US F-15s and RAF tanker in near-miss over north Norfolk coast
Thread Starter
US F-15s and RAF tanker in near-miss over north Norfolk coast
The BBC and local press have been reporting this: US F-15s and RAF tanker in near-miss over north Norfolk coast - BBC News
The full report is here: http://www.airproxboard.org.uk/uploa...%202017002.pdf
However, another incident is also rather alarming and can be seen here: http://www.airproxboard.org.uk/uploa...%202017026.pdf
The second report states:
That must be rather worrying, surely?
The full report is here: http://www.airproxboard.org.uk/uploa...%202017002.pdf
However, another incident is also rather alarming and can be seen here: http://www.airproxboard.org.uk/uploa...%202017026.pdf
The second report states:
Members wondered whether recent flying rates were such that tanker crews were less often exposed to multiple concurrent receivers than was historically the case, and noted that other complex aviation tasks were often subject either to recency and currency requirements or had a limit to the maximum number of participants to prevent operator overload.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
To hell with the pilots, what about the controllers?
I did two tours at Boulmer, one at Staxton and two at Neatishead controlling literally hundreds of hours of tanking on AAR5/6/8 with tanker cells of up to 4 tankers and up to 24 receivers either climbing towards, tanking with (and moving between tankers in the cell for dry/wet tanking) and departing on two separate frequencies (one cell, one transit). The even idea that FJ manoeuvring traffic would not be called when inside 20nm is incredible. Everyone knew that FJ traffic could turn 180 degrees in a sweep and change height by 10K+ when playing in the vertical. And all that without Mode C on most of the traffic.
But then I also did 8 ship USAF F4 intercepts off Great Yarmouth with one target and 7 fighters doing individual 135 degree intercepts with the target changing each run whilst coordinating with all the other military and civil traffic when Woodbridge/Bentwaters had about 200 F4s and Wattisham had a Lightning wing.
Standards and experience have obviously gone through the floor.
I did two tours at Boulmer, one at Staxton and two at Neatishead controlling literally hundreds of hours of tanking on AAR5/6/8 with tanker cells of up to 4 tankers and up to 24 receivers either climbing towards, tanking with (and moving between tankers in the cell for dry/wet tanking) and departing on two separate frequencies (one cell, one transit). The even idea that FJ manoeuvring traffic would not be called when inside 20nm is incredible. Everyone knew that FJ traffic could turn 180 degrees in a sweep and change height by 10K+ when playing in the vertical. And all that without Mode C on most of the traffic.
But then I also did 8 ship USAF F4 intercepts off Great Yarmouth with one target and 7 fighters doing individual 135 degree intercepts with the target changing each run whilst coordinating with all the other military and civil traffic when Woodbridge/Bentwaters had about 200 F4s and Wattisham had a Lightning wing.
Standards and experience have obviously gone through the floor.
I left ATC in 2003. Standards were high, experience was pretty good but there just wasn't enough people to do all that was required. It was clear to me back then that we were getting asked to do more and more, with less and less.
I worked some of the busiest airspace around, and with a full team it worked like a charm, band-box just one position and it could go very wrong very quickly.
Reading some of the other airprox reports have a look at how many say the controllers on task were at capacity and having to multi-task.
I worked some of the busiest airspace around, and with a full team it worked like a charm, band-box just one position and it could go very wrong very quickly.
Reading some of the other airprox reports have a look at how many say the controllers on task were at capacity and having to multi-task.
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If two F15 pilots can't see a bloody great airliner on their all-singing, all-dancing radars then they shouldn't be allowed near a fighter and should be kicked off to the desert to fly drones. Never mind ATC didn't tell them about the tanker, what's wrong with looking out of the window, or did it 'come at them from a funny angle' (to quote Snatch).
Interesting that the report on the Typhoon join near-miss fails to properly recognise the weakness in Voyager Tanker proceedures. After joining, control of the receiver is passed to the MSO! 
That is the problem!
Mind you, this report is just the deliberations of the airprox board. The responsibility for taking backward steps with UK AAR capability lays at the feet of some career thrusters within that sphere over the last ten years!
OAP
That is the problem! Mind you, this report is just the deliberations of the airprox board. The responsibility for taking backward steps with UK AAR capability lays at the feet of some career thrusters within that sphere over the last ten years!
OAP
Last edited by Onceapilot; 25th Jul 2017 at 09:16.
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Thread Starter
Onceapilot, I agree with that view!
When I first started AAR, it was standard procedure for the 'operating pilot' to fly the tanker, talk to the receivers and to ATC/SOC all on the same radio frequency. That was fine, because AAR slots were generally 30 min and we rarely had more than a 4-ship in the slot.
As time went by, someone decided that AAR slots could be reduced to 20 min. That meant that the chance of receivers leaving with others joining and some still refuelling increased. Those of us with experience could still cope with all the radio chat, but it was harder for newcomers to learn the art than it had been for us 10 years earlier.
