RAF Unsuitable for Carrier Operations - Chris Bolton

[Engines]

BZ Evalu8ter - as a dyed in the wool RN aviation engineer, proud of my Service, I recognise and understand that:

1. The future is Joint
2. It belongs to the young professionals, not us old has beens
3. As long as there's a joint understanding at VSO level that 'doing' aviation at sea isn't the same as on 'doing' aviation on land, we can leave it to the young crop of aviators to sort out the details.
4. This inter-service p*****g stuff is just a total waste of f*****g time and effort.

Best regards as ever to those talented professionals doing the joint stuff for real

Engines

[Bismark]

Well said Engines. The world has moved on from Sharkey - no one listens to him any more. A few of points:

- with the exception of the RAF F35 test pilot, the FAA are the only UK Service to have current deck qualified FJ pilots. There may be the odd RAF AV8B pilot but I am not certain on this.
- The RAF will discover that operating the QE class is a lot different to the INV class.
- It will not just be RAF/FAA FJ groups operating from QE. The USMC will be regular visitors from the word go. This will require near permanent embarkation of a UK F35 air group when ever QE is at sea so that the deck is "warm" i.e. fully worked up.
- Sortie generation rate will be higher in QE which will require regular embarked practice (as the Russians have found out to their cost).
- "Stepping Ashore" - which I am sure will be the RAF preferred way of operating, is not a "day 1" activity and thus comes further down the training order. Embarked Ops will always be the most stressful activity and thus practised most. F35 is not a GR9 replacement.

[Warmtoast]

National Audit Office 16th March Press Release Re. Delays to F35 Carrier Program

Delivering Carrier Strike
The Ministry of Defence (the Department) has made good progress since the National Audit Office last reported on delivering aircraft carriers, but faces a number of strategic risks which could have a significant impact on delivery, according to its latest report. The construction of the first carrier (HMS Queen Elizabeth) is nearing completion and the Department has clear plans to achieve an initial Carrier Strike operating capability by December 2020. This could, however, be delayed by technical issues which have yet to be resolved.
The inaugural sailing of the first carrier is expected in summer 2017, approximately three months later than planned because of technical issues related to the commissioning of the ship’s systems. The Department is assessing their impact on the overall schedule but it believes that the current target of accepting the first carrier from the Aircraft Carrier Alliance (an alliance between the Department and industry) by the end of 2017 is achievable.
The next three years will be critical to establishing the Carrier Strike capability. The Department must bring together the carriers, Lightning II jets, and Crowsnest radar[1] with trained crews and supporting infrastructure, logistics, communications and surveillance. It needs to test and operate all these elements together in preparation for deploying Carrier Strike in 2021.
The Department has set an ambitious master schedule which brings together the interdependent schedules of the three core programmes to achieve the full capability by 2026. It has taken a number of decisions to address slippage which has compressed the schedule and added risk with limited contingency. There are operational unknowns which will only become clear during testing. For example, the first sailing of HMS Queen Elizabeth will take place in summer 2017, followed by flying trials of Lightning II jets from the carrier at sea in 2018.
The NAO found there is increasing pressure on a few highly trained personnel to operate the capability. There is a shortage of military personnel, running at 4% below a target strength of 145,560. Staffing gaps include engineering roles and warfighting specialists in the Royal Navy and engineering, intelligence and some aircrew cadres in the RAF. To minimise the impact of these gaps on Carrier Strike, the Department is prioritising it and carrying out targeted recruitment.
The Aircraft Carrier Alliance and the Department are dealing with potential cost growth of between 1% and 2% on the £6.212 billion approved cost of both carriers. The Department has not accepted this increase and is working with the Alliance to minimise any cost growth. The Department has brought forward Lightning II costs originally planned for after 2020, so that two squadrons of jets are available sooner. The total forecast spend of £5.8 billion on Lightning II procurement to 2020 could change if foreign exchange rates shift and the total number of jets on order globally varies.
The forecast costs of supporting and operating Carrier Strike are less certain. Support and maintenance costs to March 2021 are forecast at £1.3 billion. Contracts, however, have not been let, and requirements will continue to be refined as the equipment is used. Historically, the Department has underestimated the costs of supporting its equipment. Operational costs up to March 2021 are estimated to be £0.6 billion.
Introducing Carrier Strike will fundamentally affect how the Navy works. It will need to move away from deploying single ships to using a significant proportion of its fleet to support and protect the carriers. Before the Department can operate the carriers and jets together as Carrier Strike, there will be an intensive period of training, trials and further work. This period is crucial to ensure crews can safely operate the equipment and give the Department confidence the capability works as intended. The Department has examined the feasibility of deploying Carrier Strike before December 2020 and advised against it in anything other than an operational emergency.
The Department has made decisions that could limit how its uses Carrier Strike. The carriers and Lightning II jets rely greatly on technology for military advantage. Technological failures on the carriers might mean that larger crews are needed or place greater pressure on existing personnel. The design and testing of the US-led Lightning II programme is happening concurrently until 2019, increasing the risk that jets already in the UK fleet need modifications. This could reduce the number available for forming the first squadron in readiness for first carrier-based deployment in 2021.
The Department accelerated its purchase of Lightning II jets, which will support pilot training, but the number of pilots will be just sufficient up to 2026 with limited resilience in the event that personnel decide to leave the services. Additionally, the Department is relying on an unusually high level of simulator-based training for pilots which, if not sufficiently realistic, could limit how well prepared pilots are to operate the jets. The Department decided to fit Crowsnest radar systems to Navy helicopters that are already in demand, rather than buying new aircraft. High helicopter demand could limit the availability of Crowsnest to protect the carriers.

