Nuclear death traps.
So, what are we investigating - security at Faslane? Fine, lets go for it. The rest is a simple demonstration that this inexperienced and poorly informed young sailor has no idea what he is talking about. If this revelation had come from a CPO SWS or Lt Cdr ME it would have significantly more creditability.
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"First, there should be an MoD inquiry. Only if they lie, deceive or deny, like they did on Nimrod, should the public once again push for a "Haddon-Cave" type inquiry."
how will we know if they lie, deceive or deny...
oh yes...when there is a large BANG somewhere in the N Atlantic ............
how will we know if they lie, deceive or deny...
oh yes...when there is a large BANG somewhere in the N Atlantic ............
experience and professional knowledge as a source of credibility.
As to the unhappy sailor, I've dealt with a few in my time.
This to me is a big, red, BS flag:
" There were some people that I served with on that patrol, who showed clear psychopathic tendencies".
*back to lurk mode*
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Investigate? Hell, Yes!
My, what an interesting thread full of interesting statements and judgements without facts.
But from afar, the entire thread is about one word, CULTURE. Some have concluded that the RN culture governing nuclear submarine operations, upkeep, command and control and the alike, clearly defined on paper has never changed, it is A#1, just as it was the day it was instituted and ingrained in all that were trained. Some experienced the early culture and are 100% sure it is what it was when they served (historical basis). But, culture like everything else in this world changes over a period of time. What was, isn't today. So now a person, thought to be a psychopath by some, having a grudge against the submarine service or RN by others, has come forward with some information that doesn't quite fit the early defined culture. Now this information, to begin with, is judged to be off the wall, the writing is poor by King's English standards and so therefore, the entire message is an outlier not worthy of investigating, err, like investigate what?
To begin with, why would a person write this? That is the first point to be investigated. And believe it or not, that can lead up the trail to places you never thought it could lead to. Case in point, the United States has possession of more nuclear warheads than any other free world country. We manage and guard them with all the sophistication possible and with exlemperary command and control, correct? Lets look at our USAF CULTURE for a moment, that hadn't changed since it was originally developed and implemented with command and control of land based ICBM, wink, wink:
The entire nuclear program underwent a massive organizational change as a result of a complainer. A former retired top Nuclear Commander was called in to investigate the modern culture and how it was performing. His conclusion was it was performing terribly.
- At one point six nuclear missiles went missing for 36 hours.
- Key nuclear warhead components were shipped to Taiwan by mistake.
- Key equipment being used was and is outdated.
- One wrench was available to attach or remove nuclear warheads on 450 ICBMs located a three different locations, so it was FedEx'd from one location to another location when needed, e.g., it made the rounds.
- The entire leadership was found to be weak, all the way to the top.
- 98 missileers were implicated in a cheating scandal involving proficiency testing and nine mid-level commanders were fired as a result.
- Complaints in a leaked email from one base asserted there was "rot" in the missile force.
- Many in leadership roles were more interested in protecting their own reputations than what was required to maintain and guard the safety of nuclear weapons.
- There was abysmal morale among the men and women responsible for maintaining and launching the most deadly and destructive weapons on the planet. Many wanted out.
These "investigative" findings caused the removal of the top nuclear commander, the firing of multiple high level commanders under the top commander and discipline of a multitude of mid-level officers for leadership lapses and maltreatment of subordinates that included threatening and or retaliations against those who might openly complain.
When the new leadership came into place, more deficiencies were discovered.
- Blast doors to the control rooms were left open, meaning unauthorized persons could walk in a perhaps remove the secret launch codes as a result of the unsecured doors which wouldn't close properly and were never fixed.
- The silo doors didn't always open upon command or shut tight when closed.
What can be more boring than baby-sitting ICBMs and nuclear warheads in a silo or onboard a submarine, knowing they will probably be never used?
I will tell you the USN passed its nuclear command and control investigations without any major findings due to their unique leadership structure involving both nuclear propulsion and ICBMs. The Navy structure is such that it is kept free from the Washington Capitol Hill bureaucrats and ding-a-lings, where the USAF structure was not organized the same way.
Bottom-line: Bring a former, highly respected nuclear command and control person to investigate the current RN nuclear CULTURE. Followup on the complaints made, see where they lead. Hopefully all will be well and the original CULTURE is still intact. But, then….
