DV excellent analogy, like hiding under the duvet rather than seeing what that noise was, I believe it is also a river in Africa?

Hi Nige, I thought the MR2 was working towards ALARP with a cut off of date of 31 MAR 09 for airframes to comply?
BTW thanks for all the hard work you do representing us from the outside, it is a sign of the times that we need people like yourself lobbying the MOD etc. to make things happen. :D

Hi Ivan, there is a bit more work to do on other aircraft types, I have had a few months off, but am just about to get stuck in again!

My question was genuine, I was told that this work was peripheral to the question of achieving ALARP and that the considered view, was that some of the evidence presented at the Inquest was inaccurate, for another want of a better word.

I note that there have been several changes of personnel since the Inquest, both military and civilian. It is not for me to speculate why.....

Distant Voice telegram for you:

If you are so concerned why not identify yourself and the position of authority from which you appear to speak.....STOP

Do you honestly think that the crews flying the aircraft would get onto the jet if they were not convinced it was safe to do so....STOP

If you are so intent on making sure the crews have not had the wool pulled over their eyes why not use a more public vehicle than pprune in which to air your concerns.....STOP

Why don't you just....STOP

Regards

Nige, just re-read Gp Cpt Hickman's (Nimrod IPTL) statement at the inquest:

Hickman: Yes. I am stating that the aircraft is tolerably safe but is not yet ALARP because there are a number of measures we have yet to take to reduce the risk to as low as reasonably praciticable, we have not taken them yet.

Coroner: What are these other matters, these areas you have not taken yet?

Hickman: There are several, but the major ones are the semi fuel coupling inspection and replacement has to be conducted on every aircraft. In addition, we want to replace the hot air ducts that are still used, that are still hot, and have not been switched off. Now, these are the measures we need to take to reduce the risk and we have not taken them yet and therefore we are not ALARP.


So clearly, without the modidifications the aircraft is not ALARP.

DV

Distant Voice,

Firstly let me apologise for my outburst this morning, having received a message pointing out who you are I know you have the crews best intentions at heart and perhaps I am a little too close to the coal face to be able to take a step back at times. I do believe though that your reply to Nav Attacking was a little curt and dismissive, especially as it was directed at current Nimrod Aircrew.

Sideshow Bob;

Thank you, and no offence taken.

DV

DV, I am aware of what Hickman said at the Inquest. I am also aware that some evidence presented to the Inquest is considered to be inaccurate. Check out what the Minister said after the Inquest. We are being asked to effectively discount what Hickman said and consider this work to be applicable to ALARP plus standard.

At least this is how it was described to me by a credible source.

Is Hickman still in post?

An interesting twist, Nige. If I understand you correctly, the MoD is effectively rewriting history, since whatever the Gp Capt said at the inquest was said under oath, to HM Coroner. What he said clearly influenced the coroner's findings.

I wonder what else that was said in that legally constituted courtroom is being 'discounted' - and by what right.

airsound

Yes, perhaps I should clarify my own post. I understand that some of the evidence presented to the Coroner was considered by the RAF/MoD to be inaccurate. Quite whether the RAF/MoD have informed the Coroner of any alleged inaccuracy I have no idea. Quite why the RAF/MoD did not send an even more knowledgeable/senior witness to correct any alleged inaccuracy I can only guess. From my experience of these things it is most useful, from the Ministry's point of view, to keep the damage away from the higher military echelons and God forbid, the Politicians.

Damage limitation?

I just find it strange the word ALARP is always used, Flying is never safe and things will always happen. The checks on Nimrod these days im surprised they ever get airborne as it takes so long to get one ready for flying .
Its just a shame the poor guys on the ground will now be without a good bit of kit above them. I guess now there ALARP status on the ground will change too or is ALARP only allowed on aircraft. Im sure they will have to take risks without top cover to carry on there job which Im sure is about 1000 times more dangerous that flying safely at altitude.

