Hawk XX204 Service Inquiry
What you’re suggesting is not vastly different from what is already done.
This accident was on a PEFATO where there would not normally ever be a low key. The 500’ contract decision (it really is not complicated like some on here believe) is the final decision point.
During a circling PFL pattern high and low key are gates of sorts but they are not, and do not need to be, mandatory. Pilots judgment and assessment of their energy state is sufficient. Varying the point at which gear and flaps are selected or adapting the ground track are all options. The contract is always there as the final check where a go around or an ejection (there should be sufficient energy to raise the nose to level flight first) can be made.
I don’t think we need to agree to disagree. I think we are basically in agreement.
BV
This accident was on a PEFATO where there would not normally ever be a low key. The 500’ contract decision (it really is not complicated like some on here believe) is the final decision point.
During a circling PFL pattern high and low key are gates of sorts but they are not, and do not need to be, mandatory. Pilots judgment and assessment of their energy state is sufficient. Varying the point at which gear and flaps are selected or adapting the ground track are all options. The contract is always there as the final check where a go around or an ejection (there should be sufficient energy to raise the nose to level flight first) can be made.
I don’t think we need to agree to disagree. I think we are basically in agreement.
BV
I must admit when I first read the numbers that R3 gave himself (as presented in the SI) I had a sharp intake of breath... it was not alluded to in the report however the visual cue, particularly in a non HUD aircraft could give one a false sense of where they are in time and space...
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I know Valley very well although my Hawk time was only AFT & TWU. Aircraft there regularly fly PEFATOs to R19/01 from the longer R13/31, the only time you tend to see a return to the take-off runway is with engine problems resulting in a fixed throttle setting approach, think in the ‘80s it was normally ‘low oil pressure’ etc. The report only mentions that the Sim duty was 45mins instead of the usual 1hr but I can’t help thinking that maybe part of it was either contentious or did not go to plan on an EFATO if flown in the Sim. Would it be a case of trying it out in the real aircraft to make sure that it would work? I flew numerous Pax on the Fin but never would contemplate carrying out simulated emergencies with them. Lastly, although we didn’t fly PEFATOs on the JP 5 we did do Glide Breaks which were probably the closest scenario I.e. on the break throttle idle until touchdown using energy management, configuring as required.
Sticking with the risk V reward theme, the number of PEFATO drills performed over the years compared with the apparent number of accidents would suggest that the way it is being carried out is not inherently or outrageously unsafe. The missing piece of data to conclude any assessment of risk V reward is the number of REAL engine failures at takeoff there have been. It would seem reasonable to extend the total to widen the definition to power loss at takeoff, to include birdstrike etc.. Can anyone hazard a guess as to an approximate number?
The more I reflect on this accident, and the contents of the SI, the more I am drawn to question something which isnt covered in the SI: what could have caused such an experienced pilot not abandon the manoeuvre sooner?
As well as what has been discussed re height and speed, by not flying the downwind leg parallel to the runway, he didnt have room to make the turn, even if he had had the energy; indeed trying to overcome this caused him to lose more energy. The human factors analysis doesnt address the question of whether the onset of press-on-itis was in any way caused by the fact that he was a newby Red Arrow. Were there any consequences, real or imagined from "screwing up" a piece of basic training? Had he had any difficulty with this manoeuvre in the past? Could he have repeated the manoeuvre that day, or would it have required another sortie to maintain / achieve currency? Did having an engineer in the back mean that word of a failed PEFATO would have been widespread in the squadron? These seem like very relevant human factors to me.
The more I reflect on this accident, and the contents of the SI, the more I am drawn to question something which isnt covered in the SI: what could have caused such an experienced pilot not abandon the manoeuvre sooner?
As well as what has been discussed re height and speed, by not flying the downwind leg parallel to the runway, he didnt have room to make the turn, even if he had had the energy; indeed trying to overcome this caused him to lose more energy. The human factors analysis doesnt address the question of whether the onset of press-on-itis was in any way caused by the fact that he was a newby Red Arrow. Were there any consequences, real or imagined from "screwing up" a piece of basic training? Had he had any difficulty with this manoeuvre in the past? Could he have repeated the manoeuvre that day, or would it have required another sortie to maintain / achieve currency? Did having an engineer in the back mean that word of a failed PEFATO would have been widespread in the squadron? These seem like very relevant human factors to me.
