Iran
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Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
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From: Peripatetic
I did see a report this morning, which I can't now find, that the UK government had denied the US the use of RAF Fairford for strikes on civilian targets (couldn't see any mention of DIego Garcia). This would have had a significant impact on the scope of the strikes the US could have launched last night, had Trump gone down that path.
Both turned back when the ceasefire was announced, the B-52 landed back a few hours ago with its full load of JASSMs still aboard.
VideoPresumably a wave was planned out of DG, but we have no means of tracking those.
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From: Reading, UK
Well if check you'll find they did launch two strike waves out of Fairford yesterday, one of 3 x B1s and the other of a single B-52 (was supposed to be a pair but one scrubbed).
Both turned back when the ceasefire was announced, the B-52 landed back a few hours ago with its full load of JASSMs still aboard.
Both turned back when the ceasefire was announced, the B-52 landed back a few hours ago with its full load of JASSMs still aboard.
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From: Co. Down
Well, l'l olde England has it as good as settled. Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer has arrived in the MidEast for a diplomatic conference on the Gulf conflict. We have subscribed our only serviceable destroyer which has gone U/S anyway, our reputation and our decades-long security alliance with the Gulf states has been shown as worthless, and our vulnerability to attack is wide open for the world to see. Sir Keir has agreed to increase defence funding -- but not just yet. As usual he dashes to take his place at any international conference as talk is cheaper than action. I fear this Iran war will be continued to a world recession or worse as Trump's defeat becomes more apparent.
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From: Toronto
Hmmmmm
No surprise that all and sundry are getting off rounds before the ceasefire becomes "official".
Iran could raise the point that their carrier pigeon network needs time to reach various isolated autonomous units - a consequence of taking out leadership and command and control networks.
Starmer's sudden ban on using UK and DG bases to attack civilian targets comes several weeks late. This entire mess could have been largely mitigated by denial of UK and DG bases for attacks on Iran. AO would have been immensely annoyed by the UK saving the US from itself.
No surprise that all and sundry are getting off rounds before the ceasefire becomes "official".
Iran could raise the point that their carrier pigeon network needs time to reach various isolated autonomous units - a consequence of taking out leadership and command and control networks.
Starmer's sudden ban on using UK and DG bases to attack civilian targets comes several weeks late. This entire mess could have been largely mitigated by denial of UK and DG bases for attacks on Iran. AO would have been immensely annoyed by the UK saving the US from itself.
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From: Mauritius,soon or latter
Iran has great problem with concept. What they really want I can't understand.
They not able to conquer a square metar of any adjacent teritory.
They could only provoke neighborougs and make additional money to western military sector.
So, what is the point to make enemy richer and yourself poorer?
They not able to conquer a square metar of any adjacent teritory.
They could only provoke neighborougs and make additional money to western military sector.
So, what is the point to make enemy richer and yourself poorer?
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Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
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From: Peripatetic
.............
Iran’s IRGC says it shot down an Israeli Hermes 900 UAV over Fars province a few moments ago. The IRGC adds that any airspace violations by U.S. or Israeli aircraft are a ceasefire violation.
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From: Bournemouth
Difficult to see this outcome as anything other than an embarrassing and humiliating defeat for the USA. Trump and Hegseth continue to claim "we have met or exceeded all military objectives" but no one ever knew what they were anyway. Given the disastrous outcome, what has actually been achieved apart from a 40-50% higher oil price for the foreseeable future that will hugely benefit both Iran and Russia and likely trigger at best, an economic slowdown in the west, at worst a recession?
If Iran was not close to having a nuclear weapon now, it sure will redouble it's efforts to acquire one now, as I suspect will many other nations.
If Iran was not close to having a nuclear weapon now, it sure will redouble it's efforts to acquire one now, as I suspect will many other nations.
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From: London
Well if check you'll find they did launch two strike waves out of Fairford yesterday, one of 3 x B1s and the other of a single B-52 (was supposed to be a pair but one scrubbed).
Both turned back when the ceasefire was announced, the B-52 landed back a few hours ago with its full load of JASSMs
Both turned back when the ceasefire was announced, the B-52 landed back a few hours ago with its full load of JASSMs
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Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
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From: Peripatetic
The Israelis seem to be trying to make hay while the sun shines, pounding Lebanon before the US tries to stop their plans.
