History Hunters on Yesterday Grp Capt Peter Casement
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History Hunters on Yesterday Grp Capt Peter Casement
Fascinating archive, from WW2 to 68. All his logbooks, notebooks, uniforms and medals DSO, DFC plus bar, AFC...
Not happy that yet again a programme maker referred to the RAF "switching bombing tactics from military targets to cities"
Both my father and father in law were RAF pilots during WW2 and were never happy with the post war criticism of Bomber Command. My FIL's brother was accredited Battle of Britain aircrew, Blenheim air gunner. My dad's home in London was bombed in 1940 and the family lost everything they owned. None of them are still alive, so I think I have the right to take up this argument on their behalf.
So lets ask a few questions ......
1/ Who started the war?
2/ Were the cities bombed by the RAF or for that matter the USAAF, any less military targets than the cities bombed by the Nazis, London, Liverpool, Hull, Bristol, Portsmouth, Plymouth, Southampton, Cardiff, Swansea, Birmingham, Belfast, Coventry, Glasgow, Manchester, Sheffield, Lowestoft and the Medway Towns?
3/ What were our options at that time, to take the war to the Nazis in Europe?
For the record, we bombed Dresden at the request of Stalin, a direct order given to Air Marshall Harris by Churchill, who subsequently, to his everlasting shame, distance himself from that order. Fire bombing, we learnt that tactic from the Nazis, London & Coventry 1940.
Grp Capt Peter Casement, one of the Bomber Command heros that took the war to the Nazis and one of the few to survive.
Both my father and father in law were RAF pilots during WW2 and were never happy with the post war criticism of Bomber Command. My FIL's brother was accredited Battle of Britain aircrew, Blenheim air gunner. My dad's home in London was bombed in 1940 and the family lost everything they owned. None of them are still alive, so I think I have the right to take up this argument on their behalf.
So lets ask a few questions ......
1/ Who started the war?
2/ Were the cities bombed by the RAF or for that matter the USAAF, any less military targets than the cities bombed by the Nazis, London, Liverpool, Hull, Bristol, Portsmouth, Plymouth, Southampton, Cardiff, Swansea, Birmingham, Belfast, Coventry, Glasgow, Manchester, Sheffield, Lowestoft and the Medway Towns?
3/ What were our options at that time, to take the war to the Nazis in Europe?
For the record, we bombed Dresden at the request of Stalin, a direct order given to Air Marshall Harris by Churchill, who subsequently, to his everlasting shame, distance himself from that order. Fire bombing, we learnt that tactic from the Nazis, London & Coventry 1940.
Grp Capt Peter Casement, one of the Bomber Command heros that took the war to the Nazis and one of the few to survive.
Last edited by WB627; 17th Mar 2020 at 22:39. Reason: Lowestoft added my apologies for the omission
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To be fair to the program maker...
Harris experimented with his new Lancasters in a daylight precision raid to Augsburg: 44 Sqn lost 5 out of 6 Lancasters despatched (Nettleton won his VC in the only surviving aircraft from Waddington) and 97 Sqn who lost 2 out of 6. Not good odds. Harris followed up with a night-time precision raid against the Heinkel Factory in Warnemunde with 18 aircraft under the cover of a main raid on Rostok. The Warnemunde Raid had 18 aircraft: 44 Sqn lost 4 out of 7 despatched. In the two precision attacks, 44 Sqn lost 9 Lancasters out of 13 Despatched. Not good odds. Three weeks later, Harris tried the 1,000 Bomber Raid on Cologne with Essen the day after. Both these raids were successful: if you can't hit the small factory target without major loss, then you hit the city with the factory in it!
Area bombing was the only method available in 1942, and Harris used it. As was said later. The only moral issue would be to let Germany win the War. All else was secondary.
