Air to Air kill over Raqqa
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XFC I agree. ORAC you are not reading it correctly, or are trying too hard to make the US look bad. According to the article you linked The SU was in the process of attacking or had just delivered an attack and was shot down. It still had weapons. Clear self defense (remember self defense can be defense of others). The SU does not get a free pass just because it dropped it's load.
Absolutely - collective self-defense applies.
If a sniper shot at your comrades and then turned his back away from you, your ROE should still allow you to shoot back. We can't have armchair experts then saying "oh no the sniper was no longer hostile, how can you show he still had hostile intent?" He was hostile because he JUST SHOT AT YOU seconds ago.
Absolutely - collective self-defense applies.
If a sniper shot at your comrades and then turned his back away from you, your ROE should still allow you to shoot back. We can't have armchair experts then saying "oh no the sniper was no longer hostile, how can you show he still had hostile intent?" He was hostile because he JUST SHOT AT YOU seconds ago.
ValMORNA Your personal definition is not what matters: there is a Law of Armed Conflict definition that is under discussion here. In this case, the self defense of your force (which is a group of people, not an individual) is what is either present or not. ORAC and the others are disagreeing about that.
Do I need to explain this further, or do you now understand the term under discussion?
Do I need to explain this further, or do you now understand the term under discussion?
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
As far back as the Falklands War I was led to believe you never make a second pass in a target. The first time they are the target, the second time you are. As to the engagement, as I said it depends on the ROE.
If the ROE only approved engagement in self-defence then once the SU-22 had cleared the target then the rationale for engagement had gone. It's the same rationale which allowed a trooper to legally 5 rounds at an approaching car in NI which he considered a threat - then convicted him of murder in court when he continued to fire at the back after it had passed and killed someone inside.
If the Pentagon statement had said the SU-22 had commenced a second attack run, then engagement was again permitted, but it doesn't. If the ROE allowed engagement of a Hostile aircraft and the attack fulfilled the criteria, then again engagement was justified; but again the statement does not make that claim.
The USA and Syria are not at war, so I doubt the ROE covered anything but self-defence, and on the evidence as presented no grounds for justifiable self-defence are given.
I am in no way anti-American or USN/USAF, but in the present circumstances the ROE must be, and be followed, meticulously.
At which point I will leave the matter.
If the ROE only approved engagement in self-defence then once the SU-22 had cleared the target then the rationale for engagement had gone. It's the same rationale which allowed a trooper to legally 5 rounds at an approaching car in NI which he considered a threat - then convicted him of murder in court when he continued to fire at the back after it had passed and killed someone inside.
If the Pentagon statement had said the SU-22 had commenced a second attack run, then engagement was again permitted, but it doesn't. If the ROE allowed engagement of a Hostile aircraft and the attack fulfilled the criteria, then again engagement was justified; but again the statement does not make that claim.
The USA and Syria are not at war, so I doubt the ROE covered anything but self-defence, and on the evidence as presented no grounds for justifiable self-defence are given.
I am in no way anti-American or USN/USAF, but in the present circumstances the ROE must be, and be followed, meticulously.
At which point I will leave the matter.
Last edited by ORAC; 22nd Jun 2017 at 18:33. Reason: Sp
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War is war. The Syrian governmental army was warned that in such cases US and others would open fire (and they did). So, it was OK with RoE no matter how clean was the wing of Su-22.
The only issue or problem that I see with all that is consistency of the position. Why call it self-defence when the subject of defence was a recently built so-called SDF consisting of Kurds (some 20K) and arabs (some 5K)? For their ground forces Su-22 was a threat indeed, but not for F/A-18 at all.
Say it clearly that you directly support rebels with your weapons and your staff (here, pilots) on the territory where you were not invited to.
The only issue or problem that I see with all that is consistency of the position. Why call it self-defence when the subject of defence was a recently built so-called SDF consisting of Kurds (some 20K) and arabs (some 5K)? For their ground forces Su-22 was a threat indeed, but not for F/A-18 at all.
Say it clearly that you directly support rebels with your weapons and your staff (here, pilots) on the territory where you were not invited to.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Van, look at Lonewolf-50's reply. Under LOAC self-defence covers not only yourself but those you are assigned to defend, whether it is a guard on a compound or a convoy or a submarine captain in defence of a CBG. In this case the F-18 was assigned to defend the forces on the ground, so an attack on them was equivalent to an attack directly on itself.
Self Defence
In the UK, self defence is an inherent right under the common law, which applies in all circumstances to all people, not just in armed conflict. It's not an issue of LOAC, which deals with the use of force other than self defence. Of course LOAC deals with more than just force, and self-defence is just a shortened way of saying 'self defence and the defence of others'
The issue of re-positioning is, like most issues where force is used, a matter of interpretation of general context and of the specific situation.
So, in Northern Ireland, our adversaries extremely rarely re-attacked, preferring to engage and then escape as soon as possible afterwards. It'd be difficult, when self defence was the prevailing rule of engagement, to justify shooting them in the back as they were running away in the expectation that they would be expected to mount another attack immediately afterwards. The threat to life has passed, the use of lethal force would not be necessary to prevent further loss of life.
However, in Afghanistan, where our adversaries would routinely run away to immediately re-attack, then it would be more justifiable. The threat to life has not passed, so the use of lethal force might be necessary to prevent further loss of life.
With respect to the SU, it's conceivable that repositioning was judged likely - perhaps the Syrian AF undertakes multiple passes - and the presence of weapons may have been too difficult to judge in time limited circumstances. The possibility of an internal gun may have been a factor were no external weapons to have been visible. Additionally, the pilot of the SU might have been capable of directing other aircraft against the ground targets or the F18, even if it had expended all of its own weapons. If this were Syrian AF practice, the SU would likely be a legitimate target.
