RAF Regiment. Heads will roll!
Melchy,
I think we can just about get away with the thread drift onto senior appointments because the central charge from the Regiment NCOs seems to be one of supine senior leadership. I think you misunderstood my point about VCDS and MilCap posts: I'm not saying Wiggy would go to either (clearly, wrong rank for the second!) but that one of the other services, and the RN is an obvious candidate for the reasons you mention, might take the view that supporting Wiggy for CDS would be a good exchange for securing its preferred candidate in one of the aforementioned posts. Rich Knighton's successor has, I understand, been named internally, but it'll be his/her successor that gets the crucial "SDSR25" gig...
I think we can just about get away with the thread drift onto senior appointments because the central charge from the Regiment NCOs seems to be one of supine senior leadership. I think you misunderstood my point about VCDS and MilCap posts: I'm not saying Wiggy would go to either (clearly, wrong rank for the second!) but that one of the other services, and the RN is an obvious candidate for the reasons you mention, might take the view that supporting Wiggy for CDS would be a good exchange for securing its preferred candidate in one of the aforementioned posts. Rich Knighton's successor has, I understand, been named internally, but it'll be his/her successor that gets the crucial "SDSR25" gig...
Below the Glidepath - not correcting
Writing public letters to criticize command decisions must be a new thing since I left the forces. Can't think of anything that could possibly go wrong from that course of action. This must be the new oath of allegiance:
I solemnly swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second, her heirs and successors and that I will, as in duty bound, except for those orders that I disagree with, or are clearly at odds with my social media contacts or the Daily Mail, honestly and faithfully defend Her Majesty".
I solemnly swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second, her heirs and successors and that I will, as in duty bound, except for those orders that I disagree with, or are clearly at odds with my social media contacts or the Daily Mail, honestly and faithfully defend Her Majesty".
Full text of the letter found on ARRSE which got it from Facebook.
It was to OC 1 Sqn RAF Regiment signed by a Sgt - co-signed by 62 others - almost half the sqn.
Looks like the frustration has been building for sometime as previous operations for which the RAF Regiment would appear to be better suited yet passed over are mentioned - eg aircraft detachment FP using Foxhound in a Complex Air Ground Environment (CAGE) and FP in Medical Emergency Response Team (MERT) helos. There is also some rancor regarding the role of the RAF Police in the RAF Whole Force and the script being flipped as to who has the lead in certain roles.
OC 1 Sqn
Raf Honington
Bury St Edmunds
Suffolk
IP31 1EE
Sir,
I have no doubt you are aware of the ongoing mobilisation of 600 troops in support of Op Pitting and the withdrawal of British nationals from Afghanistan. Their primary role in this is to provide Force Protection for Kabul Airfield to directly support Air Assets while they are conducting the withdrawal. It has caused a great deal of upset and disappointment amongst the ranks within the RAF Regt that feel once again our Corps has not been utilised to fulfil the sole propose of its inception in 1942. This is the latest in a long line of operations that the RAF Regt have been passed over for.
45 commando RM currently occupy the FOB in **** supporting Air Assets assigned to **** and ****. This job was coined the RAF Regt job and was Recci’ed and advised upon by Flt Lt **** during the 1 Sqn Shader commitments in 2018. The tasking was rejected by the Royal Air Force and eventually went to the RMs. However, they were unprepared for this task and had to qualify an entire unit in using the Foxhound, dismounts, DMIs, Mechanics, drivers and commanders. Worse still they also utilised their exchange Sgt (Sgt **** RAF Regt) to train their troops in CAGE based tactics while operating around Air frames. All this while 1 Sqn stood at readiness with both Air aware DCCT troops and AVW Foxhound Drivers, Commanders, Top covers, crews, DMIs, mechanics, with the experience and skill set to take this task without any additional training burden to the Sqn.
Before this the army took ownership of the rotary FP on Op Toral providing Force protection for NATO advisors via Kabul security forces/Kabul protection Unit. Once again establishing themselves as Air minded troops that can operate within the CAGE environment.
We, as a Force Protection element, currently hold a commitment to the AMPT taskings, however we do not hold ownership of this. The teams of Gunners currently aligned to this tasking from 2 Sqn are being led by the RAF Police. It is beyond my comprehension that the lead on this tasking is taken from BCCT troops. It once again demonstrates a lack of understanding from Air to the Land doctrine and of the roles and capabilities of the RAF Regt; this is an issue that has been passed up on multiple occasions and nobody can provide an answer to why the RAF Police have the lead on this.