“The Department has made good progress and clear plans to achieve an initial Carrier Strike operating capability by December 2020, but it still has a lot to do as it brings together the equipment, trained crews, infrastructure and support. Problems in any of these areas could mean use of the carriers is delayed or reduced. The programme will shortly move into a high-risk period of trials, testing and training which may affect plans and increase costs. The closely timed sequence of tasks offers no further room for slippage and there remain significant risks to value for money.”
Amyas Morse, head of the National Audit Office, 16 March 2017.

Here: https://www.nao.org.uk/press-release...arrier-strike/

[Engines]

Warmtoast and Others,

Perhaps I could offer some perspective on the NAO stuff. I always read their reports associated with the military with interest - they are always accurate on numbers, and provide an excellent snapshot of the state of play. Sometimes, i have some issues with their observations and conclusions - a bit like the similar style US GAO reports. This excerpt shows some of those issues. Here's my take on a few items. Others can (and I'm sure will) differ.

1. "The Department has made good progress..." - don't underestimate how rarely the NAO says this about a military programme.
2. "..but faces a number of strategic risks..." - well, yes, so will any large programme. If these risks weren't identified, the NAO would have made some severe criticism. Risk? Ops normal.
3. "...could be delayed by technical issues....' - not specified, but my guess, linked to a later statement, would be slower than expected progress in 'setting to work' all the ship systems. These are large and very complex machines - and the UK hasn't built anything on this scale, ever.
4. "The Department must bring together the carriers, Lightning II jets....etc..." - again, not an unexpected challenge. It's a very big one, as it's very rare to bring a new carrier, new systems, two new aircraft types, and a largely inexperienced crew plus new support systems together. There will be hiccups and delays. They will be worked and overcome. Again, ops normal.
5. Personnel issues - largely a result of stupefyingly asinine personnel cuts made across all three Services as part of SDR 2010. These cuts simply can't be reversed in a few years. The critical shortages aren't in overall numbers - as the NAO correctly identify, they will occur in key billets.
6. "...will fundamentally affect how the Navy works...." - what Carrier Strike is doing is reintroducing the Navy to how it used to work. There are plenty of people around who know what this means, and how to go about it. The Navy knows this very well, and will manage this risk, as best it can.
7. 'Technological failures on the carriers might mean that larger crews are required...." - well, really a statement of the blindingly obvious. This statement could have been made about every ship class brought into service since the 'T' class attack subs.
8. 'Design and test of the Lightning II programme..is happening until 2019..." - yes,, it is. One of the main reasons for the UK's decision to delay procurement of its aircraft was to avoid the worst of the various modification programmes. But there will be some, that's unavoidable. Name me any aircraft in the last 50 years that's not had this issue. Again, ops not perfect, but ops normal.

And so on. I remember vividly how the doomsayers were out in force in the late 70s, telling us young sprogs how useless the 'Invincible' class ships were, how rubbish the Sea Harrier would be, and how we should have kept our big carrier. What they didn't tell us was how absolutely worn out the old 'Ark Royal' was. And the Invincibles and the Sea Harriers didn't do too badly in the end. The new carriers and the F-35B are a simply huge step up for the RN, the RAF and the UK. They've been a long time coming, and now its up to the young professionals of today to take them and make them work. I have absolutely no doubt that they'll do a great job of it, and I for one will be cheering them on.

Best Regards to them all,

Engines

[Onceapilot]

I guess Scotland will want to sell RoUK 1/2 of a carrier back after Scotoff in 2019?