But from afar, the entire thread is about one word, CULTURE. Some have concluded that the RN culture governing nuclear submarine operations, upkeep, command and control and the alike, clearly defined on paper has never changed, it is A#1, just as it was the day it was instituted and ingrained in all that were trained. Some experienced the early culture and are 100% sure it is what it was when they served (historical basis). But, culture like everything else in this world changes over a period of time. What was, isn't today. So now a person, thought to be a psychopath by some, having a grudge against the submarine service or RN by others, has come forward with some information that doesn't quite fit the early defined culture. Now this information, to begin with, is judged to be off the wall, the writing is poor by King's English standards and so therefore, the entire message is an outlier not worthy of investigating, err, like investigate what?
To begin with, why would a person write this? That is the first point to be investigated. And believe it or not, that can lead up the trail to places you never thought it could lead to. Case in point, the United States has possession of more nuclear warheads than any other free world country. We manage and guard them with all the sophistication possible and with exlemperary command and control, correct? Lets look at our USAF CULTURE for a moment, that hadn't changed since it was originally developed and implemented with command and control of land based ICBM, wink, wink:
The entire nuclear program underwent a massive organizational change as a result of a complainer. A former retired top Nuclear Commander was called in to investigate the modern culture and how it was performing. His conclusion was it was performing terribly.
- At one point six nuclear missiles went missing for 36 hours.
- Key nuclear warhead components were shipped to Taiwan by mistake.
- Key equipment being used was and is outdated.
- One wrench was available to attach or remove nuclear warheads on 450 ICBMs located a three different locations, so it was FedEx'd from one location to another location when needed, e.g., it made the rounds.
- The entire leadership was found to be weak, all the way to the top.
- 98 missileers were implicated in a cheating scandal involving proficiency testing and nine mid-level commanders were fired as a result.
- Complaints in a leaked email from one base asserted there was "rot" in the missile force.
- Many in leadership roles were more interested in protecting their own reputations than what was required to maintain and guard the safety of nuclear weapons.
- There was abysmal morale among the men and women responsible for maintaining and launching the most deadly and destructive weapons on the planet. Many wanted out.
These "investigative" findings caused the removal of the top nuclear commander, the firing of multiple high level commanders under the top commander and discipline of a multitude of mid-level officers for leadership lapses and maltreatment of subordinates that included threatening and or retaliations against those who might openly complain.
When the new leadership came into place, more deficiencies were discovered.
- Blast doors to the control rooms were left open, meaning unauthorized persons could walk in a perhaps remove the secret launch codes as a result of the unsecured doors which wouldn't close properly and were never fixed.
- The silo doors didn't always open upon command or shut tight when closed.
What can be more boring than baby-sitting ICBMs and nuclear warheads in a silo or onboard a submarine, knowing they will probably be never used?
I will tell you the USN passed its nuclear command and control investigations without any major findings due to their unique leadership structure involving both nuclear propulsion and ICBMs. The Navy structure is such that it is kept free from the Washington Capitol Hill bureaucrats and ding-a-lings, where the USAF structure was not organized the same way.
Bottom-line: Bring a former, highly respected nuclear command and control person to investigate the current RN nuclear CULTURE. Followup on the complaints made, see where they lead. Hopefully all will be well and the original CULTURE is still intact. But, then….
I'd be more impressed by his screed if he'd mentioned UMMS, OPDEF, NAVYSAFE, NLIMs, FOST, Sea Training, Navy Security Improvement programme, the MAA Log or S285Ks: either he has missed every single one of those, or he omits them in the name of "whistleblowing". All of those are part of the culture I'm living as a CODH, one that is pan-Navy, one that I've personally briefed my team on more than once. Perhaps that might be why every single serving member of the RN I've met, AB to Capt RN, Skimmer, WAFU or Submariner, have poured utter scorn onto him. Neither have I heard anyone else, serving or recently retired, pile in to back him up - which also says something. And given that all the culture stuff that percolated about regarding USAF Nuclear Safety, and RAF Airworthiness, and people willing to whistleblow, that might be another combat indicator that he has little idea what he's talking about.
MGPS culture at Faslane - go for it, investigate it as much as you like. The rest of the bollocks, is exactly that, bollocks.
MGPS culture at Faslane - go for it, investigate it as much as you like. The rest of the bollocks, is exactly that, bollocks.
