RAF and Para training
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RAF and Para training
I suspect that there's more to this than meets the eye...
Telegraph report
Special forces soldiers are calling for parachute training to be taken out of the hands of the RAF after a serious accident which left nine paratroopers injured.
Check the date....
Never been on Farcebook in my entire life! But I did take part on the night of 11 September 1974 and that is certainly very far from being written by a dim squaddie!
MOSTAFA, what connection are you making between a five year old newspaper article and a training accident 40 years ago?
I was on exercise, in an Argosy, in Libya, when a Herc dropped off DZ at night resulting, I was told, in one death and some injuries. Recollect thinking, at the time, that, in an exercise, one can always ask for a white flare from the DZ Officer.
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Back when Air Transport aircraft carried navigators para Drop Zones were laid out with markers to aid recognition of the CARP or calculated air release point. On special DZs a simplified identifier was placed at the release point on the ground which was calculated by the army. There were no impact point markers. Therefore any drop error was the responsibility of the DZ party. Often thereafter the marker was put on the IP and navs were asked to CARP onto that. When GPS/IN kit arrived it could calculate a release point but was always verified by the nav.
Now that navs are replaced by a reading on a HUD in front of the pilot you get what the computer says is correct. One consolation point is that the paras never miss the ground.
Now that navs are replaced by a reading on a HUD in front of the pilot you get what the computer says is correct. One consolation point is that the paras never miss the ground.
"Mildly" Eccentric Stardriver
I was part of a crew on that drop in '74. We didn't drop because of all the red flares being fired. I stand to be corrected, but I believe the error was that the ground markers had been placed wrongly, resulting in the drop being early. The paras that died that night drowned in the Kiel Canal, not having life-jackets. There was also a large ship in the canal, although it was supposed to be closed. As a result of the canal not being closed, I also believe that the Kanalmeister committed suicide a day or so later. At least it meant the end of the JATFOR concept, at least as far as the Hercules fleet were concerned. If anyone knows more, please post.
There was a thread called 'reluctant paratroopers' a year or so ago. Nothing to do with Bold Guard but thread creep ended up there.
A poster called ancientaviator62 was a ALM on the same drop pointed me to the Hansard enquiry results and was certainly well worth a read if you were involved that night. I didn't realise anybody aborted the drop, interesting.
Just search for the thread or the user.
A poster called ancientaviator62 was a ALM on the same drop pointed me to the Hansard enquiry results and was certainly well worth a read if you were involved that night. I didn't realise anybody aborted the drop, interesting.
Just search for the thread or the user.
I remember the flight home to this day ... initially everyone happy that the troops went out on time.. then the drop "results" - which included the potential casualties - started to feed through ... and the flight deck went very quiet ... an atmosphere that continued right the way through the debrief and the following days.
I vividly remember getting out of the C130 door and thinking - clucking bell! This isn't the briefed 650' More like a 1000'+ And it was like bonfire night with all the Christmas lights thrown in and a ship the size of the QE2 chugging down one side of the canal and another coming the other way. German police cars with their blues n twos going yet still the blokes were piling out of the aircraft. The pičces de ré·sis·tance was then the MSPs started coming with them.
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Nobody is denying that the "Kiel Canal" incident was anything less than a horrendous clusterfeck which resulted in avoidable injuries and loss of life. Lessons were learned and further safety measures incorporated in main force para assault exercises. The reports from Bold Guard remained on file at JATE for years.
The OP however relates to Special Forces procedures which are entirely different to those employed on main force drops. The article itself is disingenuous and misleading being 5 years old. There are no K model C130s left. With deepest respect to the survivors of the '74 exercise I can see no point to answer in this thread.
The OP however relates to Special Forces procedures which are entirely different to those employed on main force drops. The article itself is disingenuous and misleading being 5 years old. There are no K model C130s left. With deepest respect to the survivors of the '74 exercise I can see no point to answer in this thread.
April 1975, House of Commons.
Parachuting Accident (Kiel Canal)
HC Deb 15 April 1975 vol 890 cc57-9W57W
§Mr. Younger asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he has received the results of the inquiry into the parachuting accident during exercise Bold Guard over the Kiel Canal on 11th September 1974: and if he will now make a statement.
§Mr. Mason The proceedings of the joint Royal Air Force and Army Board of Inquiry on this tragic accident have now been received and studied.
After an exhaustive examination, which included taking evidence from some 74 witnesses, it has been established that the basic reason for 15 men landing in the canal was that the actual wind encountered during the parachute descent was both stronger and more southerly than had been forecast, due to a temperature inversion near the surface. Using our present methods of weather forecasting this variation could not have been detected before the actual drop.
All the parachutists involved had had the necessary training and had been specifically briefed on the possibility of a landing into water. All were equipped with lifejackets which are inflated by releasing gas by hand from an attached cylinder. In the case of the six men who were drowned, three, for reasons unknown, had not attempted to inflate their lifejackets; in the case of the other three the lifejackets had failed to inflate because the head of the gas cylinder had not been screwed home, one of them because the thread had become crossed.
I have carefully considered the report of the Board of Inquiry. I am satisfied that the decision to carry out the drop was justified in the circumstances and that every reasonable precaution was taken, including the provision of safety boats. Closure of the canal during the drop could not be negotiated, but I am satisfied that this was not a significant factor in the tragedy.
A full review of all existing procedures for parachute drops, including the methods of determining wind speed and direction during descent, is being undertaken to reduce or eliminate the chances of a similar occurrence. Although there is no evidence either way to show whether the cross-threaded gas cylinder was issued in that state, action has been taken to improve standards of maintenance and inspection of lifejackets and to ensure that the gas cylinder head is fully screwed home before the jacket is issued.
