Argentine fast jet weapons choice - Falklands
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Wasn't the Tirpitz eventually rolled over by bomb(s) that landed close by but were not direct hits? (Obviously the direct hits pretty much disabled her!)
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SNEB
Going back to the SNEB rockets, I would question how useful they would be against shipping. As a Canberra pilot in the 1960s I trained with these weapons. I understood that they were for personnel and soft skin vehicles. That would have been with the HE head.
The alternative was a shaped charge head, but I think it was only good for 2" armour. A full pod of these would clearly make a mess on upper parts of a ship, but I would have been surprised if the ship was crippled as a result.
Because SNEB missiles were carried in tubes, the head had only the diameter of the rocket - 68mm I think.
In WWII, Coastal forces used rockets to sink small ships. Those were 3" rockets, so 76mm diameter, but the AP heads were of a greater diameter and therefore heavy. The trick was to place them below the vessel's waterline to cause flooding. Then the head was solid-shot and could achieve this, while the SNEB shaped charge would ejaculate on impact with the water. 3" RP were obsolete in the 1960s, no doubt because they caused so much drag, but I could visualise them as useful weapons on the A-10.
The alternative was a shaped charge head, but I think it was only good for 2" armour. A full pod of these would clearly make a mess on upper parts of a ship, but I would have been surprised if the ship was crippled as a result.
Because SNEB missiles were carried in tubes, the head had only the diameter of the rocket - 68mm I think.
In WWII, Coastal forces used rockets to sink small ships. Those were 3" rockets, so 76mm diameter, but the AP heads were of a greater diameter and therefore heavy. The trick was to place them below the vessel's waterline to cause flooding. Then the head was solid-shot and could achieve this, while the SNEB shaped charge would ejaculate on impact with the water. 3" RP were obsolete in the 1960s, no doubt because they caused so much drag, but I could visualise them as useful weapons on the A-10.
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I'm sure you are right RLS with respect to older ships - Most larger WW2 ships had armour - SNEBs would have been useless against those.
I would have thought modern destroyers and frigates would have effectively been soft skinned vehicles with plenty of venerable equipment above deck.
Maybe a QWI can help but I would have thought a pod of SNEBS would have produced enough damage, especially to the equipment such as weapons radar etc above decks to render the ship severely degraded as a fighting machine.
Of course a 1000 lb bomb is more effective - if you can get hit the target and get it to explode - They were big ifs during the Falkland's war. Also a risker profile.
I would have thought modern destroyers and frigates would have effectively been soft skinned vehicles with plenty of venerable equipment above deck.
Maybe a QWI can help but I would have thought a pod of SNEBS would have produced enough damage, especially to the equipment such as weapons radar etc above decks to render the ship severely degraded as a fighting machine.
Of course a 1000 lb bomb is more effective - if you can get hit the target and get it to explode - They were big ifs during the Falkland's war. Also a risker profile.
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It is arrogant and naïve to suggest that you have "plenty" of experience when you have never ever bombed a warship for real. You have zero experience until you have actually done it.
What is your plan to deal with goalkeeper knocking the bomb/you out of the air?
Were the practice bombs aimed at ships manoeuvring aggressively?
Were the practice bombs aimed at ships that were actually shooting at you?
I have found that a lot of units in isolation have very inflated opinions of their abilities.
Pilots who say "yes we will kill them before they see us"
Ships who say "we splashed them before they got a chance to release"
The reality is never so simple.
The Falklands is a case in point.
The ship defence systems didn't work as advertised.
Rapier didn't work as advertised.
The bombs didn't go off.
I bet if you had asked the pilots, PWOs and rapier operators pre Falklands conflict, you would have found a few saying things like "I have plenty of experience"
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You will note that they were rather bigger bombs than 1000lbs....
Sinking of the Battleship Tirpitz
If it were easy to sink warships with 1000lb bombs, then we would go back to building armoured warships impenetrable to 1000lb bombs.
Designers are not stupid.
They have decided that the chances of somebody managing to get close enough to hit you with a bomb are small enough to make armour unnecessary.
Tourist, I don't think JTO was really being arrogant, just explaining that he has a maritime attack background, perhaps. I know many on the MBW who took their ASuW role very seriously. Although they didn't get a chance to sink a hulk every day, they took weapon effort planning very seriously and certainly understood well the required tactics and munitions types required to disable, neutralise or deter a surface combatant. Notice I didn't use the word 'sink'.
