DV:Yes, I fully understand what has been written by BAeS and Qinetiq. I think we need to look at how the HRI is arrived at:

1. The published frequency of the hazard is based on judgement of both historical and technical analysis of the system. I have absolutely no argument with the upgrade to OCCASIONAL by QQ in the case of a duct leak. It is debatable what the degree of any leak or failure is likely to be, but OCCASIONAL is an acceptable failure rate.

2. The effect of the hazard is in 2 areas: local and overall. In the very worst case, a blown duct might burn out a hole in the upper skin, burn out a few wires, and/or overheat a fuel/hydraulic coupling seal. This is the local effect. However, the overall effect to the aircraft, which is where the HRI comes in, is minimal due to the fact there is a crew on board to deal with the problem(s). The aircraft will not be lost, it will not even have to make an emergency landing. The published procedures in the aircrew manuals will deal all the local failures in a structured and calm manner. The weight might need to be reduced, which could take up to 30 minutes, and then the aircraft will make a safe and controlled approach to land. The crew would not even need to make it a MAYDAY unless they received a fire warning, which, due to nature of the event, will either be spurious due to burnt wiring or a temporary hyd or fuel fire (which would require a sustained and very hot air leak), but easily extinguished. That is the very, very, worst case, and the aircraft is still flying and the rear crew are still eating their doughnuts. Regardless of the degree of the failure, the effect to the aircraft, by book definition, is not CRITICAL or CATASTROPHIC by any means. Therefore, there is no legal requirement to reduce the risk to ALARP.

I don't know how, or why, BAeS and QQ declared the hazard as CATASTROPHIC. I do know that they did not consult the aircrew when they erroneously calculated the effect to the aircraft when a HP air duct bursts on a Nimrod in flight.

I don't think I can bring anything more to this discussion.

Regards
Ed

Ed Sett; Like your tone. You can stay with me whilst you house is made ALARP.

DV

RC-135 in RAF colours. Anybody around who knows how the B29s (aka Washingtons) were crewed/operated? Or did the RAF in those days work on the basis that once you could fly a four-engine piston type it didn't take long to convert? Please note: I am not ex-RAF or a flyer! - just a supporter.

Does anyone know the time scales involved for getting the UK crews into the Rivet Joints? Also, flying from Nebraska or the UK?

Sounds like a pretty good deal either way.

With reference to what KIT said in post 68, are the families really suing the MoD for £20 million? If so, how many of the families is it and where would this money come from?
I notice that there has been no response to this claim but if it’s true, it makes me very angry!

The RC-135 link seems to be another variant of the Helix story - The project which still hasn't hit main gate and keeps getting mentioned in parliamentry questions.

e.g. Excerpts from Jan. 12 Debate in Parliament

or:
House of Commons Hansard Written Answers for 15 Dec 2008 (pt 0006)

Late, I know. £20m would scarcely cover the salary of CXX/3 prior to retirement. It makes me angry that the families have yet to get a penny from UK plc; although, I have a fair idea why.

:ok:

Duncs

Surely the RAF aren't buying replacing clapped out Comets with just as outdated 707's.

KIT,
I know, as aquaintances, a few of the widows and their families. In monetary terms, there is absolutely no doubt that they have all been robbed of a decent income through the loss of their husbands and fathers. That income loss was undeniably caused by a failure of the MOD to adequately provide that crew (and all other crews who flew on both Mks of Nimrod before 2 Sep 06 who, but for the grace of God, could have been killed) with a safe aircraft. It has been proven to have been a deathtrap.

As it stands, the families are entitled to the standard AFCS/AFPS settlement which is also payable, on exactly the same terms, to any other family whose loved one is simply lost in the course of his/her duty where the MOD is not guilty of negligence. That standard settlement is a pittance in comparison with the amount of expected income that would otherwise have been received by the families of XV230.