Ivan Rogov,

Being well clear of the MoD, I hope my “rant” at Post #36 simply outlines what was, and from my contacts, appears still to be the norm within the MoD as a whole. It is really a mix of a cultural and knowledge issues when it comes to RM. I hope none of what I have said has been taken as a personal attack on anyone on the Nimrod team. I don’t know them (or the details of this case) so could not/would not comment on the decisions taken in this case – even if I did know. Besides, those who knew H ‘n’ H in the Mil were well aware that if something needed saying, it got said. Blew my promotion prospects to hell :\ but, as one AD once said “at least I know he will tell me what I don’t want to hear … but, sadly, I need to hear!” :ok:

I guess all we all want to achieve is a robust Safety Case for a platform to enable the crews to conduct their tasks in relative safety. This is an ongoing cultural and knowledge change throughout the procurement/support chain. A lack of real knowledge-based cultural support to RM in the MoD means that, either we miss the simple opportunities to improve levels of safety or, unnecessarily, we artificially restrict capability because it seems that to assess the situation is too difficult. Everyone is trying (some just to save their skins – again, no link to the Nim IPT intended here!) and it will get better.

KeepItTidy - There will be a link to the Risk Assessment for those on the ground - but that should be included in any withdrawal of capability decision - and may also be mitigated by operational changes on the ground. No further comment there! Also, the "A" word is used precisely because flying will never be 100% safe. Therefore, we need to make sure it is acceptably safe. Again, end of that (see my noddy diagram in my first post if you want). Any more on ALARP and I'll be sent to the "ALARP Playpen" by Nav Attacking so I'm off!!!! :O

Hopefully not too many effigies of H ‘n’ H have been constructed and I’ll leave the specifics of this topic to those in the “know”! Thankfully, not my problem – but would still like to see things improve – particularly for the guys and gals currently being shot at in sunnier climes!

As Ivan wisely says, Stay Safe!!! H ‘n’ H

KeepItTidy,
As it says in the Press Release, there will be assets available to the guys on the ground, one being a new(ish) system being introduced under a UOR. We always said, when we first started this role back in 2001 and again when we deployed to PSAB for the Iraq war with the new camara (which my crew nearly lost due to bracket failure during the first sortie), you don't need a crew of 13 to operate a flying camara, we pushed for min crew whilst in arms way, but were told to put up and shut up

You're quite right, KIT, to remind us of the broader picture about why the airborne guys and gals are putting themselves in harm's way.

However, I think it's also worth remembering that the risks for troops on the ground come, at least partly, from the enemy.

On the other hand, the risks we're talking about on this thread are exclusively home grown, and have been shown to be due to failings on the part of officials, both civilian and military. Surely, we need to take all possible steps to minimise those risks.

airsound

KIT, anyone familiar with the previous thread will understand the commitment that is omnipresent on the front line. At the same time it has to be remembered that the loss of XV230 represents the greatest single loss of life to UKAF since the Falklands War. As Airsound has reminded us, the guys were not killed by the enemy, they were killed by a studied indifference to safety management which I view as negligent.

Us REMFs as we are so eloquently described are just as keen as you guys to prevent unnecessary loss of life. The hardened bods on the front line might not give a stuff about this legalise "nonsense", doesn't mean to say they are right.

I have an interest in issues regarding SH in Afg that is totally unconnected with XV230, but just wanted you to know that I do not have tunnel vision on this issue and I share your concerns about the protection of the guys on the ground.

Nigegilb: You asked me to check out what the Minister said after the Inquest.

Of course we we all know the answer, he claimed that the aircraft was ALARP. His statement was based on the "Notes of Minutes from the Extra Ordinary Nimrod platform Equipment and Environmental Safety Working Group held on 4th Jun 08 in RM 044 Bazalgette Pavilion RAF Wyton"

The minutes indicate that "The Chairman asserted that, in principle, they (the IPT) were content that the risk is ALARP. However to substantiate this, the IPT agreed to produce an ALARP statement that formally identified the mitigation measures already taken to date and why they reduce the risk to ALARP"

The minutes go on to say that BAES stated that "Given that BAES has not been directly involved in all the factors leading to the statement that the system is ALARP we, BAES are unable to support the statement directly."

So we go from a statement from Gp Cpt Hickman on 21st May 2008 that the Aircraft is not ALARP, and will not be until specified ducts and seal are replaced, to a total reversal at a quickly arranged meeting less than two weeks later.

Clearly, the latter was damage limitation, and an attempt to discredit the inquest findings.

DV

I'm no lawyer, but might it not also be contempt of court?

airsound

"At the same time it has to be remembered that the loss of XV230 represents the greatest single loss of life to UKAF since the Second World War"

Well Im sure for the majority of families involved they are trying to remember in a good way , not to see this quote constantly splashed across every TV report/newspaper.