The ac would likely be only about 6 nm away from the point of detonation. The mach stem effect would in all probability de-stabilise the bomber's recovery resulting in a departure from controlled flight.
Incidentally, the Vulcan planned to drop a WE 177 900 from a laydown profile at 300 feet. Release speed was 300 kts and the weapon safety breaks, drogue and fuzing delayed detonation by only 30 secs. This meant the ac was 2.5 nm away when the bomb detonated. One-way mission really and the crews were briefed to attempt to find a suitable airfield east of the Urals or in Turkey to recover to.
Incidentally, the Vulcan planned to drop a WE 177 900 from a laydown profile at 300 feet. Release speed was 300 kts and the weapon safety breaks, drogue and fuzing delayed detonation by only 30 secs. This meant the ac was 2.5 nm away when the bomb detonated. One-way mission really and the crews were briefed to attempt to find a suitable airfield east of the Urals or in Turkey to recover to.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Darvan, digressing slightly, the lay down attack would be nearer 415kts, even in training we did 375.
Time of bomb fall was in excess of 5 seconds. Retard delay was 32 seconds. Distance from GZ at detonation should be in region of 4 miles with the aircraft opening range. I estimated the aircraft would be about 5.5 miles from GZ when the blast wave overtook the aircraft with an pressure of less than the critical 1.25 psi.
The variant carried by the Bucc had a much lower yield.
Time of bomb fall was in excess of 5 seconds. Retard delay was 32 seconds. Distance from GZ at detonation should be in region of 4 miles with the aircraft opening range. I estimated the aircraft would be about 5.5 miles from GZ when the blast wave overtook the aircraft with an pressure of less than the critical 1.25 psi.
The variant carried by the Bucc had a much lower yield.
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Although they didn't get a chance to splash an attacking jet every day, they take ship defence very seriously and certainly understand well the tactics and weapon types required to disable neutralise or deter an airborne combatant.
One of the things I noticed while being on warships, is that they have many differences from "hulks"
They move.
They fight back.
They have countermeasures.
PN. Post 1978 the delivery profile for the 900 LB WE 177 from a Vulcan was 300 ft and 300 kts. That is what the crews briefed and practised. I guess some crews flew their own profile to expedite their egress but the 'authorised' release speed was 300 kts; QED the ac was 2.5 nm from the point of detonation.
A tour at Tain me taught me a Buccaneer flown by a good crew could consistently deliver an accurately tossed bomb. The interesting bit for us was when they were new to it. A call of "No Spot" from one of the quad spotting towers one day, provoked the response of "it's behind you!" from the main Tower, and it was, about 25 yards behind me! I was the man in the spotting tower and it scared the bejesus out of me!! "Off the Plot" didn't really cover it. 
You seem to wear your reputation for aggressive and insulting posts with pride and appear to treat your frequent banning as a badge of honour.
Others take a different view.
The statement I responded to, in a nice factual way, was your comment about bombs vs tough warships. I limited my response to actual weapon effects whilst acknowledging that getting to the point of delivery was the tricky bit. You have now shifted the argument to include CIWS and other counter-air techniques not really germane to the era of dumb bombing; but I will endeavour to educate you a little on these points too as I fear there are many in the RN, Army and RAF that are little too comfortable about this risks posed by attacking aircraft. Indeed, it is reminiscent of the attitude of the RN before the Falklands campaign.
Regarding the utility of armouring warships as a method to defeat the threat was pretty much parked decades ago. The USS Arizona was not exactly short of armour when commissioned but it had quite a bit of additional armour added to respond to the growth in power of naval guns. With no dedicated AP bombs and no means of increasing the impact angle the Japanese dropped a converted AP shell from an aircraft to cut through all the layers of armour, to destroy a magazine and the ship. Even a UK 1000lb bomb has much greater ability to penetrate and fuse correctly than the method the Japanese used.
Post WWII warships have little physical protection against any anti-ship weapon. Perhaps the slowest and broadest weapon I have analysed on striking a warship was an instrumented Tomahawk with no warhead. It had no difficult penetrating the midships and exiting on the other side. Quite simply, adding enough armour to a warship so that it can withstand direct hits from typical attack weapons is just not feasible - designers would be stupid to try.
