Hawk XX204 Service Inquiry
You misunderstand. Just what real world event would cause any need to roll from a premeditated asymmetric landing - apart from saving time during training, which is hardly relevant.
Is anyone on here familiar with the phrase 'practicing bleeding'? I think there's never been any future in 'practice turn backs' or 'asymmetric go-arounds'. More people die practicing for these rare occurrences, than in actual events. Furthermore, PEFATOs completely fail to factor in the 'startle factor'' when the PEFATO is instigated by the pilot. All IMHO of course.
Thud
I would say the exact opposite. PEFATOs effectively remove the ‘startle effect’. I honestly feel that my reaction time in the event that I were faced with a real engine failure at just such a time would not be greatly increased. That is because of training.
I have had a few ‘moments’ whilst flying and on each occasion my instinctive reactions have been correct and almost immediate (the video in each case was great proof of this). Again, this is because of training.
I assume your thought process has been triggered slightly by Sullenberger’s actions over the Hudson and maybe even by a particular scene in the associated movie.
In his case the ‘startle effect’ was real because he probably hadn’t practised that exact scenario multiple times. Although I feel sure he would have practised other engine-out scenarios.
I am not the oracle on such matters but in my opinion PEFATOs are not inherently dangerous. Some people will make mistakes but that is true of many flight regimes.
On an annual basis there are possibly (I am not about to do an analysis of all accidents but I am basing this claim on my knowledge of recent accidents) more deaths worldwide due to air combat training than there are through landing accidents. Do we stop live air combat training as a result?
I have seen knee-jerk reactions to accidents in several Air Forces. Sometimes they are necessary, but mostly they are not.
We do a challenging job and part of the risk is that sometimes we make mistakes. Our first instinct should not always to be to stop doing the hard things. I believe that is a slippery slope.
People who question how many real EFATOs have been attempted vs the number of crashes practicing them have a valid point though. It’s a toughie and I don’t know the correct answer. Luckily, my job is not to make policy.
BV
I have had a few ‘moments’ whilst flying and on each occasion my instinctive reactions have been correct and almost immediate (the video in each case was great proof of this). Again, this is because of training.
I assume your thought process has been triggered slightly by Sullenberger’s actions over the Hudson and maybe even by a particular scene in the associated movie.
In his case the ‘startle effect’ was real because he probably hadn’t practised that exact scenario multiple times. Although I feel sure he would have practised other engine-out scenarios.
I am not the oracle on such matters but in my opinion PEFATOs are not inherently dangerous. Some people will make mistakes but that is true of many flight regimes.
On an annual basis there are possibly (I am not about to do an analysis of all accidents but I am basing this claim on my knowledge of recent accidents) more deaths worldwide due to air combat training than there are through landing accidents. Do we stop live air combat training as a result?
I have seen knee-jerk reactions to accidents in several Air Forces. Sometimes they are necessary, but mostly they are not.
We do a challenging job and part of the risk is that sometimes we make mistakes. Our first instinct should not always to be to stop doing the hard things. I believe that is a slippery slope.
People who question how many real EFATOs have been attempted vs the number of crashes practicing them have a valid point though. It’s a toughie and I don’t know the correct answer. Luckily, my job is not to make policy.
BV
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I always feel the ‘how many has it saved vs how many has it cost’ argument to be too simplistic.
No life is replaceable obviously but I do believe we would be better looking at ‘how many has the exercise benefitted’.
In slack handfuls my course would have flown siro 30 simulated engine out approaches in the Hawk each. Maybe more but that feels about right. There were 10 of us. That’s 300 training serials that taught us a lot, which passed without incident, and prepared us reasonably well (won’t overstate it) for something that thankfully never happened. A short time after I left Valley someone was faced with a EFATO situation and (from memory) did exactly the right thing which was to attempt a landing and eject in time.
To me it would appear odd not to train to save ones back from ejection and the local populace the chance of collecting a jet - with the obvious caveat that in both training and actual emergency one curtails the exercise at the appropriate point.
No life is replaceable obviously but I do believe we would be better looking at ‘how many has the exercise benefitted’.
In slack handfuls my course would have flown siro 30 simulated engine out approaches in the Hawk each. Maybe more but that feels about right. There were 10 of us. That’s 300 training serials that taught us a lot, which passed without incident, and prepared us reasonably well (won’t overstate it) for something that thankfully never happened. A short time after I left Valley someone was faced with a EFATO situation and (from memory) did exactly the right thing which was to attempt a landing and eject in time.
To me it would appear odd not to train to save ones back from ejection and the local populace the chance of collecting a jet - with the obvious caveat that in both training and actual emergency one curtails the exercise at the appropriate point.
