Can Wigston survive the onslaught?
Has there been a noticeable and sustained increase in air safety failures (airprox etc) between MFTS trained personnel? Has there been a significant disparity in “military airmanship” between MFTS and non-MFTS trained personnel? Have MFTS trained personnel moved into the civilian space and their inability to demonstrate airmanship been noted?
or is it perhaps “not invented here” syndrome?
and noting your comment on MAA and DSA/DAIB, yet again I’d point out the CAA and AAIB do not meet your requirements either.
or is it perhaps “not invented here” syndrome?
and noting your comment on MAA and DSA/DAIB, yet again I’d point out the CAA and AAIB do not meet your requirements either.
I would like to think that B I deleted his own post because, no matter how strongly he felt about the underlying subject of his diatribe, he should not have identified and maligned a good man who was doing what was required of him.
atg, your views on Air Safety and mine are at variance, I hope you would agree. The only comment I would venture is that MFTS can hardly be called a success. The endless holding awaiting courses, the loss of continuity in doing so, further problems at the OCUs, all add up to a worrying end result for the front line squadrons. Does that also mean a disparity in military airmanship between MFTS and non MFTS trainees? BI instanced a particular difference but other than that how would you measure any such disparity? Like most Air Safety problems such data only reveals itself in retrospect. Meteor asymmetric exercises come to mind, or more recently Hawk EFATO practice perhaps. Evolution rather than revolution works best in aviation. Paint the goal posts by all means, keep tearing them down and setting them up elsewhere tends to lead to unforeseen consequences, or events dear boy, events.
Civil and Military Aviation are different. Much of course is common ground but one is about routine daily safe economic operation, the other about being prepared for anything but routine when at war, with realistic training scenarios for that in peacetime. That to my mind requires even more emphasis on Air Safety, to safeguard personnel and equipment for their ultimate purpose, war. What you learn from your instructors, what you learn for yourself, arms you for that. It is called airmanship, though now no doubt it is high on a wish list for urgent renaming. Being taught civilian procedures for a military career is at variance with that. Of course, it may well be that civilian instructors may well be ex-military and pass on their bon mots as if they still served. I would hope so.
I don't think that is 'not invented here'. Here is a different place to there, that's all.
Yes, you have indeed pointed out the existing limitations of the CAA and AAIB set-up. As I have pointed out, the CAA did not set out to subvert its own regulations AFAIK. The military air regulator (then the MOD) did. Whatever civilian practice is; operator, regulator, and investigator should be independent and separate from each other. 1987 shows us what happens when they are not.
Xeno, you may well be right. The problem is systemic and not down to any individual. With respect, I think that was BI's point, a civilian was imposing civilian practice on a military training system. BI felt strongly that it was inappropriate. I suspect he is right.
Civil and Military Aviation are different. Much of course is common ground but one is about routine daily safe economic operation, the other about being prepared for anything but routine when at war, with realistic training scenarios for that in peacetime. That to my mind requires even more emphasis on Air Safety, to safeguard personnel and equipment for their ultimate purpose, war. What you learn from your instructors, what you learn for yourself, arms you for that. It is called airmanship, though now no doubt it is high on a wish list for urgent renaming. Being taught civilian procedures for a military career is at variance with that. Of course, it may well be that civilian instructors may well be ex-military and pass on their bon mots as if they still served. I would hope so.
I don't think that is 'not invented here'. Here is a different place to there, that's all.
Yes, you have indeed pointed out the existing limitations of the CAA and AAIB set-up. As I have pointed out, the CAA did not set out to subvert its own regulations AFAIK. The military air regulator (then the MOD) did. Whatever civilian practice is; operator, regulator, and investigator should be independent and separate from each other. 1987 shows us what happens when they are not.
Xeno, you may well be right. The problem is systemic and not down to any individual. With respect, I think that was BI's point, a civilian was imposing civilian practice on a military training system. BI felt strongly that it was inappropriate. I suspect he is right.
Last edited by Chugalug2; 6th Sep 2022 at 17:26.