As it stands the only enduring commitment the RAF Regt holds is Op Erasmus. An on Base security detail where the main task is policing the Air Base, checking buildings are secure and assisting MPGS with Guard duties. How have the roles of the RAF Regt and the RAF Police become switched? This job alone has had and will continue to be a source of retention issues.
With the publicity that has been given to this current Op it has shown the entire military and the public that our role is now redundant. With 2 Para and 16 Air Assault taking the lead on Air FP in a hostile theatre and providing protection against both high- and low-tech threat attacks, it has effectively killed the relevance of our Corps. I believe this to be a failing of the Command elements within the RAF Regiment and a lack of understanding of his own forces needs and capacities from Air Chief Marshal Sir Mike Wigston.
The failings from within the RAF Regiment comes in two forms; firstly, their failure to own and protect their own doctrine on how Air FP MUST be conducted. The fact that we follow doctrine from Land on all things DCCT and hold no standalone doctrine in how AIR specific soldiering and CAGE FP should be carried out means, we have left this door open to any DCCT unit to adopt the roll as and when it is deemed necessary without the need for any specialist training. This effectively deems our role irrelevant. Had we owned the policies with Air and had the CAS implemented his own FP for his Air Assets ensuring that Air Assets couldn’t deploy to high threat areas without the employment of the CAGE specialists, we would find our self a key component of Air Power moving forward and embedding ourselves within the Air operations model for the forceable future. As it stands, all Air require is a form of FP and it is apparent they care very little who provides this.
The Lack of doctrine has led to the CAS having no clue in how to implement his own resources, he has shown this time and time again with Air Assets conducting Ops globally with no specific Air FP measures in place. We currently have rotatory assets in Mali with Infantry units sat in the back providing FP on MERT with the tricky C/S. On top of this the F35 has launched with the Navy Battle Group and will receive no FP when landing away from the carriers, relying on the protection of host nations instead of its own FP measures it so desperately requires in the UK on Op Erasmus.
There is clearly no voice from FPHQ that has the moral courage to fight for the viability and survival of the RAF Regt and the gulf between the troops on the shop floor and the commissioned ranks has never been greater. This is just another failing in a long list of issues currently facing the RAF Regt and its inability to maintain its own standards and relevance.
I personally find this upsetting; distressing and I’m embarrassed by the lack of action from the senior command elements lack of action and short-sightedness and secondly with The Royal Air Forces’s attitude towards risk. It is very clear we work for a risk-averse organisation. The management from the top is one of self-preservation, over actual deliverables and doing what is best for the Corps and wider Air Force.
I know I’m not alone in feeling like this and have compiled some comments from the Non-Commissioned ranks of 1 sqn. (annex A) There are a lot of people who share these views and feel let down by their Regt and the RAF. I know this to have had a detrimental effect on morale, that was already low, and believe it will directly correlate to uptake in ETs and re-trades.
The main questions that have came from the shop floor are;
• Why as a unit whose sole reason for formation in 1942 was this very job are we not being utilised?
• Why do the RAF police have the lead on the DCCT taskings (AMPT) yet have nothing to do with Op Erasmus a BCCT Task?
• What future role do you see the RAF Regt having now 2 PARA have proven they can adopt “our role” at short notice and air can deploy without FP on board?
• The RMs own their own doctrine for amphibious FP that is understood and utilised by the command elements of Royal Navy, why do we not have our own and why is our role not understood by the wider RAF?
• With the Army creating the Ranger Regiments and the RMs implementing the Future Commando Force, why has the RAF Regiments top brass done nothing to keep us current and indispensable to Air power 2025?
• How do the RAF police aid us as a Force Element or is this the pre-curser to the RAF Regt and RAF Police becoming a on base home front security force?
• Why do we have to dual qualify on DCCT and AVW annually conducting twice the training burden, twice the time away from family, have no structured timetable for any period of time greater that 8 weeks, when we are never going to be utilised and other units can qualify for taskings as they arise?
• What carrots (Courses, FD, AT, Overseas exercises) do we have as a Sqn to keep us on 1 Sqn and in the Regt?