Harris experimented with his new Lancasters in a daylight precision raid to Augsburg: 44 Sqn lost 5 out of 6 Lancasters despatched (Nettleton won his VC in the only surviving aircraft from Waddington) and 97 Sqn who lost 2 out of 6. Not good odds. Harris followed up with a night-time precision raid against the Heinkel Factory in Warnemunde with 18 aircraft under the cover of a main raid on Rostok. The Warnemunde Raid had 18 aircraft: 44 Sqn lost 4 out of 7 despatched. In the two precision attacks, 44 Sqn lost 9 Lancasters out of 13 Despatched. Not good odds. Three weeks later, Harris tried the 1,000 Bomber Raid on Cologne with Essen the day after. Both these raids were successful: if you can't hit the small factory target without major loss, then you hit the city with the factory in it!
Area bombing was the only method available in 1942, and Harris used it. As was said later. The only moral issue would be to let Germany win the War. All else was secondary.
I appreciate I'm not the right generation to have heard the criticism of Bomber Harris, or the bombing strategy of the time, although I'm subsequently aware of it. However, I'd never considered it valid to criticise anyway; in war, as much as bad people do bad things, good people are forced to do similar in response. I don't personally see the statement you've highlighted as pejorative, more factual if that indeed was the timeline. I appreciate your personal history sees that differently though. The enormity of the undertakings made by all those who fought in the war, including my family members, overwhelms any criticism by those that didn't have to make those decisions & sacrifices - their legacy is a reminder of what they had to do, so that we may never need to.
WB
Add Lowestoft to your list.
Here's something I posted on the Bomber Command Memorial thread in 2012:
"We had a very good family friend who died 3 years ago. He was a tank driver with the 4/7 Dragoon Guards and landed in one of the earliest waves on D day and fought through France and Holland. Although he survived there was a shadow over the rest of his life because he had lost his beloved 15 yr old only sister in an air raid on Lowestoft in 1942."
Add Lowestoft to your list.
Here's something I posted on the Bomber Command Memorial thread in 2012:
"We had a very good family friend who died 3 years ago. He was a tank driver with the 4/7 Dragoon Guards and landed in one of the earliest waves on D day and fought through France and Holland. Although he survived there was a shadow over the rest of his life because he had lost his beloved 15 yr old only sister in an air raid on Lowestoft in 1942."
If we look to the history of war....playing nice. never wins.
To succeed you have to deny the enemy the ability to fight and destroy his will to fight.
As time moves on we seem to want to see things through a different Prism than existed at the time and that is unkind to those having to make some very hard decisions.
When you consider the horrendous losses to Bomber crews of the RAF and US Army Air Corps during WWII....it was a very dangerous business for the aircrews.
I tip my hat to them all!
I had a close family friend who went to Canada and wound up flying Lancaster Bombers from Teeside doing Thirty Missions.
Sadly, he passed on a couple of years ago and was quite the positive influence on me over the years I knew him.
To succeed you have to deny the enemy the ability to fight and destroy his will to fight.
As time moves on we seem to want to see things through a different Prism than existed at the time and that is unkind to those having to make some very hard decisions.
When you consider the horrendous losses to Bomber crews of the RAF and US Army Air Corps during WWII....it was a very dangerous business for the aircrews.
I tip my hat to them all!
I had a close family friend who went to Canada and wound up flying Lancaster Bombers from Teeside doing Thirty Missions.
Sadly, he passed on a couple of years ago and was quite the positive influence on me over the years I knew him.
Dresden didn't have heavy war industries but it still had war industries making optics for submarine periscopes and range finders for ships so it was always a legitimate military target. The USAAF also participated in the raid yet they were never "tainted" with the association. Curtis LeMay copied the area bombing concept on Japan when once again the precision bombing fallacy was demonstrated. I'm not sure about Stalin demanding the raid go ahead but it was certainly used to demonstrate to the Russians the capabilities of the RAF and USAAF strategic bombing force. The Nazi then the Communist propaganda apparatus allegedly inflated the numbers to show the West to be merciless killers. The same Communist propaganda that blamed the Katyn Forest massacre on the Germans. As someone else mentioned it was a blot on Churchill's reputation that after ordering the raid he washed his hands of the responsibility for it and denied the brave crew of Bomber Command any post war recognition.
