Pilot Error After ‘Sierra Hotel [SH-T HOT] Break’ F-35C Crash
 

Pilot Error After ‘Sierra Hotel [SH-T HOT] Break’ Resulted in South China Sea F-35C Crash, Investigation Says 21 Feb 2023 https://news.usni.org/2023/02/21/pil...stigation-says
“...The mishap pilot (MP) attempted an expedited recovery breaking overhead the carrier, an approved and common maneuver, but the MP had never performed this maneuver before, and it reduced the amount of time to configure the aircraft and conduct landing checks,” the report said. “As a result of the compressed timeline and the MP’s lack of familiarity with the maneuver, the MP lost situational awareness and failed to complete his landing checklist. Specifically, the MP remained in manual mode when he should have been (and thought he was) in an automated command mode designed to reduce pilot workload during landings.” The ramp strike followed a routine mission of just under four hours for the junior officer pilot and his wingman....

...JASON 406 entered the “groove,” or the final approach to the carrier, and was moving too slowly. “The [pilot] realized that the jet was extremely underpowered as the jet became slow and continued to descend (settle),” the investigation continued. “At this moment, [the pilot] manually pushed the throttle to military power and then went to maximum afterburner once he realized that the airplane was in a perilous state, failing to climb.”... the LSO told the pilot the speed was too low. A second later the LSO told the pilot to wave off and hit the afterburners.

Data recovered from the F-35C after the crash showed that after the turn the F-135 engine on the aircraft shifted to flight idle – the minimum throttle position for the engine – and remained there until the pilot attempted to accelerate two seconds before hitting the ramp on Vinson....

...Ultimately, investigators determined that “pilot error was the cause of the mishap. However, the error was not conducted in a reckless manner nor with malicious intent,” reads the report. A Navy spokesman told USNI News that, due to the crash, the pilot has been removed from flight status but is still in the service.

Additionally, investigators recommended that aviators stop performing Sierra Hotel Breaks, that policy require F-35C pilots to always use Approach Power Compensation Mode (APC)/Delta Flight Path (DFP) throttle assists and that heads-up displays include indicator lights showing when flight aids are activated.""

36 page mishap redacted report PDF: https://s3.documentcloud.org/documen...edacted-v2.pdf (8Mb)

Energy state by any means is a fairly basic requirement, be it by alpha or IAS... if we have dumbed down the driving to the point that the landing mode selections for automation are the actual cause, and not the failure to actually manage the energy state of the plane, then we should pack up our bags and turn off the lights, and go to Creech and drive smarter drones. :(

For sure there was a pilot helmet fire with the explanation for that awful power up sound just before the ramp strike thud in the video:
"...Data recovered from the F-35C after the crash showed that after the turn the F-135 engine on the aircraft shifted to flight idle – the minimum throttle position for the engine – and remained there until the pilot attempted to accelerate two seconds before hitting the ramp on Vinson...."

Pilots do make errors for whatever reason. The night F-35A landing crash/ejection at EGLIN AFB by a senior F-35A pilot attempting to land unwittingly 50 KNOTS too fast. What can one say. DON'T DO IT?!

Eglin F-35 Crash Blamed on Landing Speed, but Software, Helmet, Oxygen Also Faulted | Air & Space Forces Magazine (airandspaceforces.com)

Extract from front pages of Ramp Strike Report:
COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE F-35C CLASS A AVIATION MISHAP OF 24 JAN 22
"...3. I have directed my staff to execute the following recommendations:
a. To consult with the manufacturers of the F-35C and Commander, Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIRSYSCOM) to develop the following:

(1) An intemal indication (Helmet Mounted Display and/or audio tone) to alert a pilot that the aircraft has reached on-speed Angle of Attack (AOA) in the power approach mode without Approach Power Compensation Mode (APC) Delta Flight Path (DFP) engaged. To avoid this indication during level flight, this symbology or tone should only be triggered above a given rate of descent and below a given altitude.