So, having repeatedly asked what should be investigated, it is you that has answered the question ATG, ie security at Faslane. Everything else being bollocks and, by implication, not to be investigated. Might I suggest if anything should be investigated it is what this "whistleblower" has to say? By pouring scorn on that from the start you say more about your attitude (and possibly the MOD's?) than you do about him.
Turbine D's powerful post shows how seriously matters pertaining to nuclear weapons and their delivery systems should be taken, ie bloody seriously. As a fermenter of that other odious culture, UK Military Airworthiness (not just RAF!), I have grown used to the patronising attitudes of our betters who, unlike we mere untermenschen, know all that there is to know. Time and time again they have been shown to be mere mortals themselves, with skeletons to hide and lies to tell.
At the very suggestion that the malevolence and ineptitude that destroyed our world leading standard of UK Military Air Safety has been visited upon our nuclear deterrent we should all be demanding the sort of in depth investigation that Turbine D describes. The worry though is who, in our entire nation, should we entrust with it? Who indeed could we trust with it?
Turbine D's powerful post shows how seriously matters pertaining to nuclear weapons and their delivery systems should be taken, ie bloody seriously. As a fermenter of that other odious culture, UK Military Airworthiness (not just RAF!), I have grown used to the patronising attitudes of our betters who, unlike we mere untermenschen, know all that there is to know. Time and time again they have been shown to be mere mortals themselves, with skeletons to hide and lies to tell.
At the very suggestion that the malevolence and ineptitude that destroyed our world leading standard of UK Military Air Safety has been visited upon our nuclear deterrent we should all be demanding the sort of in depth investigation that Turbine D describes. The worry though is who, in our entire nation, should we entrust with it? Who indeed could we trust with it?
Chug, I think the first step may be to establish if there is a question to answer and whether or not the young man is making any kind of reasonable claims.
AB McN clearly has an axe to grind after a very short time in service. Someone needs to determine whether that is the result of a genuine sense of honour, the misunderstanding of a young, possibly pricipaled, possibly naive man or someone that just didn't like what he saw when he joined up - for not very long.
You have to agree, Chug, the claims here could be interpreted in more than one way - maybe depending on the tint of today's spectacles. The UK cannot immediately open a costly investigation into everything.
Some credibility has to be established first. Everything we see with a shadow on it isn't necessarily a conspiracy.
Edit: it was me that mainly kept asking what should be investigated. And, yes, security at the Faslane Main Gate may be worth a look.
AB McN clearly has an axe to grind after a very short time in service. Someone needs to determine whether that is the result of a genuine sense of honour, the misunderstanding of a young, possibly pricipaled, possibly naive man or someone that just didn't like what he saw when he joined up - for not very long.
You have to agree, Chug, the claims here could be interpreted in more than one way - maybe depending on the tint of today's spectacles. The UK cannot immediately open a costly investigation into everything.
Some credibility has to be established first. Everything we see with a shadow on it isn't necessarily a conspiracy.
Edit: it was me that mainly kept asking what should be investigated. And, yes, security at the Faslane Main Gate may be worth a look.
CM, my problem isn't particularly with this man, but more (you will be stunned to hear) with the MOD. It has shown itself to be ready to lie and to bully in order to obscure the truth, witness the many military fatal air accident threads on this very forum, witness this site that says it all in its title:-
https://sites.google.com/site/militaryairworthiness/
Whatever is done to investigate these allegations, it should not be done by the MOD. Given the results of Judicial Inquiries into the Nimrod and Chinook tragedies, that cost 14 and 29 lives respectively, I would suggest that is not the way either, never mind the financial costs that you mention.
As far as I know the Office for Nuclear Regulation's reputation is not so sullied:-
Office for Nuclear Regulation - Health and safety in the nuclear industry
Lots of reasons why it should not carry out an inquiry I'm sure, but if it can at least be trusted to work in the public interest rather than its own then that would be a big plus for me. As to cost, can we afford not to ensure the safety of our deterrent?
https://sites.google.com/site/militaryairworthiness/
Whatever is done to investigate these allegations, it should not be done by the MOD. Given the results of Judicial Inquiries into the Nimrod and Chinook tragedies, that cost 14 and 29 lives respectively, I would suggest that is not the way either, never mind the financial costs that you mention.