So the idea of a discrete 'boom' frequency was proposed - I wrote some SOPs which went to Staneval, but they never got round to putting them into effect. The idea was to operate as on a trail - pilot-flying dealt with the receivers on the 'boom' frequency and pilot-not-flying dealt with ATC/SOC. Inbound receivers would only be accepted when the pilot-flying was happy; all the RV call etc. would take place on the ATC/SOC frequency and the receivers would only be pushed to the boom frequency when they'd called 'visual'. Clearance to join the formation would only be given by the pilot-flying; he/she would also be the ONLY person responsible for moving receivers around the tanker and clearing them for contact/disconnect etc.
Another nation decided that they wanted the PF to use the ATC/SOC frequency, with the PNF controlling receiver movement on the boom frequency. I advised against this, but they insisted. Then they devolved receiver movement to their air refuelling officers once the receivers had reached echelon, or the 'observation' position as it became. They coped with this ONLY because their air refuelling officers were experienced fast-jet backseaters who were very familiar with formation control and had bags of spare capacity. But I still recommended that only the pilot at the controls should move receivers around the formation - I once witnessed a PF turning the aircraft just as a Tornado had been cleared for contact by the air refuelling officer, much to the Tornado crew's surprise. I explained in the debrief that this was precisely why only one pilot should fly the formation. But it's their train set and they cope fine due to the well above average quality of their air refuelling officers - whereas my proposed SOPs were for 3 'average' crew members!
We offered the RAF an opportunity to come and play with the full mission AAR desktop trainer to evaluate SOPs - but there was no money in the budget for such a thing....
OAP, there's a fair bit in that report about datalink issues etc. But the SOP shouldn't require such things and, as they used to be, should be simple enough to work with the basic principles which the RAF AAR force developed through long experience.
When I first started AAR, it was standard procedure for the 'operating pilot' to fly the tanker, talk to the receivers and to ATC/SOC all on the same radio frequency. That was fine, because AAR slots were generally 30 min and we rarely had more than a 4-ship in the slot.
As time went by, someone decided that AAR slots could be reduced to 20 min. That meant that the chance of receivers leaving with others joining and some still refuelling increased. Those of us with experience could still cope with all the radio chat, but it was harder for newcomers to learn the art than it had been for us 10 years earlier.
So the idea of a discrete 'boom' frequency was proposed - I wrote some SOPs which went to Staneval, but they never got round to putting them into effect. The idea was to operate as on a trail - pilot-flying dealt with the receivers on the 'boom' frequency and pilot-not-flying dealt with ATC/SOC. Inbound receivers would only be accepted when the pilot-flying was happy; all the RV call etc. would take place on the ATC/SOC frequency and the receivers would only be pushed to the boom frequency when they'd called 'visual'. Clearance to join the formation would only be given by the pilot-flying; he/she would also be the ONLY person responsible for moving receivers around the tanker and clearing them for contact/disconnect etc.
Another nation decided that they wanted the PF to use the ATC/SOC frequency, with the PNF controlling receiver movement on the boom frequency. I advised against this, but they insisted. Then they devolved receiver movement to their air refuelling officers once the receivers had reached echelon, or the 'observation' position as it became. They coped with this ONLY because their air refuelling officers were experienced fast-jet backseaters who were very familiar with formation control and had bags of spare capacity. But I still recommended that only the pilot at the controls should move receivers around the formation - I once witnessed a PF turning the aircraft just as a Tornado had been cleared for contact by the air refuelling officer, much to the Tornado crew's surprise. I explained in the debrief that this was precisely why only one pilot should fly the formation. But it's their train set and they cope fine due to the well above average quality of their air refuelling officers - whereas my proposed SOPs were for 3 'average' crew members!
We offered the RAF an opportunity to come and play with the full mission AAR desktop trainer to evaluate SOPs - but there was no money in the budget for such a thing....
OAP, there's a fair bit in that report about datalink issues etc. But the SOP shouldn't require such things and, as they used to be, should be simple enough to work with the basic principles which the RAF AAR force developed through long experience.
In the first instance with the F-15's, why is the tanker sitting at such a low FL? Most modern aircraft with a modicum of performance can tank at least 10k above that height..
Last edited by flighthappens; 25th Jul 2017 at 09:56.
SATCOS WB,
Yes, the highly polished Miliary radar services of the 80's and 90's did seem to wane somewhat. Seemed like it was a whole new crew by 2005. Overall, still generally got a great service though.
OAP
Yes, the highly polished Miliary radar services of the 80's and 90's did seem to wane somewhat. Seemed like it was a whole new crew by 2005. Overall, still generally got a great service though.
OAP
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Towline 8, Wash ATA and 323C has always been an 'interesting' mix.
As to the tanker procedures - it does seem rather slack compared with those CGB was taught a few decades back.
As to the tanker procedures - it does seem rather slack compared with those CGB was taught a few decades back.
Thread Starter
flighthappens, ARA8 is limited to FL70-FL170 and airway Y70 is immediately to the south, with a base of FL175.
OAP at what point is the MSO given control of the receivers? Surely not before they've established in echelon / observation? Who clears the receivers to leave the formation?