Either way thats not a personel dig at anyone , it just seems to be the same story everytime Nimrod is on the news. So much has happened that outways the bad press but needless to say that fails to make good press.

DV, the Defence Minister assured MPs at a Parliamentary meeting following the Inquest that BAeS fully supported the Govt view that Nimrod was ALARP. Perhaps BAeS should clarify the situation? Is Angus Robertson aware of your info? It is the first time I have seen this.
Certainly when I was given my mini-brief Iwas told that Industry concurred with the Govt line.

I think the argument as to if it is ALARP, Tolerable or whatever has been answer by Bob Ainsworth.

From the MOD website
Ergo after the 31st March they remain neither ALARP or Tolerable, otherwise they would continue to fly them. I understand from the media that the MOD are refusing to say how many of both types of Nimrods have had the modifications done. And will not say why those operating in the sand can't be replaced with Nimrods that have had there modifications completed.

I will leave you to draw your own conclusions. It does mean that a number of NImrods will be grounded , whoops I mean in maintenence when Mr Haddon Caves report comes out in early June. Are they hedging their bets ?

I understand that only ONE Nimrod has been modified (ducts and seals), and a new series 10 seal is being used. What was wrong with the old series 1?

DV

It contains the wrong amount of carbon. I can't remember from the brief to aircrew if was too much or too little. Suffice to say, that a number of them have been found, on routine removal, to be split or similarly damaged due to incorrect carbon content. The damaged seals were not leaking at the time of discovery. Seems like the MOD was supplied with dud seals from the turn of the century. This adds weight to the probability of a fuel coupling leak on XV230, due to either misalignment (XV235 incident) or seal failure, rather than a 1 Tank blow-off.

DV:I wasn't aware that BAeS had inspected all of the HP air ducts and pronounced them lifex as early as Jun 05. Are you confusing the examination of the SCP system with the HP air system? The SCP system was certainly examined and declared dangerous the day after the XV227 incident, resulting in the immediate banning of its use. BAeS later (Jun 05?) confirmed the SCP was lifex.

IMHO Your last few words are not quite correct. ALARP, in the context of Nimrod risk analysis refers to the degree of risk of losing the aircraft due to a hazard caused by a single failure. Hickmans use of the term "ALARP" was misplaced and has led to a lot of confusion. Yes, in terms of the hazard presented by the old ducts, the risk of a single failure was not as low as practicable. They are lifex and they need to be replaced and, arguably, it is practicable to change them at the first opportunity, hence it can be said that the risk of a duct failure is not as low as practicable until the duct is changed. But, importantly, that is only in reference to the ducts, NOT the AIRCRAFT. The risk to the aircraft, created by a single duct failure (for whatever reason, including lifex) can be mitigated by the structure around the ducts and well practised crew procedures. Granted, there were no crew drills for a duct failure in the bomb bay, due to a lack of detection capability, and that part of the system is now out of operation in the air. Therefore, although the duct failure risk is not as low as reasonably practicable, the risk to the aircraft of a catastrophic or critical failure is bordering on negligible due to mitigation. This high degree of mitigation provides the control required for safe operation even in the event of pipe burst at the most critical time. Therefore, regardless of what Hickman said at the inquest, there is no legal need to drive towards ALARP then, now, or in the future. A HP air duct might be about to fail, according to Qinetiq, but the structure and the crew can handle it, safely.

Yes, I read Hazard 66 some time ago, but the discussion was inactive and I thought it sensible to leave it so. Now, due to "Bob" its back in the headlines. I haven't been able to read Qinetiq's report, but I know the conclusion and I don't have any argument with it. It centres, quite rightly, on the age and condition of the pipework and they have upgraded the hazard accordingly. However, I'm led to believe that QQ did not comment on how the loss of the aircraft due to a pipe failure is mitigated by airframe structure, warnings and drills. Is there anything in H66 that you want to know more about? Please believe me, the loss of a hydraulic system (we have 5), an electric supply (we have 4), an air conditioning system (we have 2), and airframe de-icing system (we have 2; each capable of supplying everywhere) or a CDSU cooling pipe (I don't know why they mentioned that, but we have 4, anyway) an engine fuel fire (we have detection and extinguishants) all due to a single hot pipe failure is not a problem. Even our least experienced crews will deal with the problem very effectively. It has been practiced regularly since the day the aircraft first flew. Its a formal Basic Training Requirement to be able to deal with a hot pipe failure in an engine compartment. But it appears that Hickman doesn't want to account for our training in his narrow decision making process. On that basis, every max weight take off is dangerous because if an engine fails, the crew procedure is not accounted for as the only mitigation against a crash.