I can assure you that all of the families have my unconditional support in seeking a reasonable settlement in compensation for the loss that they have suffered due to the failure of the MOD/RAF/BAe. The MOD is the current owner and operator of the Nimrod and is therefore the respondent in this case. To my knowledge, not one single claimant has said anything about punitive damages. This is a claim for reasonable compensation. Do you have any idea how much income an average pilot can expect to receive in a 36/18 career followed by a civilian flying career and RAF pension?

Might I politely suggest that you review your last message.

Ed Sett

Moderator Required
 

KIT

Time you withdrew both if not most of your posts on this forum. The families are quite rightly concerned about further loss from what was and still is a tight knit community. They wanted answers as to why such a tradgedy was allowed to happen in the first place and they are slowly getting there, I take my hat off to them for their persistance. If we all roled over and accepted it like you seem to suggest, because others are in a worse boat or basher, then it would just be a matter of time before another XV230 happened.

If the aircraft operating authority was aware of problems but had not mitigated against them then they deserve full compensation and more. Al Squires alone would have earned a further £10M in his career, without going to the civvies.

KIt you need to think twice about who views these forums before posting such inflamatory comments that will only upset or antagonise. Get rid of the post before the moderator does.

Nav attacking,

Don't want to be deliberately pedantic, or detract from a valid point, but your calculation is way off...

Nav,

Your decimal point is in the wrong place. The correct amount (if my sums are right!) is IRO £1M till retirement at age 55.

:ok:

Duncs

Girlfriend sues MOD:hmm:

Nav attacking, I think you may be out by a factor of 10. Either that or I am in the wrong job. ;)

Incorrect. On at least two counts. You would be surprised at the level of interest from within the fleet - it seems that you see yourself as a Champion for the Cause. Maybe less time with the mouth open (or fingers on the keyboard) and more time using your ears (and eyes).

I'd think you would never be the choice of the Kinloss masses, as a representative of their beliefs........you're passionate to the point of being unhinged. Everyone is entitled to an opinion but there is no need to be so bloody personal with it. I disagree with many of the armchair experts on this forum but remember that the internet is hardly the place for an argument. If you know better than someone else, great. You then have a choice, put the facts up and argue or maintain your silence and enjoy the fact that you do, indeed, know better.

Sobering up and learning some manners might be a good place to start for you KIT.

Thank You All
 

Thanks for pointing out the error everyone. :*

However, I was of cause allowing for service to 60 or a second career as a training captain and index linking it for the outrageaous inflation that we are aboiut to suffer after Gb has messed about with the money supply.:ok: That plus a few sensible investments of the multiple FRIs that are bound to be offered once the pull from civvy street recovers.

Good bye to KIT though.

Ed Sett;

Whether we agree with it or not, Hazard H66 is set to CATASTROPHIC on the Cassandra Hazard Log. It was recommended by BAEs and accepted the Nimrod IPT.

DV

DV:Well, I've said it before, but its incorrect. Lets not forget that H66 is part of the original Nimrod Safety Case, which has been severely criticised by the BOI. As I write, that safety case is under scrutiny by Kinloss engineers and aircrew, for the first time (see my comment below). Once I know how H66 fares under examination by the experts, I will let everyone, here, know. Given that it was Kinloss officers who found the flaws in the original hazard log, I suggest that H66 should have been sent to Kinloss, for an opinion on its "catastrophic" effect, before the IPT decided to take the drastic action it has.

A new safety case is currently being produced by BAeS, with all interested parties involved. I'm confident that the zonal and functional hazard reports will be far more accurate, and that the effect of HP air duct failure in the engine zones will be assessed as less than critical. Lets face it, BAeS built the Nimrod. The company designers were not so stupid, even in the late 60's, to create a system that would bring the aircraft down with one single failure. They knew that hot pipes were needed in the engine zones, so they designed failure warnings, isolation valves and crew procedures to cater for the failure and prevent a catastrophic or critical event. Now, in their niavety, the company safety staff have paid little or no regard for the company designers' provisions right at the outset of the aircraft's life. BAeS are truly British Waste of Space.

