Nimrod Grounded
 

Why?

Plenty of reassurances about airworthiness from MoD and ministers, even after the damning inquest into the loss of XV230.

BBC NEWS | UK | Nimrod aircraft grounded by MoD

Anything to do with possible MoD liability under HRA 98, particularly as the Equalities and Human Rights Commission is opposing the MoD's challenge to Mr Justice Collin's ruling that troops (etc) may have some protection under HRA 98 even on operations?

BBC NEWS | UK | Human rights challenge to MoD due

Nimrod not grounded
 

All Nimrod aircraft that have not had a vital safety modification are to be grounded by the Ministry of Defence, the BBC has learned.
The Nimrods, all based overseas, will be withdrawn on 31 March in order to replace engine bay hot air ducts.
The MoD has said there will be no impact on operations.

So..er...not grounded then

This is not new news this has been planned for months,did get a scare when it was plastered all over the news fleet is grounded !!!

This reduction in numbers has been on cards for a long time and this is the date we all knew it was going to happen. Nothing new about this except and official release from Defence secretary.

No impact on operations - the Beeb says we will use other nation assets.

If this has been planned for months, why not announced before now?

Why ground them all at once, if this is indeed the case? Can't surely work on them all at once?

I

Will they be returning to the theatres they are being withdrawn from?

Jess, according to the news I heard at lunchtime, the grounding is because the work was supposed to have been done more quickly than it has. The grounding is supposed to allow the work to proceed more quickly.

I would guess that the grounding will have two effects. Airframes will be available for Mods rather than being diverted to essential tasks.

The groundcrew who would be servicing the in-service jets can be deployed for a surge maintenance programme.

Just a guess.

Len, I would have thought they will be deploye dback in theatre once modified. The same news item said that the capability would be maintained by the use of other UK and allied assets.

One might ask why wait another 2 weeks or so. I would guess it is to allow time for those other assets to be deployed in to theatre.

Jess It has been known for months and was made public a while back that the fleet will be reduced or the word drawdown to start the introduction of the MRA4.

This just happened to coincide with the target date for the fuel seal replacement programme.... and yes I know its all very coincendental :suspect:

Just to edit on that last , I laugh at the news right now on Sky.... Nimrod jets grounded for maintenance checks as the headline ?

Nothing like causing a panic

PN,
Thanks for that. Been out of ISK for a while now and was just wondering if this was going to be used as the first stage in the withdrawal of Nimrod from OOA given that other platforms are now obviously available.

In June 2005, just a few months after the XV227 incident, several ducts in the hot air system were identified as "life expired and in need of replacement". Some 3 years went by before MoD (IPT) admitted there was a problem and introduced a program to replace 37 sections of ducting per aircraft. At the inquest we all heard Gp Cpt Hickman say that these ducts would be replaced by the end of 2008, then this was corrected to read "end of financial year". To make matters worse, sections of ducting are in high risk areas with a potential Harzard Risk Index (HRI) of "A". I say "potential" because NIPT once again refuse to except opion in the same way the did in June 2005.

The big joke is that just one week after the inquest in May 2008, a safety working group chaired by IPT declared the risk was ALARP.

DV

Thought I'd try and find the words from the horse's mouth. Eventually, after much unsuccessful and frustrating searching of MoD/RAF sites, found this, lurking in 'Equipment and Logistics News'

Ministry of Defence | Defence News | Equipment and Logistics | Nimrods requiring safety modifications to temporarily cease flying

Noted that neither the coroner nor the inquest was mentioned.

Also, in the Minister for the Armed Forces' statement, he says
I wasn't aware the the risks had become ALARP - they were admitted as not being so at the inquest. Are we to take it that they now are, despite the fact that the modifications have not been completed?

Or have I missed something?

Edited to say - obviously I did miss DV's observation of ALARP being declared so soon after the inquest. Sorry.
airsound

Other than the politician economy/truth equation, don't think you've missed anything.

s37

I have now read Bob Ainsworth statement, and once again he dances around safety. If these modifications are needed in order that the risks remain "tolerable and as low as reasonably practicable", (safe), then without them the aircraft can not be SAFE. And because these defective ducts have been known about since 2005 then the aicraft was not safe in Sept 2006.

