Tecumseh, you have more than a passing interest and knowledge in CAE 5000 etc,, and the previous basis of certification related to MTC and to continued airworthiness, are you able to expand on the "There's lots more"?
Nothing in the handling of the Chinook accident sat well, and the concerns related to the acceptance for use of the DEECs smacks of expediency and has a possibility to have been a factor in the event. The greatest concern is that a defence service which has arguably a tradition of competency fails to remove the stigma of less than independent competent investigation into its own disasters. This is unfortunately a situation that exists in many services but does not sit well with the relabelling of the regulation of defence aviation to include the term "Safety". Where command has oversight of the mishaps, there is an unacceptably high risk of expediency that has potential to continue risks needlessly.
I've done attaining and maintaining airworthiness a lot more recently than continuing! I've always felt your career should work backwards through this sequence, but that's no longer MoD policy, and it shows. In my day, many moons ago, you were examined in both MoD and CAA procedures before being allowed to do continuing; then the others were formal appointments whereby you were (uniquely) named in the contracts. So never believe MoD when it says responsible individuals can't be identified.
When I say there are lots more examples, I'm also referring to the book 'Citadel of Waste' and (I haven't counted them, but probably over 40) case studies, across air, land and sea domains, over a period of 35 years.
Many of these examples of waste led directly to fatal accidents; and in the ZD576 case this can be seen in a Director Flight Safety report of August 1992 in which he complains of that year's 25% cut in direct airworthiness funding (the second of three successive cuts). What he didn't know was it was done to compensate for quite deliberate waste, and the book explains why, by whom, and quotes from the warnings they were given as to the effect their fraud would have on air safety. If you're warned of that, by specialist staff, auditors, and other senior officers and officials, and continue, then that is deliberate. If more than one person is involved, and the act serves to conceal an offence, then (to address Rheinstorff's question) that is a conspiracy.
Might I suggest, for the price of a cup of coffee, you get the Kindle version and then ask anything you like. I'm happy to explain.
Rheinstorff. Cock-up or conspiracy. What more do you need than Lord Philip confirming that it was mandated upon the Air Staff that the Chinook HC Mk2 was not to be relied upon in any way, and he was prohibited from signing an RTS; but he did? MoD has been invited many times by various parts of the media to debate this openly, but has always refused.
The book(s) list those who knew, by name. Not one said anything, or came forward during the Mull of Kintyre Review. There's even written evidence the Senior Reviewing Officer knew this before he wrote his remarks. A letter was written shortly after the accident demanding that the work to declare the Mk2 airworthy be hastened. (Not much Boscombe can do when all they have is an unrepresentative prototype). While the House of Lords did well overall, their act of allowing this to be concealed extended the campaign for 10 years. That's an awful lot of people involved, just in that one example.