UK Strategic Defence Review 2020 - get your bids in now ladies & gents
The mendacious tw@t.
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Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/mod-...rvice-in-2028/
MOD confirm new cruise missile to enter service in 2028
The Ministry of Defence has confirmed the service entry for the maritime-launched Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon to be 2028.
The information came to light in response to Labour’s defence spokesman John Healey MP and can be found below.
James Cartlidge, Minister of State at the Ministry of Defence, addressed the inquiry, stated, “The planning assumption for service entry for the maritime-launched Future Cruise / Anti-Ship Weapon is 2028; a decision around which options, including off the shelf choices, should fulfil this requirement is ongoing, and will be confirmed in due course in the Full Business Case.”
The FC/ASW initiative, co-developed by France and the United Kingdom and launched in 2017, is a successor to the jointly-developed Storm Shadow/SCALP, Exocet, and Harpoon anti-ship missiles.
The programme, equally funded by both nations and spearheaded by European missile manufacturer MBDA, is outlined in the Lancaster House treaties.
In 2022, the programme was evaluating two missile concepts: a low observable subsonic cruise missile and a supersonic highly manoeuvrable missile, moving away from a previous focus on a hypersonic solution akin to the CVS401 Perseus.
The current trajectory of the FC/ASW programme involves completing the assessment phase by 2024 and proceeding to the manufacturing phase from 2025 to 2035. Notably, the programme plans to introduce two role-specific variants, with a deep-strike, land-attack variant expected to be operational from 2028 and an anti-ship variant from 2034.
MOD confirm new cruise missile to enter service in 2028
The Ministry of Defence has confirmed the service entry for the maritime-launched Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon to be 2028.
The information came to light in response to Labour’s defence spokesman John Healey MP and can be found below.
James Cartlidge, Minister of State at the Ministry of Defence, addressed the inquiry, stated, “The planning assumption for service entry for the maritime-launched Future Cruise / Anti-Ship Weapon is 2028; a decision around which options, including off the shelf choices, should fulfil this requirement is ongoing, and will be confirmed in due course in the Full Business Case.”
The FC/ASW initiative, co-developed by France and the United Kingdom and launched in 2017, is a successor to the jointly-developed Storm Shadow/SCALP, Exocet, and Harpoon anti-ship missiles.
The programme, equally funded by both nations and spearheaded by European missile manufacturer MBDA, is outlined in the Lancaster House treaties.
In 2022, the programme was evaluating two missile concepts: a low observable subsonic cruise missile and a supersonic highly manoeuvrable missile, moving away from a previous focus on a hypersonic solution akin to the CVS401 Perseus.
The current trajectory of the FC/ASW programme involves completing the assessment phase by 2024 and proceeding to the manufacturing phase from 2025 to 2035. Notably, the programme plans to introduce two role-specific variants, with a deep-strike, land-attack variant expected to be operational from 2028 and an anti-ship variant from 2034.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Sir Humphrey…Schrodinger's Armed Forces - They can be both smaller due to technology, but need to be larger to cope with a national crisis.
In a week where 'conscription' dominated UK headlines, a Pinstripedline blog on whether the MOD needs technology or people?
http://tinyurl.com/s6xhe4db
In a week where 'conscription' dominated UK headlines, a Pinstripedline blog on whether the MOD needs technology or people?
http://tinyurl.com/s6xhe4db
Thread Starter
Someone in today's Times makes the point that the UK still has pretty tight limits on people being recruited - age for example. Using older people where physical strength and endurance isn't needed would really open up aa much bigger pool of people
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Looking at the quarterly stats (if my maths is right) I estimate the following ratio of recruited vs applications:Naval Service 8.4%, Army 8.1%, and RAF 5.8% the corresponding figures for Officers only are 4.8%, 7.25% and 2.48%.
Not sure how this compares historically but, given the shortfall in intake vs outflow, it suggest to me that either too many of the wrong sort of people are being attracted or there is the possibility to lower the bar slightly to accept more with a need to tolerate a higher chop rate during training.
Not sure how this compares historically but, given the shortfall in intake vs outflow, it suggest to me that either too many of the wrong sort of people are being attracted or there is the possibility to lower the bar slightly to accept more with a need to tolerate a higher chop rate during training.
Speaking to my nieces and nephews a common thing is the adverse media stories. It's one disaster after another and they ask why each time some gold braid says "we've learned our lessons it won't happen again" and then it does time after time. And they're wise enough to realise that it's not a recent thing, it's just that the Mod managed to keep it underwraps in the days before social media.
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Thread Starter
Looking at the quarterly stats (if my maths is right) I estimate the following ratio of recruited vs applications:Naval Service 8.4%, Army 8.1%, and RAF 5.8% the corresponding figures for Officers only are 4.8%, 7.25% and 2.48%.
Not sure how this compares historically but, given the shortfall in intake vs outflow, it suggest to me that either too many of the wrong sort of people are being attracted or there is the possibility to lower the bar slightly to accept more with a need to tolerate a higher chop rate during training.