OAP at what point is the MSO given control of the receivers? Surely not before they've established in echelon / observation? Who clears the receivers to leave the formation?
Beagle, Ack, I am aware of the airway to the south.
I did not realise TL8 was capped. why is it capped given it is clear of controlled airspace? I'm guessing because of the lateral proximity?
I did not realise TL8 was capped. why is it capped given it is clear of controlled airspace? I'm guessing because of the lateral proximity?
OAP
The Rx were still talking to the pilots at the time! I would suggest that your concerns are out of place here. Yes BEags the transfer is at echelon left and the PF clears them to leave.
The Rx were still talking to the pilots at the time! I would suggest that your concerns are out of place here. Yes BEags the transfer is at echelon left and the PF clears them to leave.
Going back to the F15 Airprox, the incident shows how TCAS is no panacea for all Mil situations. A large aircraft cannot outmanoeuvre a fighter/bomber that maintains a collision flightpath while manoeuvring. Even if RA was enabled and followed, a manoeuvring FJ that happens to follow a dynamic path to collision cannot be avoided. TCAS can only assure a miss against steady flightpath traffic or compliant TCAS avoiding traffic. This should be fully understood. On the same basis, I think that active AAR block levels should normally be reserved for only co-ordinated Military traffic, as a Military restriction. It may be difficult to further restrict Civil traffic but, it is rare that civil conflictions occur and Mil radar should direct the Tanker to avoid laterally by a wide margin.
OAP
OAP
THE TYPHOON 5 PILOT reports that he gained visual with the tanker and all aircraft alongside,
began a visual join and switched across [from the join] to the boom frequency. During this process he
lost visual with the tanker as it entered cloud. He descended back to FL240 and ceased overtake
whilst maintaining 2.5nm radar trail. The pilot communicated this to the tanker on the boom frequency
which was acknowledged by the tanker crew, who stated they would commence a climb to FL270 in
began a visual join and switched across [from the join] to the boom frequency. During this process he
lost visual with the tanker as it entered cloud. He descended back to FL240 and ceased overtake
whilst maintaining 2.5nm radar trail. The pilot communicated this to the tanker on the boom frequency
which was acknowledged by the tanker crew, who stated they would commence a climb to FL270 in
Further,
Voyager crew consisted of military crew only and
comprised 2 pilots, the PF and PM, and a Mission Systems Officer (MSO). The PF task was to take
the receivers from the controlling agency on the ‘join frequency’, and bring them to the left wing, on
the ‘boom frequency’. The MSO’s task was then to cycle the receivers through the hoses and onto
the right wing, or to control the receivers should non-standard manoeuvering be required. The military
member concluded by stating that in this case there appeared to have been a break-down in
procedure whilst the tanker was climbing in intermittent IMC. Members also noted that although the
tanker organisation had taken a full part in the Occurrence Safety Investigation, it was disappointing
that military regulation had not been complied with and an Airprox DASOR had not been submitted.
comprised 2 pilots, the PF and PM, and a Mission Systems Officer (MSO). The PF task was to take
the receivers from the controlling agency on the ‘join frequency’, and bring them to the left wing, on
the ‘boom frequency’. The MSO’s task was then to cycle the receivers through the hoses and onto
the right wing, or to control the receivers should non-standard manoeuvering be required. The military
member concluded by stating that in this case there appeared to have been a break-down in
procedure whilst the tanker was climbing in intermittent IMC. Members also noted that although the
tanker organisation had taken a full part in the Occurrence Safety Investigation, it was disappointing
that military regulation had not been complied with and an Airprox DASOR had not been submitted.
OAP
Thread Starter
vascodegama, what is the point in transferring receiver control to the MSO? I can see it for boom tankers where the boom operator communicates with the receiver he/she's plugging, but for probe and drogue why would a pilot flying a tanker transfer control of receiver formation movement around the aircraft to anyone else? It is bound to increase intercom activity, if only to avoid the scenario I mentioned earlier where one person cleared a receiver for contact and another decided to turn without seemingly being aware of the approaching receiver.
So what is the perceived benefit? Personally I consider that it increases risk.
The push to boom frequency should only be made, in my view, when a receiver confirms visual with the tanker. Once on the boom frequency it should be cleared to join by the PF. When AAR is complete, it should be pushed to the ATC/SOC frequency with the allocated squawk whilst in echelon right, then cleared to leave by the non-flying-pilot, who has probably also advised ATC/SOC that the receivers area about to leave the formation, thus improving the controller's SA as well as that of other receivers inbound to the tanker.
So what is the perceived benefit? Personally I consider that it increases risk.
The push to boom frequency should only be made, in my view, when a receiver confirms visual with the tanker. Once on the boom frequency it should be cleared to join by the PF. When AAR is complete, it should be pushed to the ATC/SOC frequency with the allocated squawk whilst in echelon right, then cleared to leave by the non-flying-pilot, who has probably also advised ATC/SOC that the receivers area about to leave the formation, thus improving the controller's SA as well as that of other receivers inbound to the tanker.
Last edited by BEagle; 25th Jul 2017 at 10:48.