Ed Sett

PS. The BOI report, in Dec 07, recommended a review of the Nimrod Safety Case (NSC) by Kinloss engineers and aircrew. It is a collection of documents that have never been at Kinloss, AFAIK, until now. We didn't even know it existed. It is only now, nearly 15 months after the publication of the BOI report, and more than 4 years since the NSC was produced, that the NSC has finally arrived at Kinloss for examination. I blame the IPT for that one.

BGG,

OK, fair point.

However, it is the case that the original designers must have anticipated HP air duct failures because they fitted detectors, valves and surrounded the pipes and the engines with titanium walls to protect the aircraft. Sure, the top skin might suffer some damage. A complete top panel might even be blown off, but its not catastrophic to the aircraft.

Ed Sett 100 you said:That is correct, and they set the hazard to CATASTROPHIC. The BOI comments relate to Hazard H73 (Zone 514/614), which had been set to CATASTROPHIC/REMOTE by BAes, but then downgarded by IPT to CATASTROPHIC/IMPROBABLE. You should read Martin Breakell (BAes) evidence at the inquest

Do you really believe that MOD are now replacing 37 sections of ducting per aircraft, four years after the 2005 "warning", as an act of good will? You should be very careful before you do any downgrading.

DV

DV:Do you have a copy of the transcript? If so, do you know how I could also get a copy?

Not sure of the context of the quote and not to denignate the tragic loss of life in the Nimrod crash this quote is quite wrong. In 1965 a Hastings crashed at Abingdon with the loss of 41 lives.

Ed Sett;

I have a copy of the transcript and his written statement to the court. You should be able to get a copy from MoD.

DV

EdSett
I have enjoyed reading your measured, considered discussions/arguments on this forum and you have done more than most to bring some levelheaded common to what is undoubtedly an emotive subject.

However, one small observation on a comment a few post ago where you said that no-one (aircrew?) at Kinloss knew about a Safety Case even existing? The fact that one existed but no-one knew about it isn't really the fault of the IPT. As professional aviators we should all take an interest in how our chariots/sports cars/double decker buses make it into the air. I don't mean just Mr Bernoulli and his theories but all the aspects of stress testing, fatigue life measurement and impacts, engineering processes and yes, aircraft certification process. An old and oft quoted saying "Ignorance is no excuse" is as relevant today as ever.

We should and must make aircraft safety our business as operators, we can't just hold our hands up and say "Nobody told me." Ask, question, learn, dig, pester and do it until we are satisfied.

Keep up the good work! :D

I'll have to disagree SFO,
during my long and illustrious career (ahem, just turn the bull**** alarm off for a minute) the further I got the more I realised how many things the average sh*g didn't get to know about. If you know that a document exists then you can ask for it, but if you don't know it exists then you don't even know that you do want to ask for it....

davejb

Couldn't agree more.



Without going into the detail - PM me if you want it - there is a procedural Def Stan available on the MoD site that explains in infinite detail precisely why it IS the IPTs responsibility, and how they are meant to go about establishing and maintaining the lines of communication with Users.

If any IPT does not do this, it is negligence.

So the fact that JSPs refer to Safety Cases and the Airworthiness process etc is roundly ignored? These same JSPs that we, as professional aviators, are supposed to at least be familiar with? OK, I accept that we don't need to know them inside out but surely there must be some personal responsibility to ensure that we at least glance at them once in a while (particularly as we sign a currency chit as having done so).

I also accept that the IPT does indeed have a responsibility to transmit this information and there-in lies an issue that is slowly being addressed with the IPTs being pulled into the forward element. Internal communication has been one of our weakest areas, more so in the modern era (IMHO) as it is always assumed that t'interweb is the information super highway. That is only true if the information is available, accessible and clearly signposted, otherwise people lose interest searching endlessly for something that should be easy to find and lose interest(see what I did there, lost interest:O).

