US F-15s and RAF tanker in near-miss over north Norfolk coast
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Onceapilot,
I helped develop said manoeuvre for both the Victor and C130. Both ac, in the right hands, it was possible to roll to 110 AOB and as the nose drops to 10-20 deg below the horizon, roll out, IDLE and Speedbrake. If you really wanted to descend quickly lower Gear/Flap or open Bomb Bay Doors. The Victor deployed chaff at the appropriate time.
Designed to break a fighters radar lock and hopefully loose contact.
All possible but needed to be practiced!!
My original point was, to avoid a mid-air collision all pilots should be able to max turn their ac even be it 50AOB or 2G.
BTW, the Victor "missile break" would, I think, be a misnomer.
Designed to break a fighters radar lock and hopefully loose contact.
All possible but needed to be practiced!!
My original point was, to avoid a mid-air collision all pilots should be able to max turn their ac even be it 50AOB or 2G.
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As an ATCO, my only (filed) airmiss was between the Varsity I was conteolling and an energetically manoeuvring VFR F-100. The Biard agreed there was nothing I, or the Varsity, could have done to avoid the pesky fast-ish jet. IIRC they ended up at co-altitude at less than 1 mile.
Thread Starter
Just before GW1 became hot, we developed a profile for the VC10K to avoid a fighter being able to achieve a successful weapon lock.
The VC10K had very limited manoeuvre potential, so the initial action was to change speed and height to beam the threat signal. Idle thrust, 20° nose up pitch, turn to beam the threat. Then overbank to 45° AoB and 10° nose down pitch, stabilising in a 240KIAS, 45° AoB idle thrust descent. Select slats out and reduce to 210KIAS, then select flap to T/O 20° and reduce to 170KIAS, still in the 45° AoB spiral aiming to level in haze, cloud or at low level to deny the fighter any firing solution. Not an easy exercise, but we flew it in the simulator and it worked fine.
Fortunately air dominance was achieved before anyone needed to put the profile to the test.
Flight envelope protection will ensure that an A330 or Voyager can be taken to the protected limits fairly easily, but will protect the aircraft from any danger of overstress or structural failure. Whereas the Pegasus doesn't have such benefits and extreme manoeuvre is far more difficult to achieve without causing serious damage.
Our profile was based on a 'leaker' being detected by AWACS at BVR, not as the response to a short range tally sighting, as was the case in ARA8.
Indeed - and the Voyager pilot had but a spilt second to make that decision!
I still cannot understand how 4 pairs of eyes and 2 radars in a brace of Uncle Sam's superb Mud Hens couldn't see an aircraft as large as a Voyager in 10km+ visibility though.
The VC10K had very limited manoeuvre potential, so the initial action was to change speed and height to beam the threat signal. Idle thrust, 20° nose up pitch, turn to beam the threat. Then overbank to 45° AoB and 10° nose down pitch, stabilising in a 240KIAS, 45° AoB idle thrust descent. Select slats out and reduce to 210KIAS, then select flap to T/O 20° and reduce to 170KIAS, still in the 45° AoB spiral aiming to level in haze, cloud or at low level to deny the fighter any firing solution. Not an easy exercise, but we flew it in the simulator and it worked fine.
Fortunately air dominance was achieved before anyone needed to put the profile to the test.
Flight envelope protection will ensure that an A330 or Voyager can be taken to the protected limits fairly easily, but will protect the aircraft from any danger of overstress or structural failure. Whereas the Pegasus doesn't have such benefits and extreme manoeuvre is far more difficult to achieve without causing serious damage.
Our profile was based on a 'leaker' being detected by AWACS at BVR, not as the response to a short range tally sighting, as was the case in ARA8.
the Board agreed that the Voyager’s crew had had very few options for avoiding action due to manoeuvrability of his aircraft and the tracks of the F15, one passing in front and one behind; the Board concluded that his right-turn manoeuvre was probably the best he could achieve.