Whilst the discussion of the risks / merits / techniques of this PEFATO apply only to single engine fast jets, and since I somehow can’t see them practicing this in the F35, this debate is strictly a Hawk debate. The HF issues apply to every type, and I am sure that every type experiences the sort of administrative overload that, at least partly, affected R3. I recently heard of pilots on an operational deployment being used to guard the gate IN ADDITION to their op flying , and of a pilot on a course having nowhere to sleep because the accommodation booking process was too labarynthine for him to complete in the time he had. Does the catering on Op Shader yet manage to provide a hot meal before a 7 hour trip?
These issues need need to be addressed across the whole RAF by people that understand the requirements of an op tempo flying program before everyone leaves or, heaven forbid, has more accidents. It may cost money, but training pilots costs more.
These issues need need to be addressed across the whole RAF by people that understand the requirements of an op tempo flying program before everyone leaves or, heaven forbid, has more accidents. It may cost money, but training pilots costs more.
Beagle's post re the STUPRECC drill in the Gnat (had to Google it!) has raised some interesting points in my mind. Essentially a PEFATO is NOT an EFATO, and could actually lead a pilot into believing turning back after the engine quits is a good idea, when it really isn't. Firstly, with the engine idling all the systems still work and secondly, at flight idle the engine must be producing some thrust. Not a lot, but possibly just enough to be the difference between a hard landing in the undershoot and a ball of flame in the approach lights. All IMHO of course.
Thud
I am only speaking for Hawk here but you needn’t worry. All the required systems will still be fully available. Hydraulics, electrics, avionics (such as they are in the T1 - the T2 has an APU and hence all avionics would be available after a short delay) would all be available via back up systems.
The engine at idle does produce a minimal amount of thrust but not enough to really notice. A ceased engine may produce more drag but a windmilling engine would not.
All of this means that the aircraft will still fly and, whilst performance will not be identical, the practice will be very similar to the real thing.
The techniques and rules will be exactly the same. Instead of a go around decision at 500’ it becomes an ejection decision. The minimum speed that pilots fly will provide enough energy to level the aircraft and eject if initiated at the correct point.
BV
The engine at idle does produce a minimal amount of thrust but not enough to really notice. A ceased engine may produce more drag but a windmilling engine would not.
All of this means that the aircraft will still fly and, whilst performance will not be identical, the practice will be very similar to the real thing.
The techniques and rules will be exactly the same. Instead of a go around decision at 500’ it becomes an ejection decision. The minimum speed that pilots fly will provide enough energy to level the aircraft and eject if initiated at the correct point.
BV
. The engine at idle does produce a minimal amount of thrust but not enough to really notice. A ceased engine may produce more drag but a windmilling engine would not.
beardy
You may be correct. I’m just going on what I have been told and have never really applied too much thought as to whether it was true or not.
If I am ever unlucky enough to find out I will let you know.
BV
If I am ever unlucky enough to find out I will let you know.
BV
Thanks Bob, although I still think you may be surprised by the difference that an idling engine (which is producing thrust) and a windmilling engine (which produces drag) makes.
Some basic figures might help ; 180kts ,45*bank,Vs 137kts(115 basic)180* turn diameter 5800ft,G1.4,Time 30secs.
50*Vs143kts G1.6,D 4840 ft, T25 secs;/; 55* Vs152 Kts ,G 1.7 ,D 4100 ft, T21 secs;/;60*Vs 163kts, D 3330 ft, T 18 secs;/;63* Vs 172 kts, G 2.2, D 3000 FT,T15 secs..These figures are taken from a website and Nomogram of `Turning Performance`,and for level flight,but close enough for 8-10* glide angles.
At the start of the d/w leg R3 was 5000 +_ 100 ft from RW31; at the end ,commencing the turn ,he was appx 4300 ft displaced,with an approx. G/S of 190 kts,and a x/wind.,both of which had not been compensated for,unless he was using aggressive bank angles,and an increase in airspeed to compensate. Putting the gear/flaps down was the end-game.....
IF otoh he had turned for a L/H D/W for R/W 01,it would have been `easy`,and may have also worked for r/w 31,as his `offset`track would be approx. 5300ft.... Speed is life.....lower the nose in gliding turns....
OK,bonedome on,nose down, avoiding incoming ,!!
50*Vs143kts G1.6,D 4840 ft, T25 secs;/; 55* Vs152 Kts ,G 1.7 ,D 4100 ft, T21 secs;/;60*Vs 163kts, D 3330 ft, T 18 secs;/;63* Vs 172 kts, G 2.2, D 3000 FT,T15 secs..These figures are taken from a website and Nomogram of `Turning Performance`,and for level flight,but close enough for 8-10* glide angles.