You might like to consider the fact that the engineers are not taught the meaning of airworthiness. They are taught good engineering principles and practices however I always thought it would be better if we were taught more of the regulations/law in which the aircraft will be operated as well as how to go about fixing it.

Sad but True
 

Sumps, I fully understand your concerns. I have met and worked with many engineers in my current job over the last 9 years and it still amazes me when I quote some aspect of JSP 553 and they look at me with that blank, eyes glazed expression (although that might just be their natural reaction to me!) meaning they have no idea what I'm wittering on about.

It may just be the mists of time and too many happy hours but I seem to have a vague recollection that we were first introduced to Airworthiness concepts as baby pilots on Jet Provosts. OK, so everyone was bored stiff, just not exciting bedtime reading is it? My next CPA with Airworthiness was when I went to CFS 10 years later and I paid a bit more attention that time. It was only an hour or so but it covered all the basics of fatigue, stress, design, testing, RTS etc.

Maybe Cosford, along with the other relevant training 'centres of excellence' should introduce mandatory Airworthiness awareness packages?

There is a large difference between Manufacturing and Design Airworthiness issues (which, you say, is taught at Sleaford Tech) and that of EASA Part M Continued Airworthiness Monitoring - a job I've been doing for some 10 years now (leading up to ARC standards).

I believe the latter is what would be best required by most RAF maintenance staff and would them help in understanding why they need to do certain tasks in a regular manner.

All civil LAE's need to understand something of both Design and Continued Airworthiness matters for their Licence exams but some do tend to 'drop it' as soon as they can! I'm sure the same would occur in the RAF, but at least they would have some knowledge.


Excuse my ignorance but...you mention "JSP 553" (a publication?) - could it be too high in RAF docs Heirarchy to be read by "mere" engineers?

Rigga,

I realise that CAM is in itself a whole area of specialization and requires different skill sets/processes to implement through the 'life' of an in-service aircraft. What I was trying to suggest (perhaps wrongly, I don't know, I'm not an RAF engineer) was that perhaps our training systems (aircrew and engineers) are too narrowly focused sometimes. Whilst I wouldn't expect us to go down the whole Licensed Pilot/Engineer route I would hope that we are taking the 'best practice' elements from our civilian counterparts experiences. The Manufacture & Design element is as important for us as CAM I think, as it provides a good insight into the many considerations that go towards getting an aircraft into service. It would then provide a useful lead-in to CAM and 'through-life support'.

As far as I know(someone please correct me if I'm wrong - oh, wait a minute this is Prune:)), Manufacture & Design Airworthiness concepts are not taught or even considered at Cosford, my point was that maybe they should be (and not just Cosford, Flying Training units as well).

Sorry, forgot to say "Yes, Joint Service Publication 553 - Military Airworthiness Regulation" is a document and is the progenitor of JAP 100 which is the Policy implementation side (standing-by to be corrected!).

SFO,
Thanks for your kind words. I was writing from an aircrew perspective about the Safety Case. It is likely that the senior (ground) engineers at Kinloss were aware of its existance, but there was no knowledge of it on the aircrew front line or, I believe, the Staneval, who are only now involved with the IPT in this important area.

Should the aircrew have known about these matters at the outset, nearly 5 years ago? Absolutely, we should have. Should we have reached for the JSP 550 series before now? Well, thats a debatable point. The RAF is founded on teamwork and there has to be reliance on people, whom the aircrew and the front line engineers do not even know exist, to look after our best interests and that of the aircraft. Obviously, no one on the front line should be denied access to the 550 series, but they are clearly published for the guidance of the higher-ups, although we can all learn about front line Flight Safety matters from them.