• We now have a Regt of “Air aware troops” that have less operational experience operating in the CAGE & counter SAFIRE patrolling than; 16 air assault, 2 and 3 para and 45 Commando. How can we be credible SMEs in the delivery of Air minded FP to the RAF if we aren’t the most current or even credible?
I felt this to be my duty to raise the points and concerns of both myself and the members of 1 Sqn RAF Regt and also believe we should be given guidance and direction from the CG, so we can make informed decisions on our careers and our futures within the RAF Regt. I would be happy to discuss the above raised points in greater detail. I look forward to hearing your response and thoughts on the raised concerns.
Regards
Sgt ****
Co Signatures
Sgt ***, Sgt ****, Sgt ****, Sgt **** , Cpl ****, Cpl ****, LCPL ****, SAC ****, SAC ****, SAC ****, SAC **** SAC ****, SAC ****, SAC ****, SAC ****, SAC ****, SAC ****, SAC ****, SAC ****, SAC ****, SAC ****, SAC ****, LCPL ****, SAC ****, LCPL ****, SAC ****, SAC ****, SAC ****, LCpl ****, CPL ****, L/CPL ****, L/CPL ****, L/CPL ****, LAC ****, CPL ****, LAC ****, SAC ****, LAC ****, SAC ****, SAC ****, LAC ****, LAC ****, LAC ****, LAC ****, LAC ****, SAC ****, LAC ****, LAC ****, LAC ****, LAC ****, SAC ****, SAC ****, SAC ****, LAC ****, L/CPL ****, L/CPL ****, LCpl **** SAC ****, SAC ****, SAC ****, Sac ****, SAC ****
Annex A
Points raised by troops of 1 sqn
• I have been told over and over again we are Air FP specialists, specialising in expert Force protection for UK Aircraft and personnel. Force protection is our ‘bread and butter’ yet we do not ever seem to get the force protection jobs, the Army/Marines get them. For example:
**** – 45 commando – utilising foxhound armoured vehicles which we have personnel trained in. RM callsign had to train all their personnel for deployment and we were good to go!!
Mali – Army providing force protection for RAF Chinooks
Kabul – Para reg providing force protection for UK air assets and conducting NEO taskings
• Why am I putting my body on the line, risking injury going on and passing arduous courses, trying to be the best that I can be for my Corps, for nothing. I can get out and join an infantry unit within the British Army and do my job. I joined because I was sold a lie at the AFCO I am yet to do anything in my so far short career that I was told I would do when I joined up or went through basic training.
• Understand that the RAF Regiment is part of the RAF but the RAF needs to realise we are different and they need us to be different. We have to be highly trained in infantry tactics to give them the protection they require and where necessary take life to protect theirs. The RAF doesn’t understand this it seems and are too risk averse do not want to see in the headlines airman injured or airman killed.
• The RAF Regiment is moving closer and closer to the RAF yet there is no flex or movement from the RAF to move closer to understanding us.
• The arduous basic training we go through is a waste of tax payers money. The courses I go on and the high levels of training I conduct yearly is a waste of tax payers money considering what I do!
• If the RAF Regiments future is conducting on base guarding taskings then we need to re-think our recruitment strategy and our training because we are lying to people, selling them a job which is not as it seems. False advertisement!!
• Senior leadership has no appetite to use us. Senior leadership not fighting our corner.
• There’s been a few lads here who have broadcasted theirs feelings to me in which I partly agree, they feel like they have been training for nothing and simply wasting their time, this is the most exciting thing that has happened to us a sqn for a good amount of time, with us just coming off Erasmus in September and every other sqn already busy it seemed a no brainer that there could be potential for us to go out and operate.
• I’ve been talking to the senior sac’s and a couple of my closer pals on the sqn about taking a different career path because since this has happened it just made us realise that the Corps is a dead end… I don’t want to rant but that’s basically what blokes feel like
• the current situation and op in Afghan being given to the army isn’t the only time that this has happened as there is many jobs that have been given to the army/marines such as Mali and the royal welsh staging on the chinook squadron which is an Air Force asset yet they stag on it. Akrotiri airfield is staged on by the army. The airfield in **** that was given to the paras and then handed to marines, not to mention the Corps was formed to defend airfields to enable the projection of air power assets. Why invest and sell the brand and of the regiment when in reality we do nothing. Train for nothing and are basically the MPGS or the RAF with all the guard and Erasmus and that is apparently the commitment that keeps the corps alive after the defence review. For lads who haven’t been away and then we get questioned on why we aren’t keen or enthusiastic about the job when stuff like this happens around us and makes us feel so useless in a way
• I will not be staying in the RAF Regiment for the longevity if this is how we get used.