Warship designs moved away from armour and shifted focus to defeating the aircraft, or the inbound weapon. By the 60's the RAF had decided that only a shift to stand-off weapons (eg Martel) would meet the threat posed by warships. By the 70's most aircraft with an anti-ship role were developing sea-skimming missiles of various speeds, sizes and capabilities. By the time of the Falklands campaign the RAF was on its 3rd generation of anti-ship missile in the shape of Sea Eagle.
Somehow the proliferation of anti-ship missiles caught the RN off-guard, even though it also possessed its own range of anti-ship missiles. Worringly, fleet air defence exercises frequently dictated the attack profiles that the opposing force had to use.
It was not uncommon for Buccaneer formations to be tasked to use simulated dumb bomb profiles rather than their preferred weapons. Even post-Falklands I have conducted an attack with 4 aircraft lofting full sticks of airburst 1000lbs, followed by a further 4-ship delivering direct attacks. Somehow the RN would treat a simulated downing of 1 x loft aircraft and 3 x laydown aircraft as a success. At times they were utterly ambivalent that the first 3 aircraft had delivered 24 x 1000lb airburst weapons on them before the next formation had arrived.
Returning to the Falklands and the RN's hope that attacking aircraft would follow their canned exercises - well the RN got lucky. Whilst the opposing force had a limited stand-off capability, which had to be respected, the majority of the opposing air only possessed a rather rustic dumb-bomb capability, with very few of the bells and whistles used by others. Indeed, the attacks profiles were from a different era - very low-level visually aimed direct attacks with impact fused weapons. A shockingly high number of RN warships were hit and if was not for the poor understanding of the rather rustic bomb fuses used it would have been a slaughter. For a navy that had a NATO-declared amphibious capability the shortfalls were suddenly obvious to all. Being hit by a bomb dropped by a converted C-130 just rubbed salt into the wounds.
So skipping to the modern era, with systems such as CIWS and missiles capable of intercepting inbound anti-ship weapons, have the RN remembered the real lessons of the past? Do we still face the same arrogance and indifference to airpower?
Imagine my surprise when the tasking from the RN still dictates the attack profile to be used on the next exercise. But things have moved on and we are told to conduct multi-axis attacks against a Type-23. They want pop-up attacks with simulated subsonic anti-ship missiles (Hawk T1s), stand-off jamming with fast air closing to visual range for further CIWS and visual AA gunning practise. The fast air is duly slaughtered and the arrogant debrief follows.
In the FJ world it is common to cloak yourself in the capabilities of the opposing weapon systems. We imagine a 'bubble' around us that varies in range, altitude and aspects of the respective adversary. We try to keep the opposing system, aircraft or missile out of this bubble whilst we endeavour to bring our own weapons to bear.
So in answer to your question as to how I tackle CIWS or the missiles carried on the Type-23 (and keeping answers unclassified / wiki based) is that I do not let the capabilities of these systems overlap with my aircraft. How far and how high can a Sea Wolf go? How far can a CIWS fire; how many bursts does it get before a lengthy reload; up to what elevation can the gun, radar and tracking systems elevate to? Do I need to ever place my own aircraft at risk?
A lengthy post that deliberately circles back to the beginning. I have no doubt the RN's appreciation for airpower ensures that they are ready for the Argies now, but as for the ancient 1000lb GP bomb, with a cheap LGB kit that has changed little since the 70s, delivered from high-level on a near vertical profile…
Others take a different view.
If it were easy to sink warships with 1000lb bombs, then we would go back to building armoured warships impenetrable to 1000lb bombs.
Designers are not stupid.
They have decided that the chances of somebody managing to get close enough to hit you with a bomb are small enough to make armour unnecessary.
Designers are not stupid.
They have decided that the chances of somebody managing to get close enough to hit you with a bomb are small enough to make armour unnecessary.
Regarding the utility of armouring warships as a method to defeat the threat was pretty much parked decades ago. The USS Arizona was not exactly short of armour when commissioned but it had quite a bit of additional armour added to respond to the growth in power of naval guns. With no dedicated AP bombs and no means of increasing the impact angle the Japanese dropped a converted AP shell from an aircraft to cut through all the layers of armour, to destroy a magazine and the ship. Even a UK 1000lb bomb has much greater ability to penetrate and fuse correctly than the method the Japanese used.