DV

Distant Voice
 

There are a few hundred aircrew (all volunteers) at Kinloss who are in the know on this matter. We all climb the steps to go flying, week-in and week-out. We don't lose sleep over Nimrod flying and we aren't scared of it.

The measures put in place since that dreadful day have worked and I take great comfort in the fact that airworthiness is constantly being assessed and the findings acted upon.

We still have a very important job to do and will keep doing so until the MR2 is relieved of duty by the MRA4.:ok:

and also on the MoD site as of today...THIS REPORT

I think there is a fairly widespread misconception on this forum that there is one certifiable level of risk that can be defined as ALARP. The practicable part of the acronym allows for timely work.

If, for example a fault was found with fleet wide ramifications for any airliner you care to think of, the chances are the entire fleet of hundreds of aircraft would not be grounded, but given a suitable timescale to effect a modification. In the case of the RAF, faults which require immediate rectification will in effect ground the aircraft until rectified, whereas those deemed acceptable within a given timeframe will be given that time for rectification and afterwards would be grounded until the work was complete.

Continuing to operate with a level of risk that is understood and tolerated within banded limits, whilst working towards a higher standard is reasonable whilst remaining practicable.

So who decides the timeframe, and on what basis....

That may be true, drustsoe, but I was present at the inquest when the IPT Leader (holder of the airworthiness delegation for the MR2) confirmed to the coroner, on oath, that the MR2 risks were not ALARP because of the state of the fuel couplings and the hot air ducts.

These risks were not expected to become ALARP until the end of 2008. But apparently, the RAF decided only about a week after the inquest that the risks were, after all, ALARP.

But now we discover that these modifications have not been made to all aircraft - and will not be completed until “early summer”. In the meantime, some of the fleet, but not all, will be “temporarily withdrawn”.

Not only that, but Mr Ainsworth seems to have chosen a very, shall we say, untransparent, not to say opaque, way of announcing this in a written statement well concealed in the ministry’s publication processes.

With the best will in the world, doesn’t that all smell a bit fishy?

airsound

I wonder if the date I heard on the news of 31 Mar is a coincidence, or has something to do with a new financial year. It is always the way of IPTs that work goes ahead at the start of a new year!

The work has been going on for months and DOES NOT start on 1st April. As has already been stated, aircrew at Kinloss have known about this for months but political interference has muddied the water regarding the rigidity of the date for completion.

Only aircraft that have not completed the hot air duct replacement programme cannot be flown. The 31st March is not a magical date beyond which the aircraft is not safe, this is a date that has been forced on the Kinloss engineering staff to have the work completed by.

Although this has not always been the case in recent years, aircrew at Kinloss are being kept up to speed with the engineering situation. Sky News announced to the world that "the Nimrod is grounded" due to "fuel seals that brought down a Nimrod in 2006". I am announcing that Sky News does not have a clue what is going on with the safety or engineering programmes of the Nimrod.

I believe that the media can have a very important role to play in exposing political malpractice, but ill-informed and poorly researched reporting gives all journalists a bad name.

...and just out of shear intrigue...whats going to take its place in the mean time?

.

To whom should a journalist talk, then, to avoid being ill-informed and poorly researching their stories? Official or unofficial channels? Who would you trust enough to tell the truth, that you'd tell it to them?

R

My question is this:

Have unmodified aircraft been flying, and if so, why have they been grounded at this particular time? Is there an engineering reason, or a political reason?

I have the greatest respect for those who fly in these airframes, based on past experience and especially since the XV230 tragedy. However, as we all know, there have been many failings identified in airframe and equipment procurement and maintenance which have led directly to the loss of lives. Hence the widespread cynicism and distrust.

Hi Jess:The HP air pipe replacement program is borne out of an incident on XV227 in Nov 04, when an SCP pipe burst and nearly caused the loss of that aircraft. Among many of the recommendations in the subsequent investigation report was a requirement for all HP air pipes on a selection of aircraft to be examined for condition and then a lifing and maintenance policy be considered depending on the outcome of the examinations. BAeS carried out the work and they found some areas of concern in both the crossfeed pipe and the engine bays. They suggested a pipe life which was less than the existing age of all the pipes in service (except the SCP pipework; already replaced). Given that BAeS are also the design authority, the RAF had no alternative but to immeditely declare all of the pipes on all of the aircraft as LIFEX at that time. But, we didn't have spare pipes and we didn't have the manpower, so it was declared that we will change them all before 31 Mar 09. Thats the politics.