Yup, agree. flash back to 1967. I rolled on a CFS trapper ride in a Canberra T4 at Akrotiri. He pulled the throttle on me just after take-off. We just missed the control tower by feet & he made me fly on one engine all the way to Nicosia. My leg hurt for a week.
Two very well reasoned posts Bob and Orca, although I would still claim that if you instigate the PEFATO and you're solo, there is no startle factor at all. And of course, the Real Deal here is the aircraft. I've not flown a Hawk, but guess its quite benign (for a jet). Did the RAF do PEFATOs in Gnats and Jet Provosts? I'm guessing that in the JP it was do-able, but unwise in a Gnat? Similarly, I'm sure I've read somewhere that a big cause of the horrendous Meteor accident rate (almost one every other day in a particularly bad year) was down to practicing asymmetric flight near the ground in an aircraft with actually quite reliable engines. TOTALLY agree with avoiding kneejerk reactions though Bob, and also that flight training is a harsh environment and that, sometimes, a student does need to know fear - or at least profound concern. Otherwise they may not grasp the gravity of the situation! Finally I cannot argue with "the obvious caveat that in both training and actual emergency one curtails the exercise at the appropriate point." If we were in court Orca, you could quite easily say "the defence rests"!
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Wearing my lawyers wig I wonder whether in the case of single engined jet the acronym PEFATO (partial engine failure after take-off) is used accurately.. What is partial about powering down the only source of propulsion?
Isn't total EFATO. a more accurate description..
[I recall that following a suspected bird strike during the take off roll in a JP4 at Shawbury, my late father consciously aborted take-off making full use of the safety net rather than chancing a total EFATO,.]
Isn't total EFATO. a more accurate description..
[I recall that following a suspected bird strike during the take off roll in a JP4 at Shawbury, my late father consciously aborted take-off making full use of the safety net rather than chancing a total EFATO,.]
My suggestion of low key as a “gate” ( and if you cant make the height for low key due cloud cover, extra speed at a lower height, similar total energy, would work) was jumped on by Viking.
If you dont make low key, go around. If you do, continue to, say, a min height before GA of 500. Two gates.
We civilian guys had a low key on EVERY approach, needing to be stable, configured etc., by 1000 feet or its a go around. Very little discretion there
Why not a similar stipulation for a PFL, it is after all, only training and presumably on a PRACTICE, the engine is still running making a go around routine.
Absolutely no need to stop training, but limit the risk, which, as this fatal accident has shown, does exist under the current procedures.
Last edited by RetiredBA/BY; 21st Oct 2019 at 13:23.
EFATO, ISTR practised in Chipmunk, JP, Gnat and Canberra. Only one that potentially changed the colour of my trousers was in the Canberra, initially. After that, without being complacent, practice made perfect, or nearly so. Sadly, if you did get it wrong, it would kill you, and often the crew too.
The Inquest .....
....
I don't suppose the North-West Wales Coroner will be greatly bovvered by the loss of one of Her Majesty's forty-year-old Hawks. Nor I guess, will he be officially concerned with the near death experience of the pilot.
The Coroner's duty is presumably to take evidence and rule on the cause of death of Corporal Bayliss. I imagine he is not bound to investigate. His verdict may be a simple one-line finding, or a narrative, or (very unlikely) even be provided by a jury.
It will be interesting to see who turns up and says what, or not, to the Coroner, and what time-scale the Coroner expects to provide for the resumed inquest. Will he look beyond the simple words and authority of the SI ? Will there be legal representation for the interested parties ?
This time there doesn't seem to be a deus ex ejector seat machina to miraculously take the blame via an avenging HSE, but that doesn't mean that any possible contribution or blame will be correctly assigned, given the MoD's penchant for re-writing or concealing history.
We seem to have strayed from the OP's likely purpose in starting the thread but I have a feeling the tale has some way to run.
LFH
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I don't suppose the North-West Wales Coroner will be greatly bovvered by the loss of one of Her Majesty's forty-year-old Hawks. Nor I guess, will he be officially concerned with the near death experience of the pilot.
The Coroner's duty is presumably to take evidence and rule on the cause of death of Corporal Bayliss. I imagine he is not bound to investigate. His verdict may be a simple one-line finding, or a narrative, or (very unlikely) even be provided by a jury.
It will be interesting to see who turns up and says what, or not, to the Coroner, and what time-scale the Coroner expects to provide for the resumed inquest. Will he look beyond the simple words and authority of the SI ? Will there be legal representation for the interested parties ?
