Pilot Error After ‘Sierra Hotel [SH-T HOT] Break’ F-35C Crash
 

Pilot Error After ‘Sierra Hotel [SH-T HOT] Break’ Resulted in South China Sea F-35C Crash, Investigation Says 21 Feb 2023 https://news.usni.org/2023/02/21/pil...stigation-says
“...The mishap pilot (MP) attempted an expedited recovery breaking overhead the carrier, an approved and common maneuver, but the MP had never performed this maneuver before, and it reduced the amount of time to configure the aircraft and conduct landing checks,” the report said. “As a result of the compressed timeline and the MP’s lack of familiarity with the maneuver, the MP lost situational awareness and failed to complete his landing checklist. Specifically, the MP remained in manual mode when he should have been (and thought he was) in an automated command mode designed to reduce pilot workload during landings.” The ramp strike followed a routine mission of just under four hours for the junior officer pilot and his wingman....

...JASON 406 entered the “groove,” or the final approach to the carrier, and was moving too slowly. “The [pilot] realized that the jet was extremely underpowered as the jet became slow and continued to descend (settle),” the investigation continued. “At this moment, [the pilot] manually pushed the throttle to military power and then went to maximum afterburner once he realized that the airplane was in a perilous state, failing to climb.”... the LSO told the pilot the speed was too low. A second later the LSO told the pilot to wave off and hit the afterburners.

Data recovered from the F-35C after the crash showed that after the turn the F-135 engine on the aircraft shifted to flight idle – the minimum throttle position for the engine – and remained there until the pilot attempted to accelerate two seconds before hitting the ramp on Vinson....

...Ultimately, investigators determined that “pilot error was the cause of the mishap. However, the error was not conducted in a reckless manner nor with malicious intent,” reads the report. A Navy spokesman told USNI News that, due to the crash, the pilot has been removed from flight status but is still in the service.

Additionally, investigators recommended that aviators stop performing Sierra Hotel Breaks, that policy require F-35C pilots to always use Approach Power Compensation Mode (APC)/Delta Flight Path (DFP) throttle assists and that heads-up displays include indicator lights showing when flight aids are activated.""

36 page mishap redacted report PDF: https://s3.documentcloud.org/documen...edacted-v2.pdf (8Mb)

Energy state by any means is a fairly basic requirement, be it by alpha or IAS... if we have dumbed down the driving to the point that the landing mode selections for automation are the actual cause, and not the failure to actually manage the energy state of the plane, then we should pack up our bags and turn off the lights, and go to Creech and drive smarter drones. :(

For sure there was a pilot helmet fire with the explanation for that awful power up sound just before the ramp strike thud in the video:
"...Data recovered from the F-35C after the crash showed that after the turn the F-135 engine on the aircraft shifted to flight idle – the minimum throttle position for the engine – and remained there until the pilot attempted to accelerate two seconds before hitting the ramp on Vinson...."

Pilots do make errors for whatever reason. The night F-35A landing crash/ejection at EGLIN AFB by a senior F-35A pilot attempting to land unwittingly 50 KNOTS too fast. What can one say. DON'T DO IT?!

Eglin F-35 Crash Blamed on Landing Speed, but Software, Helmet, Oxygen Also Faulted | Air & Space Forces Magazine (airandspaceforces.com)

Extract from front pages of Ramp Strike Report:
COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE F-35C CLASS A AVIATION MISHAP OF 24 JAN 22
"...3. I have directed my staff to execute the following recommendations:
a. To consult with the manufacturers of the F-35C and Commander, Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIRSYSCOM) to develop the following:

(1) An intemal indication (Helmet Mounted Display and/or audio tone) to alert a pilot that the aircraft has reached on-speed Angle of Attack (AOA) in the power approach mode without Approach Power Compensation Mode (APC) Delta Flight Path (DFP) engaged. To avoid this indication during level flight, this symbology or tone should only be triggered above a given rate of descent and below a given altitude.