Post WWII warships have little physical protection against any anti-ship weapon. Perhaps the slowest and broadest weapon I have analysed on striking a warship was an instrumented Tomahawk with no warhead. It had no difficult penetrating the midships and exiting on the other side. Quite simply, adding enough armour to a warship so that it can withstand direct hits from typical attack weapons is just not feasible - designers would be stupid to try.
Warship designs moved away from armour and shifted focus to defeating the aircraft, or the inbound weapon. By the 60's the RAF had decided that only a shift to stand-off weapons (eg Martel) would meet the threat posed by warships. By the 70's most aircraft with an anti-ship role were developing sea-skimming missiles of various speeds, sizes and capabilities. By the time of the Falklands campaign the RAF was on its 3rd generation of anti-ship missile in the shape of Sea Eagle.
Somehow the proliferation of anti-ship missiles caught the RN off-guard, even though it also possessed its own range of anti-ship missiles. Worringly, fleet air defence exercises frequently dictated the attack profiles that the opposing force had to use.
It was not uncommon for Buccaneer formations to be tasked to use simulated dumb bomb profiles rather than their preferred weapons. Even post-Falklands I have conducted an attack with 4 aircraft lofting full sticks of airburst 1000lbs, followed by a further 4-ship delivering direct attacks. Somehow the RN would treat a simulated downing of 1 x loft aircraft and 3 x laydown aircraft as a success. At times they were utterly ambivalent that the first 3 aircraft had delivered 24 x 1000lb airburst weapons on them before the next formation had arrived.
Returning to the Falklands and the RN's hope that attacking aircraft would follow their canned exercises - well the RN got lucky. Whilst the opposing force had a limited stand-off capability, which had to be respected, the majority of the opposing air only possessed a rather rustic dumb-bomb capability, with very few of the bells and whistles used by others. Indeed, the attacks profiles were from a different era - very low-level visually aimed direct attacks with impact fused weapons. A shockingly high number of RN warships were hit and if was not for the poor understanding of the rather rustic bomb fuses used it would have been a slaughter. For a navy that had a NATO-declared amphibious capability the shortfalls were suddenly obvious to all. Being hit by a bomb dropped by a converted C-130 just rubbed salt into the wounds.
So skipping to the modern era, with systems such as CIWS and missiles capable of intercepting inbound anti-ship weapons, have the RN remembered the real lessons of the past? Do we still face the same arrogance and indifference to airpower?
Imagine my surprise when the tasking from the RN still dictates the attack profile to be used on the next exercise. But things have moved on and we are told to conduct multi-axis attacks against a Type-23. They want pop-up attacks with simulated subsonic anti-ship missiles (Hawk T1s), stand-off jamming with fast air closing to visual range for further CIWS and visual AA gunning practise. The fast air is duly slaughtered and the arrogant debrief follows.
In the FJ world it is common to cloak yourself in the capabilities of the opposing weapon systems. We imagine a 'bubble' around us that varies in range, altitude and aspects of the respective adversary. We try to keep the opposing system, aircraft or missile out of this bubble whilst we endeavour to bring our own weapons to bear.
So in answer to your question as to how I tackle CIWS or the missiles carried on the Type-23 (and keeping answers unclassified / wiki based) is that I do not let the capabilities of these systems overlap with my aircraft. How far and how high can a Sea Wolf go? How far can a CIWS fire; how many bursts does it get before a lengthy reload; up to what elevation can the gun, radar and tracking systems elevate to? Do I need to ever place my own aircraft at risk?
A lengthy post that deliberately circles back to the beginning. I have no doubt the RN's appreciation for airpower ensures that they are ready for the Argies now, but as for the ancient 1000lb GP bomb, with a cheap LGB kit that has changed little since the 70s, delivered from high-level on a near vertical profile…
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You think me insulting, however I find your assertion that warships are easy targets insulting to their well trained crews.
How entertaining that on one thread we have hysteria because the Russians have installed S400 in Syria and somehow this owns and dominates everything out to hundreds of miles despite the obvious vulnerabilities of a ground based missile system, yet here you would have me believe that you can walk up to a modern warship with your general purpose bomber and plink it at will after defeating it's defences.
I notice, incidentally that you have chosen to attack the T23, an ASW frigate rather than a T45 which would obviously accompany the T23 into any area with an air threat.
That is a bit like me specifying that you are only allowed to attack in a Sentinel.
Good luck with bombing a T45 from above.
Yes, you can swamp any defence system. That has been true since the beginning of time.