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Dresden didn't have heavy war industries but it still had war industries making optics for submarine periscopes and range finders for ships so it was always a legitimate military target. The USAAF also participated in the raid yet they were never "tainted" with the association. Curtis LeMay copied the area bombing concept on Japan when once again the precision bombing fallacy was demonstrated. I'm not sure about Stalin demanding the raid go ahead but it was certainly used to demonstrate to the Russians the capabilities of the RAF and USAAF strategic bombing force. The Nazi then the Communist propaganda apparatus allegedly inflated the numbers to show the West to be merciless killers. The same Communist propaganda that blamed the Katyn Forest massacre on the Germans. As someone else mentioned it was a blot on Churchill's reputation that after ordering the raid he washed his hands of the responsibility for it and denied the brave crew of Bomber Command any post war recognition.
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Regarding missing German targets. Do not forget the Baedeker Raids of 1942 when towns and cities of historic importance were deliberately targeted. If I remember correctly they included Exeter, Bath, Canterbury, Norwich and York to name but a few.
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When it comes to bombing civilian populations, the Germans "had form", starting with the bombing of Guernica in Spain in 1937. Warsaw was bombed extensively in September 1939. In May 1940, Rotterdam was almost destroyed, with the threat to do the same to Utrecht should the Dutch government not capitulate. In addition to the UK cities mentioned above, from the summer of 1944, London was being bombarded by V1s and then V2s, killing thousands - albeit not on the scale of Dresden.
War involves making hard choices; however, for much of the war, Bomber Command's strategy was the only choice for taking the fight to the enemy and to keep Stalin at least partially happy.
It was right that the Natzis should thus have "reaped the whirlwind". Churchill's stance regarding Bomber Command at the end of the war was a disgrace.
War involves making hard choices; however, for much of the war, Bomber Command's strategy was the only choice for taking the fight to the enemy and to keep Stalin at least partially happy.
It was right that the Natzis should thus have "reaped the whirlwind". Churchill's stance regarding Bomber Command at the end of the war was a disgrace.
WB627,
You may not be happy with the description but that is in effect what happened.
Post the Butt report and the adoption of area tactics the targets became the built up areas of cities and not military or industrial targets.
The ultimate proof of this, apart from statements from Harris himself, lies in the target maps from the Dresden raid. The industrial areas did not even lie within the targeted areas, the target was the unburnt/destroyed areas of the city itself.
You may not be happy with the description but that is in effect what happened.
Post the Butt report and the adoption of area tactics the targets became the built up areas of cities and not military or industrial targets.
The ultimate proof of this, apart from statements from Harris himself, lies in the target maps from the Dresden raid. The industrial areas did not even lie within the targeted areas, the target was the unburnt/destroyed areas of the city itself.
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Reverting to the title theme, a Wg.Cdr.Casement signed my log book for September,1956: I had been on 120 Sqn Aldergrove for about a week and he moved on about a week later. I imagine that every new arrival would ask,in a whisper,"Is he kin to that other Casement ,you know, the one we hanged
?" And the answer was "Yes. Nephew."
?" And the answer was "Yes. Nephew."
pr00ne
I know we were not getting close to the targets which is why we changed tactics, because that was our only option. What I was not happy about, was the way in which it was said in the programme, which to me at least, implied yet again, criticism of the RAF and the crews that were involved.
Whilst Dresden was a strategic target, it was a major rail transport and communication centre, there were over 100 factories and 50,000 workers supporting the German war effort, it had however, not been significantly bombed up to that point in the war. A Soviet intelligence report which was later proven erroneous, indicated that one or two German armored divisions were in Dresden, on their way to reinforce the Eastern Front. Consequently, the Russians, who would later denounce the attack as an Anglo-American war crime, made the request that led to Dresden’s destruction.
Bomber Command crews have taken the flack for the change in strategy after Butt, since the end of the war, probably for doing their job too well and it is time it stopped.
I know we were not getting close to the targets which is why we changed tactics, because that was our only option. What I was not happy about, was the way in which it was said in the programme, which to me at least, implied yet again, criticism of the RAF and the crews that were involved.
Whilst Dresden was a strategic target, it was a major rail transport and communication centre, there were over 100 factories and 50,000 workers supporting the German war effort, it had however, not been significantly bombed up to that point in the war. A Soviet intelligence report which was later proven erroneous, indicated that one or two German armored divisions were in Dresden, on their way to reinforce the Eastern Front. Consequently, the Russians, who would later denounce the attack as an Anglo-American war crime, made the request that led to Dresden’s destruction.