As far as I know the Office for Nuclear Regulation's reputation is not so sullied:-
Office for Nuclear Regulation - Health and safety in the nuclear industry
Lots of reasons why it should not carry out an inquiry I'm sure, but if it can at least be trusted to work in the public interest rather than its own then that would be a big plus for me. As to cost, can we afford not to ensure the safety of our deterrent?
There are others who might correct me, but based on my experience at Faslane 15 years ago, the Office for Nuclear Regulation only applies to RN reactors, from the moment (and only at the moment) the vessel goes alongside.
Wuh:-
It is a compromise I admit that the ONR has any responsibilities here at all, but they do have the experience, and technical knowledge, that is required to make any meaningful analysis of evidence put before them. That was what was lacking to a great extent in the Judicial Inquiries mentioned previously.
Of course those whose turf would be stepped upon will have much to protest about. They must blame those who have brought the MOD into such disrepute.
the Office for Nuclear Regulation only applies to RN reactors, from the moment (and only at the moment) the vessel goes alongside
Of course those whose turf would be stepped upon will have much to protest about. They must blame those who have brought the MOD into such disrepute.
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We all see it everyday.
Alfred & Courtney seem happy to accept that the civvy staff who man the gate, with weapons, are fair game for an audit.
I can tell you, as a frequent civilian visitor to more than one RAF Station in recent years, the gates are not secure, not by a long way.
To suggest that this is an MPGS failing is missing the point.
Senior RAF staff must see the lapses every day and yet it continues unchallenged.
Either what the AB says is all bollocks, I doubt that, or there is at least some truth there.
You certainly should not think it's OK to blame MPGS as the security has been outsourced. Everyone has a duty to protect the station.
I recall seeing the infra red thumbprint scanner working at a large base a few years ago. this senses the ID of the motorcyclist, (I know it's infra red as it reads the thumb print through the biker's gloves) as he approaches the gate giving a thumbs up. This results in the barrier being raised and a smile and a wave from the MPGS guy as the bike barely slows to drive through.
It must be that system, otherwise the MPGS guy just lets people in because they confidently approach the gate. Another lapse is where you can drive up to the gate, let the MPGS guy tell you that you need a pass, park outside the Guardroom, go in, ask some stupid questions to pass two minutes, and then emerge clutching a piece of green paper and he thinks you have just been cleared in, so he lifts the barrier.
It's the routine lapses that will be exploited. that's the kind of schit that Taceval teams would exploit, in the old air force.
I can tell you, as a frequent civilian visitor to more than one RAF Station in recent years, the gates are not secure, not by a long way.
To suggest that this is an MPGS failing is missing the point.
Senior RAF staff must see the lapses every day and yet it continues unchallenged.
Either what the AB says is all bollocks, I doubt that, or there is at least some truth there.
You certainly should not think it's OK to blame MPGS as the security has been outsourced. Everyone has a duty to protect the station.
I recall seeing the infra red thumbprint scanner working at a large base a few years ago. this senses the ID of the motorcyclist, (I know it's infra red as it reads the thumb print through the biker's gloves) as he approaches the gate giving a thumbs up. This results in the barrier being raised and a smile and a wave from the MPGS guy as the bike barely slows to drive through.
It must be that system, otherwise the MPGS guy just lets people in because they confidently approach the gate. Another lapse is where you can drive up to the gate, let the MPGS guy tell you that you need a pass, park outside the Guardroom, go in, ask some stupid questions to pass two minutes, and then emerge clutching a piece of green paper and he thinks you have just been cleared in, so he lifts the barrier.
It's the routine lapses that will be exploited. that's the kind of schit that Taceval teams would exploit, in the old air force.
The problem with this AB is/was his agenda. He is trying to make a point from the outset of his career and his report is a loose collection of third-hand anecdotes, wilful breaking of trust and the rules, and uninformed observations; added to that his behaviour (going on the run, topless photos, allusions to his impending assassination) implies some sort of psychiatric episode.
I recall, when I was a Recruit Flight Commander many years ago, a young armourer faking his own disappearance and persuading an equally gullible young airman to cover for him, with tails of secret mercenary armies, submarines waiting to pick him up, and so on. When his room was searched, apart from finding MDC and some dets, the police also found detailed records of police shift rosters, movements of base execs etc. When asked to account for these, he said he wanted to expose 'lax' security. These days Special Branch would be on to him and he'd be detained under Anti-Terrorism legislation; in this occasion he was detained under the Mental Health Act.