(2) An external indication that an F-35C is in power approach and APC/DEP is not engaged. This extemal indication will need to be visible to the Landing Signal Officers (LSO) while the aircraft is on final approach. This would provide the LSOs the opportunity to intervene earlier in a landing attempt, preventing a similar reoccurrence of an airplane approaching the ship without appropriate thrust....

...c. To collaborate with NAVAIRSYSCOM on the following:
(1) Update the F-35C Flight Manual to reflect that F-35C pilots shall fly APC/DFP when recovering aboard the carrier. The current F-35C Landing Checklist, Step 4 is: APC/DFP — As desired.

(2) Consult with manufacturer of F-35C to incorporate internal HMD and/or audio tone to alert pilot that the aircraft has reached on-speed AOA in the power approach mode without PLM engaged...."

https://s3.documentcloud.org/documen...edacted-v2.pdf (8Mb)

Then there is this in the report: YIKES!
"8. ...The investigation determined the cause of the mishap to be pilot error. The pilot entered the carrier break, bringing the throttle to Flight IDLE, allowing the aircraft to slow to approach speed. Once approach speed was achieved, the F-35C landing checklist was not fully completed by selecting Approach Power Compensation Mode (APC)/Delta Flight Path (DFP), leaving the aircraft operating in Manual Powered Approach (PA) Control Laws (CLAW).

9. During the start, middle, and in-close portions of the landing approach, the pilot applied corrections via stick inputs under the assumption that the aircraft was in either APC or DFP PA CLAW. These corrections did not engage the engine to provide additional thrust as the aircraft was still operating in Manual PA CLAW with the throttle still at Flight IDLE. The aircraft developed a rapid sink rate during the in-close portion of the landing approach and a manual engine power demand was not added until 2.6 seconds prior to impact. This late power addition was insufficient to prevent the aircraft from striking the ramp...."

This old info may be of interest: Semper Lightning: F-35 Flight Control System 09 Dec 2015 Dan “Dog” Canin

"...The ability to tailor the airplane’s response as a function of its configuration and flight regime is the beauty – and potential curse – of FBW. If control engineers get it right – if they define the modes properly, put the transitions in the right places, and give the pilot the right feedback – then control is intuitive. But if they make the various modes too complicated, or the feedback (visual or tactile) isn’t compelling, then modal confusion can set in and bad things can happen.

Some mode changes occur without our knowing, which is fine as long as we don’t have to change our control strategy. An example is the blend from pitch rate command at low speed to g-command at high speed. This transition is seamless from the pilot’s perspective. Other changes require us to change our technique, which is okay if we command the changes ourselves and they’re accompanied by a compelling change in symbology. Examples are the transitions from gear-up (UA) to gear-down (PA), and from CTOL to STOVL.

There are few areas, though, where a mode change is important but not obvious, which is where pilot discipline and training come in. For example, the CV airplane has three different approach modes, easily selected using buttons on the stick and throttle. Two of these modes – APC and DFP[3] – are autothrottle modes, indicated by a three-letter label on the left side of the HUD. The third mode – manual throttle – is indicated by the absence of a label…arguably not the most compelling indication that you’re responsible for the throttle. This interface will probably evolve; [yes sireebob] in the meantime, we need to be disciplined and to make doubly sure we’ve got APC engaged before we turn throttle control over to George...."

https://www.codeonemagazine.com/arti...ml?item_id=187

It’s interesting that the Navy has withheld the accident pilots name. This is not the norm at this stage after a accident.

Just proves that pilots are smarter than engineers. No matter how good the system is, a pilot will find a way of screwing it up. Been there!

Mog

There is an assertion that this maneuver had not been done before. OK, if that's true, then I ask:
If you haven't practiced it during FCLPs, or over an airfield, why are you doing it over the ship?
(The hot break and compressed timeline to get into the groove)

Reads like the military version of Asiana 214.

Mog,

Or. have the engineers made the aircraft far too complex and Pilot's become so reliant upon the machine they lose both flying skills and the ability to effectively control the aircraft systems?

"Children of the Magenta" disease now creeping into Naval Aviation?