Unless I’ve misread it, it seems Wiggy is inferring that the aforementioned go capt quit because the proposed policy was challenged and NOT implemented rather than quit because she REFUSED to implement it???
Air Chief Marshal Wigston said: "Earlier this year we explored a recruiting practice to improve the diversity of our workforce - this policy was challenged and never implemented, but I regret that challenge led to our Head of Recruiting and Selection stepping down from her role.
The Star Chamber marking its own homework as usual. The inquiry shouldn't be about the Group Captain, it should be about the illegal order that she rightly refused to obey. Who gave her the order and who instigated it? Someone should fall on their sword, and it certainly isn't the Gp Capt. Is that the best the CAS can do, "Challenged and never implemented"? It wasn't implemented because it was challenged, because it was illegal! What a weasel statement.
To quote Lewis Carroll:
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.” “The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.” “The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master—that's all.”
So we have a woke humpty dumpty in charge. And he headed for a great fall from which no-one could save him.
But only in the case of MoD has a court ruled that the Defence Safety Authority / Military Aviation Authority is not independent of MoD. Has there been an official response to that?
. But only in the case of MoD has a court ruled that the Defence Safety Authority / Military Aviation Authority is not independent of MoD.
There is, of course, a link to this Air Safety sideline and the subject of this thread. I do believe that the current CAS has neither been a Station Commander (or Commander Air Wing) as the Delivery Duty Holder (DDH), nor an AIr Officer Commanding (AOC) as the Operating Duty Holder (ODH), so as the Chief he is now the Senior Duty Holder (SDH) does that mean he has the required experience to be the SDH? Does it show and has that influenced other decisions, such as the drive to push Aircrew out of the senior command positions that we have seen under his tenure?
RA1020 is the bible on such matters: https://www.gov.uk/government/public...-organisations
So, if you have not held the responsibility of the DDH and ODH, how effectively can you manage and appoint those under you as SDH if you have never experienced those levels of responsibility? Open question…
RA1020 is the bible on such matters: https://www.gov.uk/government/public...-organisations
SDHs will be personally legally responsible and accountable for ensuring that: an effective, end-to-end ASMS is resourced, implemented and appropriately managed in their AoRs; and that those personnel under their command who are engaged directly in aviation activities are suitably qualified, trained, experienced and equipped.
There is, of course, a link to this Air Safety sideline and the subject of this thread. I do believe that the current CAS has neither been a Station Commander (or Commander Air Wing) as the Delivery Duty Holder (DDH), nor an AIr Officer Commanding (AOC) as the Operating Duty Holder (ODH), so as the Chief he is now the Senior Duty Holder (SDH) does that mean he has the required experience to be the SDH? Does it show and has that influenced other decisions, such as the drive to push Aircrew out of the senior command positions that we have seen under his tenure?
RA1020 is the bible on such matters: https://www.gov.uk/government/public...-organisations
So, if you have not held the responsibility of the DDH and ODH, how effectively can you manage and appoint those under you as SDH if you have never experienced those levels of responsibility? Open question…
RA1020 is the bible on such matters: https://www.gov.uk/government/public...-organisations
So, if you have not held the responsibility of the DDH and ODH, how effectively can you manage and appoint those under you as SDH if you have never experienced those levels of responsibility? Open question…
edit - it would helpful if you then read RA1022, detailing the responsibilities of an SDH, ODH and DDH to appoint a SQEP Senior Operator to advise them.
in the case of the SDH, the ODH may be the SO, or the function maybe discharged by an individual qualified IAW Table 1 of the RA.
https://assets.publishing.service.go...22_Issue_5.pdf
Last edited by alfred_the_great; 9th Sep 2022 at 19:04.
where is the intrinsic link between each level? Does it exist in the civilian flight safety community? Does Michael O’Leary have the “experience” to be an SDH?
edit - it would helpful if you then read RA1022, detailing the responsibilities of an SDH, ODH and DDH to appoint a SQEP Senior Operator to advise them.