A little knowledge + Internet + paranoia = calls for 'immediate enquiry' + 'heads must roll'
I recall, when I was a Recruit Flight Commander many years ago, a young armourer faking his own disappearance and persuading an equally gullible young airman to cover for him, with tails of secret mercenary armies, submarines waiting to pick him up, and so on. When his room was searched, apart from finding MDC and some dets, the police also found detailed records of police shift rosters, movements of base execs etc. When asked to account for these, he said he wanted to expose 'lax' security. These days Special Branch would be on to him and he'd be detained under Anti-Terrorism legislation; in this occasion he was detained under the Mental Health Act.
A little knowledge + Internet + paranoia = calls for 'immediate enquiry' + 'heads must roll'
"It must be that system, otherwise the MPGS guy just lets people in because they confidently approach the gate. Another lapse is where you can drive up to the gate, let the MPGS guy tell you that you need a pass, park outside the Guardroom, go in, ask some stupid questions to pass two minutes, and then emerge clutching a piece of green paper and he thinks you have just been cleared in, so he lifts the barrier."
Genuine question - have you ever been to Faslane and tried to get onto the SSBN jetty? Its a little bit different, despite what our wannabe Snowden has suggested.
ATG is bang on the money - usually at times like this if there is some credibilityin the allegations, others will pipe up and go 'yes there is something there'. Everyone I have spoken to, and this includes a lot of people who are a) very very credible in this area and b) would have the moral courage to say something if they thought there was an issue, has been unanimous that this was a young man with highly limited experience who did not understand what was going on.
We've been running SSBNs for nigh on 50 years without a break in coverage and this is the first time any of the tens of thousands of ex bomber queens has broken ranks. Surely that should in it self suggest something?
Genuine question - have you ever been to Faslane and tried to get onto the SSBN jetty? Its a little bit different, despite what our wannabe Snowden has suggested.
ATG is bang on the money - usually at times like this if there is some credibilityin the allegations, others will pipe up and go 'yes there is something there'. Everyone I have spoken to, and this includes a lot of people who are a) very very credible in this area and b) would have the moral courage to say something if they thought there was an issue, has been unanimous that this was a young man with highly limited experience who did not understand what was going on.
We've been running SSBNs for nigh on 50 years without a break in coverage and this is the first time any of the tens of thousands of ex bomber queens has broken ranks. Surely that should in it self suggest something?
More likely buried in the foundations of the Ship Lift at Faslane or the Explosives Handling Jetty at, err, Coulport.
Echoing Jim's comments, you can't just stroll into that part of HMNB Clyde; there are many physical and other barriers in place to do so; at least there were 14 years ago when I used to visit there on a monthly basis.
That's not to say that there haven't been site security issues. A few years back a SAGA bus tour got waved in through the Southern Gate and had an impromptu tour of the non-nuclear site. But remember, every day there are any people trying to enter the site illegally, principally (but not elxclusively) from the Ploughshare movement; without a doubt there are FISs who'd love to get on site to learn both of our deterrent and the technology associated with our submarine fleet. The MDP have the place well stocked up in terms of stopping intruders and there's the RM Force Protection Group there as well...
Echoing Jim's comments, you can't just stroll into that part of HMNB Clyde; there are many physical and other barriers in place to do so; at least there were 14 years ago when I used to visit there on a monthly basis.
That's not to say that there haven't been site security issues. A few years back a SAGA bus tour got waved in through the Southern Gate and had an impromptu tour of the non-nuclear site. But remember, every day there are any people trying to enter the site illegally, principally (but not elxclusively) from the Ploughshare movement; without a doubt there are FISs who'd love to get on site to learn both of our deterrent and the technology associated with our submarine fleet. The MDP have the place well stocked up in terms of stopping intruders and there's the RM Force Protection Group there as well...
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Im in no position to comment on that guys allegations, but on a general basis, it would be naive to assume mistakes dont happen in the military 
according to the news, a US DoD lab just sent live anthrax samples around the world
US military accidentally shipped live anthrax to labs - BBC News
according to the news, a US DoD lab just sent live anthrax samples around the world
US military accidentally shipped live anthrax to labs - BBC News