At the start of the d/w leg R3 was 5000 +_ 100 ft from RW31; at the end ,commencing the turn ,he was appx 4300 ft displaced,with an approx. G/S of 190 kts,and a x/wind.,both of which had not been compensated for,unless he was using aggressive bank angles,and an increase in airspeed to compensate. Putting the gear/flaps down was the end-game.....
IF otoh he had turned for a L/H D/W for R/W 01,it would have been `easy`,and may have also worked for r/w 31,as his `offset`track would be approx. 5300ft.... Speed is life.....lower the nose in gliding turns....
OK,bonedome on,nose down, avoiding incoming ,!!
Seized jet engines definitely create more drag than windmilling. Think of the windmilling engine as offering less resistance to the passage of air; it only extracts enough energy from the airflow to overcome rotational friction (= not a lot at windmilling RPM). The seized engine effectively presents a flat plate to the airflow, so while there is no work done on the shaft, there is plenty done on the whole airframe by the intake-sized airbrake thus ‘extended’. I’ve suffered both types of failure (fortunately in twin-engined aircraft) and the difference in thrust requirement from the remaining engine was very noticeable.
Seized jet engines definitely create more drag than windmilling. Think of the windmilling engine as offering less resistance to the passage of air; it only extracts enough energy from the airflow to overcome rotational friction (= not a lot at windmilling RPM). The seized engine effectively presents a flat plate to the airflow, so while there is no work done on the shaft, there is plenty done on the whole airframe by the intake-sized airbrake thus ‘extended’. I’ve suffered both types of failure (fortunately in twin-engined aircraft) and the difference in thrust requirement from the remaining engine was very noticeable.
I wonder what the procedure was when ferrying the 5th engine on the 747? But I suppose they may have had problems lubricating the shafts. Similarly for dead engine ferry flights.
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Interesting to hear of your experiences. I suppose the rotational friction includes the ancillaries (pumps, generators etc..) and of course the compressor.
I wonder what the procedure was when ferrying the 5th engine on the 747? But I suppose they may have had problems lubricating the shafts. Similarly for dead engine ferry flights.
I wonder what the procedure was when ferrying the 5th engine on the 747? But I suppose they may have had problems lubricating the shafts. Similarly for dead engine ferry flights.
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The Coroner is not bound to investigate. Direction given by the Lord Chief Justice after the Norfolk Coroner demanded the CVFDR from a helicopter accident (same sitting as West Sussex police wanting the AAIB’s Shoreham witness statements), was that Coroners should only conduct their own investigation if they had evidence that the specialist investigation was fundamentally flawed or incomplete.
Whatever your views on the independence of the DAIB, I don’t think you could make a legally defensible argument that the SI was fundamentally flawed in its conduct or conclusions, or that it was incomplete.
Whatever your views on the independence of the DAIB, I don’t think you could make a legally defensible argument that the SI was fundamentally flawed in its conduct or conclusions, or that it was incomplete.
DV
I have finally caught up with all discussion here and am truly disheartened to read that report. what strikes me is that the post #64 by Typhoondriver sums up my thoughts. It is so sad that past lessons regarding secondary duties and distraction have not be heeded.
Over twenty years ago I saw on a regular basis niff naff and triv taking someone's mind off their primary task.
The first was a young and newly qualified ATC Director coming on to shift. As Sup I knew the afternoon was going to be busy and asked what was on his mind. He had just had a bollocking from the PMC for not getting the Mess Minutes distributed on time and that he (the PMC) wanted them by close of play. I told him not to worry and that I would sort it, which I did pointing out to said PMC that it was wholly unacceptable to put people under undue pressure, especially when their primary role involved flight safety. The PMC seemed to have no concept of what was at stake and I told him as much. I got 1/2 a bollocking from SATCO and 1/2 praise too for standing up and speaking my mind. It wasn't the only time I had to step in and bring some sanity / reality back to the situation. (it was how I got the Whipping Boy monicker).
The second was at a pre-flight briefing involving a few jags and some visiting aircraft (might have been when the migs came over) Anyhow, we were just about to start and one of the JP's came running in a tad flustered. OC Ops tapped his watch and asked what the delay was. The JP had just been contacted by an admin in PSF asking for some paperwork or such and that it was needed by OC PSF by the end of the day as the admin assistant was going on leave. OC Ops apologised to the group, picked up the phone and ripped said admin a new one. He told them their leave was cancelled and that he expected them in his office first thing in the morning for a "chat".