The cost can be prohibitive though.
How entertaining that on one thread we have hysteria because the Russians have installed S400 in Syria and somehow this owns and dominates everything out to hundreds of miles despite the obvious vulnerabilities of a ground based missile system, yet here you would have me believe that you can walk up to a modern warship with your general purpose bomber and plink it at will after defeating it's defences.
I notice, incidentally that you have chosen to attack the T23, an ASW frigate rather than a T45 which would obviously accompany the T23 into any area with an air threat.
That is a bit like me specifying that you are only allowed to attack in a Sentinel.
Good luck with bombing a T45 from above.
Yes, you can swamp any defence system. That has been true since the beginning of time.
The cost can be prohibitive though.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Tourist, on one exercise we made an attack on Ticonderoga. I set the radar to simulate a missile lock. She didn't jam me but executed such a tight manoeuvre that she painted a wake circle on the radar screen.
Had we got one bomb near her (AAA not withstanding) we would have been exceedingly lucky.
Had we got one bomb near her (AAA not withstanding) we would have been exceedingly lucky.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
JTO
What we used to call 'Fighter Rules'. The Bombers ordered to use limited profiles to simulate what the defender, RN or UKADGE, thought was the likely profile used by the enemy.
In the Malta Sunspot series of ADEX the routed planned by Bomber Command often succeeded in penetrating despite the disadvantage of taking off from the joint AD/Bomber base thus rather limiting the vulnerability window.
In one exercise Bomber 'cheated' by sending a squadron of Vulcans direct from UK and penetrating at low level while the resident Vulcans loitered at the edge of radar cover.
Another year, over 3 days, the bomber tracks were varied and included spoof raids etc. Again some bombers got through.
In both cases Fighter Command cried foul saying the Egyptian Air Force was not that clever!
Imagine my surprise when the tasking from the RN still dictates the attack profile to be used on the next exercise. But things have moved on and we are told to conduct multi-axis attacks against a Type-23. They want pop-up attacks with simulated subsonic anti-ship missiles (Hawk T1s), stand-off jamming with fast air closing to visual range for further CIWS and visual AA gunning practise. The fast air is duly slaughtered and the arrogant debrief follows.
In the Malta Sunspot series of ADEX the routed planned by Bomber Command often succeeded in penetrating despite the disadvantage of taking off from the joint AD/Bomber base thus rather limiting the vulnerability window.
In one exercise Bomber 'cheated' by sending a squadron of Vulcans direct from UK and penetrating at low level while the resident Vulcans loitered at the edge of radar cover.
Another year, over 3 days, the bomber tracks were varied and included spoof raids etc. Again some bombers got through.
In both cases Fighter Command cried foul saying the Egyptian Air Force was not that clever!
Using the profile of potential adversaries is an absolute must. 
Setting the profile to match your own weapon limitations - not so great.
The RN has a grand total of 6 ships that can shoot at high-level aircraft.
Setting the profile to match your own weapon limitations - not so great.
The RN has a grand total of 6 ships that can shoot at high-level aircraft.
Thanks to JTO, PN, Skelton and Darvan and others on this thread for explaining your actual experiences, even while under sniper fire from others on here- it really helps the discussion and is appreciated.
Thanks guys, keep it up.
Thanks guys, keep it up.
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I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
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As a Bucc QWI of some vintage a quick read through these pages leads me to conclude that there is an awful lot of BBC journalist-type guess work on this thread with regard to the Buccaneer, its weapons and their capability.
First. Maritime Buccaneers were NEVER fitted with SNEB. The FAA Buccs used 2" Rockets as did those on 12 Sqn in my day during the 70s. However, RAFG Buccaneers used SNEB Rockets but never against ships.
Second. The 2" Rocket had much more power and punch than SNEB - 36 Rx per Pod as oppose to 19 in an Op SNEB Pod. ASuW Buccs did not use Rx against capital ships, they were designed to be used to flood the sea around a flotilla of manoeuvring FPBs in the Skaggerak and Kattegat mainly.
Third. The Long Toss Manoeuvre, designed for the release of the WE177 when not delivered in a laydown mode, gave sufficient time for the aircraft to complete its escape manoeuvre and be well established back at 100ft over the 'oggin and at 580 kts egressing away from the detonation. Yes, the blast wave would eventually catch you up but we had methods to cope with that and knew when to expect it. However, the fallout would not catch you and the flash was overcome by wearing an eye patch (yes folks that's true) to protect vision in at least one eye.