I still cannot understand how 4 pairs of eyes and 2 radars in a brace of Uncle Sam's superb Mud Hens couldn't see an aircraft as large as a Voyager in 10km+ visibility though.
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I still cannot understand how 4 pairs of eyes and 2 radars in a brace of Uncle Sam's superb Mud Hens couldn't see an aircraft as large as a Voyager in 10km+ visibility though.
Last edited by Dominator2; 27th Jul 2017 at 14:55. Reason: Quote
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I dont know what avionics package those F-15 have, but if equipped with link-16 and interrogators, they should have had fairly good SA on the voyager (surveillance picture and mode 3 reply). Might be that they were busy doing visual maneuvers and did not glance at their screens once in a while...
Thread Starter
From the report:
Which would indicate that the F-15s were indeed Mud Hens.
The likelihood of a Voyager NOT being seen on 'state of the art' radar is zero - unless it has a Klingon cloaking device activated.... The report states that the F-15 pilots were 'flying visually'; the field of view from an F-15 is excellent, so it remains a mystery as to how the F-15s didn't spot the Voyager in 10km plus visibility.
With 4 crew members able to conduct lookout from the 2 F15 aircraft, military members opined that they should have been able to visually sight the Voyager, despite its grey camouflage scheme, as they climbed towards it. In both these respects, Board members wondered if the F15 crews had become task focused and whether this may have been the reason that they missed or discounted the Voyager both visually and on their radars.
The likelihood of a Voyager NOT being seen on 'state of the art' radar is zero - unless it has a Klingon cloaking device activated.... The report states that the F-15 pilots were 'flying visually'; the field of view from an F-15 is excellent, so it remains a mystery as to how the F-15s didn't spot the Voyager in 10km plus visibility.
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F-16GUY,
Having spent 41 years flying Air-to-Air and Air-to-Ground in 2 seat ac there is absolutely NO acceptable reason why one or both F15s did not detect the Voyager both visually and on the array of electronic devices at their disposal. If I were their Wing Commander I would be asking serious questions.
Equally, if you are receiving a radar service you would hope to be told that the AAR track was active AND receive traffic information if it became a factor. As mentioned previously, is poor training, lack of currency, too much simulation or poor procedures the reason that the control (or lack of control) was so poor?
Having spent 41 years flying Air-to-Air and Air-to-Ground in 2 seat ac there is absolutely NO acceptable reason why one or both F15s did not detect the Voyager both visually and on the array of electronic devices at their disposal. If I were their Wing Commander I would be asking serious questions.
Equally, if you are receiving a radar service you would hope to be told that the AAR track was active AND receive traffic information if it became a factor. As mentioned previously, is poor training, lack of currency, too much simulation or poor procedures the reason that the control (or lack of control) was so poor?
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Perhaps against a 1960s PD but against a C/E? Nah
However, I agree, a F15E WSO should had seen the Voyager as soon as they turned North.
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Did not notice that it was an E model. With the Pulse Doppler APG-63 as in some of the C models it would have been possible to lose track of something the size of Exxon Valdez, should it be in the notch with no relative closure. Hence my comment.
Dominator,
With 41 years experience in FJ surly you to have experienced more then one incident where you did not se the other aircraft before it was way to close for comfort? I certainly have, both in training and in combat, and as always its a combination of pure work by the controlling agency and lack og SA/poor system management/visual lookout by the crew. It did happen back in the day and it still does happen today.
Dominator,
With 41 years experience in FJ surly you to have experienced more then one incident where you did not se the other aircraft before it was way to close for comfort? I certainly have, both in training and in combat, and as always its a combination of pure work by the controlling agency and lack og SA/poor system management/visual lookout by the crew. It did happen back in the day and it still does happen today.
With 41 years experience in FJ surly you to have experienced more then one incident where you did not se the other aircraft before it was way to close for comfort? I certainly have, both in training and in combat, and as always its a combination of pure work by the controlling agency and lack og SA/poor system management/visual lookout by the crew. It did happen back in the day and it still does happen today.