• General consensus is the RAF Regiment has none or is losing its identity, no clear direction from senior leadership, no opportunities to do our actual jobs, nothing to ‘dangle the carrot’ for new gunners. Lads feel lied to and quite frankly fed up."
It was to OC 1 Sqn RAF Regiment signed by a Sgt - co-signed by 62 others - almost half the sqn.
Looks like the frustration has been building for sometime as previous operations for which the RAF Regiment would appear to be better suited yet passed over are mentioned - eg aircraft detachment FP using Foxhound in a Complex Air Ground Environment (CAGE) and FP in Medical Emergency Response Team (MERT) helos. There is also some rancor regarding the role of the RAF Police in the RAF Whole Force and the script being flipped as to who has the lead in certain roles.
OC 1 Sqn
Raf Honington
Bury St Edmunds
Suffolk
IP31 1EE
Sir,
I have no doubt you are aware of the ongoing mobilisation of 600 troops in support of Op Pitting and the withdrawal of British nationals from Afghanistan. Their primary role in this is to provide Force Protection for Kabul Airfield to directly support Air Assets while they are conducting the withdrawal. It has caused a great deal of upset and disappointment amongst the ranks within the RAF Regt that feel once again our Corps has not been utilised to fulfil the sole propose of its inception in 1942. This is the latest in a long line of operations that the RAF Regt have been passed over for.
45 commando RM currently occupy the FOB in **** supporting Air Assets assigned to **** and ****. This job was coined the RAF Regt job and was Recci’ed and advised upon by Flt Lt **** during the 1 Sqn Shader commitments in 2018. The tasking was rejected by the Royal Air Force and eventually went to the RMs. However, they were unprepared for this task and had to qualify an entire unit in using the Foxhound, dismounts, DMIs, Mechanics, drivers and commanders. Worse still they also utilised their exchange Sgt (Sgt **** RAF Regt) to train their troops in CAGE based tactics while operating around Air frames. All this while 1 Sqn stood at readiness with both Air aware DCCT troops and AVW Foxhound Drivers, Commanders, Top covers, crews, DMIs, mechanics, with the experience and skill set to take this task without any additional training burden to the Sqn.
Before this the army took ownership of the rotary FP on Op Toral providing Force protection for NATO advisors via Kabul security forces/Kabul protection Unit. Once again establishing themselves as Air minded troops that can operate within the CAGE environment.
We, as a Force Protection element, currently hold a commitment to the AMPT taskings, however we do not hold ownership of this. The teams of Gunners currently aligned to this tasking from 2 Sqn are being led by the RAF Police. It is beyond my comprehension that the lead on this tasking is taken from BCCT troops. It once again demonstrates a lack of understanding from Air to the Land doctrine and of the roles and capabilities of the RAF Regt; this is an issue that has been passed up on multiple occasions and nobody can provide an answer to why the RAF Police have the lead on this.
As it stands the only enduring commitment the RAF Regt holds is Op Erasmus. An on Base security detail where the main task is policing the Air Base, checking buildings are secure and assisting MPGS with Guard duties. How have the roles of the RAF Regt and the RAF Police become switched? This job alone has had and will continue to be a source of retention issues.
With the publicity that has been given to this current Op it has shown the entire military and the public that our role is now redundant. With 2 Para and 16 Air Assault taking the lead on Air FP in a hostile theatre and providing protection against both high- and low-tech threat attacks, it has effectively killed the relevance of our Corps. I believe this to be a failing of the Command elements within the RAF Regiment and a lack of understanding of his own forces needs and capacities from Air Chief Marshal Sir Mike Wigston.