Bomber Command crews have taken the flack for the change in strategy after Butt, since the end of the war, probably for doing their job too well and it is time it stopped.
Last edited by WB627; 18th Mar 2020 at 17:13. Reason: Marshalling yards bombed twice before the final attack
Jack
In commenting on the activities of bomber command in WW2, I think it is vital to distinguish between the operational personnel and their senior commanders. The former are beyond reproach, and their bravery and commitment remains a remarkable testament.
As for their commanders, much has been made of the tactics of bombing civilian populations rather than specific military or industrial targets. It seems to me that in the first instance, in the early stages of the war, bomber command could barely hit the proverbial barn door, and even then at the cost of severe casualties. The tactics which ensued were driven by the evolving nature of the conflict, the enemy, and the equipment, and as such seem to me to represent a "good faith" attempt to advance our cause to the best of their abilities. Hindsight and better information available after the event should not allow this to be retrospectively vilified.
HOWEVER, where I do believe that criticism is warranted is in the failure to prioritise attacks on the oilfields in 1944. There was sufficient compelling contemporary intelligence available to show not only that reducing capacity would be catastrophic for the enemy, but that it could be achieved at relatively low cost to life. In other words, by that stage, we had better options that area bombing, and we knew it.
As I understand it, Harris refused direct orders from Portal (originating from Churchill) to switch priority, instead only allocating "surplus" capacity to the task. Such was the stature of Harris in the eyes of the public, having in the darkest days been the face of our only way of hitting back, that his removal could not be conscienced at that time. To my mind, that explains what happened thereafter to Harris, and sadly by association, all of Bomber Command.
As for their commanders, much has been made of the tactics of bombing civilian populations rather than specific military or industrial targets. It seems to me that in the first instance, in the early stages of the war, bomber command could barely hit the proverbial barn door, and even then at the cost of severe casualties. The tactics which ensued were driven by the evolving nature of the conflict, the enemy, and the equipment, and as such seem to me to represent a "good faith" attempt to advance our cause to the best of their abilities. Hindsight and better information available after the event should not allow this to be retrospectively vilified.
HOWEVER, where I do believe that criticism is warranted is in the failure to prioritise attacks on the oilfields in 1944. There was sufficient compelling contemporary intelligence available to show not only that reducing capacity would be catastrophic for the enemy, but that it could be achieved at relatively low cost to life. In other words, by that stage, we had better options that area bombing, and we knew it.
As I understand it, Harris refused direct orders from Portal (originating from Churchill) to switch priority, instead only allocating "surplus" capacity to the task. Such was the stature of Harris in the eyes of the public, having in the darkest days been the face of our only way of hitting back, that his removal could not be conscienced at that time. To my mind, that explains what happened thereafter to Harris, and sadly by association, all of Bomber Command.
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Reverting to the title theme, a Wg.Cdr.Casement signed my log book for September,1956: I had been on 120 Sqn Aldergrove for about a week and he moved on about a week later. I imagine that every new arrival would ask,in a whisper,"Is he kin to that other Casement ,you know, the one we hanged
?" And the answer was "Yes. Nephew."
?" And the answer was "Yes. Nephew."
I would say one and the same gentleman, as in the pictures shown on the programme was a shackleton and liberators
Reverting to the title theme, a Wg.Cdr.Casement signed my log book for September,1956: I had been on 120 Sqn Aldergrove for about a week and he moved on about a week later. I imagine that every new arrival would ask,in a whisper,"Is he kin to that other Casement ,you know, the one we hanged
?" And the answer was "Yes. Nephew."
?" And the answer was "Yes. Nephew."
Last edited by XV490; 20th Mar 2020 at 13:12.
The most effective argument I have ever heard for Bomber Command came from a BC pilot on a TV programme in the 90s if I remember correctly. Lindemann's de housing was aimed at civilian morale. More importantly bombing workers houses was ,this former pilot stated justified. The justification was that the workers were the producers of the war materials that allowed Germany to wage war. The workers were therefore justified targets.