It's worth noting that US law takes a subtly different view of the imminence of a threat than does the UK law (English and Scottish law are the same on this for all intents and purposes).
As an aside, the term 'Rules of Engagement' is pretty unhelpful. Whilst the 'rules' delegate freedoms on the use of force (within LOAC), they seldom give absolute freedom and most still require interpretation of the situation.
The issue of re-positioning is, like most issues where force is used, a matter of interpretation of general context and of the specific situation.
So, in Northern Ireland, our adversaries extremely rarely re-attacked, preferring to engage and then escape as soon as possible afterwards. It'd be difficult, when self defence was the prevailing rule of engagement, to justify shooting them in the back as they were running away in the expectation that they would be expected to mount another attack immediately afterwards. The threat to life has passed, the use of lethal force would not be necessary to prevent further loss of life.
However, in Afghanistan, where our adversaries would routinely run away to immediately re-attack, then it would be more justifiable. The threat to life has not passed, so the use of lethal force might be necessary to prevent further loss of life.
With respect to the SU, it's conceivable that repositioning was judged likely - perhaps the Syrian AF undertakes multiple passes - and the presence of weapons may have been too difficult to judge in time limited circumstances. The possibility of an internal gun may have been a factor were no external weapons to have been visible. Additionally, the pilot of the SU might have been capable of directing other aircraft against the ground targets or the F18, even if it had expended all of its own weapons. If this were Syrian AF practice, the SU would likely be a legitimate target.
It's worth noting that US law takes a subtly different view of the imminence of a threat than does the UK law (English and Scottish law are the same on this for all intents and purposes).
As an aside, the term 'Rules of Engagement' is pretty unhelpful. Whilst the 'rules' delegate freedoms on the use of force (within LOAC), they seldom give absolute freedom and most still require interpretation of the situation.
Last edited by Rheinstorff; 22nd Jun 2017 at 19:53. Reason: Additional detail
How much time you spend in the service, sir? RoE matters. I've had to live with and work with it in real time, as have a number of contributors here. If you were in Afghanistan, you are fully aware of that, since RoE keeps your engagement decisions within the bounds of the mission. (And we can't help that the politicians make a buggery of the whole thing in the first place ...)
Has any Western Air Force fighter ever been shot down by another fighter in the Middle East ?
How much time you spend in the service, sir? RoE matters. I've had to live with and work with it in real time, as have a number of contributors here. If you were in Afghanistan, you are fully aware of that, since RoE keeps your engagement decisions within the bounds of the mission. (And we can't help that the politicians make a buggery of the whole thing in the first place ...)
As to your question on time in Service: more than 30 years. My first operational deployment in a combat role was in 1988, three days after joining my first front-line unit. Since then, I've been operationally deployed in combat roles, including to Afghanistan, more times than I or my family care to remember. The employment of force, by me and the people under my command, and the associated ROE were the dominant feature of each those.
My point is merely that the term 'rules' is often taken to imply crystal clarity about what you can and cannot do, but the truth is that interpretation is required and must be done with an understanding of the law and a good grasp of context. I've always found Op Law lawyers very useful when planning military operations, and when conducting pre-training and in-theatre refresher training. The understanding they provide is almost invariably welcomed by all who have contact with them, usually because they help guide judgements and interpretation of ROE. The key point is in is guiding judgement and interpretation, rather than rigid application of 'rules'.
Perhaps my meaning didn't come across to you; allow me to try again. Of course ROE are important. Indeed the 'licence to operate' they provide means that we behave in a way that both satisfies national law and international law, but also in a way that the population on whose behalf we act is comfortable with it. Essential in a democracy, I'd suggest. Furthermore, properly interpreted, ROE provide protection to individuals applying force, and those directing it, from prosecution. To some extent, it might help too with the risk of psychological harm that can arise from killing and injuring others by providing the psychological defence of 'I was acting lawfully'.
As to your question on time in Service: more than 30 years. My first operational deployment in a combat role was in 1988, three days after joining my first front-line unit. Since then, I've been operationally deployed in combat roles, including to Afghanistan, more times than I or my family care to remember. The employment of force, by me and the people under my command, and the associated ROE were the dominant feature of each those.
My point is merely that the term 'rules' is often taken to imply crystal clarity about what you can and cannot do, but the truth is that interpretation is required and must be done with an understanding of the law and a good grasp of context. I've always found Op Law lawyers very useful when planning military operations, and when conducting pre-training and in-theatre refresher training. The understanding they provide is almost invariably welcomed by all who have contact with them, usually because they help guide judgements and interpretation of ROE. The key point is in is guiding judgement and interpretation, rather than rigid application of 'rules'.
As to your question on time in Service: more than 30 years. My first operational deployment in a combat role was in 1988, three days after joining my first front-line unit. Since then, I've been operationally deployed in combat roles, including to Afghanistan, more times than I or my family care to remember. The employment of force, by me and the people under my command, and the associated ROE were the dominant feature of each those.
My point is merely that the term 'rules' is often taken to imply crystal clarity about what you can and cannot do, but the truth is that interpretation is required and must be done with an understanding of the law and a good grasp of context. I've always found Op Law lawyers very useful when planning military operations, and when conducting pre-training and in-theatre refresher training. The understanding they provide is almost invariably welcomed by all who have contact with them, usually because they help guide judgements and interpretation of ROE. The key point is in is guiding judgement and interpretation, rather than rigid application of 'rules'.
Thank you.
The key point is in is guiding judgement and interpretation, rather than rigid application of 'rules'.
*hand salute*