in the case of the SDH, the ODH may be the SO, or the function maybe discharged by an individual qualified IAW Table 1 of the RA.
https://assets.publishing.service.go...22_Issue_5.pdf
edit - it would helpful if you then read RA1022, detailing the responsibilities of an SDH, ODH and DDH to appoint a SQEP Senior Operator to advise them.
in the case of the SDH, the ODH may be the SO, or the function maybe discharged by an individual qualified IAW Table 1 of the RA.
https://assets.publishing.service.go...22_Issue_5.pdf
MoD followed the regulations you cite and were found negligent. The accompanying ruling that MoD and DSA/MAA are not independent must surely mean CAS cannot now evade responsibility in RAF matters.
The regulations used explicitly to require ODHs to have had experience as a DDH. That seems to have gone from the latest versions, with only a hint in MAA 03 Annex G that it used to be a requirement (where it indicates evidence of Station / DDH experience is to be provided for ODH nominees). There is not, and never has been a similar requirement for the SDH.
I think this is a good thing: the nature of risk management at each level is different.
I also think it is a good thing because arbitrary setting of essential experience criteria for senior roles was the vehicle by which various 'mafias' of years gone by stitched up appointments for their mates. It left the appointing agencies with few or no options, and I'm glad that era is more or less over.
I think this is a good thing: the nature of risk management at each level is different.
I also think it is a good thing because arbitrary setting of essential experience criteria for senior roles was the vehicle by which various 'mafias' of years gone by stitched up appointments for their mates. It left the appointing agencies with few or no options, and I'm glad that era is more or less over.
Last edited by Easy Street; 10th Sep 2022 at 14:47.
When a 2 Star mentions such in a room of people, I was so far down the food chain to confirm his facts or not. I would wager the politicians rubber stamp the suggestions for all Chief's for the star positions. I would be happy to retract my comment if incorrect. I was chatting to a OF5 today at the local Proclamation. He was from a different force to the type I worked on in my time and we were mentioning people we may have both known. The CAS came into the conversation with one of my stories and one could see his opinions with the lips curling. A subject to avoid at the time.
Squirmingly embarrassing interview with Wigston on Sky News this morning. Outside Buckingham Palace he was given a really hard time by Kay Burley (imagine!) when queried on RAF recruitment processes and senior management policy in the RAF. He avoided direct answers and when repeatedly pressed merely stumbled over his evasive replies via the Battle of Britain and Afghanistan.
Not a good look.
Not a good look.
He was probably overwhelmed with anger that Burley chose to use an interview about RAF support for the national and Royal mourning as an opportunity to score points. That she carried on pushing even after he had given her an answer says more about her ego than her sense of occasion.
Whatever you think about the wokery, and I am not an apologist for him, it was just plain inappropriate to raise it.
Whatever you think about the wokery, and I am not an apologist for him, it was just plain inappropriate to raise it.
He was probably overwhelmed with anger that Burley chose to use an interview about RAF support for the national and Royal mourning as an opportunity to score points. That she carried on pushing even after he had given her an answer says more about her ego than her sense of occasion.
Whatever you think about the wokery, and I am not an apologist for him, it was just plain inappropriate to raise it.
Whatever you think about the wokery, and I am not an apologist for him, it was just plain inappropriate to raise it.
If the appropriate Ministers won't ask the right questions for us (and there is no outcome apparent that suggests they have) then we have to rely on Sky News and the rest of the media (Hurrah for Private Eye).
The scandals regarding Flight Safety and Procurement give the appearance that VSOs lie to their masters like Soviet apparatchiks to the Politburo, and ministers believe what they are told (e.g. Malcolm Rifkind's ineffective and far too late apology)
(Rant over, blood pressure recovering) .
The scandals regarding Flight Safety and Procurement give the appearance that VSOs lie to their masters like Soviet apparatchiks to the Politburo, and ministers believe what they are told (e.g. Malcolm Rifkind's ineffective and far too late apology)
(Rant over, blood pressure recovering) .