The failings from within the RAF Regiment comes in two forms; firstly, their failure to own and protect their own doctrine on how Air FP MUST be conducted. The fact that we follow doctrine from Land on all things DCCT and hold no standalone doctrine in how AIR specific soldiering and CAGE FP should be carried out means, we have left this door open to any DCCT unit to adopt the roll as and when it is deemed necessary without the need for any specialist training. This effectively deems our role irrelevant. Had we owned the policies with Air and had the CAS implemented his own FP for his Air Assets ensuring that Air Assets couldn’t deploy to high threat areas without the employment of the CAGE specialists, we would find our self a key component of Air Power moving forward and embedding ourselves within the Air operations model for the forceable future. As it stands, all Air require is a form of FP and it is apparent they care very little who provides this.
The Lack of doctrine has led to the CAS having no clue in how to implement his own resources, he has shown this time and time again with Air Assets conducting Ops globally with no specific Air FP measures in place. We currently have rotatory assets in Mali with Infantry units sat in the back providing FP on MERT with the tricky C/S. On top of this the F35 has launched with the Navy Battle Group and will receive no FP when landing away from the carriers, relying on the protection of host nations instead of its own FP measures it so desperately requires in the UK on Op Erasmus.
There is clearly no voice from FPHQ that has the moral courage to fight for the viability and survival of the RAF Regt and the gulf between the troops on the shop floor and the commissioned ranks has never been greater. This is just another failing in a long list of issues currently facing the RAF Regt and its inability to maintain its own standards and relevance.
I personally find this upsetting; distressing and I’m embarrassed by the lack of action from the senior command elements lack of action and short-sightedness and secondly with The Royal Air Forces’s attitude towards risk. It is very clear we work for a risk-averse organisation. The management from the top is one of self-preservation, over actual deliverables and doing what is best for the Corps and wider Air Force.
I know I’m not alone in feeling like this and have compiled some comments from the Non-Commissioned ranks of 1 sqn. (annex A) There are a lot of people who share these views and feel let down by their Regt and the RAF. I know this to have had a detrimental effect on morale, that was already low, and believe it will directly correlate to uptake in ETs and re-trades.
The main questions that have came from the shop floor are;
• Why as a unit whose sole reason for formation in 1942 was this very job are we not being utilised?
• Why do the RAF police have the lead on the DCCT taskings (AMPT) yet have nothing to do with Op Erasmus a BCCT Task?
• What future role do you see the RAF Regt having now 2 PARA have proven they can adopt “our role” at short notice and air can deploy without FP on board?
• The RMs own their own doctrine for amphibious FP that is understood and utilised by the command elements of Royal Navy, why do we not have our own and why is our role not understood by the wider RAF?
• With the Army creating the Ranger Regiments and the RMs implementing the Future Commando Force, why has the RAF Regiments top brass done nothing to keep us current and indispensable to Air power 2025?
• How do the RAF police aid us as a Force Element or is this the pre-curser to the RAF Regt and RAF Police becoming a on base home front security force?
• Why do we have to dual qualify on DCCT and AVW annually conducting twice the training burden, twice the time away from family, have no structured timetable for any period of time greater that 8 weeks, when we are never going to be utilised and other units can qualify for taskings as they arise?
• What carrots (Courses, FD, AT, Overseas exercises) do we have as a Sqn to keep us on 1 Sqn and in the Regt?
• We now have a Regt of “Air aware troops” that have less operational experience operating in the CAGE & counter SAFIRE patrolling than; 16 air assault, 2 and 3 para and 45 Commando. How can we be credible SMEs in the delivery of Air minded FP to the RAF if we aren’t the most current or even credible?
I felt this to be my duty to raise the points and concerns of both myself and the members of 1 Sqn RAF Regt and also believe we should be given guidance and direction from the CG, so we can make informed decisions on our careers and our futures within the RAF Regt. I would be happy to discuss the above raised points in greater detail. I look forward to hearing your response and thoughts on the raised concerns.