Meanwhile, the troops on the ground will not know where the next bullet is coming from. I wonder what the Army chiefs would think if they find out that we are not flying one their most valued air assets because we are "worried" about an insignificant problem.

Agreed. And to summarize, we can easily avoid the accident and we can live with pipe failures ad infinitum.

Regards
Ed Sett

Ed Sett, so do you agree with my summary that the AIRCRAFT has been ALARP these past few months and that the new standard WEF 01 Apr is effectively ALARP with bells and whistles-ALARP PLUS?

NigeThere can be a world of difference between senior and well informed. The inquest put a lot of focus on seniority. Questioning on engineering that requires considered thought, close evaluation of documentation etc is not something best done with individual witnesses on the spot in a court room. It is an environment that, imho is almost guaranteed to give inaccurate results.

MOD admits only 1 Nimrod with modification completed

Article from Press and Journal (Aberdeen) 13 March

"The MoD is facing a £20million claim for compensation from relatives of those who were killed in the crash"

I shocked and in disbelief that the family members are after this sort of cash. I am in utter shock .. I will leave the keyboard now as I dont want to say anything I will regret ............ I really am astounded as I thought a substantial payout was done not so long after the crash but for a few more million each

Ed Sett;

The June 2005 BAes report, to which I refer lists the following;

(a) 15 ducts - engine to cross feed cocks

(b) 12 ducts - between cross feed cocks

(c) 7 ducts - downstream of 5-way duct pressure reducing valve.

Note: Many of the above had already been identified in an earlier "quick look" report, dated 7th Jan 2005.

Ducts listed under (a) and (b) are now being replaced in the duct replacement program, four yeras after they were dclared "life expired".

Hope that helps.

DV

Like I said I smell Shiite , WTF does the BBC know

Im not even going to start at this utter complete bullcrap

drustsonoferp, not sure the Inquest should be blamed for placing a great deal of focus on seniority. The Coroner would have wanted to have heard evidence from the people who had responsibility for decision making. I am sure Tuc has a view on this, since the IPT system came into being a lot of the specialist engineering knowledge and experience has either been lost or overridden.

The MoD and RAF would have had a degree of flexibilty as to who was forwarded to give evidence. I happen to know that a number of presonnel have been "moved on", "retired" etc since the Inquest. I spent a lot of time at the Herc Inquest it was very obvious, even to the layman who were the strong witnesses, who were struggling, who were being economical with the truth. I am sure the Coroner formed his own opinion on the reliabilty of the witnesses.

I do understand your underlying point. For a long time I did not believe the Nimrod was ALARP, EdSett's answer was most helpful in understanding this issue.

I agree completely. I would add that it has been ALARP ("as safe as it needs to be"' as CAS clearly stated at the time) since 4 Sep 06.

Ed

Ed Sett,

If it is, and always has been ALARP how come they can't fly them. In the letter sent to me by Bob Ainsworth on March the 10th 2009 he said that the Nimrod fleet remains airworthy as long as the ones that haven't had the ducts done don't take off.

I'm confused !!!!:ugh:

DV:Do you have documentary evidence that BAeS signed a report declaring those pipes LIFEX in Jun 05? I was led to believe that they made their report in 2007. If so, I could understand, to some degree, why only one aircraft has had the new pipes fitted so far, in response to that report. I believe they have to be tailor-made for each aircraft. I still stand by my assertion that the Duct Replacement Programme should never have compromised flying operations, anyway.

Today we were informed by the BBC that only one of our aircraft is airworthy. Who the hell is releasing this rubbish to the media? We are losing our way, here, big time.

Ed Settt

Ed.

The report that have was issued by BAES in reply to PDS task 06-3487. An ealier report from BAES, dated 7th Jan 2005, identifying the same ducts, was in reply PDS Task 16-3468. Neither report, nor the one issued in 2007 (but prepared in 2006) was made available to the BOI for XV230.

DV

I may have this wrong but I read the story as :

5 aircraft have had their ducts done, but it seems only 1 aircraft of those aircraft has had fuel seals changed (is this MoD info?)