This time there doesn't seem to be a deus ex ejector seat machina to miraculously take the blame via an avenging HSE, but that doesn't mean that any possible contribution or blame will be correctly assigned, given the MoD's penchant for re-writing or concealing history.
We seem to have strayed from the OP's likely purpose in starting the thread but I have a feeling the tale has some way to run.
LFH
....
Watton 1967
Wander00.
Canberra and PEFATO.
Don't recall if you were at RAF Watton when a crew did a night PEFATO and the PF applied the wrong rudder? (He had his hand on the throttles and the instructor tweaked the one before pulling the other). Violent roll and the nav ejected and was killed. The back seats of the Canberra with that non-frangible hatch were not pleasant.
Canberra and PEFATO.
Don't recall if you were at RAF Watton when a crew did a night PEFATO and the PF applied the wrong rudder? (He had his hand on the throttles and the instructor tweaked the one before pulling the other). Violent roll and the nav ejected and was killed. The back seats of the Canberra with that non-frangible hatch were not pleasant.
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When the losses/deaths that result from practice exercises exceed those from the actual events practised for, you do have to wonder why they continue to practice. The RN submarine service used to practice escapes from submerged submarines, using emergency breathing apparatus in a 100 foot high water-filled tower at Portsmouth. They lost 1 or 2 submariners each year, either killed or permanently disabled, until they worked out that the last death from a RN submarine was in the 1950's, and they had lost more men practicing since then than had died in the last event.
So they stopped practicing in the tower, and worked out another way of getting the men out, from a greater depth than was possible before, by using a rescue sub.
So they stopped practicing in the tower, and worked out another way of getting the men out, from a greater depth than was possible before, by using a rescue sub.
Once upon a time, 'practice' engine failure meant that the engine was shut down. If it was retarded to idle, that was known as a 'simulated' engine failure.
EFATO was certainly NEVER practised in the Gnat on my course. It wouldn't have been a question of just flying the jet; an engine failure would also require completion of the STUPRECC drill and continuing in 'manual'. For those who may not know, that would have been very difficult and highly unlikely to lead to anything except an ejection.
EFATO was certainly NEVER practised in the Gnat on my course. It wouldn't have been a question of just flying the jet; an engine failure would also require completion of the STUPRECC drill and continuing in 'manual'. For those who may not know, that would have been very difficult and highly unlikely to lead to anything except an ejection.
....
I don't suppose the North-West Wales Coroner will be greatly bovvered by the loss of one of Her Majesty's forty-year-old Hawks. Nor I guess, will he be officially concerned with the near death experience of the pilot.
The Coroner's duty is presumably to take evidence and rule on the cause of death of Corporal Bayliss. I imagine he is not bound to investigate. His verdict may be a simple one-line finding, or a narrative, or (very unlikely) even be provided by a jury.
....
I don't suppose the North-West Wales Coroner will be greatly bovvered by the loss of one of Her Majesty's forty-year-old Hawks. Nor I guess, will he be officially concerned with the near death experience of the pilot.
The Coroner's duty is presumably to take evidence and rule on the cause of death of Corporal Bayliss. I imagine he is not bound to investigate. His verdict may be a simple one-line finding, or a narrative, or (very unlikely) even be provided by a jury.
....
Whatever your views on the independence of the DAIB, I don’t think you could make a legally defensible argument that the SI was fundamentally flawed in its conduct or conclusions, or that it was incomplete.
BA/BY
What you’re suggesting is not vastly different from what is already done.
This accident was on a PEFATO where there would not normally ever be a low key. The 500’ contract decision (it really is not complicated like some on here believe) is the final decision point.
During a circling PFL pattern high and low key are gates of sorts but they are not, and do not need to be, mandatory. Pilots judgment and assessment of their energy state is sufficient. Varying the point at which gear and flaps are selected or adapting the ground track are all options. The contract is always there as the final check where a go around or an ejection (there should be sufficient energy to raise the nose to level flight first) can be made.
I don’t think we need to agree to disagree. I think we are basically in agreement.
BV
This accident was on a PEFATO where there would not normally ever be a low key. The 500’ contract decision (it really is not complicated like some on here believe) is the final decision point.
During a circling PFL pattern high and low key are gates of sorts but they are not, and do not need to be, mandatory. Pilots judgment and assessment of their energy state is sufficient. Varying the point at which gear and flaps are selected or adapting the ground track are all options. The contract is always there as the final check where a go around or an ejection (there should be sufficient energy to raise the nose to level flight first) can be made.
I don’t think we need to agree to disagree. I think we are basically in agreement.
BV