Regarding the safety side of this subject, use of the SCP and the crossfeed pipe in the air is prohibited and those pipes are at low temperature and depressurized in flight. The pipes in the engine zones remain in daily use, without any restrictions, and become more vulnerable to failure as each day passes and they are doubtless a growing hazard. However, and this is a very important point, those pipes are monitored by hot air leak detectors, instrumentation, a fire warning and suppresant system and the crew have robust drills to deal with even the most explosive failure. The worst case failure will result in an engine being shut down by the crew (not an engine fire or failure). This robust mitigation reduces the risk of losing the aircraft, due to a pipe failure, to a neglible level. We are more at risk of crashing due to birds, fuel contamination or pilot error than an HP pipe failure. Consequently, the impending grounding is not a flight safety issue at all. All the aircrew know this.

Having stated that all the pipes on all the aircraft will be replaced before 31 Mar 09, the IPT is worried that if a pipe fails in flight after that date, regardless of any drill that will successfully and safely deal with it, that they, the IPT, will be seen to have been negligent with airworthiness. Therefore, those aircraft without the new pipes will not fly on or after 1 April. Unfortunately, we will not have enough aircraft with new pipes to meet all of the tasks. The task that will drop off is the overseas operational one.

So, its a polical issue within the IPT to ground some aircraft. IMHO its a flawed decision to ground them, for these self serving reasons within the IPT, when those aircraft are all needed. Soldiers on the ground will suffer due to the absence of the Nimrod. I despair that the IPT, having been briefed ad nauseum that the aircraft is not at risk of a catestrophic or critical failure, is allowed to do this to the troops in theatre. They risk a bullet in the head and we risk an engine-out on an overpowered aircraft. Someone needs to re-think his risk analysis.

Ed Sett

Hi EdSett, good to see you back on this and the other thread.

It is true that the duct replacement program stems from the incident involving XV277, but the statement from BAES that certain ducts within the system were "life expired" goes back to June 2005, in is not a recent event. MOD did not accept that there was a problem until early 2008, almost 3 years later. Between June 2005 and 2nd Sept 2006, Nimrods flew with the cross-feed duct activated and with "life expired" ducting in the system. Since then Nimrods have continued to fly with suspect parts of the hot air system.

The completion date of 31st May, 2009, was set by the Nimrod IPTL at the inquest, when he agreed that the system was not ALARP, but he was moving towards it. I am not surprised that IPT do not want to go beyond this point, because if it is not ALARP it is not safe.

With regards to the hazard risks in the engine bay and wing areas, I must ask if you have had time to read up on Hazard H66 and the QinetiQ report of Feb 2008. (We have talked about this on the other thread).

Finally, detectors, fire suppression etc do not mitigate a hazard, they mitigate the accident. QinetiQ's words, not mine.

Regards DV

sumps...and just out of shear intrigue...whats going to take its place in the mean time?

If you have to ask do you really need to know?

Ed Sett



I’m afraid this rather gives the impression MoD always listens to the DA (or DC) and acts on their engineering advice. Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, the refusal to listen has in the past been directly linked to other accidents. Furthermore, and far worse, senior staffs and Ministers have consistently ruled that non-engineers can over-rule decisions to heed such engineering advice and are permitted to sign-off on contracts knowing the design is unsafe.

In this case, it would seem the IPT has listened and, regardless of the underlying reasons, I applaud them.