I think the MoD have implied those 5 can fly - as presumably the ducts were the Mar 09 grounding issue - hence the fuel seals are not a grounding issue -
EDIT on checking they have actually stated this explicitly - "Delays to the replacement of fuel seals will, however, have no impact on flying since our experts assess that the risk is tolerable."

The BBC has seems to have ignored this to imply that only 1 is airworthy, and stated in earlier reports that the MoD had not clarified the issue (despite the fact that I did a 10 sec search on the mod site to produce the quotes above where it seems pretty clear to me!).

Ministry of Defence | Defence News | Equipment and Logistics | Nimrods requiring safety modifications to temporarily cease flying

Hence on this occasion, the MoD appears to have had their facts completely twisted by the media to create a better story.


-----

This issue of timeliness in ALARP has been raised on this thread many times as another dimension to any ALARP assessment - but this continues to be misunderstood it seems by many on here.

A good example is that the 777 are still flying today with unmodified Trent 800 engines & its current Fuel Oil Heat Exchanger (FOHE) technology - the FAA have given operators around 6 months after a Rolls Royce modification is developed (so 6 month clock not even ticking yet - it will only start when Rolls have a fix) to get it fixed - until that time the risk of a heathrow crash repeat is quite real (noting the workarounds to minimise the risk). So is it ALARP? Well you can argue the aircraft is not really ALARP as you can improve the FOHE and fit it - but this hasn't been installed yet and can't practically be done for 6-12+ months. The FAA are content that there are workarounds to mitigate the hazard so are content that it is reasonable to keep flying as long as the mods are embodied within a reasonable time. Hence you could say they are working towards an ALARP build standard of the 777 fleet - this is where the terminology can get confusing, as it is also true to say the whole situation is ALARP, as the the risks have been minimised by outlining an timely upgrade plan. Hence you can say the risks to current 777 ops are ALARP, even though the new FOHE won't be fitted for months. Hope that makes sense, and the parallels to Nimrod are obvious.

I love some of the conspiracy theories starting to abound on this topic; they do make for amusing reading.:hmm:

Please remember that tour lengths are getting shorter (for various reasons including overstretch and the rediculous size of the RAF today) so if people are getting "moved on" it's probably just that they are tourex! The only people who tend to do longer than 2 years in post are aircrew on squadrons, for anyone else (including sqn ldr+ aircrew on squadrons) it will only be about 2 years. It shouldn't come as a surprise that some people have been posted.

Ed Sett 100: I believe that over the past year you and I have come to respect each others views and opinions. Having said that, views and opinions are one thing, evidence and statements presented by specialist is something else. And whilst it may run contrary to our views and opinions it has to be respected and taken seriously.

Whether we like it or not, hazard H66 has a hazard severity rating of CATASTROPHIC. It is currently set on the data base has having a probabilty of IMPROBABLE. Is was recommended by QinetiQ in 2008 that because there had been two duct failures this should be reset to OCCASIONAL. This would give it a HRI of "A".

According to the safety case developed by BAes a failure in this area has the "Potential for hot air leaks from the LP & HP ducting on rib 2 to impinge on the engine bay top scin and electrical wiring. The leak would also impinge on the CSDU cooling oil pipe installation together with fuel and hydraulic pipelines creating a potential for overheated systems"

So, unfortunately, I am unable to agree with you on your ALARP approach, and remind you that detection and suppression and drills do not mitigate the hazard, only the accident. If some one told you that the electrical wiring in your house was unsafe and could cause a fire would you simply go out and buy a smoke detector and extinguisher, or would you have the wiring replaced/redesigned?

DV

Naval Air: Nimrod Withdrawal


According to this publication two U.S. Air Force electronic monitoring aircraft (RC-135 Rivet Joint) have been leased to fill in because of shortages. The aircraft will have joint British and American crews, but will be painted in Royal Air Force colors. Britain is also buying three RC-135s from the United States, at $350 million each.

DV:I would have the wiring replaced, as a matter of urgency. But I wouldn't move out of my only home and make myself homeless and a burden on my friends while the house is re-wired. I would switch off the electricity where I don't need it and, where it is needed, I would employ someone to watch it like a hawk, who would switch it off and deal with it, while the repairs were being carried out.

Ed Sett

US aircraft in UK colours - so who owns it?

US and UK crews - so who tasks it? And who fix's it? ROE's?

I'm all for Combined/Joint/Coalition etc etc but I do hope someone somewhere has got the management chain well and truly nailed down! Potential for some large SNAFU's methinks.