I deeply regret the tragic deaths of these six volunteer soldiers. My concern is not lessened by the fact that the men who were involved in this parachute drop took part knowing the high risks inherent in military parachuting and that fatal accidents will occur from time to time. It is, however, to minimise these risks that we are adopting the additional measures I have already described.
Parachuting Accident (Kiel Canal)
HC Deb 15 April 1975 vol 890 cc57-9W57W
§Mr. Younger asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he has received the results of the inquiry into the parachuting accident during exercise Bold Guard over the Kiel Canal on 11th September 1974: and if he will now make a statement.
§Mr. Mason The proceedings of the joint Royal Air Force and Army Board of Inquiry on this tragic accident have now been received and studied.
After an exhaustive examination, which included taking evidence from some 74 witnesses, it has been established that the basic reason for 15 men landing in the canal was that the actual wind encountered during the parachute descent was both stronger and more southerly than had been forecast, due to a temperature inversion near the surface. Using our present methods of weather forecasting this variation could not have been detected before the actual drop.
All the parachutists involved had had the necessary training and had been specifically briefed on the possibility of a landing into water. All were equipped with lifejackets which are inflated by releasing gas by hand from an attached cylinder. In the case of the six men who were drowned, three, for reasons unknown, had not attempted to inflate their lifejackets; in the case of the other three the lifejackets had failed to inflate because the head of the gas cylinder had not been screwed home, one of them because the thread had become crossed.
I have carefully considered the report of the Board of Inquiry. I am satisfied that the decision to carry out the drop was justified in the circumstances and that every reasonable precaution was taken, including the provision of safety boats. Closure of the canal during the drop could not be negotiated, but I am satisfied that this was not a significant factor in the tragedy.
A full review of all existing procedures for parachute drops, including the methods of determining wind speed and direction during descent, is being undertaken to reduce or eliminate the chances of a similar occurrence. Although there is no evidence either way to show whether the cross-threaded gas cylinder was issued in that state, action has been taken to improve standards of maintenance and inspection of lifejackets and to ensure that the gas cylinder head is fully screwed home before the jacket is issued.
I deeply regret the tragic deaths of these six volunteer soldiers. My concern is not lessened by the fact that the men who were involved in this parachute drop took part knowing the high risks inherent in military parachuting and that fatal accidents will occur from time to time. It is, however, to minimise these risks that we are adopting the additional measures I have already described.
And everybody that jumped that night knows exactly what a crock of **** that report was. I'd deeply regret that clusterfuc* as well. Due to a temperature inversion, my arse! - There was very little if no wind that night. Temperature inversions don't don't drop MSPs with Artillery howitzers and land rovers on personnel DZs, nor drop you at twice the height you are briefed on. As for the canal not being closed not being significant tell that to the poor sod they found miles out to sea several days later, dragged by a QE2 sized ship.
Courtney mil, take it from somebody that was there. I never saw any Hansard publication or BOI report until a very honest ancientaviator62 pointed out there was one 38 years later. Try to imagine being in the middle of a packed solid C130, full of parachutists and personal containers, wth another 37 C130s all around them doing exactly the same and in the dark! Those parachutists solely rely on people to put them in the right place at the right time and the right height. They have zero control of nothing and can see bugger all until they are outside the aircraft. It's that simple.
I have categorically no doubt Ex Bold Guard was the final nail in the coffin for 16 Parachute Brigade which disbanded 18 months later and we never even attempted another JATFOR exercise thanks to the last effort.
Courtney mil, take it from somebody that was there. I never saw any Hansard publication or BOI report until a very honest ancientaviator62 pointed out there was one 38 years later. Try to imagine being in the middle of a packed solid C130, full of parachutists and personal containers, wth another 37 C130s all around them doing exactly the same and in the dark! Those parachutists solely rely on people to put them in the right place at the right time and the right height. They have zero control of nothing and can see bugger all until they are outside the aircraft. It's that simple.
I have categorically no doubt Ex Bold Guard was the final nail in the coffin for 16 Parachute Brigade which disbanded 18 months later and we never even attempted another JATFOR exercise thanks to the last effort.
Last edited by MOSTAFA; 6th Jan 2016 at 22:46.
Champagne anyone...?
The article is indeed elderly and is the standard article that "mate in the paras" sends to his tame journo at the DT prior to any major defence spending announcement (in this case SDSR). You could pretty much set your watch by the appearance of these "mutter mutter" army furious, parachuting, all the RAFs fault, everything awful Telegraph articles. These were best read on a Friday afternoon in the PTS crewroom whilst waiting to be told that the army had cancelled the rest of the day's lifts so that everyone could get home for the weekend instead 
The drop in question wasn't anything particularly "SF'y" - just a standard night LLP drop where the Nav either input the wrong IP coordinates or miscalculated the red light time.
The army kill plenty of their troops in training accidents so there was no reason to go sobbing to the papers about this incident other than to generate the usual "save the paras" noise that gets the man on the Clapham omnibus animated prior to looming defence cuts.
The drop in question wasn't anything particularly "SF'y" - just a standard night LLP drop where the Nav either input the wrong IP coordinates or miscalculated the red light time.
The army kill plenty of their troops in training accidents so there was no reason to go sobbing to the papers about this incident other than to generate the usual "save the paras" noise that gets the man on the Clapham omnibus animated prior to looming defence cuts.