Not sure how this compares historically but, given the shortfall in intake vs outflow, it suggest to me that either too many of the wrong sort of people are being attracted or there is the possibility to lower the bar slightly to accept more with a need to tolerate a higher chop rate during training.
Thread Starter
This weeks Economist editorial:-
Feb 1st 2024
BRITAIN’S ARMED forces have much to be proud of. The Royal Navy is engaged in some of the most intense naval skirmishing since the Falklands war, knocking Houthi missiles out of the sky above the Red Sea. The Royal Air Force (RAF) is still flying over Iraq and Syria to keep Islamic State in check. The army has trained more than 60,000 Ukrainian soldiers in the past ten years and helps guard Estonia.Yet something is rotten in British defence. Even though the country is the sixth-largest military spender in the world and the largest in Europe, it is not always clear where the money goes. The navy’s fleet operates fewer frigates and destroyers than Japan, South Korea or France. The army, at its smallest in centuries, would struggle to deploy a single heavy division. Britain has admirably emptied its cupboard to arm Ukraine, but its meagre ammunition holdings are now a matter of grave concern. What has gone wrong?
The first problem is cash. In 2020 the government boasted of the biggest sustained increase in defence spending for 30 years. It spends just over £50bn ($64bn) on defence, a sum that crosses NATO’s threshold of 2% of GDP. But a fifth of the budget goes on nuclear weapons. The conventional forces that Britain needs are being cannibalised to pay for nuclear cost-overruns. Strip out the nuclear bits and defence spending stands at around 1.75% of GDP, in the middle of the European pack.
The second problem is a lack of manpower. In 2010, when the Conservative Party entered government, the British Army was over 100,000-strong. It is now due to fall to 72,500. The government says that technology means fewer people are needed than in the past. This is casuistry. The Royal Navy is decommissioning ships for want of sailors. New technology often requires more personnel to maintain and operate it, not fewer. Even at its reduced scale, the army is struggling to recruit; beefing up the army reserve would be one way to help.
British defence cannot be fixed without more money and more people. But the country’s defence woes are also rooted in deeper problems of culture, outlook and process. Far too often, penny-pinching and short-termism have resulted in Britain buying high-end kit and then economising on the things that make it work properly. The Treasury bears some responsibility for this state of affairs. It has incentivised services to delay expensive projects. That balances the books in the short run but causes costs to balloon overall. Its strictures can have absurd results. Reducing an order of Wedgetail airborne command aircraft from five to three means that the RAF may not have one available in a crisis.
Yet the services also deserve much of the blame, having repeatedly botched major projects. That is hardly unique to the armed forces or to Britain. But if Britain is serious about re-arming, it may have to buy more foreign equipment off the shelf rather than demanding new features and insisting on domestic design and manufacturing. The ill-fated Ajax armoured vehicle—whose excessive vibration deafened crew—was supposed to be based on a pre-existing Austrian-Spanish platform. After the army unwisely added 1,200 requirements, it was essentially bespoke.
The Tories have had 13 years in office and four defence reviews. They will not, as an election approaches, solve problems that have festered for years. But with Ukraine in peril and Russia rearming fast, defence is once again too important to suffer from neglect. Like one of Britain’s ageing fleet of armoured vehicles, the country’s defence system is no longer good enough. The next government should act quickly and boldly to fix it. ■
How to fix British defence
It needs more money and more people, but also reform
Feb 1st 2024
BRITAIN’S ARMED forces have much to be proud of. The Royal Navy is engaged in some of the most intense naval skirmishing since the Falklands war, knocking Houthi missiles out of the sky above the Red Sea. The Royal Air Force (RAF) is still flying over Iraq and Syria to keep Islamic State in check. The army has trained more than 60,000 Ukrainian soldiers in the past ten years and helps guard Estonia.Yet something is rotten in British defence. Even though the country is the sixth-largest military spender in the world and the largest in Europe, it is not always clear where the money goes. The navy’s fleet operates fewer frigates and destroyers than Japan, South Korea or France. The army, at its smallest in centuries, would struggle to deploy a single heavy division. Britain has admirably emptied its cupboard to arm Ukraine, but its meagre ammunition holdings are now a matter of grave concern. What has gone wrong?
The first problem is cash. In 2020 the government boasted of the biggest sustained increase in defence spending for 30 years. It spends just over £50bn ($64bn) on defence, a sum that crosses NATO’s threshold of 2% of GDP. But a fifth of the budget goes on nuclear weapons. The conventional forces that Britain needs are being cannibalised to pay for nuclear cost-overruns. Strip out the nuclear bits and defence spending stands at around 1.75% of GDP, in the middle of the European pack.
The second problem is a lack of manpower. In 2010, when the Conservative Party entered government, the British Army was over 100,000-strong. It is now due to fall to 72,500. The government says that technology means fewer people are needed than in the past. This is casuistry. The Royal Navy is decommissioning ships for want of sailors. New technology often requires more personnel to maintain and operate it, not fewer. Even at its reduced scale, the army is struggling to recruit; beefing up the army reserve would be one way to help.