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From: Nottinghamshire
I was surprised at the announcement that we'd denied thier use to target civilian infrastructure - The "defensive operations only" line was given weeks ago. Unless bridges have suddenly started to be thrown at Cyprus, my conclusion is that a specific request was made, or it was reiterated in that form to disassociate the UK from the potential action of last night. Regards the BUFFs departure with JASSMS - my understanding is that weapon could reasonably been construed as one used in defence - at missile sites for example, but my concern, which I voiced to my MP yesterday evening, was that if used in coordination with action that POTUS had threatened, surely embroiled the UK in the operation and that those flights also should have been/should be denied.
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Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
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From: Peripatetic
Iranian air defense has been active in central, western, and eastern Tehran, Karaj, Eslamshahr & Isfahan for 30+ minutes. This comes following statements from the IRGC and Mousavi, saying that they will respond to Israeli attacks on Lebanon if they don't stop.
It's still unclear whether this is due to recon drones being spotted, a new wave of airstrikes, or trigger-happy AD operators. Reminder that the UAE was likely behind strikes on the Lavan Oil Refinery and oil facilities and landing docks on Siri Island today.
It's still unclear whether this is due to recon drones being spotted, a new wave of airstrikes, or trigger-happy AD operators. Reminder that the UAE was likely behind strikes on the Lavan Oil Refinery and oil facilities and landing docks on Siri Island today.
More info on reported explosions/AD activity in Iran:
.
- South of Karaj: Andisheh City, Parand, near the Bidganeh Missile Base, along with Robat Karim
- Sapol area in Babol, Mazandaran Province
- Tehran: Sattarkhan, Ektaban Town, Narmak
- Isfahan
- Kerman
- Rasht
- Palestine Square area in Mashhad
.
- South of Karaj: Andisheh City, Parand, near the Bidganeh Missile Base, along with Robat Karim
- Sapol area in Babol, Mazandaran Province
- Tehran: Sattarkhan, Ektaban Town, Narmak
- Isfahan
- Kerman
- Rasht
- Palestine Square area in Mashhad
Thread Starter
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
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From: Peripatetic
Looks like the ceasefire is off.
Speaker of the Iranian parliament - and the man Trump was supposedly negotiating with - Ghalibaf.
Speaker of the Iranian parliament - and the man Trump was supposedly negotiating with - Ghalibaf.
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From: West
A boom operator on an Air Force tanker earned two DFCs for combat flights
A boom operator on a KC-135 tanker earned two Distinguished Flying Crosses on recent combat missions, the Air Force confirmed this week, a rare double-award of the military’s top medal for flight.Staff Sgt. Gabrielle Stallings, a KC-135 boom operator, was one of 15 members of the 93rd Air Refueling Squadron who were presented with DFCs or Bronze Stars for combat flights on March 31, in a ceremony at Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington.
In all, 12 pilots and boom operators from the squadron were awarded Distinguished Flying Crosses. Three senior leaders in the squadron were awarded Bronze Stars. Stallings was the only double-awardee.
Though Air Force officials were tight-lipped on when and where the tanker crews had flown the missions behind the awards, a local congressman who attended the ceremony told the Spokesman-Review newspaper that they were linked to Operation Midnight Hammer, the surprise overnight bombing mission in Iran on June 21 to 22.
U.S. Rep. Michael Baumgartner, an Eastern Washington Republican, told the paper, “The refueling community is such a big part of the fabric of Eastern Washington in Spokane, and to see those pilots get recognized for their valiant efforts with respect to Iran in Operation Midnight Hammer last year, particularly while there’s an ongoing operation against Iran, really brought the thing home.”
Officials with the 92nd Air Refueling Wing and the Eighteenth Air Force would not provide copies of the award citations, nor confirm if the medals were associated with Midnight Hammer. That operation targeted three Iranian nuclear installations with a massive fleet of U.S. aircraft, including B-2 Spirit stealth bombers and fighter jets. Nearly all the aircraft involved needed mid-air refueling during the operation, including B-2s flying from Whiteman Air Force Base in the continental United States.