Distant Voice,

That is a slightly erroneous statement – though I think I understand what you are trying to say. However, your use of the word “safe” as an absolute term is incorrect. “Safety”, however quantified (HRI for example) is a range. Absolute safety is simply not possible – hence someone defining ALARP which is deemed as safe as "reasonably practicable" – i.e. the best we can do given funding, value of life etc, etc. In simple terms, you get

100% Unsafe
Watch out!
V
V
V
V
ALARP
Best we can do.
V
100% Safe
The Holy Grail!

where the ALARP position is shifted as far down as we can get it given funding, blah, blah, blah! Therefore, if something is not ALARP, it is just not as safe is it could be; it is slightly above the old ALARP position. It’s not a question that it is now magically “unsafe”, it is just less safe, or, rather, in this case, probably a greater risk of ocurrance than the previous ALARP position.

Just because something is deemed to be at ALARP does not make it 100% safe. You just will be less likely to be sued in Court because you can demonstrate that you have done as much as you could practicably be expected to do! By how much less safe it is (i.e. how far up has the point moved) requires a futher Risk review - possibly using existing data - reposition the ALARP point - and justify that.

I am not surprised that IPT do not want to go beyond the TL's stated point because they would then have to justify why they moved what they effectively defined as part of the ALARP criteria in the first case; in other words they would need to justify the shift in what was considered ALARP. Or, perhaps, "politically" the TL made a statement which they feel they are honour-bound to adhere to without any recourse to "scientific consideration"! I don’t know the details so I won’t comment further.

Anyway, hope that has helped vis-a-vie the statement!

Cheers, H ‘n’ H

H 'n' H; I am using the definition as stated in MOD Def Stan 00-56, which states that for a system to be safe the risk has been demonstrated to be tolerable and ALARP. So clearly, if it is not ALARP it is not safe. MOD's definition not mine.

DV

Keep it Tidy;

"This is not new news this has been planned for months,did get a scare when it was plastered all over the news fleet is grounded !!!

This reduction in numbers has been on cards for a long time and this is the date we all knew it was going to happen. Nothing new about this except and official release from Defence secretary."


KIT is absolutely right. I was told about this decision months ago. Nobody has mentioned the new ALARP plus standard which I was also made aware of, months ago.

Stand by for the long awaited report by the QC. These events are not unrelated.

DV,

Agreed that is the definition in 00-56 (I think I have the latest definition!) – which, in itself, I would suggest is incorrect! :eek: The description better defines the following phrase – “Acceptably Unsafe”! Substitute the word “Safe” with “Acceptably Unsafe” and have a read and you will see. Effectively, the MoD agrees to accept that part of the Risk beneath the ALARP point (see el cheapo diagram in my last post!) as “life”. In a Court, that is what you are banking on them agreeing as that is the acid test! Above the ALARP point and you are now “Unacceptably Unsafe” and you can safely assume a Court will agree amd go to town for as much as they can sting you!

What the MoD are actually are saying is that, if it strays above the original ALARP point, the MoD cannot justify the additional Risk in Court without a proper reassessment/redefinition of the new ALARP point - at which point they can then take the additional risk - and hope the Court will agree. Clearly, common sense (looking after crews, hardware, bystanders etc) has a huge part to play but, in deciding what is ALARP, at the end of the day, you have to convince a Judge/Jury! Thank the Americans for that I guess! :ugh:

Point taken that you were using the 00-56 definition – my point is that we should all become slightly more adept in the use of Risk Management terminology – and change Def Stans where they are incorrect. Such situations (Def Stans etc being incorrect/behind the times) has been known! :eek: On many occasions!!! :eek: :eek:

I know what you were trying to say – and perhaps I am being picky – but not to score points – maybe just help evolve the art of RM in the world! :ok: And for my next trick, there is a Damsel who is about to be eaten by a lion in darkest Africa – H ‘n’ H is needed there!

Rgds, H 'n' H

It is important to understand the definitions, but practical Risk Management always boils down to human factors - the willingness of people to notify risks, the ability to classify them correctly, of the Risk Manager to allocate tasks and for those charged with mitigation to carry them out.

Ask ANY Risk Manager in DE&S, or what was PE, AMSO, AML, DLO or DPA, if he/she was given the correct resources and, equally important, the support of his line management AND all other stakeholders; most will laugh. The last time I called a RM Committee on a major programme, nobody turned up, having been told not to. Upon recommending to a senior officer that we should perhaps recognise major safety risks and mitigate them, his answer was “You’re beginning to grate” and, as I mentioned in my last post, continued to permit over-rules by unqualified staff.