It would be interesting to see a video of F-35 Pilots flying approaches to a Carrier (in cockpit view of both hands and the pilot's head with view ahead of the aircraft) and compare those to existing video's of F-18 and legacy aircraft to see the difference in pilot workload and involvement (call it the human/machine interface).

You might find this article relates to what appears to have happened in the F-35 Accident.

The one exception is the F-35 is single pilot and thus the absence of a second pilot eliminates the ability for a check and verify ability that is facilitated by the inclusion of a second human pilot.

The article references a Video which is excellent viewing having watched it before.

https://airfactsjournal.com/2020/09/...-magenta-line/

Does one instance of pilot error remove you from flying? Seems a bit harsh.

This reads more like a basic switchology thing, followed by some fairly basic lack of SA on the pilots behalf. It would appear he did not engage APCM having screamed into a truncated break, throttled back to idle and then apparently not noticed his sink rate until too late. The difference here is that no-one on the ship could be aware that APCM wasn't engaged. Normally there are external indications to the LSO that all the gear - and the hook are down and locked. Hence the recommendations for LM and NAVAIRSYSCOM.

F/A18 are mainly single seat as well. Only the D, F and EA18G variants have a RIO.

depends - if you write off a small trainer - maybe not - if it gets into 9 figures the DEW line beckons

Or. have the engineers made the aircraft far too complex and Pilot's become so reliant upon the machine they lose both flying skills and the ability to effectively control the aircraft systems?

Indeed!

Mog

What at about the millions of taxpayers £/$ to get you to that standard? Assuming he/she is cleared and was a accident, would it not be good practice to give them a chance to redeem them selfs ?
Maybe with some more deck landing training?

Make anything idiot proof and Mother Nature improves the idiot , Mk 2
or to be accurate , attempt to make anything idiot proof :)

In the scheme of things you sure found the absolute least important.

Perhaps the solution to your priority. problem is removing the Pilot from the situation and go Pilot-less with UAV/Drones.

Then some non-Winged Pogue could drive these thing by remote control.....but then who or what would be needed to look over that shoulder?

Did you consider why the concern about Pilots and Automation conflict exists?

The question the Board might not have asked....and answered is what effect would the Pilot correctly engaging the auto systems had on the outcome?

Is the Automation capable of accomodating pilot errors such as happened by showing up hot, high, and close aboard or would it order a Missed Approach and Go Around on its own?

When the report said "...an approved and common maneuver, but the MP had never performed this maneuver before,..." relating to the break did they mean ever or just on the F-35 over the carrier? I started teaching breaks to students at the piston training stage of pilot training and it was a normal method of arriving in the circuit (pattern) on every aircraft I flew. If you take away raw flying skills and rely on more and more automation then this is the outcome.

You know what the LSOs do don't you? Why they are there - and have been since the inception of naval aviation.......

The F-35C pilot was recognising & waiting for an LSO wave off because: "...94. The MP explained that he thought the LSO[s] were going to wave off his attempt to land because he was fast at the start to in the middle of the landing attempt...." This was a bad pilot attitude. Pilot flies the aircraft not the LSOs. They advise mostly and then they COMMAND - which must be OBEYed - with the WAVE OFF being mandatory, no matter what anyone thinks.

About 'breaking into the circuit'. The F-35C pilot had not carried out an SHB (Sh-tHot Break) at the carrier. Breaking into the circuit is standard procedure and well practiced. There is always going to be a first time (and watch out for the second time) for everything. This lad's first time was not to be repeated apparently. Otherwise as the report says the F-35C pilot was a good nugget. Sad that he FRABBED it UP.

Spaz, if you'll indulge me, please explain the difference between a normal break and a sh1thot break? I have an idea, but may be blind to a few particulars.
I have seen and flown the difference in a "short break" (at the numbers, downwind end end) versus a normal break (at the numbers, upwind end) in a trainer aircraft, but that's not quite at F-35C speeds.

