In commenting on the activities of bomber command in WW2, I think it is vital to distinguish between the operational personnel and their senior commanders. The former are beyond reproach, and their bravery and commitment remains a remarkable testament.
As for their commanders, much has been made of the tactics of bombing civilian populations rather than specific military or industrial targets. It seems to me that in the first instance, in the early stages of the war, bomber command could barely hit the proverbial barn door, and even then at the cost of severe casualties. The tactics which ensued were driven by the evolving nature of the conflict, the enemy, and the equipment, and as such seem to me to represent a "good faith" attempt to advance our cause to the best of their abilities. Hindsight and better information available after the event should not allow this to be retrospectively vilified.
HOWEVER, where I do believe that criticism is warranted is in the failure to prioritise attacks on the oilfields in 1944. There was sufficient compelling contemporary intelligence available to show not only that reducing capacity would be catastrophic for the enemy, but that it could be achieved at relatively low cost to life. In other words, by that stage, we had better options that area bombing, and we knew it.
As I understand it, Harris refused direct orders from Portal (originating from Churchill) to switch priority, instead only allocating "surplus" capacity to the task. Such was the stature of Harris in the eyes of the public, having in the darkest days been the face of our only way of hitting back, that his removal could not be conscienced at that time. To my mind, that explains what happened thereafter to Harris, and sadly by association, all of Bomber Command.