to allow such spending for what is a relatively radical and comprehensive re-design, so for anyone who wishes to simply claim that no-one pays heed to safety until it all goes wrong, here is proof that someone did indeed think, before something possibly went wrong. It is with great sadness, however, that something did indeed go wrong, cause as yet unproven.
Unfortunately, this re-design hasn't been without some issues. Pipelines fretting against the AAR pipe and coupling leaks to name but 2. Now, with the best will in the world, and the utmost care and attention by the technicians carrying out these modifications to ensure correct routing and clearances, nothing can take into account the constant flexing of the airframe (if it didn't it'd snap!) and movement due to thermal expansion/contraction causing all the pipework to "settle" into the position that it wants to adopt. That is what causes the fretting/leaks. Maybe there should have still been some hose sections to allow movement? I don't know, as I'm not a designer. I do know, however, that I wouldn't have attached a fuel pipe support bracket to a hot temp control valve....... :ugh:
There are currently so few Nimrods flying, partly due to the rigorous checks and inspections being carried out to hopefully prevent any further catastrophe and unnecessary loss of life, the groundcrew do care and have a personal pride in their own workmanship, (at least, all the ones I personally know do) contrary to some popular beliefs. It seems to me that a lot of emphasis is being placed on AAR, now although this may well have been a possible leak source, there had to be an ignition source as well......

More speculation but don't we already have a precedent for the ignition source, namely the 227 incident?

Having read the Unit Inquiry Report its seems to be feasible that the same or a similiar chain of events could have occurred on 230:


That is unless something has been done since the 227 incident to prevent a similar incident!

Nimrod failure was predicted
 

THE SUNDAY TIMES June 23, 2007

Nimrod failure was predicted

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle1977632.ece

THE station commander of a Nimrod spyplane that exploded over Afghanistan warned a year earlier that an “unexpected failure” was likely with a similar ageing plane already 10 years past its out-of-service date.
The comments were made in August 2005 at the end of an internal report into a leak of superheated air in the bomb bay of a Nimrod.
In the report, an unnamed group captain says the leak was “a particular concern as the ageing Nimrod MR2 is extended beyond its original out-of-service date” of 1995. ...........

The Nimrod Families Deserve the Truth Now
http://timesonline.typepad.com/mick_...mrod-fami.html
The draft report of the Board of Inquiry into the explosion of Nimrod XV230 over Afghanistan last September in which all 14 of those on board died has been circulating in the MoD and the upper reaches of the RAF for weeks now. I was told by an MoD official in early May that it was already with the MoD lawyers. The families of those who died were told they would see the report this month. Now they are told it will not be released until September. No doubt there will be “good reasons” given but if the report was ready in early May, it is difficult to see why it will take so long to tell the families how their sons, husbands, partners, or fathers died. ............

GOOD WORK MICK SMITH :ok:

21 Jun 2007

http://www.publications.parliament.u...07062166000035
Nimrod Aircraft

Mr. Liddell-Grainger: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many fuel leaks were recorded aboard RAF Nimrod aircraft in the six months prior to September 2006. [142811]
Mr. Ingram: Between the period 1 March 2006 and 31 August 2006 a total of 52 fuel leaks were reported on Nimrod MR2 and R1 aircraft. A fuel leak is defined as any leakage of fuel from aircraft couplings, pipes or fuel tanks. These did not compromise the safety of the aircraft and were rectified under normal maintenance procedures