The narrative timeline has 11 seconds between entering the groove and the ramp strike. At some time in the first six seconds according to the narrative, the pilot realised he was off glideslope and sinking and advanced the throttle (although the flight data part of the narrative also suggests that he only advanced the throttle two seconds before the ramp strike). At the groove plus six seconds point, the LSO made first call for power, followed by a wave-off one second later. Four seconds later, the aircraft hit the ramp and the pilot ejected.

So the pilot got into the groove with throttle at idle and for whatever reason failed to notice - SA again - until too late. The fact it's a very short approach doesn't help, which is why some form of visual / aural alert to the LSO that (as per gear and hook) the aircraft is in the correct mode for recovery would have helped. That extra six seconds between entering the groove and the first LSO power-call might have resulted in a successful wave-off. That's why they have that authority.

Have we forgotten to teach go arounds recently? I don't think I am "suggesting" that, I am stating that as an observation of what we are seeing people occupying the window seat while relying on automation to do the job. I would have been happy not to see a CAG jettison his ride in there brine, nor read of Elgin's high speed pass from a tight fitting helmet, or a known deteriorating energy state for unrecognised error. This is not isolated to a fleet or service, the airlines have an irreducible level of USAs that occur and have clear wave off policy, yet our drivers continue and land. Expectancy seems to rule the roost.

Years ago, driving a 777 all night to get to 24R @ LAX, beautiful morning, (it's so-CAl..) youngster PF. traffic, normal LAX lineups. Passing 1,000', guy in front misses the only available HS exit that doesn't have a SW tail stuck on it, yet slows down and taxies at a crawl, with the only free off ramp the 90 at the end. Cockpit chat, "expect this to be a GA..." my youngster comments, "... but we are stabilised.....". @ 400', I call "G/A" to the guy on the controls, and tell ATC we are going around. Pleasant scenic of Marina del Ray in the tight RH pattern. Question from approach, " from tower, what was the reason for the G/A?", Hmmm... "noise abatement". "huh?" "noise abatement, there was a plane on the runway, didn't want to make a big noise". It isn't just the flight crew that get target fixation, or task saturation, or helmet fires. The activity we do needs constant comparison of desired state to actual state, to detect the slip. We have a natural confirmation bias from prior successes that the situation we have is not that bad or is salvageable, assuming we actually know we have a slip between expected and actual conditions. Having a helmet fire is not unusual or unexpected, it becomes a problem when the 1st person participant doesn't recognise the overload conditions and act to reset the situation to one where they aren't leaving teeth marks on the elevators.

So a guy flying a multi-crew aircraft, as the Non-Flying pilot while conducting a stabilised approach for 2 minutes, is comparing that situation to a nugget, in a single seat, high energy fighter flying an approach with a significantly changing energy state, that even with automation requires significant manual inputs, with only 11 seconds in the groove- all this against a moving target.

Yep, I can see the parallels.

From the report.

42. The F-35C Landing Checklist is:
1. Landing Gear – Down
2. Hook – Down (as required)
3. Land/Taxi Lights – As required
4. APC/DFP – As desired

refocus,

From the USNI article posted back in the Thread.....

'SASless' I would not trust a USNInews article about NavAv for them to get the details correct unless the author specialised in the matter. I read what you highlighted and thought 'that does not seem correct' but then did not try to puzzle it out at the time. The F-35C has automation that cannot be taken away as mentioned I think in the Dan Canin article.

My old brain always reverts to 'meatball, line up and airspeed (Opt AoA). Trim to that (the A4G held that attitude very well still with fast ailerons/elevators) controlling glideslope with throttle and AoA with elevator and line up with aileron. It is a twinkletoe business that keeps one occupied for a few intense concentration tunnel vision seconds. Nothing else will do. My skin crawls reading the F-35C mishap pilot was at flight idle for so long even lining up in that state. That was the time to wave off, given other bits were not OK, according to the pilot but then again I was not there - it was not me chief. For sure the LSOs need to know when the F-35C is in manual. I would have thought that was in the ball call. "Callsign Fuel Manual (or not)".

F-35C Slow Motion Arrest USS NIMITZ OK Number Three Wire
https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....0b2b40f07d.gif

Based on the various podcasts discussing PLM, they are going to PLM only, no manual mode. For PLM to fail, other flight systems would have to fail too. No one brought up the fact that someone would leave it off.

I find the modes on/off confusing. The gaggle of LSOs on the platform (it has another name also) have a bunch of dials and screens SO I'm guessing that an indicator about the status of the PLM/whatever OR NOT could be shown despite whatever the pilot says during ball call.

apparently not, you missed the point, the helmet fire wasn't in our plane, it was ATC. Re-read.