We all had our fair share of secondary duties and sometimes you had to make it known that they were "secondary" and unimportant; if it was important then it should be someone else's Primary duty. It is extremely sad that here we have a loss of a life, a pilot's career in the balance and an aircraft lost ...for what? Just because the services saved a few quid on employing someone to do the basic admin tasks - as Typhoondriver succinctly put it - counting the sandwiches. Personally I think it is shameful.
Over twenty years ago I saw on a regular basis niff naff and triv taking someone's mind off their primary task.
The first was a young and newly qualified ATC Director coming on to shift. As Sup I knew the afternoon was going to be busy and asked what was on his mind. He had just had a bollocking from the PMC for not getting the Mess Minutes distributed on time and that he (the PMC) wanted them by close of play. I told him not to worry and that I would sort it, which I did pointing out to said PMC that it was wholly unacceptable to put people under undue pressure, especially when their primary role involved flight safety. The PMC seemed to have no concept of what was at stake and I told him as much. I got 1/2 a bollocking from SATCO and 1/2 praise too for standing up and speaking my mind. It wasn't the only time I had to step in and bring some sanity / reality back to the situation. (it was how I got the Whipping Boy monicker).
The second was at a pre-flight briefing involving a few jags and some visiting aircraft (might have been when the migs came over) Anyhow, we were just about to start and one of the JP's came running in a tad flustered. OC Ops tapped his watch and asked what the delay was. The JP had just been contacted by an admin in PSF asking for some paperwork or such and that it was needed by OC PSF by the end of the day as the admin assistant was going on leave. OC Ops apologised to the group, picked up the phone and ripped said admin a new one. He told them their leave was cancelled and that he expected them in his office first thing in the morning for a "chat".
We all had our fair share of secondary duties and sometimes you had to make it known that they were "secondary" and unimportant; if it was important then it should be someone else's Primary duty. It is extremely sad that here we have a loss of a life, a pilot's career in the balance and an aircraft lost ...for what? Just because the services saved a few quid on employing someone to do the basic admin tasks - as Typhoondriver succinctly put it - counting the sandwiches. Personally I think it is shameful.
BM are advertising for FTRS roles to assist in carrying out some associated duties. Hopefully, this will allow controllers to get back on console and do what they do best. I hope the initiative is successful, however, as highlighted on other threads, FTRS has its issues.
Beardy and Vendee ,
Seem to remember VC10s had a streamlining nose cone for 5th Pod , possibly the 747 ; but not sure on 74 .
2 engine ferryflight on a HS Trident , yes it did happen I still have the tie !
The dead engine was '' Spragged '' or was it '' Sragged '' [ broom handle bolted thru' from front to back to stop rotation . Not sure if drag , or oil pressure reasons ] .
V1, V2 calcultations interesting ; as was our ''escape route '' , down the river Bollin valley from Manch's old rwy 24. Then G/A point , technique and assured landing at LHR .
rgds condor .
Seem to remember VC10s had a streamlining nose cone for 5th Pod , possibly the 747 ; but not sure on 74 .
2 engine ferryflight on a HS Trident , yes it did happen I still have the tie !
The dead engine was '' Spragged '' or was it '' Sragged '' [ broom handle bolted thru' from front to back to stop rotation . Not sure if drag , or oil pressure reasons ] .
V1, V2 calcultations interesting ; as was our ''escape route '' , down the river Bollin valley from Manch's old rwy 24. Then G/A point , technique and assured landing at LHR .
rgds condor .
This was supplied on the tech log forum :
Windmilling drag
So when practicing a turnback be aware that in the real case a windmilling engine is high drag, higher than idle thrust or a seized engine.
Windmilling drag
So when practicing a turnback be aware that in the real case a windmilling engine is high drag, higher than idle thrust or a seized engine.
Beardy
I am certainly not claiming to be the expert on the matter and am still open to persuasion either way. However, the report you quote is for turbojet engines at high mach numbers from the 1950s.
What I am saying is that there are too many discrepancies to convince me just yet.
BV
What I am saying is that there are too many discrepancies to convince me just yet.
BV
I am certainly not claiming to be the expert on the matter and am still open to persuasion either way. However, the report you quote is for turbojet engines at high mach numbers from the 1950s.
What I am saying is that there are too many discrepancies to convince me just yet.
BV
What I am saying is that there are too many discrepancies to convince me just yet.
BV
Even as far back as the 1950`s physics was the same as now, the date is not relevant.