That is why I advocate mandatory Radar Control of AARA's for Military aircraft in routine AAR. For goodness' sake, FJ LL training is now pretty restricted due to proven limitations of "see and be seen!" OAP
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Going back to the F15 Airprox, the incident shows how TCAS is no panacea for all Mil situations. A large aircraft cannot outmanoeuvre a fighter/bomber that maintains a collision flightpath while manoeuvring. Even if RA was enabled and followed, a manoeuvring FJ that happens to follow a dynamic path to collision cannot be avoided. TCAS can only assure a miss against steady flightpath traffic or compliant TCAS avoiding traffic. This should be fully understood. On the same basis, I think that active AAR block levels should normally be reserved for only co-ordinated Military traffic, as a Military restriction. It may be difficult to further restrict Civil traffic but, it is rare that civil conflictions occur and Mil radar should direct the Tanker to avoid laterally by a wide margin.
OAP
OAP
Have you changed your opinion on TCAS since the last time it was discussed in the "Crew ignored TCAS RA" thread or do you still think it should be followed blindly?
Thread Starter
If Voyager AAR SOPS are the same as for other modern tankers, TCAS is selected to 'TA only' when within the AARA, otherwise it's in TA/RA. This is to stop 'nuisance RAs' being generated by receivers inbound to the tanker. Ignoring RAs is a total no-no under IFR even in VMC; you might think that you've spotted the intruder, but have you really? A culture of ignoring any RA is unacceptable.
Onceapilot, is that how you see it?
During an AARSAG, I was once perplexed to hear the USAF advocating use of TCAS as an RV aid. It must be remembered that azimuth TCAS information is unreliable and it should only be used in the vertical plane. If you need further 3-dimensional information on targets, data link is a help but remember that you will ONLY see traffic which has been put on the link and other traffic might still be about, which could possibly generate TCAS advisories even if not displayed on the data link display.
Radar control in an AARA isn't the real solution and isn't possible under SERA in Class G anyway. Civil aircraft would never accept the limitation, so perhaps it would be better to treat ARRAs as TRAs; only those military aircraft cleared to enter the TRA would be permitted to do so.
Onceapilot, is that how you see it?
During an AARSAG, I was once perplexed to hear the USAF advocating use of TCAS as an RV aid. It must be remembered that azimuth TCAS information is unreliable and it should only be used in the vertical plane. If you need further 3-dimensional information on targets, data link is a help but remember that you will ONLY see traffic which has been put on the link and other traffic might still be about, which could possibly generate TCAS advisories even if not displayed on the data link display.
Radar control in an AARA isn't the real solution and isn't possible under SERA in Class G anyway. Civil aircraft would never accept the limitation, so perhaps it would be better to treat ARRAs as TRAs; only those military aircraft cleared to enter the TRA would be permitted to do so.
Where did I say " it should be followed blindly?"
You are misrepresenting my previous post and, misrepresenting an incident where TCAS RA was not followed.
Notwithstanding the fact that you have quoted my old post without any supporting facts or context about that other incident and, there is no link to the incidents in this present post, why are you Trolling this up?
OAP
Last edited by Onceapilot; 29th Jul 2017 at 12:27.
If Voyager AAR SOPS are the same as for other modern tankers, TCAS is selected to 'TA only' when within the AARA, otherwise it's in TA/RA. This is to stop 'nuisance RAs' being generated by receivers inbound to the tanker. Ignoring RAs is a total no-no under IFR even in VMC; you might think that you've spotted the intruder, but have you really? A culture of ignoring any RA is unacceptable.
Onceapilot, is that how you see it?
Onceapilot, is that how you see it?
OAP
Radar control in an AARA isn't the real solution and isn't possible under SERA in Class G anyway. Civil aircraft would never accept the limitation, so perhaps it would be better to treat ARRAs as TRAs; only those military aircraft cleared to enter the TRA would be permitted to do so.
OAP