I don't think that is a helmet fire fdr. That just sounds like a regulation gherkin that ATC throw at you from time to time.

I don't get it. It's been a long time since I was doing this kind of stuff, but we used to enter the break at the ship in a similar way quite often. Of course a Sierra Hotel break was not always possible or appropriate. For example, when returning from a 35 or 40 plane Alpha strike with the pattern full of aircraft , we entered between 250 and 350 knots and made a normal break to downwind so as to fit in with the existing traffic. The idea was to slot into your place in line without any unnecessary gap to the plane ahead but also without extending upwind very far which would cause an extended downwind leg and that burns up precious fuel. It was all about judgement and it was a low stress event, if you can consider any landing on a carrier "low stress".

However, when returning from the Northern BARCAP in the Gulf of Tonkin during the Vietnam Conflict, we left station only after being relieved by the guys from the subsequent launch. Consequently, we were last to recover and often the ship was waiting for us having already recovered all the other aircraft except the ready tanker and the helo. The pattern was empty and the ship was eager to complete the recovery without delay. In that case, my flight of two normally approached the ship in a steep decent with the leader's power set just above idle (to give the wingman something to work with) and the oil cooler door open which produced a wonderful howl which was the hallmark of the F-8 Crusader entering the break at high speeds. The goal was to arrive at the ship just above flight deck altitude, close aboard the starboard side so the guys on the 0-7 level in the island could get a good view.

You wanted to look your best because it reflected on your squadron reputation. People were watching, so if you were the wingman you tucked in as tightly as you dared and then got even a little bit closer to the leader, hoping that you didn't touch him and wind up in a big ball fo flaming metal. How embarrassing that would be. And the leader tried to be silky smooth, giving his wingman the best chance to fly a really tight formation. If you were good at it, you hit the break with ultra smooth maneuvering and little or no throttle movement. Airspeed would be right around 600 knots or a bit more, making close formation flying even more challenging. There is a reason the Blues and Thunderbirds fly around at about half that speed.

When abeam the island, the leader and wingman would break together in a 6.5g "fan break", throttle at idle, and speed brakes out. The wingman would use a bit less g in order to gain a little separation at the 180.

The idea of lighting the burner in the break, as this F-35 pilot apparently did, makes no sense. The idea is to slow down, isn't it? The F-35 pilot in question, it seems to me, entered the break too slowly and lit the burner in order to sustain a high g turn to downwind. I don't get it.

Back to my Sea Story. So after 180 degrees of turn you find yourself at the 180, usually with too much speed to lower the gear and (in the case of the Crusader) raise the wing. You turn in anyway and when you slow sufficiently you configure your fighter for landing somewhere around the 135 or 90 degrees to go. We had APC but using it it was optional. However, knowing if it was engaged or not was NOT optional. I always read the landing checklist, EVERY TIME. And I never had a gear-up pass or a ramp strike caused by not knowing the configuration of my airplane.

That seems rather obvious and at first glance it seems as though it would be pretty simple. But flying a high performance fighter is rather complicated and not everyone can do it well. That's why it's so important to place the best people in the cockpit based on their ability and (as someone once said) the "content of their character". Using gender or skin color or any other social metric to assign fighter pilots is no way to run a military force.

Bottom line: When appropriate, making a Sierra Hotel break is normal and it's surprising that any fighter pilot operating around the ship who achieved the rank of Lt. had never performed one. Something isn't quite right. It sounds to me like this guy was in over his head and found himself performing a maneuver everyone in his squadron should find easy enough to complete safely. You don't like a 650 knot break? Enter at 550 knots. Can't hack a 7g break, use a 6g turn. Can't configure the airplane for landing by the time you hit the groove if you're too hot at the 180? Break a little bit long or extend your downwind and accept a "long in the groove" grade by the LSO.

I admit I'm out of touch with the modern Navy. However, if you can't keep up with airplane well enough when things get busy to the point that you cant perform the landing checklist and/or you don't know if you're in APC or not, it's time to ask them to transfer you to flying the COD or some other less challenging job, isn't it? Folks who don't measure up when it comes to showing off around the ship will NEVER measure up if they ever find themselves in real combat.

Don't try being a "hot dog" if you're really a "hamburger", or in this guy's case a "cheeseburger". I don't know if fighter pilots still use these terms, but you get the point. Said another way, "The don't wind 'em as tight as they used to".

