Originally Posted by
tucumseh
If you haven't read any of the books its not inapt at all. It's a fair question.
I know you probably mean Wratten and Day, but CAS (Graydon) was also a reviewing officer. The biggest lie of them all was, in my opinion, his claim to Marshal of the RAF Sir John Grandy that they 'were some miles off course'. The letter was submitted to the Mull of Kintyre Review in evidence.
The Board obviously didn't have that 'evidence' as they foolishly assumed the aircraft was heading for a waypoint close to the light house, unaware of Graydon's first hand evidence. However, Graydon has chosen not to reveal what course they should have been on, so it's a fair assumption that the Board was right; and so was the waypoint evidence held in the nav computer, which aligned with the route planning map.
And of course AVM John Day had, he claimed, absolute knowledge of what was seen by the crew from the cockpit; an unimpressed Lord Philip saying 'Sir John Day’s approach places the onus of disproving negligence on the deceased, which is also wrong’.
He also claimed to the Lords that Beinn na Lice was an almost sheer cliff face extending over 600 feet higher at point of impact, and they headed straight for it. No doubt the Board, who actually visited the gentle slopes, were puzzled over that one.
It's easy to get confused, because 600 feet is also the minimum height the cloud base was above the aircraft, according to the statement by the only an eye-witness to the approach. Or at least the only statement published. The RO's position was the cloud base was 700 feet lower, but again they didn't reveal their source. As this statement destroys the RO's case, one can only wonder what the unpublished ones say.
A close second in the porky stakes is the claim by the Air Staff that at the time (2 June 1994) there was no such thing as a Release to Service. (The Master Airworthiness Reference). The Air Staff copy from 7 months before was given to the Review. Lord Philip was distinctly unimpressed with that one, and a Minister was eventually forced to issue an apology.
There's lots more!
Tecumseh, you have more than a passing interest and knowledge in CAE 5000 etc,, and the previous basis of certification related to MTC and to continued airworthiness, are you able to expand on the
"There's lots more"?
Nothing in the handling of the Chinook accident sat well, and the concerns related to the acceptance for use of the DEECs smacks of expediency and has a possibility to have been a factor in the event. The greatest concern is that a defence service which has arguably a tradition of competency fails to remove the stigma of less than independent competent investigation into its own disasters. This is unfortunately a situation that exists in many services but does not sit well with the relabelling of the regulation of defence aviation to include the term "Safety". Where command has oversight of the mishaps, there is an unacceptably high risk of expediency that has potential to continue risks needlessly.