The Nimrod 2 Star agreed with him.

YAWN
 

DV, H'n'H and Tecumseh

Yet again you manage to turn the thread into a bicker over definitions of ALARP. Didn't you get it last time you did this on the XV230 thread, nobody else took part because it was BORING. Nobody is interested in a petty fight over definitions, unless you are a lawyer of course and stand to make some pretty large sums of money by convincing families it is worth fighting the MOD. Maybe you could start a thread about ALARP and its definition. You might just see how many people are interested in it! Better still I have started one for you!!

As current Nimrod aircrew we are ALL convinced that we are now operating an ageing aircraft as safe as we can possibly be otherwise we wouldn't venture onto the old lady, we do still have some choice in the matter. These arguments about whether she is SAFE or UNSAFE only cause anguish and pain for the families of those who still operate the aircraft. For :mad: sake take your argument elsewhere, preferably by PM.

The biggest question that should be asked by everyone is - Why did the MOD decided to release this information before the event?

Crews are still flying unmodified aircraft at home and more to the point in theatre. The timing of this press release just shows a total lack of sensitivity towards the families and people flying them, yet again. The plan has always been in place to recall the jet from theatre before the end of March because the work was supposed to have been done by then, and numbers of modified ac are too low to support higher priority commitments back home. So why not wait until the last aircraft is back home and the non modified aircraft are grounded before announcing the fact. It would have saved a lot of very awkward questions being asked by anxious families such as " why are you still flying in an unsafe aircraft?".

We could still be continuing our support to theatre if it had not have been for a very misguided statement from a Minister (shock horror surely not!:ooh:) last year when he stated that the work on the fuel seals and hot air ducts would be complete by 31 Mar 09. Better still the Minister could have actually apologised for a poor decision and allowed a extension so the in-theatre aircraft could continue to support our troops on the ground, I wouldn't have held my breath for that though.

The aircraft doesn't turn into a pumpkin at midnight on 31 Mar 09 and could still be operated in a safe manner as it is now TFN whilst modifications continue. Maybe they thought that the Shadow R1 would be around by now, or that all the Pred that we bought would still be flying. The old lady is still a very capable platform, albeit old and ageing, and still provides vital information for the ground commanders who are still crying out for more ISTAR.

I hope that the Taleban are as accommodating and will agree to a lull in their operations at the same time or a Minister may just have blood on his hands. Maybe the lawyers would relish persuing that claim as well.

Nav Attacking, you said the problem has been caused by:Sorry, you are wrong. The date was made public by Gp Cpt Hickman (IPTL) at the inquest last May.

Before you give subjective statements about Nimrod safety, I suggets that you go away and read some relevant reports on the subject under discussion; namely ducts and seal. To start with there are 3 BEAS reports, a QineiQ report on hazard H66 and several on FRS couplings.

DV

Sorry Nav Attacking, you are indeed entirely justified and correct in your moan and I stand suitably chastised! It is very boring - but this whole thing is caused by senior staffs, who are out of their depth, playing at RM rather than doing it!

All I will say is that, for the guys and gals trying to provide you guys and gals with the kit to do your job in relative safety, so you can provide the service to those you are tasked to look after/take out (depends on who they are that bit!), it is very frustrating. This is down to senior staff who demand we use a given system, then (as DV says) don’t provide the resources (or even personal support) to get the job done properly. Then, and this is your point and mine, they seemingly arbitrarily remove a capability based on the fact that they are Senior Officers/Ministers who came up with a seemingly random date in the first place – nothing more scientific than that!

Your comment about anguish and pain (ie confusion) for the families is very relevant, and is generated, in the main, by the MoDs total inability at a Corporate level (I’m definitely not having a go at the RM “worker bees” here) to accurately and consistently explain and manage Safety (see para above for reasons why!). So, when Senior Officers are caught sweeping issues under the carpet they, as a result, totally over-react to protect their 6 o’clocks, spouting all sorts of Safety-related rubbish to “demonstrate” just how keen they are to protect people like you and all the others affected by your work! No wonder people are confused and worried! Muppetry is hard to hide – it tends to shine out!