To this landlubber, the proportion of naval aviators' flying time spent developing and maintaining competence in arrested landings is ridiculous. It was one of the UK's reasons for going STOVL with the Sea Harrier and then the F35B. Accordingly I don't share SASless's dim view of F35C throttle automation and associated pilot deskilling. The primary reason for putting a human on board modern fighters is to take tactical and ethical decisions which we do not currently entrust to computers. The less time which can be spent rehearsing domestics like takeoff and landing, the more is available to rehearse combat skills. Eventually we will get to a point where the sole occupant of a combat aircraft is a passenger ahem, WSO, giving instructions but having no direct control of the aircraft. Automation did not fail in this case: the human failed to engage it. A familiar story. The actions demanded by the reviewing officer look like good ones to prevent recurrence. One F35C might turn out to be a relatively small price to pay when set against all the CQ flying that automation, properly used, could save over the aircraft's service career.

I guess you called it yourself in the opening of your post: landlubbers tend to lack a clue.
I ran into similar uninformed opinions among the USAF.
I am not sure if you are aware of this, but the F-18 has had a "let HAL fly it" feature for well over 20 years.
That does not offer any excuse to ignore both proficiency and fundamental skills.
Likewise with instrument flying.

HEHEH. IIRC the accident report explains well enough? I'd have to go look now. My deck landing experience started with an A4G Skyhawk 'rolling deck landing' (touch and go) aboard HMS Eagle back in late 1971. Being completely new to deck landings I was not authorised to arrest / catapult as were the other members of VF-805 - all experienced deck landers. About one month later I day qualified and later night qualified as an A4G deck lander aboard HMAS Melbourne - that is all I know. We knew nothing of an SHB but I guess may have carried out our own 'quick circuit' if we were late for CHARLIE TIME (arrive at carrier for DL). I've said before elsewhere I think that at first the A4Gers did NON-standard carrier circuits at 400 feet - the old Sea Venom height. This was great because it allowed a LEVEL base turn to pick up the meatball in the MIRROR halfway around, to fly the meatball for a shorter straightaway and less time to FRABup. :} During my cruise late 1971 aboard MELBOURNE the USN trained A4G LSOs convinced VF-805 CO (ex Sea Venom) to fly at the NATOPS height of 600 feet downwind. SADLY this meant a descending base turn which could be difficult to master as a newbie while also carrier landing, but hey I'm still here.

The USNI news 'LIGHTING' article has a NATOPS carrier circuit diagram so that explains a lot: (the caption is not correct - the diagram shows an ordinary Hornet carrier circuit - read the accident / mishap report for the SHB details [which is OK by the USN when required])
JPG: https://news.usni.org/wp-content/upl...g_pattern.jpeg
article: Pilot Error Caused South China Sea F-35C Crash, Investigation Says - USNI News
https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....de309dc49e.gif
JPG shows Super Hornets likely about to break into CVN carrier circuit - as per diagram - for DLs.

https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....cd47cef3e2.jpg

I think you misunderstand. F-18 might as well not have an autoland feature, given that its pilots are required to maintain competence in manual landings, which forces practically all deck landings to be flown manually. But USN leadership deserves great credit for the progress it has made, and continues to make on automation. Are the leaders who have moved the culture away from "manual first" uninformed or clueless as to the relative value of CQ? For evidence of how much further the Navy is down this road than the USAF, see MQ-25.

For the avoidance of doubt, this is a compliment for naval aviation.

Page 22 of mishap report has this for SHBs (perhaps there's a more extreme version? Probably :} ).
"...Aviation Mishap
77. The MP led his flight from two thousand feet to the initial when the flight deck was ready for the fixed wing recovery. Approaching the ship, the MP initiated an expedited recovery to the downwind. An expedited recovery maneuver is when an aircraft initiates a turn to downwind from either behind the ship or over the top of the ship. Based on airspeed, break location, and Gforces applied to an aircraft, there are various types of expedited recoveries (also referred to as a Sierra Hotel Break (SHB)).