OAP

[alfred_the_great]

The line about "changing the way the RN operates" is not directed at the RN. It is evidence for the RN to take to SoS and the PM to prove there is a reason we can't simply do all our deployments and do Carrier Strike: they will have to chose one or the other.

[charliegolf]

Nothing sadder than a person who feels he is his job. He must have incredibly low self esteem, and a sad retirement (which he forgets to reference his rank with!).

[George K Lee]

2026.

2020-zarking-6.

https://www.c-span.org/video/?76853-...type-contracts

At 3:15, "a flagship for acquisition reform". At 4:06, McDonnell Douglas has a heart attack.

Sorry, but even in 2008, had anyone predicted that the UK's carrier force would not reach "full capability" - as planned from Day One - for another 18 years, they'd have been called worse than a Doomsayer.

And here's a lovely picture of a STOVL JSF with folding wingtips to fit the elevator of the carrier that was just towed to the breakers'.

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Originally Posted by alfred_the_great

The line about "changing the way the RN operates" is not directed at the RN. It is evidence for the RN to take to SoS and the PM to prove there is a reason we can't simply do all our deployments and do Carrier Strike: they will have to chose one or the other.

And maybe get a manpower uplift?

[MSOCS]

Can only echo Engines' wise sentiments.

Bismark, a few corrections:

- with the exception of the RAF F35 test pilot, the FAA are the only UK Service to have current deck qualified FJ pilots. There may be the odd RAF AV8B pilot but I am not certain on this.
- The RAF will discover that operating the QE class is a lot different to the INV class.
- It will not just be RAF/FAA FJ groups operating from QE. The USMC will be regular visitors from the word go. This will require near permanent embarkation of a UK F35 air group when ever QE is at sea so that the deck is "warm" i.e. fully worked up.
- Sortie generation rate will be higher in QE which will require regular embarked practice (as the Russians have found out to their cost).
- "Stepping Ashore" - which I am sure will be the RAF preferred way of operating, is not a "day 1" activity and thus comes further down the training order. Embarked Ops will always be the most stressful activity and thus practised most. F35 is not a GR9 replacement.

The number of current deck qualified of any cloth makes not one blind difference today; rather, it's how may F-35B deck qualified people we have in the future, when we need them. Your point is confusing in this regard.

The "RAF" involved in simulated QE deck trials is about he same as "RN". Those currently involved, and those who have been, are quite aware of how different QE is to INV. Nobody has landed F-35B on QE, so again, your point is confusing.

USMC will review what to send, and if it wants to, on each occasion. The deck will be as warm as it has to be, in accordance with BRd766 and the Force Gen cycle. Don't presume anything. One thing our politicians will always want is freedom of choice. That's a fact.

Let's see how F-35B sortie gen rate turns out before you apply your wet finger metric to QE output and trg requirements.

Finally, don't assume the RAF want to step ashore. It betrays your thinly-veiled contempt. I'm RAF, and, frankly, I'd rather conduct sorties from QE where possible. Many of my colleagues share that view, proving your statement to be no more than a sweeping generalisation.

Good to see the two Chiefs at QE together. Leadership comes from the top and their Joint commitment to Carrier Strike looks very encouraging, and anyone who seeks to tar the new Force with the old brush will find themselves up against a raft of dark and light blue (inc yours truly) who are firmly committed to CS.

[Bismark]

MSOCS,

I am hugely encouraged by your comments and your eagerness to operate from QE. However, your masters continue to try and make the case for Step Ashore as the norm rather than operate from the ship.

I agree that I am tarnished by battles past - they were unnecessary and severely trying to many of us. If you are as keen as you say then I hope you are ensuring those above you support your attitude. We all want QE/ F35 to be a huge success but I am not yet convinced that the RAF as a service are wholly bought in to it. Time will tell.

One pointer will be if there is an attempt to limit F35B to just 48 jets and convert the rest of the 130 odd final order to F35A.

[sharpend]

I have served on board a carrier (at war), albeit an American one. I also have served as an RN QFI. I was a member of the RAF for 39 years. All I can say is that in my experience, RN pilots are no different to RAF ones. Some good, some bad.