Regards
Sgt ****
Co Signatures
Sgt ***, Sgt ****, Sgt ****, Sgt **** , Cpl ****, Cpl ****, LCPL ****, SAC ****, SAC ****, SAC ****, SAC **** SAC ****, SAC ****, SAC ****, SAC ****, SAC ****, SAC ****, SAC ****, SAC ****, SAC ****, SAC ****, SAC ****, LCPL ****, SAC ****, LCPL ****, SAC ****, SAC ****, SAC ****, LCpl ****, CPL ****, L/CPL ****, L/CPL ****, L/CPL ****, LAC ****, CPL ****, LAC ****, SAC ****, LAC ****, SAC ****, SAC ****, LAC ****, LAC ****, LAC ****, LAC ****, LAC ****, SAC ****, LAC ****, LAC ****, LAC ****, LAC ****, SAC ****, SAC ****, SAC ****, LAC ****, L/CPL ****, L/CPL ****, LCpl **** SAC ****, SAC ****, SAC ****, Sac ****, SAC ****
Annex A
Points raised by troops of 1 sqn
• I have been told over and over again we are Air FP specialists, specialising in expert Force protection for UK Aircraft and personnel. Force protection is our ‘bread and butter’ yet we do not ever seem to get the force protection jobs, the Army/Marines get them. For example:
**** – 45 commando – utilising foxhound armoured vehicles which we have personnel trained in. RM callsign had to train all their personnel for deployment and we were good to go!!
Mali – Army providing force protection for RAF Chinooks
Kabul – Para reg providing force protection for UK air assets and conducting NEO taskings
• Why am I putting my body on the line, risking injury going on and passing arduous courses, trying to be the best that I can be for my Corps, for nothing. I can get out and join an infantry unit within the British Army and do my job. I joined because I was sold a lie at the AFCO I am yet to do anything in my so far short career that I was told I would do when I joined up or went through basic training.
• Understand that the RAF Regiment is part of the RAF but the RAF needs to realise we are different and they need us to be different. We have to be highly trained in infantry tactics to give them the protection they require and where necessary take life to protect theirs. The RAF doesn’t understand this it seems and are too risk averse do not want to see in the headlines airman injured or airman killed.
• The RAF Regiment is moving closer and closer to the RAF yet there is no flex or movement from the RAF to move closer to understanding us.
• The arduous basic training we go through is a waste of tax payers money. The courses I go on and the high levels of training I conduct yearly is a waste of tax payers money considering what I do!
• If the RAF Regiments future is conducting on base guarding taskings then we need to re-think our recruitment strategy and our training because we are lying to people, selling them a job which is not as it seems. False advertisement!!
• Senior leadership has no appetite to use us. Senior leadership not fighting our corner.
• There’s been a few lads here who have broadcasted theirs feelings to me in which I partly agree, they feel like they have been training for nothing and simply wasting their time, this is the most exciting thing that has happened to us a sqn for a good amount of time, with us just coming off Erasmus in September and every other sqn already busy it seemed a no brainer that there could be potential for us to go out and operate.
• I’ve been talking to the senior sac’s and a couple of my closer pals on the sqn about taking a different career path because since this has happened it just made us realise that the Corps is a dead end… I don’t want to rant but that’s basically what blokes feel like
• the current situation and op in Afghan being given to the army isn’t the only time that this has happened as there is many jobs that have been given to the army/marines such as Mali and the royal welsh staging on the chinook squadron which is an Air Force asset yet they stag on it. Akrotiri airfield is staged on by the army. The airfield in **** that was given to the paras and then handed to marines, not to mention the Corps was formed to defend airfields to enable the projection of air power assets. Why invest and sell the brand and of the regiment when in reality we do nothing. Train for nothing and are basically the MPGS or the RAF with all the guard and Erasmus and that is apparently the commitment that keeps the corps alive after the defence review. For lads who haven’t been away and then we get questioned on why we aren’t keen or enthusiastic about the job when stuff like this happens around us and makes us feel so useless in a way
• I will not be staying in the RAF Regiment for the longevity if this is how we get used.
• General consensus is the RAF Regiment has none or is losing its identity, no clear direction from senior leadership, no opportunities to do our actual jobs, nothing to ‘dangle the carrot’ for new gunners. Lads feel lied to and quite frankly fed up."
The RAF Regiment and the Paras would be a better mix perhaps. A tool for every job. To belabor the metaphors.
Signed,
Was an Infantry Officer, and have worked with and against the Paras.
I fully agree withe the sentiments expressed. Following the intervention in Sierra Leone in May 2000 (featuring many a picture of Gurkhas at Lungi with RAF C130 in background) the then AOC 2 Gp - Filbey, and CAS - Squire IIRC, visited RAF Honington (and II Sqn RAF Regt in particular - at that moment the lead readiness FP sqn). They both said they were highly embarrassed that the RAF Regt had not been involved and stated that this would never happen again.