From what little I have seen and heard of it, the Nimrod Safety Case is almost 2000 sides of A4 paper which was never presented to the aircrew for our input on the functional hazards that exist. Many assumptions were made by BAeS and IPT engineers on how and when we operated systems and how they believe the aircraft, as an airborne vehicle, would respond when some of those systems failed. In some cases, as highlighted by the BOI report, there was a reliance on warnings and suppressants that did not exist or, conversely, no reliance was placed on warnings and drills that clearly do exist. Its a rain forest that has turned into a bag of nails. Fortunately, the front line at Kinloss is now integrated into a deep review of the existing safety case and the production of a new one, as I write.

Too little, too late, sadly.

Ed

EdSett,

I agree that in many ways this is too little too late. You are correct in that many of the day-to-day decisons about the aircraft we fly are taken in remote offices, often by people whose knowledge of the way a particular aircraft type is operated is limited or misplaced.

That is why there has been a desire to increase the IPTs exposure to Front Line input, whether directly by first hand experience or indirectly by increasing the number of 'Blue' suits in IPT posts. The problem of the second approach is that many FL operators do not want to go to work for an IPT (the reasons for which vary). More problematical is that after 3 years, the individual is usually replaced so continuity is lost, the new guy spends 8-12 months getting up to speed, does about 18 months of effective and productive work and then concentrates on his escape plan.

You make an interesting point about JSP 550 series. They are most definitely not meant for higher authority consumption, they are meant to provide FL operators with a guidance framework within which they can grow their professional skills and abilities, whilst being given the boundaries of operational constraints and safety considerations. They were supposedly designed to provide much more detail and background than the preceding JSP 318 series (which I think they generally do) but, like the 318s, are deemed mandatory reading for aircrew (OK, I accept no-one is going to read something they feel doesn't have any relevance to them, that is a problem for higher authority).

Perhaps something that could be covered at the next Sqn training day?

My reason for droning on about this is that if we, as an organization, want to learn from dreadful days like 2nd Sep, we need to start educating our people at the grass roots. How much better prepared for my current job I would have been if I had had exposure to all the aspects of Airworthiness Regulation before I started (instead of learning on the job!).

Whilst the latest modification program calls for the replacement of many obsolete seals within the fuel system, there is still no documentation instructing tradesmen on how they can achieve 1 degree of alignment with the couplings. Latest AP information simply says "The pipe angular displacement is not to exceed 1 degree in any direction".

It has been made clear by specialist from Eaton Aerospace and QinetiQ that coupling misalignment causes stresses within the seal and results in premature fuel coupling leaks.

DV

I now understand that we are still using the Gp Cpt Hickman Mk 1 eye-ball for fuel coupling alignment.

DV

Talk about a dog with a bone!

DV, are you involved with Nimrod, at any level?

Yes, you are right. However, having been told by specialist that fuel couplings must be aligned to within 1 degree in order to avoid seal distortion and leakage, I am interested to know how this is being achieved. Failure to comply will simply mean that seals being replaced on the latest modification program could suffer damage.

For the record, I no longer work on Nimrods, but I have taken an active part in the XV230 investigation, and continue to do so. Neither the Coroner, nor the QC have any Nimrod experience, but their views and comments are respected.

DV

Back in the early Eighties the Lightnings suffered with leaks form the couplings in hot areas. The solution was to X-ray all couplings post assembly to check for alignment.
I wouldn't know if this is standard practice on Nimrod but it would certainly be a solution.

OTTB.

The latest instruction for assembling FRS fuel couplings (dated Nov 2008) includes a NOTE, which simply says "The pipe angular displacement is not to exceed 1 degree in any direction". There is nothing to say how this is to be achieved or measured.

Previous instructions made no mention of alignment requirements. In fact prior to Dec 2007 there was no technical iinformation regarding FRS fuel pipe couplings within the a/c Topic 1 publications.


DV

As a repair is incomplete unless verified, it would be interesting to know how maintainers are advised to deal with this. How did Tech Pubs verify the AP amendment? Surely the Pubs Authority raised a MF765 on themselves? After all that has happened, still so many questions on basic processes and procedures a first year apprentice would flag up.