Fourth. THE NATO standard for Medium Toss was 300 ft and the Buccaneer's automatic analogue system could routinely put a practice bomb well inside that and much closer to the target too if the system was well harmonised. When using Medium Toss against capital ships a stick of weapons would be tossed from each aircraft resulting in 24 weapons being thrown against a single target from a 6-ship formation. Now, if you want me to elaborate on Weapon Effort Planning and the number of aircraft required to achieve a particular Pk then I can do but can it wait for another day please!
Fifth. Varitoss was a manual toss attack dependent upon a clockwork timer set by the navigator and used initially to release LEPUS Flares in the dark and, I think but I was never Fleet Air Arm, Bullpup missiles. Imagine this, pitch black, over the Kattegat, FPBs manouevring in all directions, 2 Buccaneers in Arrow formation at 300 feet over the black 'oggin, stars in the sky but no moon, ships lights blinking below you, both Buccs carrying LEPUS and pods of 2", First Bucc pulls up and releases 1 million candela of light whilst the 2nd Bucc dives and sprays the FPBs (towing a splash target in peacetime) with his load whilst he then pulls up, re-jiggles the pair and chucks his lepus skywards whilst his ertswhile leader then dives against the splash target before they both recover back to height and congratulate each other on not becoming another statistic! Bloody disorientating but excellent fun - and all in the dark!
Sixth. TV MARTEL was an open ocean weapon. It was fired from 100 feet at 10nms from the predicted target position (maybe visible on the Bucc's Blue Parrot). After launch it climbed to 2,000ft and cruised towards the target area. Using a mini hand controller on the RHS of the cockpit the navigator could step the missile left, right, up and down by pre-determined distances or heights until he captured the target on the small TV Screen between his knees. By then Selecting Terminal Phase the missile entered a pre-programmed 8 degree dive angle which the navigator could control with the joystick whilst he attempted to fly his Mx into the target. Get shallow and the Mx would mush into the sea short. Too steep could be disastrous to control. There are no terrain masking issues as only a fool would plan to attack a ship in a fjord on an attack heading that would bring terrain masking into play! There were definitely no 'land return issues'.
Seventh. Terrain masking will NOT cause SNEB or 2" Rx an issue. Both weapons were released in a 10 degree dive from about 1500 feet. If there are any terrain issues then I'm afraid that the aircraft is going to hit it!
Eighth. The Sverdlov was not a destroyer but a cruiser. More importantly it was a very potent cruiser and the biggest Soviet Navy vessel of its day. Its very existence in the 50s was the reason for the Navy writing Naval Aircraft Requirement 39 - the result being Blackburn's NA39 project - more commonly known as the Buccaneer.
Ninth. Tourist - I fear you protest too much. I did 4 years ship bashing on 12 Sqn in the 70s and the number of times we managed to 'splash' ship targets undetected on Northern Merger and Ocean Safari would require me to take off my shoes and socks and yours too, no doubt, to assist with the counting. Moreover, when simulating TV MARTEL we always flew the missile profile after launch rather than conduct the escape manoeuvre in order to allow the ships to carry out their Air Raid Red drills and to bring their FC radars to bear on the Buccs. Signal traffic was always interesting afterwards as claims were only ever made by the ships after the Buccaneers, under normal Mx release circumstances, would have been long gone from the scene. When this was pointed out to them the RN would always use the excuse - 'ah well, but there is no air threat at sea!' Of course, in the mid-70s that was so. The Sovs had not developed an aircraft carrier other than the Moskva which was a through-deck cruiser fitted only with helos. So the RN always claimed a moral victory. AND THEN CAME THE FALKLANDS WAR AND THE REST, AS THEY SAY, IS HISTORY!
Hope that helps and please come back if anybody needs a further update on the Buccaneer's capabilities or if I've got something wrong!
Bloggs
First. Maritime Buccaneers were NEVER fitted with SNEB. The FAA Buccs used 2" Rockets as did those on 12 Sqn in my day during the 70s. However, RAFG Buccaneers used SNEB Rockets but never against ships.
Second. The 2" Rocket had much more power and punch than SNEB - 36 Rx per Pod as oppose to 19 in an Op SNEB Pod. ASuW Buccs did not use Rx against capital ships, they were designed to be used to flood the sea around a flotilla of manoeuvring FPBs in the Skaggerak and Kattegat mainly.