Totally.
Surely the future is not having 'aircrew' touch the aeroplane for take off or landing - these can be automatic functions - let the computer do this.
This halfway house of some auto functions is just a temporary stop on the march of progress.

Aircrew, while they still fly, will be airborne to put a human brain into battle management on the scene - essentially the job of a back seater.

And yet, it is exactly the same thing that happened at KSFO 28R with the latest effort to cut tails off aircraft parked off the side of a runway, but from the other side, ATC directing 6 times for the plane to go arounds, a whoopsie put down to "sorry, comms". Are we so fixated on details that actually looking that the runway is clear is too much to ask for? Is it too much to expect a pilot to cross check a MASI/AOA indexer when they have an auto throttle that they have abrogated , rightly or wrongly, responsibility to? For the F35, perhaps the APC needs a set of gold wings gifted from the drivers, and silver wings from the USAF. Or maybe, and sorry to be simplistic, maybe we should train and expect crews to cross check their instruments to confirm performance and selections, perhaps pilots should be trained to confirm a switch selection against an expected response, and in the absence of that response, to have a curiosity in the proceedings. Would save the odd occasional F35A, F35C, B777, B777, B777, ATR 72... etc.

Developing of bad habits can occur over time, or instantaneously. The instant version tends to be self evident by the ablutions that follow. Those that develop over time are insidious, and we have an expectancy that our deviation from good practice is without risk, until stuff goes pear shaped. Driving planes continues to be an education, hopefully.

“Helmet fires” (otherwise known as task saturation, mis-prioritization, situational awareness and channelized attention)

Assuming that they only relate to temporally constrained events is to miss some of the obvious implications.

In respect to temporal constraints, an 11 second window is about the time that it took to tear apart Lauda 4, It is about 15 times the available response time for a recovery of an R-22 from a throttle chop OGE^... it's 4 times the event time for an engine failure in the hover*... and, as far as SA is concerned, if the time available to ensure that you can remain in front of the elevators is inadequate for the driver to remain in front of the elevators, or to bother to look at an ASI or AOA gauge, then perhaps the training command and the RAG is needing to change their program. In the event at Eglin with the high speed landing there, the time spent leaving bite marks on the elevators was substantial.

• If a day VFR recovery to the boat with a jet is reliant on the guys getting the right sequence of buttons flicked as it is a cognitive overload to check an IAS or alpha indexer, then we need to be looking at drones instead.
• If it is reasonable to be dismayed by the state of SA of the AZ214 crew for loss of awareness pertaining to basic aviation skills, then there is a hypocrisy in not considering the Eglin A35A and the F35C ramp striker to be "...just one of those things..."
• The failure to check performance is not a new phenomenon, e.g, serviceable F-8 Crusaders parked short of the airport in the 50s and 60s and early 70s...#
• it is't restricted to nuggets, e.g., CAG Super hornet.

----------------

^ OGE hover engine failure, one certified helicopter has a Tau (time constant) from normal Nr to stall of 0.7 seconds. The FAA §27 requires a 1 second delay for showing compliance, which exceeds the time from failure to death by around 1-(0.7+(1/8.87)*0.5)= ~0.244 seconds, an eternity to meet eternity. The FAA is happy for a 200FH brand new CFI(H) to demonstrate and to teach that procedure... Now, divide the 11 seconds by 0.7...
* for an IGE hover engine failure, in a low energy rotor system the event is over and the dust is settling in less than 3 seconds. In that time, there are at least 5 control input responses that the 200hr instructor has to get right in sequence to avoid rolling his shiny little rotorcraft into a wad.
#The approach mags used to have so many of the "didn't look at AOA/MASI" events that it was hard to determine if a magazine had been previously read or not.

Mozella, thank you for hitting the nail right on the head. Respect from a former Air Defender.

How about this for an exercise.....forget all the Gucci kit available to assist in the landing of a jet on a carrier.....let's focus on the straight forward basic airmanship that occurred.

Answer the question.....at what point did the MP's effort to land that F-35 on the Carrier begin to go wrong?

Was it initial entry airspeed, height, combination of both, the addition of After Burner in the initial break, radius of turn in the initial break, and right on down the line to the point he realized it was time to eject leaving his aircraft to crash onto the carrier?

At which point would one think a Go Around Decision should have been made?

Why did he wait so long to see the Accident Chain materialize in front of his eyes?

Why did he not realize he had goofed it up to the degree that abandoning the Landing was necessary and appropriate?

He is quoted as saying he did not feel any pressure by Command or other sources that might have influenced his thinking....but does not the Navy system not do that even if it is not intentional?

Some experienced Navy Jet Pilots have suggested what some of the answers might be.