KC-135s fly with a crew of three, including two pilots and a boom operator. Back-up crew members are common on longer flights.
Several of the Distinguished Flying Crosses were awarded with “V” or “C” devices, which denote various levels of combat exposure during a mission.
The “V” device for valor is a higher level of award, and requires “an act or acts of heroism by an individual above what is normally expected while engaged in direct combat,” according to Air Force regulations. Those awarded DFCs with a “V” device were: Capt. Eric Gershoff; Capt. Kimberly Soltero; Capt. Joseph Ferguson; Capt. Roman Rohrbach; Capt. Seung Choi and Capt. Robert Schaefer, as well as 1st Lt. Ryan Ioanidis.
The “C” device indicates the awards were earned in combat or while exposed to “grave danger” by hostile actions. Those awarded DFCs with a “C” device were: Capt. Bobby Sherrill; Capt. Robert Maloy and Capt. Abigail Swenson, as well as Senior Airman Clark Bromley.
Stallings received one of each.
The three senior squadron officials who received Bronze Stars were: Lt. Col. Graydon Vandament, 93rd Air Refueling Squadron commander; Maj. Sean Fernando; and Master Sgt. Shane Endreson, the squadron’s production superintendent.
“The skill and tenacity displayed by the members here today led directly to the success of the overall operation,” said Maj. Gen. Charles Bolton, Eighteenth Air Force commander, who presented the awards. “We thank them for displaying this true grit and dedication.”
In 2024, 24 KC-135 crew members from various units received Distinguished Flying Crosses for support interception flights that spring, in which American fighter jets shot down dozens of Iranian drones and missiles. This February, three Air National Guard F-16 pilots also received the awards for their role in the April 2024 intercepts.
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From: Within AM radio broadcast range of downtown Chicago
The Fragile Cease-Fire
From CSIS (quoted verbatim, author noted at end)
Daniel Byman is the director of the Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He is also a professor at Georgetown University.
After over a month of fighting, the United States and Iran agreed to a two-week ceasefire. The ceasefire is fragile, and many of the key factors that will determine its durability are unclear. Below are six issues to watch as negotiations play out.
Ceasefire or a Settlement?
For now, the United States, Israel, and Iran have agreed to a ceasefire and only a ceasefire. Numerous contentious issues remain unresolved, ranging from Iran’s nuclear and missile programs to Tehran’s support for proxies and repression of protesters at home. Tehran, for its part, seeks an end to U.S. sanctions, the right to enrich uranium, an end to Israel’s attacks on Lebanon, and other demands, as well as guarantees that attacks on Iran will not resume. The war itself has also generated new demands: Iran seeks compensation for the devastation caused by U.S. and Israeli bombing and is claiming that it will demand payment for tankers seeking to transit the Strait of Hormuz. The two sides are far apart, and both seek to convince audiences at home that they have won—something that will further complicate negotiations.
It is possible that the ceasefire itself will be the settlement: The United States, Israel, and Iran will not come to a final deal, but the ceasefire will continue indefinitely, with the risk of a flare-up hovering over the region.
Iran’s Nuclear Program
Iran’s nuclear program has been at the center of the U.S.-Iran conflict for decades, and over the years the United States has tried sanctions, cyberattacks, negotiations, and limited military force to stop it. The United States and Israel destroyed much of Iran’s program in the 12-day war in 2025, and the 2026 war saw further attacks. Much of Iran’s facilities and stockpiles are currently buried beneath tons of rubble.
Throughout this period, Iran has claimed it does not seek a nuclear weapon but has ferociously defended its right to enrich uranium—an approach that the United States and Israel have long believed is a not-so-secret path to a nuclear weapon.
The nuclear issue remains unresolved, and Iran even claims (probably falsely) that the United States has accepted its right to enrichment as part of the ceasefire deal. Although the U.S. and Israeli campaign means that Iran is further from a bomb, it might redouble efforts to acquire one, believing that only a nuclear weapon can protect it given the United States’ and Israel’s conventional military superiority.