Third. The Long Toss Manoeuvre, designed for the release of the WE177 when not delivered in a laydown mode, gave sufficient time for the aircraft to complete its escape manoeuvre and be well established back at 100ft over the 'oggin and at 580 kts egressing away from the detonation. Yes, the blast wave would eventually catch you up but we had methods to cope with that and knew when to expect it. However, the fallout would not catch you and the flash was overcome by wearing an eye patch (yes folks that's true) to protect vision in at least one eye.
Fourth. THE NATO standard for Medium Toss was 300 ft and the Buccaneer's automatic analogue system could routinely put a practice bomb well inside that and much closer to the target too if the system was well harmonised. When using Medium Toss against capital ships a stick of weapons would be tossed from each aircraft resulting in 24 weapons being thrown against a single target from a 6-ship formation. Now, if you want me to elaborate on Weapon Effort Planning and the number of aircraft required to achieve a particular Pk then I can do but can it wait for another day please!
Fifth. Varitoss was a manual toss attack dependent upon a clockwork timer set by the navigator and used initially to release LEPUS Flares in the dark and, I think but I was never Fleet Air Arm, Bullpup missiles. Imagine this, pitch black, over the Kattegat, FPBs manouevring in all directions, 2 Buccaneers in Arrow formation at 300 feet over the black 'oggin, stars in the sky but no moon, ships lights blinking below you, both Buccs carrying LEPUS and pods of 2", First Bucc pulls up and releases 1 million candela of light whilst the 2nd Bucc dives and sprays the FPBs (towing a splash target in peacetime) with his load whilst he then pulls up, re-jiggles the pair and chucks his lepus skywards whilst his ertswhile leader then dives against the splash target before they both recover back to height and congratulate each other on not becoming another statistic! Bloody disorientating but excellent fun - and all in the dark!
Sixth. TV MARTEL was an open ocean weapon. It was fired from 100 feet at 10nms from the predicted target position (maybe visible on the Bucc's Blue Parrot). After launch it climbed to 2,000ft and cruised towards the target area. Using a mini hand controller on the RHS of the cockpit the navigator could step the missile left, right, up and down by pre-determined distances or heights until he captured the target on the small TV Screen between his knees. By then Selecting Terminal Phase the missile entered a pre-programmed 8 degree dive angle which the navigator could control with the joystick whilst he attempted to fly his Mx into the target. Get shallow and the Mx would mush into the sea short. Too steep could be disastrous to control. There are no terrain masking issues as only a fool would plan to attack a ship in a fjord on an attack heading that would bring terrain masking into play! There were definitely no 'land return issues'.
Seventh. Terrain masking will NOT cause SNEB or 2" Rx an issue. Both weapons were released in a 10 degree dive from about 1500 feet. If there are any terrain issues then I'm afraid that the aircraft is going to hit it!
Eighth. The Sverdlov was not a destroyer but a cruiser. More importantly it was a very potent cruiser and the biggest Soviet Navy vessel of its day. Its very existence in the 50s was the reason for the Navy writing Naval Aircraft Requirement 39 - the result being Blackburn's NA39 project - more commonly known as the Buccaneer.
Ninth. Tourist - I fear you protest too much. I did 4 years ship bashing on 12 Sqn in the 70s and the number of times we managed to 'splash' ship targets undetected on Northern Merger and Ocean Safari would require me to take off my shoes and socks and yours too, no doubt, to assist with the counting. Moreover, when simulating TV MARTEL we always flew the missile profile after launch rather than conduct the escape manoeuvre in order to allow the ships to carry out their Air Raid Red drills and to bring their FC radars to bear on the Buccs. Signal traffic was always interesting afterwards as claims were only ever made by the ships after the Buccaneers, under normal Mx release circumstances, would have been long gone from the scene. When this was pointed out to them the RN would always use the excuse - 'ah well, but there is no air threat at sea!' Of course, in the mid-70s that was so. The Sovs had not developed an aircraft carrier other than the Moskva which was a through-deck cruiser fitted only with helos. So the RN always claimed a moral victory. AND THEN CAME THE FALKLANDS WAR AND THE REST, AS THEY SAY, IS HISTORY!
Hope that helps and please come back if anybody needs a further update on the Buccaneer's capabilities or if I've got something wrong!
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