78. The expedited recovery maneuver is commonplace in naval aviation and it can reduce the amount of open deck time as a ready deck is waiting for a recovering aircraft. During an expedited recovery, an aircraft uses G-forces to decelerate over the course of a 360-degree turn, dropping the landing gear when the aircraft is below landing gear transition speed. When breaking aft of the ship or overhead the ship, a pilot has a reduced amount of time to configure the aircraft and conduct landing checks. An expedited recovery reduces the amount of open deck time and can increase flight deck efficiencies. When breaking upwind of the ship, a pilot has more time to configure the aircraft for landing, trim the airplane, conduct landing checks, and prepare for the approach turn to landing.

79. Before the Mishap Flight (MF), the MP had never initiated an expedited recovery from overhead the ship. On 24 January, it was his first attempt. The MP was a previous Top-5 Nugget and a Top-10 ball-flyer within CVW-2, indicating that his landing performance at the ship had been exceptional for a first-tour junior officer (JO).

80. The MP discussed the proper execution of an expedited recovery with other members of his squadron. The MP wanted to try a “benign first attempt” at breaking overhead the ship. The MP explained that other JOs had performed the maneuver overhead the ship and he wanted to attempt it before the end of deployment. The MP described hearing from CVW-2 LSOs that an expedited recovery can reduce open deck times, but he did not feel pressure to perform an expedited recovery on 24 January from the CVW-2 LSOs or anyone else...."

There is a lot of technical detail about 'automatic carrier landings' that could be extracted but I doubt the 'doubters' want to read it. Both the Super Hornet and F-35C have a version of the "MAGIC CARPET" (now known under different acronyms respectively). This automation reduces FCLP & CQ requirements because even NUGGET pilots do well when it is enabled. Super Hornet nuggets apparently don't use it all the time - or initially - so that they are well practiced in manual landings before going 'auto'; so that IF auto fails they can revert to manual, so to speak. I have not read that F-35C nuggets use 'manual' but perhaps they do during FCLP. When F-35C nuggets use 'auto' for DLs they have excellent nugget results.

Presumably the waiting was concluded at around the time of the ramp strike.
Was that an attempt to teach the LSO something? The logic of waiting for a wave off when the flight path or energy state is already ugly seems to be a fundamentally flawed plan.

Irrespective of the amount of bells and whistles that are incorporated into the system, and displayed by whatever means, somewhere there is a speedo and an alpha indexer, and the assumption that a mode that is selected is going to work as advertised comes with historical examples of unfortunate outcomes. Should we remove the wings from the pilots uniform and replace it with a stylised Nintendo hand piece?

Automation is great, it does not and never will replace the need for monitoring of the system performance, and if that is inconvenient, then there are jobs begging at McDonalds and Carl's Jnr that are easier on the demand of monitoring of systems performance.

AZ 214, AF447, Pierre le Luberjack, Bangalore, even the Too loose A330-300 test flight deal.... assuming automation is going to work every time is fine if you have really good life insurance or religion.

Thanks for the video link. I did not realise the SHBs are now banned? I'll have to reread the report more closely. Also the wordy host tells us that the F-35C pilot was injured enough to lose his medical flight status but then later outlines he has the second worse FNAB (whatever) result "keeps wings but won't fly again' if I heard talk correctly. A few times MOOCH mumbles acronyms I cannot fathom but hey 'what's new'. :}

Oops missed 'fdr' point about 'waiting'. Perhaps I misconstrued the point. "IT was not me Chief". I can only go on the pilot words in the report. The pilot kept going hoping to save the approach. He did get waved off but too late.

Monitoring the approach is of course a requirement but this pilot had a helmet fire. I'm reminded of the Eglin AFB F-35A pilot at night attempting to rectify HMDS faults during his FAST approach. These two pilots were trying to do TOO MUCH and needed to GO ROUND AGAIN - but too late. CRASH.

Recently (a few years ago) LSOs used a NINTENDO/ATARI gizmo to fly an aircraft approach for reals. I've not heard anything more (probably for good reason). :} I'll go get the link to the story....