Major Bloodknock was such an accurate character! Sums up so many AD’s and above. Many good guys up there – but, boy, are there some “politicians” up there too. And we all know what “politicians” are like! Thank heavens I'm out of it. Rant over!

H 'n' H

PS. Like the idea of an ALARP "playpen"! Think I will give it a miss tho as, you are right, it is boring! ;)

Distant Voice,
Before you start berating the aircrew that actually fly the aircraft, why don't you get off your REMF arse, go somewhere else and stop boring the hell out of all of use with your superior knowledge of engineering reports and practices. I used to fly the aircraft, my friends still fly the aircraft, some of my friends died flying the aircraft. People like you tend to forget the human side to these things. You sit in your nice safe world, scoring points off each other, proving your superior intellect, whilst the rest of us have to get on with the job of dealing with these things in the real world and still get the job done.

Nav Attacking,
ou said the "S" word better look out the window and see if the Black Vauxhall is here LOL :ok:

Sideshow Bob;

Sorry if you see it that way, but it is not my intention to berat aircrew. It has always been my aim to ensure that the crews who fly the aircraft are made aware of what the true state of the aicraft is, as seen by specialist such as BAEs, QinetiQ and Eaton Aerospace. This is what I have tied to get across on this thread. However, it has been my expirence whilst posting information on pprune that there some aircrew members who simply do not want to know. I once likened this attitude to the man who believes he has cancer, but is afraid to go to the doctor to have it confirmed. He would rather carry on in the belief that he must be OK because he is still alive.

The crew of XV230 believed their aircraft was safe, because no one had told them of ducting that had been declared "life expired and should be replaced" in June 2005. The crew of XV235 believed their aircraft was safe, because no one had told them about fuel line alignment tolerances and the distortion of seals. And of course no one is telling you that hazard H66 has a risk index of "A" (catastrophic/occasional). This according to the Nimrod Safety Case in an INTOLERABLE tisk.

Finally, your claim that I forget the human side is far from the truth, as I am sure you will discover one day.

DV

FWIW I appreciate almost all the comments (technical, engineering, etc.) on the MR2 threads, except those who seem to take it on themselves to speak for me or tell me what to think. By all means give information, explain technical aspects and pass your opinions if you want, but please try to refrain from personal attacks and telling people what to think. I have my own views on the subjects but recognise that it would be inappropriate to post them on the WWW.

Having read most of the threads relating to the MR2 (and the C130) it is obvious that Airworthiness/Flight Safety/Procurement etc. should be proactive and not reactive. I believe that it is currently (generally), that is why I am willing to continue flying. Nigegilb, I think many have forgotten about the QCs report, hope it's worth the time taken on it.

Serving members walk a fine line when posting on any work related subject. Due to our current knowledge, giving information or asking pointed questions is not a good idea and could well end up with a witch hunt, official or otherwise. Many of us will not post in any detail on here, so to the guys/girls that do please be professional and consider carefully whether you are being helpful or just venting your spleen. Before clicking submit, imagine you are in a room with the people you are posting to, would you speak to them like that?

Stay safe everyone :ok:

OK, seeking clarification here on the word that shall not be said, for fear of upsetting some Nimrod crews and engineers on the front line- ALARP.

I was pulled aside a few months ago and told that the risks on Nimrod at that time were considered to comply with the ALARP standard and that as of March 31 2009 a new standard would be complied with ALARP PLUS for want of a better description.

I read this thread and I am now wondering if that accurately refects the last few months. EDSett please put me out of my misery? I am only interested in the official party line, not what others, described as REMFS might consider to be ALARP. Specifically, do you on the front line think you have been flying/maintaining an ALARP aircraft for the last few months, or one that is moving towards the ALARP standard. If you don't care, then please don't bother replying to my question. The word, from on high and repeated by the Minister, backed up by Industry was that Nimrod was ALARP throughout this period.

Further to my heads up, I was also told that Nimrod might be grounded sooner, if the QCs report were to hit the streets. It would appear that not everyone agrees on the ALARP standard as it applies to Nimrod.

The RAF could opt to hire fully crewed surveillence planes from the Americans, French or Italians. Nimrod is ugly and by no means unique in its attrubutes other than being unsafe.