[Evalu8ter]

"One pointer will be if there is an attempt to limit F35B to just 48 jets and convert the rest of the 130 odd final order to F35A." I suppose more to the point is who makes that decision? It can hardly be blamed on the RAF if the Treasury decides to save $ at the current ForEx rate by adjusting the F35 numbers to the cheaper version? What if JFC decide the split on capability/requirements/WLC grounds? Interesting comment from Cdre Kidd re the max warload of the QEC being ~70 F35Bs (although whether that leaves any space for RW was not mentioned); perhaps the split (if, indeed, any is forthcoming) should be such that a "beefed up" FW TAG, say 50 jets, could be embarked in time of crisis - giving a requirement for about 80 Bs. A fleet of 50 A-models would give the RAF enough for 3 Sqns with a FE@R of about 20 jets. Sounds about right if you ask me as a partial GR4 replacement. There's also no guarantee we'll stop at 130, the jet will only get cheaper and more capable through life so we may well answer "unknown unknowns" with more aircraft in the future. This is the real advantage of buying into an aircraft likely to have a long production run a la F16.

[Engines]

As ever, a thoughtful post from evalu8ter.

I'd gently demur on whether the RAF would have anything to do with fast jet procurement - of course they would, I'd expect nothing less. And the Treasury would have their say.

The possibility of a UK F-35A/B mix has been, to my mind, the elephant in the room once the reality of the F-35 being the GR4 replacement became obvious. (I have to point out that I saw briefing charts spelling this out from some smart people isn the MoD as far back as 1998).

My view (and purely my view) is that a split A/B fleet makes excellent sense. There is simply no point in making the RAF land based units haul STOVL gear around on every sortie when they patently don't need it. The normal problems of costs associated with a split fleet are mitigated by two factors. Firstly, there is a lot of commonality between the A and the B, especially in the traditional high cost drivers of avionics systems. The pilot training pipelines also have a lot of commonality, especially in the area of weapon system operation. Secondly, where the UK will have a split fleet of engine types, these are part of much larger international fleets that should reduce overall engine support costs.

The big question will be numbers, and it's here that the VSOs up in town will need to make sure that they don't revert to inter-service battles just as the young people at the front line are making 'Joint' work.

Evalu8ters' suggestion of a 50/80 A/B split looks eminently sensible - but I wouldn't expect anything else from him.

Best Regards as ever to all those making the long range defence planning cycle work,

Engines

[MSOCS]

Bismark,

If you are speaking from recent experience, from within a position where you can see this, then I can only say that you and I are viewing very different people. My seniors absolutely want the best for Defence and the wording has certainly not been about 'stepping ashore' at the first opportunity. There are benefits and constraints to be argued for both actually...yet, reality-check, it's the operational estimate that will dictate the force composition, not rivalries and perceived aversions to a life on the ocean wave.

There are some extremely lofty ambitions coming from parts of the RN when it comes to QE. The latest press releases hint at them, and yet, we don't have the numbers of aircraft and the RN doesn't (yet) have the manpower to yield such ambitions - and that's both matelots and wafus. This capability only works if we work together and the only reason we've survived HMT's axe on F-35 is each other.

Do I think we'll get more than 48 F-35B? I do. Will each QEC have a complement of jets for Defence Tasks? Yes. How many each? Not 70-odd, but maybe enough to have a 'credible' 24 on each, or surge 36-48 for one... one day. Do I think the proportion of F-35A will be higher in the long run? Yes I do. This is my wet finger guess, nothing more.

It'll all be decided in successive SDSRs and each Service will have to make sacrifices to achieve balance in their respective equipment plans. Want more F-35s? HMT: What are you willing to give up? Same goes for RAF and British Army.

[charliegolf]

I have served on board a carrier (at war), albeit an American one.

I'd love to hear about that Sharpend!

CG

[BEagle]

Were the RAF to decide on the F-35A, no doubt LM would take the MoD to the cleaners once someone noticed that it isn't compatible with any UK AAR asset....

Would MoD pay $quillions to LM - or squi££ions to Airbus for the Voyager fleet to be fitted with booms?

[SpazSinbad]

'BEagle' would the "$quillions to LM" be for the F-35A modification (as yet not designed nor tested - just space provided for - in same place as the F-35B/C) to use the probing droguey thingos?

"...O'Bryan: "We anticipated a number of the operators would want probe-and-drogue refueling in the F-35A and we kept that space empty on the F-35A to accommodate probe and drogue refueling...." http://www.dodbuzz.com/2012/06/19/lo...a-on-the-f-35/ 19 Jun 2012

[BEagle]

It wouldn't be like ticking an option box - there would be all the NRC to cover for LM's design, testing, flight trials etc. etc. - and would the UARRSI be retained or would it be integrated into a dual-mode AAR system?

LM would rub their hands with glee at the thought of handing the bill to MoD...

[Just This Once...]

LM sent the AAR probe estimate to the Canadian government.