SMOOTH LANDING
https://navalaviationnews.navylive.d...8_01Spring.pdf (9.4Mb)

“From left, VX-23 test pilots Lts. John Marino and Christopher Montague, who are also landing signal officers, monitor an F/A-18 Super Hornet with degraded ailerons as it successfully lands aboard USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) during March 21 testing of the Precision Landing Modes flight control system, which has been updated to account for failing aerodynamic surfaces. (U.S. Navy photos by Buddy Denham)”
https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....b2abd1dae9.jpg
https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....84556d90f3.jpg

SMOOTH LANDING by Jeff Newman and MC1 Josue L. Escobosa NAVAL AVIATION NEWS Spring 2018 Volume 100, No. 2

...“What we were looking at is, in the event we have a casualty with JPALS, what other options would we have to recover unmanned aircraft?” he added.

The first of several options tested, the non-coincidentally named Aircraft Terminal Approach Remote Inceptor — or ATARI, after the iconic video game company — would give LSOs the ability to remotely take over an aircraft from up to five miles away and land it on a carrier by observing and fixing errors in its glideslope and lineup.

Denham said LSOs make for a natural first option to take over a distressed aircraft because they already oversee carrier approaches from the time an aircraft is three-quarters of a mile away until it touches down. Working in teams of two, LSOs monitor a pilot’s deviations from glideslope and centerline, call up corrections to the pilot as needed, and grade the pilot’s performance during debrief. “They’re always working to improve touchdown performance and safety, so we can capitalize on the fact that they can see deviations and correct errors,” Denham said.

Much like the gaming system it’s named after, the ATARI features a joystick that an LSO uses to control an aircraft.

“You’re effectively using small joystick controllers to guide a 40,000-pound airplane, and it’s almost like you’re playing a video game,” Denham said.

Wanting to quickly demonstrate ATARI’s capability, NAWCAD engineers worked with Boeing last year to outfit a VX-23 Super Hornet with a surrogate UAV capability, allowing the manned jet to receive the ATARI’s flight-control signals from a carrier deck. It marked the first time a Super Hornet has had a full stick-and-throttle surrogate capability installed into its flight control system, Denham said.

This proved a quicker developmental option because the F/A-18s would have a safety pilot from VX-23 onboard who in the case of an emergency could take back control of the aircraft, Denham said. “Being able to rely on the safety pilot was integral,” he added. “It allowed us to move more rapidly.”

Originally tested in 2016 on a Learjet performing shore-based approaches, the ATARI system underwent further shore testing and quality assurance with the retrofitted Super Hornet, at which point VX-23 felt confident enough to test the system at sea.

Aboard Lincoln, the ATARI demonstration endured the same high sea states as the PLM testing.

“There was some nervousness because the sea state was so bad. Back on the airfield, testing was benign,” said Lt. John Marino, the VX-23 pilot who flew the outfitted F/A-18, and the first aviator to land on a flight deck using ATARI. As during the PLM testing, Marino first had to perform three approach-to-wave-offs to ensure all conditions and surrogate systems were safe and that the ATARI system could indeed take over the aircraft while at sea. Beginning with the fourth approach, Marino and the LSOs performed roughly 40 touch-and-goes. “I was really impressed with the LSO’s ability to get me to touch down,” Marino said. “The conditions were difficult, and it was impressive the system worked the way it did. On a calm day, it would have been a little bit boring, but this was definitely more challenging.”

“The deck was pitching significantly and yawing and rolling,” Denham said. “It was particularly difficult to land that day, and we showed it’s possible to use this system even when the conditions aren’t ideal. So I guess we were fortunate to end up in high sea states. All in all, a successful trial.”

A fully self-contained van outfitted with the ATARI system and a data link up to the outfitted Super Hornet was brought aboard Lincoln and set up behind the LSO platform so engineers could watch the approaches in real-time, monitor safety-of-flight data and ensure passes were going smoothly. The van recorded flight data for engineers to analyze later and allowed VX-23 to test their systems without having to install them aboard the carrier.

Though not intended to be a primary method for recovering aircraft, ATARI would provide a relatively inexpensive backup system in the case an LSO needs to step in and use their expertise and training to safely guide an aircraft. “We don’t have unmanned carrier-based vehicles in the fleet today, but they are coming soon,” said Dan Shafer, a NAWCAD air vehicle engineer. “This is a potential alternative landing method, and our system performed well.”

