I would say the exact opposite. PEFATOs effectively remove the ‘startle effect’. I honestly feel that my reaction time in the event that I were faced with a real engine failure at just such a time would not be greatly increased. That is because of training.
I have had a few ‘moments’ whilst flying and on each occasion my instinctive reactions have been correct and almost immediate (the video in each case was great proof of this). Again, this is because of training.
I assume your thought process has been triggered slightly by Sullenberger’s actions over the Hudson and maybe even by a particular scene in the associated movie.
In his case the ‘startle effect’ was real because he probably hadn’t practised that exact scenario multiple times. Although I feel sure he would have practised other engine-out scenarios.
I am not the oracle on such matters but in my opinion PEFATOs are not inherently dangerous. Some people will make mistakes but that is true of many flight regimes.
On an annual basis there are possibly (I am not about to do an analysis of all accidents but I am basing this claim on my knowledge of recent accidents) more deaths worldwide due to air combat training than there are through landing accidents. Do we stop live air combat training as a result?
I have seen knee-jerk reactions to accidents in several Air Forces. Sometimes they are necessary, but mostly they are not.
We do a challenging job and part of the risk is that sometimes we make mistakes. Our first instinct should not always to be to stop doing the hard things. I believe that is a slippery slope.
People who question how many real EFATOs have been attempted vs the number of crashes practicing them have a valid point though. It’s a toughie and I don’t know the correct answer. Luckily, my job is not to make policy.
BV