It may be the case that the RAF Regt alone could not have fulfilled all of the ground component tasks on Op PITTING, but a properly constituted joint force, including an element from the RAF Regt, would have been the right response.
Batco
It may be the case that the RAF Regt alone could not have fulfilled all of the ground component tasks on Op PITTING, but a properly constituted joint force, including an element from the RAF Regt, would have been the right response.
Batco
Last edited by BATCO; 6th Sep 2021 at 08:51.
Today and Tomorrow at RAF Honnington are going to be interesting days, how many are going to be 'tapping the boards' and careers blighted.
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Allegedly, it would have taken every field sqn and most of the guys you see doing your IRTs on the Force Development sqns in order to have enough personnel to deploy. Additionally, 16 AAB were the bros on readiness to move in case of a crisis.
CG has handed his notice in about it though. Furthermore, it seems that CAS just didn’t fight at all to get the Regt out there, he was laissez faire about it which is deeply damaging.
someone on the thread above nailed it, he’s too consumed and interested in his E&D drive than talking operational capability.
CG has handed his notice in about it though. Furthermore, it seems that CAS just didn’t fight at all to get the Regt out there, he was laissez faire about it which is deeply damaging.
someone on the thread above nailed it, he’s too consumed and interested in his E&D drive than talking operational capability.
OC 1 Sqn RAF Regiment had only been in post about 11 days when the letter appeared on ARRSE (August 28).
RAF Regiment on Twitter: "A warm welcome to Sqn Ldr Algar (Right), who has taken over command of 1 Sqn #RAFRegiment from Sqn Ldr Jones (Left). Wishing both Sqn Ldr Jones and Sqn Ldr Algar the best of luck in their new roles. #AlwaysOperating #ArkishSurrish #AlwaysOperating. #ArkishSurrish https://t.co/kiDw3V7GRL" / Twitter
RAF Regiment on Twitter: "A warm welcome to Sqn Ldr Algar (Right), who has taken over command of 1 Sqn #RAFRegiment from Sqn Ldr Jones (Left). Wishing both Sqn Ldr Jones and Sqn Ldr Algar the best of luck in their new roles. #AlwaysOperating #ArkishSurrish #AlwaysOperating. #ArkishSurrish https://t.co/kiDw3V7GRL" / Twitter
The other people who may and probably will be caught up in this are the other Sgt's, Flt Sgt's and Squadron WO for not being on top of this and/or defusing the situation.
Last edited by air pig; 5th Sep 2021 at 22:26.
Why, or indeed how, should the WO/SNCOs of 1 Sqn defuse a situation caused entirely by the total mismanagement and disregard shown by the RAF senior leadership??
After a generation of overstretch and failed leadership, we are entering a new era of British military culture, where people suffering from professional malaise are obviously not content to sit down and shut up, and will use any and all the comms channels at their disposal to be heard!
After a generation of overstretch and failed leadership, we are entering a new era of British military culture, where people suffering from professional malaise are obviously not content to sit down and shut up, and will use any and all the comms channels at their disposal to be heard!
I fully agree withe the sentiments expressed. Following the intervention in Sierra Leone in May 2000 (featuring many a picture of Gurkhas at Lungi with RAF C130 in background) the then AOC 2 Gp - Filbey, and CAS - Squire IIRC, visited RAF Honington (and II Sqn RAF Regt in particular - at that moment the lead readiness FP sqn). They both said they were highly embarrassed that the RAF Regt had not been involved and stated that this would never happen again.
It may be the case that the RAF Regt alone could not have fulfilled all of the ground component tasks on Op PITTING, but a properly constituted joint force, including an element from the RAF Regt, would have been the right response.
Batco
It may be the case that the RAF Regt alone could not have fulfilled all of the ground component tasks on Op PITTING, but a properly constituted joint force, including an element from the RAF Regt, would have been the right response.
Batco
RAF Reg did deploy to SL- 2 Sqn were there towards the end of the deployment. (Rough) Order of arrival in theatre (formed units).
Some strange Army bods
RAF SHF (7 and 27 Sqns), MAMs, LTW,TCW.
Para Reg
RM when HMS Ocean arrived.
2 Sqn RAF Regiment (I think they jumped in?) when Ocean sailed. Left us with airfield security provided by the UN- IIRC the Bangladeshi Battalion (BANGBAT) who didn't really inspire much confidence.