Even though it tested well, Denham said the ATARI is merely the first alternative landing system his team has developed, and by no means the one that ultimately will be pursued for fleet-wide implementation. His engineers will now analyze the data collected aboard Lincoln and make adjustments for further at-sea testing.

“The question was, is it even feasible for the LSOs to land an aircraft from their location, and the answer was most definitely yes,” Denham said. “We can put that in our options for emergency backups and say we know we can do it from the LSO station.”

Denham called the ATARI system the “lowest-tech option” of those being considered and said the others would aim for a more autonomous approach using aircraft sensors.

https://navalaviationnews.navylive.d...8_01Spring.pdf

My understanding was that the F-35C pilot, while injured in the mishap, is losing flight status due to performance deficiency (but keeping wings). The LSO, who was much more seriously injured, will lose flight status due to medical disqualification.

Thanks for the clarification.

I have looked for 'shbs banned' but did not find it - perhaps because the assertion is on another forum which may remain nameless. [I recall now - I think MOOCH in the VIDEO above made the claim that SHBs were banned now" (old guys and their claims eh).] :} To clarify with this weird USN 'merican wording at the end of the mishap report:

"4. The IOs do not recommend modifying CV NATOPS in the following areas for the reasons described below:
a. Modifying CV NATOPS procedures to ban expedited recoveries or SHBs. Although the expedited recovery was a factor in time compression for the MP, the execution of a 400 KCAS expedited recovery over the LSO platform was not directly the cause of the mishap. ‘This mishap occurred because the MP failed to select APC/DFP at any point during the 27 seconds between the lowering of the landing gear and subsequent impact with the flight deck.

b. Requiring overhead maneuvers to occur forward of the ship or extending aircraft further upwind than 4nm from the ship. When leading a division, the flight lead needs to break no later than overhead the ship or dash-4 will be greater than 4nm up wind of the ship. Case-1 weather requires at least 3000 feet and 5 miles visibility with the Mini Boss responsible for maintaining sight of aircraft up wind of the ship (for safety considerations).

c. Utilizing the Extended Landing Pattern (ELP) for daytime operations. With an extended pattern, there would be more time for a pilot to complete landing checklists and prepare the aircraft for landing. The ELP is undesirable, however, for several reasons. Due to visibility in the tower, it limits the ability of the Air Boss to monitor aircraft during their approach turn. Aircraft like the E-2 face challenges locating their interval for determining when to initiate their break downwind."

you beat me to it.

Eglin was way outside of the envelope at the other end of the spectrum, but at least it was still subsonic... FBW places the driver outside part of the feedback loops, but the soft squishy stuff still has an ASI, an E indexer or other to show the energy state. If the commands are accepting of the SA that exists where the guys n' gals have bad days because the CB popped on their HMD, or the mode didn't change, then we may be at the thin edge of some large orders for replacements for the wrecks that are going to stack up. For an aircraft that has been designed to give unparalleled sensor fusion and information to the driver, that there appears to be a hint of a trend to loss of SA to the pilot with expensive outcomes, seems to need a bit of a rethink.

The helmet fire itself is not the problem, it is having a helmet fire, and without a greater emergency existing, continuing with a wild ride without the advantage of having a season ticket. We can always sell tickets to spectators to come and see the impromptu rapid disassembly of seriously expensive assets conducted with flair.

Have we forgotten to teach go arounds recently?