The Lebanon War
The ceasefire covers attacks on Iran, but Israel claims it does not cover its operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon—and Israel has continued attacks there. The Lebanon war has been almost as devastating as the Iran war, with almost 1,500 Lebanese killed and over 1 million Lebanese displaced, and Israel is establishing a buffer zone on the Lebanese side of the Israel-Lebanon border.
Weakening Iran will probably weaken Hezbollah, but the path is messy and risky. Sustained Israeli military pressure may degrade Hezbollah’s capabilities and constrain its ties to Tehran, yet it simultaneously weakens Lebanon’s institutions faster than they can recover and risks leaving a power vacuum rather than a stronger state. Hezbollah is likely to be battered but still present, the state further hollowed out, and the country more vulnerable to prolonged internal and regional shocks.
Terror and Revenge
U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran have heightened the near-term risk of international terrorism by Tehran and its partners, including Lebanese Hezbollah. As Iran has already sought to widen the conflict by targeting U.S. partners in the Gulf, terrorism offers another avenue to impose costs on Washington and its allies. If hostilities resume, Iranian leaders may judge that escalating pain is necessary to deter further attacks. Even in a ceasefire environment, the incentive for retaliation remains strong: Tehran has a history of plotting attacks to avenge senior figures, and the recent losses—over 250 high-ranking officials—are unprecedented in scale. At the same time, the broader conflict is catalyzing anti-Israel and antisemitic violence that is not directly orchestrated by the Iranian state.
Yet Iranian terrorist efforts may falter or prove counterproductive. The United States and Israel have long invested heavily in countering Iranian networks, and their demonstrated intelligence penetration in the latest war suggests they may be well positioned to disrupt plots abroad. A successful attack on U.S. soil could also generate the domestic support for military action that has thus far been limited. Similarly, attacks against allied countries risk hardening public opinion and political will against Iran, strengthening rather than weakening the coalition aligned with Washington and Jerusalem.
It is also plausible that the terrorist threat may diminish. Iran and several of its key proxies, including Hamas and Hezbollah, have absorbed significant military and organizational damage. In the aftermath, they may be more cautious about provoking additional retaliation through high-profile terrorist operations, particularly if doing so risks further degrading already weakened capabilities.
How Do Allies and Partners View the United States?
Perhaps the greatest long-term damage to the United States from the Iran war will be in its relationships with allies around the world. The war is deeply unpopular in Europe and has increased inflation and hurt growth in Asia and the rest of the world as well. Adding insult to injury, the United States did not consult with NATO allies before the war and then U.S. officials berated them for not taking on difficult missions like opening the Strait of Hormuz after things began to get ugly. More practically, the United States used up scarce air defense and other military assets in the Iran war, leaving stockpiles diminished for opposing Russia and helping allies deter China. China sees the war as an opportunity to increase its influence and portray the United States as erratic and bellicose.
It is possible that the world will move on quickly and that Beijing’s aggressive posture toward Taiwan and the South China Sea will set back any Chinese gains in negatively portraying the United States. Nevertheless, the United States is likely to find its allies more hesitant and more instrumental in their dealings with the United States.
War After the War
Even after major fighting subsides, Israel and Iran are likely to remain locked in a persistent, lower-level conflict rather than transition to stable peace. Militarily, Israel has not achieved decisive victory, and it may see continued attacks as necessary to stop Iran from rebuilding missile stockpiles and to put pressure on Iranian leaders. Tehran may believe it will be targeted regardless of restraint, reinforcing a logic of continued resistance and retaliation.
Domestic and strategic pressures on both sides further reinforce this dynamic. For Iran’s leadership, ongoing confrontation can help justify repression and deflect attention from economic hardship and political unrest. For Israel, the long-standing “campaign between the wars” approach favors continued strikes to keep Iran and its proxies weak and off balance rather than allowing them to rebuild. The result is a likely pattern of recurring clashes—cyberattacks, proxy violence, limited strikes, and periodic escalation—rather than a clean postwar settlement. Even if the United States seeks to step back, its close alignment with Israel means it will remain exposed to Iranian retaliation, making a cycle of “wars after the war” difficult to escape.