(2) An external indication that an F-35C is in power approach and APC/DEP is not engaged. This extemal indication will need to be visible to the Landing Signal Officers (LSO) while the aircraft is on final approach. This would provide the LSOs the opportunity to intervene earlier in a landing attempt, preventing a similar reoccurrence of an airplane approaching the ship without appropriate thrust....

...c. To collaborate with NAVAIRSYSCOM on the following:
(1) Update the F-35C Flight Manual to reflect that F-35C pilots shall fly APC/DFP when recovering aboard the carrier. The current F-35C Landing Checklist, Step 4 is: APC/DFP — As desired.

(2) Consult with manufacturer of F-35C to incorporate internal HMD and/or audio tone to alert pilot that the aircraft has reached on-speed AOA in the power approach mode without PLM engaged...."

https://s3.documentcloud.org/documen...edacted-v2.pdf (8Mb)

Then there is this in the report: YIKES!
"8. ...The investigation determined the cause of the mishap to be pilot error. The pilot entered the carrier break, bringing the throttle to Flight IDLE, allowing the aircraft to slow to approach speed. Once approach speed was achieved, the F-35C landing checklist was not fully completed by selecting Approach Power Compensation Mode (APC)/Delta Flight Path (DFP), leaving the aircraft operating in Manual Powered Approach (PA) Control Laws (CLAW).

9. During the start, middle, and in-close portions of the landing approach, the pilot applied corrections via stick inputs under the assumption that the aircraft was in either APC or DFP PA CLAW. These corrections did not engage the engine to provide additional thrust as the aircraft was still operating in Manual PA CLAW with the throttle still at Flight IDLE. The aircraft developed a rapid sink rate during the in-close portion of the landing approach and a manual engine power demand was not added until 2.6 seconds prior to impact. This late power addition was insufficient to prevent the aircraft from striking the ramp...."

This old info may be of interest: Semper Lightning: F-35 Flight Control System 09 Dec 2015 Dan “Dog” Canin

"...The ability to tailor the airplane’s response as a function of its configuration and flight regime is the beauty – and potential curse – of FBW. If control engineers get it right – if they define the modes properly, put the transitions in the right places, and give the pilot the right feedback – then control is intuitive. But if they make the various modes too complicated, or the feedback (visual or tactile) isn’t compelling, then modal confusion can set in and bad things can happen.

Some mode changes occur without our knowing, which is fine as long as we don’t have to change our control strategy. An example is the blend from pitch rate command at low speed to g-command at high speed. This transition is seamless from the pilot’s perspective. Other changes require us to change our technique, which is okay if we command the changes ourselves and they’re accompanied by a compelling change in symbology. Examples are the transitions from gear-up (UA) to gear-down (PA), and from CTOL to STOVL.

There are few areas, though, where a mode change is important but not obvious, which is where pilot discipline and training come in. For example, the CV airplane has three different approach modes, easily selected using buttons on the stick and throttle. Two of these modes – APC and DFP[3] – are autothrottle modes, indicated by a three-letter label on the left side of the HUD. The third mode – manual throttle – is indicated by the absence of a label…arguably not the most compelling indication that you’re responsible for the throttle. This interface will probably evolve; [yes sireebob] in the meantime, we need to be disciplined and to make doubly sure we’ve got APC engaged before we turn throttle control over to George...."

https://www.codeonemagazine.com/arti...ml?item_id=187

It’s interesting that the Navy has withheld the accident pilots name. This is not the norm at this stage after a accident.

Just proves that pilots are smarter than engineers. No matter how good the system is, a pilot will find a way of screwing it up. Been there!

Mog

There is an assertion that this maneuver had not been done before. OK, if that's true, then I ask:
If you haven't practiced it during FCLPs, or over an airfield, why are you doing it over the ship?
(The hot break and compressed timeline to get into the groove)

Reads like the military version of Asiana 214.