Apologies if I've missed anyone out!
We did see a Harrier once as well.
PapaD
Thanks for response. You have correctly identified II Sqn RAF Regt as participating in operations in SL. However some of your detail is wrong.
II Sqn's first involvement came as part of a concurrent Op (MAIDENLY), with a Flt deploying just as 42 Cdo (follow-on force to Para/Gurkha BG) withdrew at the conclusion of the major intervention. We arrived by C130 (conventional landing).
The second involvement came a year or so later with the Sqn parachuting into Op SILKMAN to demonstrate the UK's ability to reinforce rapidly 'from over the horizon'.
I was honoured to have participated in both (PM me if you want to know my position/role).
Given the debate on whether Op PITTING should be recognised by a medal/clasp I might add that I missed the SL/OSM medal for MAIDENLY by one day and SILKMAN by several (and the days could not be added together). But I think PITTING should be recognised with the OSM with a 'PITTING' clasp.
Batco
Thanks for response. You have correctly identified II Sqn RAF Regt as participating in operations in SL. However some of your detail is wrong.
II Sqn's first involvement came as part of a concurrent Op (MAIDENLY), with a Flt deploying just as 42 Cdo (follow-on force to Para/Gurkha BG) withdrew at the conclusion of the major intervention. We arrived by C130 (conventional landing).
The second involvement came a year or so later with the Sqn parachuting into Op SILKMAN to demonstrate the UK's ability to reinforce rapidly 'from over the horizon'.
I was honoured to have participated in both (PM me if you want to know my position/role).
Given the debate on whether Op PITTING should be recognised by a medal/clasp I might add that I missed the SL/OSM medal for MAIDENLY by one day and SILKMAN by several (and the days could not be added together). But I think PITTING should be recognised with the OSM with a 'PITTING' clasp.
Batco
Last edited by BATCO; 6th Sep 2021 at 08:52.
Unless something has changed very recently, none of the Service Chiefs gets to decide who does what - they are tasked with generating Force Elements @ Readiness and providing domain advice to the supported commander, in this case COM STRATCOM. CJO and PJHQ work out which FE they require based on all the factors in play and the CofC is then tasked to provide units accordingly. Using a perceived failure to deploy the RAF Regt as an excuse for some of the Wiggy-bashing in this thread is not only weak - the decision was taken elsewhere - but simply adds to the Daily Mail blame game (given that PPrune and ARRSE are frequent DM sources of information).
FWIW, I suspect the troops to task equation was probably, as alluded to by Foghorn Leghorn (post #4), beyond the scale available from the RAF Regt and the task was also seen as airport security, not airfield defence. From a C2 perspective there would have been much less risk in sending a formed battle group than in having to integrate other fighting units, which is perhaps why 16 Air Assault Bde was the preferred option. I would have added an FP HQ to provide specialist airfield ops advice - perhaps someone in the know can tell us if any extra Regt personnel were deployed beyond those already embedded in 16 AAB?
FWIW, I suspect the troops to task equation was probably, as alluded to by Foghorn Leghorn (post #4), beyond the scale available from the RAF Regt and the task was also seen as airport security, not airfield defence. From a C2 perspective there would have been much less risk in sending a formed battle group than in having to integrate other fighting units, which is perhaps why 16 Air Assault Bde was the preferred option. I would have added an FP HQ to provide specialist airfield ops advice - perhaps someone in the know can tell us if any extra Regt personnel were deployed beyond those already embedded in 16 AAB?
Out of interest as much as anything, my watching of the events was that 2PARA did the getting people outside the wire and sorting/ guarding/ protecting them once inside the wire. The US did the airfield guarding, hence why they could carry on once we left. Thus what exactly would the RAFR do? If their main job is FP of bases and aircraft, the US had that covered. Open to comments of course. At the risk of a major BEADWINDOW, what readiness state are the RAFR on? Can they get a full FE out of the door in 48 hours or less? If not, it was always going to be an Army FE.
I am sure that today various elements for the RAF Regt are on graduated RS as with other force elements across Sea, Land and Air. Indeed, in my day we twice exceeded the requirements of the mandated RS in order to get the job done. My own record was to leave HQ Air at 1400Z (having travelled from HONZ), return to HONZ get my gear and be on the midnight someday C130 bound for Sierra Leone.
Batco