In the end, the ceasefire is less a resolution than a pause in a conflict whose underlying drivers remain not only intact but, in some cases, intensified. The nuclear issue is unresolved, Lebanon is destabilized, the risk of terrorism persists, and U.S. alliances have been strained—all while Israel and Iran retain strong incentives to continue a shadow war that periodically erupts into open violence. Even if large-scale fighting does not immediately resume, the United States faces a region marked by persistent instability, emboldened adversaries, wary allies, and a continuing cycle of escalation that will be difficult to control or conclude.
Ceasefire or a Settlement?
For now, the United States, Israel, and Iran have agreed to a ceasefire and only a ceasefire. Numerous contentious issues remain unresolved, ranging from Iran’s nuclear and missile programs to Tehran’s support for proxies and repression of protesters at home. Tehran, for its part, seeks an end to U.S. sanctions, the right to enrich uranium, an end to Israel’s attacks on Lebanon, and other demands, as well as guarantees that attacks on Iran will not resume. The war itself has also generated new demands: Iran seeks compensation for the devastation caused by U.S. and Israeli bombing and is claiming that it will demand payment for tankers seeking to transit the Strait of Hormuz. The two sides are far apart, and both seek to convince audiences at home that they have won—something that will further complicate negotiations.
It is possible that the ceasefire itself will be the settlement: The United States, Israel, and Iran will not come to a final deal, but the ceasefire will continue indefinitely, with the risk of a flare-up hovering over the region.
Iran’s Nuclear Program
Iran’s nuclear program has been at the center of the U.S.-Iran conflict for decades, and over the years the United States has tried sanctions, cyberattacks, negotiations, and limited military force to stop it. The United States and Israel destroyed much of Iran’s program in the 12-day war in 2025, and the 2026 war saw further attacks. Much of Iran’s facilities and stockpiles are currently buried beneath tons of rubble.
Throughout this period, Iran has claimed it does not seek a nuclear weapon but has ferociously defended its right to enrich uranium—an approach that the United States and Israel have long believed is a not-so-secret path to a nuclear weapon.
The nuclear issue remains unresolved, and Iran even claims (probably falsely) that the United States has accepted its right to enrichment as part of the ceasefire deal. Although the U.S. and Israeli campaign means that Iran is further from a bomb, it might redouble efforts to acquire one, believing that only a nuclear weapon can protect it given the United States’ and Israel’s conventional military superiority.
The Lebanon War
The ceasefire covers attacks on Iran, but Israel claims it does not cover its operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon—and Israel has continued attacks there. The Lebanon war has been almost as devastating as the Iran war, with almost 1,500 Lebanese killed and over 1 million Lebanese displaced, and Israel is establishing a buffer zone on the Lebanese side of the Israel-Lebanon border.
Weakening Iran will probably weaken Hezbollah, but the path is messy and risky. Sustained Israeli military pressure may degrade Hezbollah’s capabilities and constrain its ties to Tehran, yet it simultaneously weakens Lebanon’s institutions faster than they can recover and risks leaving a power vacuum rather than a stronger state. Hezbollah is likely to be battered but still present, the state further hollowed out, and the country more vulnerable to prolonged internal and regional shocks.
Terror and Revenge
U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran have heightened the near-term risk of international terrorism by Tehran and its partners, including Lebanese Hezbollah. As Iran has already sought to widen the conflict by targeting U.S. partners in the Gulf, terrorism offers another avenue to impose costs on Washington and its allies. If hostilities resume, Iranian leaders may judge that escalating pain is necessary to deter further attacks. Even in a ceasefire environment, the incentive for retaliation remains strong: Tehran has a history of plotting attacks to avenge senior figures, and the recent losses—over 250 high-ranking officials—are unprecedented in scale. At the same time, the broader conflict is catalyzing anti-Israel and antisemitic violence that is not directly orchestrated by the Iranian state.
Yet Iranian terrorist efforts may falter or prove counterproductive. The United States and Israel have long invested heavily in countering Iranian networks, and their demonstrated intelligence penetration in the latest war suggests they may be well positioned to disrupt plots abroad. A successful attack on U.S. soil could also generate the domestic support for military action that has thus far been limited. Similarly, attacks against allied countries risk hardening public opinion and political will against Iran, strengthening rather than weakening the coalition aligned with Washington and Jerusalem.