Hang on. "...Have we forgotten to teach go arounds recently?" Who is suggesting this? It seems the mishap pilot has been benched because he did not wave off compounded by all the reasons in the accident report to qualify as PILOT ERROR. I don't know if he has a chance to come back but Naval Aviation has many stories (many not public and historical) about pilots not qualifying as deck landers for one reason or another. Some were able to get back to being qualified after more training. Them's the breaks of naval air. I'm reminded of a Super Hornet Senior CAG pilot punching out at night behind the CVN because he thought he was in auto throttle when he wasn't. A PLAT video shows the ejection. Pilot was rescued OK but what happened after I do not know. To date there have been many F-35C carrier landings without any particular incidents AFAIK. Mostly reports are good with comments about how accurate the aircraft can be flown to the deck such that the target wire is changed more often because it is hit so often during a good approach. Nuggets particularly are noted to transition to being good deck landers with minimal training beforehand, such that deck qualifying day/night is a breeze (green glow has been eradicated from USN HMDSs whilst USAF has been tardy changing over it seems). BooHoo USAF. USN pilot calls the ball in auto throttle but he ain't.

Wot's on the PLAT? See GIF. (does not show PLAT screen for the video below)

https://cimg6.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....7126d4e8dc.gif

Video title: Hook 2014 PLAT/ILARTS Night Eject F-18E Super Hornet Approach USS CARL VINSON Pilot Rescued OK HELO

Just a thought....how long is the Pre-Landing Check List and how is it presented....Mental recall only, written in a Check List , presented digitally, or just by Pilot Memory?

The comment about the Pilot not selecting the correct Throttle Mode during the 27 Seconds following lowering the Landing gear and the aircraft striking the Ramp....without some basis of the workload the Pilot was confronted with during that time period begs expanding upon by the investigating Officer.

How many items on that Check List?

Is there a "Finals" Check List for limited to critical items only...Gear Flaps, Throttle, AFCS, Radar, etc..

There seems to ample evidence the Pilot was being over loaded and just failed to admit it and initiate a Go Around on his own.

A carrier landing is difficult under any circumstances....and in a very short abbreviated landing circuit there is a lot of acuities going on that pose a distraction.....called handling of the aircraft....that interferes with the house keeping side of business.

No matter how good you are or have been....every landing is a test of your skill and ability. and of the aircraft and its systems, and of external support and assistance of the Carrier.

Habits are hard to break.

Having George flying your approaches is a gift from the Gods.....until George makes a mistake or is given confusing directions by the Pilot.

Auto Pilots are pretty reliable as are Humans....but no matter how capable the Auto Pilot can be....they have to be set up properly both by the Engineers but also the Pilot of the Aircraft.

In this accident I do not see anything that triggered a warning to the Pilot of impending disaster as the aircraft did not warn him and he himself did not tweak to the fact there was a problem of his own doing.



For Not a Boffin.....even the LSO's were not aware of a problem until the very final moments as they. had no indication of a problem from any one or any thing.

Which was the entire point of my post which you seemed to think was "absolutely the least important". The LSO have visual indication of everything else, gear down and locked, hook down etc. They don't have visual ID that APCM is engaged or not - which was the thrust of the recommendations to NAVAIRSYSCOM and LM to look at it.

The LSO is the last link in the safety chain - and in an SHB, they have limited time to tell whether on or off glideslope. If they can't visually or aurally ID that all the main items are "green" then they can't provide that function and can't wave-off in time.

None of which gets away from the fact that it was pilot error. If you're at min throttle - for whatever reason (too much trust in the machine, failure to follow checklist, simple switchology), the simple fact is that you can't be following the meatball, sink rate must be below requirement. The meatball must have been at least amber, if not red.

At what point in the approach did the aircraft sink below the Glide Slope and the Pilot and LSO's detect the aircraft was not correcting that deviation?

Check the video timeline and see how little time exists between that determination and the time the Pilot ejected and the time it took for the aircraft to strike the Ramp.

That suggests the demand for additional power came late in the approach remembering the Throttle was in Manual thus the Computer flying the aircraft had a constant power setting right to that point.

We call it Pilot Error....but a lot of things happened to set him up for failure.

As the Pilot he has the final repsonsibility not the LSO's although one can argue the LSO's have ultimate authority if they issue a Wave Off command.

Did the Pilot advance the Throttle at all before ejecting.....or did he not have the time to do do?

We know Navy Carrier Pilots receive training about the importance of making a Ejection decision when things go wrong as even with modern Seats delay can fatal.