High, fast, and above the Glide Slope is a tough situation to correct in a sleek low drag Jet. just as it is in any aircraft when landing.

Are we not taught that the secret to a good landing. is a good approach to that landing.

At what point did the MP realize his approach was "unstable" or did he not ever realize that until the LSO called Wave Off at almost the same instant that the Pilot was ejecting?

The real question os "why" the very late realization it was not going to end well.

A ramp strike should result in the removal of the pilot’s certification. If you can’t land the aircraft, you have no business flying it. Basic airmanship. As for the “checklist excuse”, just four items? Not impressed.

There are quite a few misconceptions and areas of misunderstanding on this thread that should probably be cleared up…

What stands out to me is the usual ‘facts based’ USN mishap report that completely fails to answer the question of how the pilot got himself into an unrecoverable situation. By glossing over that, this report offers little than a summary of what happened with a few recommendations that will hopefully prevent a crash when the next guy or girl screws it up. However, no effort is made to prevent future screw ups - simply the consequences.

Before I receive a barrage of incoming spears, I will start out by stating that I am 100% guilty of participating in this activity in a previous life. I’ve seen ‘expedited recoveries’ performed excellently and safely. I have also seen more than 1 pilot almost fly into the ocean attempting them. I’ve seen countless over-stresses of F18s doing this and plenty of requirements to wave off unsafe SHBs.

To start we should move away from the terminology of ‘expedited break’ or Sierra Hotel Break - it was a ***** hot break. Period. The intent was to demonstrate ability / Naval Aviator ‘spirit’ / bring morale to those watching. Very happy for someone to tell me the risks inherent in a SHB are worth saving approximately 30s during a deck recovery cycle. Additionally, in order to execute a SHB you need to generate more of a gap between you and your interval - you can achieve the exact same timing by just executing a normal break behind the aircraft ahead of you in the pattern. Finally, if you are ‘breaking the deck’ ie. the first aircraft to land in a given cycle, you aim for the deck to go green and ready for your recovery as you enter the groove. The time spent in the pattern, getting to the point in space, is irrelevant.

So how does one fly a SHB? Great question as it’s not published. It is not a standard procedure that a pilot is taught at any point in training or when in the fleet. Is it commonplace? - absolutely. But the first time you ‘attempt’ the SHB you are on a voyage of discovery guided only by the ‘gouge’ / techniques passed informally to you by your peers. What could go wrong? What we are talking about is normalisation of deviance. CV NATOPS states how you should fly the pattern and offers no alternative guidance. Fly the SHB and you are saying “noted, but I’m going to ignore that and try something else”. Again, before you come at me, baying for blood - I’ve ignored CV NATOPS and ripped it off at 7g aft of the ship in Max AB.

Why Afterburner in the break? Because it looks and sounds cool to the audience watching on the deck. Period. Why didn’t he wave off when he thought he was off parameters? Because pilots ‘shall not’ take their own wave offs in the groove - this is the job of the LSOs. Very happy to explain why another time. Why did he fail to complete his 4 item landing checklist? Because he was task saturated in a 7g, ~600ft, max performance turn whilst looking over his shoulder at the flight deck whilst panicking on how an earth he was going to slow his F35 down. I sympathise - I’ve been there.

SHBs are informally encouraged in the fleet. LSOs used to give automatic upgrades to your landing grade if you flew a safe SHB, regardless of being off parameters that would guarantee you a poor grade had you been flying a normal pattern. Do something unsafe however and all bets are off.

So to finish with something constructive. If the USN want to avoid this happening again by addressing the route cause they have two options:

1. Prohibit SHBs. Tricky one as it’s a grey line on what is / what isn’t and I agree with the board’s rationale on why a blanket ban creates additional problems.
2. Write a procedure on how to fly a SHB and like everything else you do in naval aviation, train to it. This would be my recommendation for what it’s worth (absolutely nothing).

Finally thoughts to the 5 crew members who were seriously injured by this, 3 of which whom required immediate MEDIVAC. I do sympathise with the pilot but you have little defence when consciously decide to deviate from your trained standards and attempt something you’ve never done before, that has not formalised execution standards.

Not a Spectator Sport
 

If circumstances put you in a position where you cannot execute a safe landing, on a ship or on a field, the Sierra Hotel thing to do is to go around before you get "in the groove,"

Perhaps the APD/DFP need to be engaged automatically when the gear and hook are extended,but can be turned OFF,manually when `Brains` wants to prove he is `SH-T HOT`.....and confirmed by the LSO on getting `in the groove`...