It is also plausible that the terrorist threat may diminish. Iran and several of its key proxies, including Hamas and Hezbollah, have absorbed significant military and organizational damage. In the aftermath, they may be more cautious about provoking additional retaliation through high-profile terrorist operations, particularly if doing so risks further degrading already weakened capabilities.
How Do Allies and Partners View the United States?
Perhaps the greatest long-term damage to the United States from the Iran war will be in its relationships with allies around the world. The war is deeply unpopular in Europe and has increased inflation and hurt growth in Asia and the rest of the world as well. Adding insult to injury, the United States did not consult with NATO allies before the war and then U.S. officials berated them for not taking on difficult missions like opening the Strait of Hormuz after things began to get ugly. More practically, the United States used up scarce air defense and other military assets in the Iran war, leaving stockpiles diminished for opposing Russia and helping allies deter China. China sees the war as an opportunity to increase its influence and portray the United States as erratic and bellicose.
It is possible that the world will move on quickly and that Beijing’s aggressive posture toward Taiwan and the South China Sea will set back any Chinese gains in negatively portraying the United States. Nevertheless, the United States is likely to find its allies more hesitant and more instrumental in their dealings with the United States.
War After the War
Even after major fighting subsides, Israel and Iran are likely to remain locked in a persistent, lower-level conflict rather than transition to stable peace. Militarily, Israel has not achieved decisive victory, and it may see continued attacks as necessary to stop Iran from rebuilding missile stockpiles and to put pressure on Iranian leaders. Tehran may believe it will be targeted regardless of restraint, reinforcing a logic of continued resistance and retaliation.
Domestic and strategic pressures on both sides further reinforce this dynamic. For Iran’s leadership, ongoing confrontation can help justify repression and deflect attention from economic hardship and political unrest. For Israel, the long-standing “campaign between the wars” approach favors continued strikes to keep Iran and its proxies weak and off balance rather than allowing them to rebuild. The result is a likely pattern of recurring clashes—cyberattacks, proxy violence, limited strikes, and periodic escalation—rather than a clean postwar settlement. Even if the United States seeks to step back, its close alignment with Israel means it will remain exposed to Iranian retaliation, making a cycle of “wars after the war” difficult to escape.
In the end, the ceasefire is less a resolution than a pause in a conflict whose underlying drivers remain not only intact but, in some cases, intensified. The nuclear issue is unresolved, Lebanon is destabilized, the risk of terrorism persists, and U.S. alliances have been strained—all while Israel and Iran retain strong incentives to continue a shadow war that periodically erupts into open violence. Even if large-scale fighting does not immediately resume, the United States faces a region marked by persistent instability, emboldened adversaries, wary allies, and a continuing cycle of escalation that will be difficult to control or conclude.
Last edited by T28B; 9th April 2026 at 12:54. Reason: It is OK to use the quote function
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From: 3rd Rock, #29B
Hezbollah is/was unlikely to cross Irans request for cessation of hostilities. Hezbollah has survived due to the support from Iran and are quite aware of the consequences of getting sideways with their benefactor.
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From: Canada
What is actually going on with shipping?
Well for starters the expected and much anticipated “Hormuz Tanker Races” don’t seem to have started.
Not too many competitors it seems.
Anyhow here is Sal’s view of the situation.
Well for starters the expected and much anticipated “Hormuz Tanker Races” don’t seem to have started.
Not too many competitors it seems.
Anyhow here is Sal’s view of the situation.
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From: on the ground
So at $627.70 (when you posted) or $628.50 (now as I post), their stock price is down $30 or almost 5%, from the start of the war, and squarely in the middle of the stock price range in the month before the war.
Last edited by Senior Pilot; 9th April 2026 at 05:08. Reason: Remove repeated image, not needed
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From: UK
So, … the statement implies that while large-scale open warfare may be temporarily suspended, true, durable peace is not on the immediate horizon. The ceasefire buys time at best, but without major concessions or external mediation breakthroughs on the nuclear file, proxies, and sanctions, the underlying drivers point toward continued volatility and periodic eruptions rather than stability in the U.S.–Israel–Iran triangle and the wider Middle East.
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