British defence cannot be fixed without more money and more people. But the country’s defence woes are also rooted in deeper problems of culture, outlook and process. Far too often, penny-pinching and short-termism have resulted in Britain buying high-end kit and then economising on the things that make it work properly. The Treasury bears some responsibility for this state of affairs. It has incentivised services to delay expensive projects. That balances the books in the short run but causes costs to balloon overall. Its strictures can have absurd results. Reducing an order of Wedgetail airborne command aircraft from five to three means that the RAF may not have one available in a crisis.
Yet the services also deserve much of the blame, having repeatedly botched major projects. That is hardly unique to the armed forces or to Britain. But if Britain is serious about re-arming, it may have to buy more foreign equipment off the shelf rather than demanding new features and insisting on domestic design and manufacturing. The ill-fated Ajax armoured vehicle—whose excessive vibration deafened crew—was supposed to be based on a pre-existing Austrian-Spanish platform. After the army unwisely added 1,200 requirements, it was essentially bespoke.
The Tories have had 13 years in office and four defence reviews. They will not, as an election approaches, solve problems that have festered for years. But with Ukraine in peril and Russia rearming fast, defence is once again too important to suffer from neglect. Like one of Britain’s ageing fleet of armoured vehicles, the country’s defence system is no longer good enough. The next government should act quickly and boldly to fix it. ■
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
HoC Defence Committe Report.
First Report - Ready for War? - 4th Feb 2024
Summary: https://publications.parliament.uk/p...6/summary.html
Full Report: https://committees.parliament.uk/pub...14880/default/
First Report - Ready for War? - 4th Feb 2024
Summary: https://publications.parliament.uk/p...6/summary.html
Full Report: https://committees.parliament.uk/pub...14880/default/
How about we give everyone in the Treasury a proper war role in the front line?
HoC Defence Committe Report. First Report - Ready for War? - 4th Feb 2024
The part relevant to the RAF can be found on P25 of the full report..surprised to learnthat "the Poseidon MRA1, Wedgetail AEW1, RC-135W Rivet Joint and C-17 Globemaster aircraft .....all lack an in-flight refuelling probe to make them compatible with the RAF Voyager tanker fleet."
The part relevant to the RAF can be found on P25 of the full report..surprised to learnthat "the Poseidon MRA1, Wedgetail AEW1, RC-135W Rivet Joint and C-17 Globemaster aircraft .....all lack an in-flight refuelling probe to make them compatible with the RAF Voyager tanker fleet."
Thread Starter
59. Professor Justin Bronk also raised the issue of F-35 fleet size, describing the F-35 force as “triple or quadruple-hatted in terms of how many parts of UK defence are counting on it for how many mission outputs in the case of a war [and] … there are not very many of them.
The Poseidon, Wedgetail, Rivet Joint and C-17 are all US aircraft, designed to air to air refuel using the boom method (as I'm sure everyone on here already knows!!).
Would you trust/pay any contractor (BAE and Nimrod MR2 refuelling probe) to convert them for probe/drogue?
Anyway, according to our betters, apparently we are always going to fight as part of NATO aren't we, so it's not a problem....
Would you trust/pay any contractor (BAE and Nimrod MR2 refuelling probe) to convert them for probe/drogue?
Anyway, according to our betters, apparently we are always going to fight as part of NATO aren't we, so it's not a problem....
Last edited by Biggus; 4th Feb 2024 at 14:00.
If I remember correctly some years ago (I forget when and which administration) military pensions were moved from the general pension pot into the defence budget to make it appear that we were hittingthe 2% requirement.
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In 2014/15 there was the addition of war pensions (£820 million), contributions
to UN peacekeeping missions (£400 million), pensions for retired civilian MOD
personnel (£200 million) and a large portion of MOD income (around £1.4
billion).
NATO accepted that the items conformed with its definition of defence
expenditure, although the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI, a leading
defence think tank) argued in 2015 that more information was needed before
the legitimacy of the decision could be decided.
to UN peacekeeping missions (£400 million), pensions for retired civilian MOD
personnel (£200 million) and a large portion of MOD income (around £1.4
billion).
NATO accepted that the items conformed with its definition of defence
expenditure, although the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI, a leading
defence think tank) argued in 2015 that more information was needed before
the legitimacy of the decision could be decided.
Briefing CBP-8175 20 April 2023
Note. AFPS were included but War pensions weren't
RUSI Paper can be found here:https://rusi.org/explore-our-researc...ding-increases
Last edited by SLXOwft; 4th Feb 2024 at 19:19. Reason: Brain fade
The Poseidon, Wedgetail, Rivet Joint and C-17 are all US aircraft, designed to air to air refuel using the boom method (as I'm sure everyone on here already knows!!).
Would you trust/pay any contractor (BAE and Nimrod MR2 refuelling probe) to convert them for probe/drogue?
.........
Would you trust/pay any contractor (BAE and Nimrod MR2 refuelling probe) to convert them for probe/drogue?
.........
Or maybe the UK should have specified a boom like every other A330 MRTT operator. 