Mog,

Or. have the engineers made the aircraft far too complex and Pilot's become so reliant upon the machine they lose both flying skills and the ability to effectively control the aircraft systems?

"Children of the Magenta" disease now creeping into Naval Aviation?

It would be interesting to see a video of F-35 Pilots flying approaches to a Carrier (in cockpit view of both hands and the pilot's head with view ahead of the aircraft) and compare those to existing video's of F-18 and legacy aircraft to see the difference in pilot workload and involvement (call it the human/machine interface).

You might find this article relates to what appears to have happened in the F-35 Accident.

The one exception is the F-35 is single pilot and thus the absence of a second pilot eliminates the ability for a check and verify ability that is facilitated by the inclusion of a second human pilot.

The article references a Video which is excellent viewing having watched it before.

https://airfactsjournal.com/2020/09/...-magenta-line/

Does one instance of pilot error remove you from flying? Seems a bit harsh.

This reads more like a basic switchology thing, followed by some fairly basic lack of SA on the pilots behalf. It would appear he did not engage APCM having screamed into a truncated break, throttled back to idle and then apparently not noticed his sink rate until too late. The difference here is that no-one on the ship could be aware that APCM wasn't engaged. Normally there are external indications to the LSO that all the gear - and the hook are down and locked. Hence the recommendations for LM and NAVAIRSYSCOM.

F/A18 are mainly single seat as well. Only the D, F and EA18G variants have a RIO.

depends - if you write off a small trainer - maybe not - if it gets into 9 figures the DEW line beckons

Or. have the engineers made the aircraft far too complex and Pilot's become so reliant upon the machine they lose both flying skills and the ability to effectively control the aircraft systems?

Indeed!

Mog

What at about the millions of taxpayers £/$ to get you to that standard? Assuming he/she is cleared and was a accident, would it not be good practice to give them a chance to redeem them selfs ?
Maybe with some more deck landing training?

Make anything idiot proof and Mother Nature improves the idiot , Mk 2
or to be accurate , attempt to make anything idiot proof :)

In the scheme of things you sure found the absolute least important.

Perhaps the solution to your priority. problem is removing the Pilot from the situation and go Pilot-less with UAV/Drones.

Then some non-Winged Pogue could drive these thing by remote control.....but then who or what would be needed to look over that shoulder?

Did you consider why the concern about Pilots and Automation conflict exists?

The question the Board might not have asked....and answered is what effect would the Pilot correctly engaging the auto systems had on the outcome?

Is the Automation capable of accomodating pilot errors such as happened by showing up hot, high, and close aboard or would it order a Missed Approach and Go Around on its own?

When the report said "...an approved and common maneuver, but the MP had never performed this maneuver before,..." relating to the break did they mean ever or just on the F-35 over the carrier? I started teaching breaks to students at the piston training stage of pilot training and it was a normal method of arriving in the circuit (pattern) on every aircraft I flew. If you take away raw flying skills and rely on more and more automation then this is the outcome.

You know what the LSOs do don't you? Why they are there - and have been since the inception of naval aviation.......

The F-35C pilot was recognising & waiting for an LSO wave off because: "...94. The MP explained that he thought the LSO[s] were going to wave off his attempt to land because he was fast at the start to in the middle of the landing attempt...." This was a bad pilot attitude. Pilot flies the aircraft not the LSOs. They advise mostly and then they COMMAND - which must be OBEYed - with the WAVE OFF being mandatory, no matter what anyone thinks.

About 'breaking into the circuit'. The F-35C pilot had not carried out an SHB (Sh-tHot Break) at the carrier. Breaking into the circuit is standard procedure and well practiced. There is always going to be a first time (and watch out for the second time) for everything. This lad's first time was not to be repeated apparently. Otherwise as the report says the F-35C pilot was a good nugget. Sad that he FRABBED it UP.