Nuclear death traps.
I hereby declare that the RAF put an aircraft type into Squadron service with an illegal RTS.
There was an Official Inquiry into a subsequent accident when all 29 occupants were killed. The illegal RTS never came up. It was issued by the operator/regulator/investigator.
There was an Official Inquiry into a subsequent accident when all 29 occupants were killed. The illegal RTS never came up. It was issued by the operator/regulator/investigator.
dervish:-
You make my point precisely, thank you. Which brings us back to Mr McNeilly...
IIRC only one person put forward this fact and was ignored.
Chug, I do so agree that flaws have been found in the MoD's airworthiness record and, potentially, in the current set up. But please don't suggest that everything is wrong in every corner of the Forces.
This one has run its public course and until any of us has any evidence of malfeasance, we can't just go telling the world that because the MAA isn't independent enough (for which I have seen your evidence) that the Trident force is equally rotten. A young lad does not constitute that evidence.
By all means make public charges if you have something better to base them than this. Your excellent inside information on airworthiness does not necessarily translate to this. Please don't compromise your airworthiness crusade by making it look like (I stress,"look like") your good work is all a conspiracy theory.
None of us here know the first thing about this lad's case, but it hasn't stopped us all guessing. Any speculation here is exactly that, speculation. If you have any insight into the RN's nuclear safety procedures and how they are managed, keep them to yourself in public. If you do not, then consider what message your posts may be sending.
Some things are bigger than your main issue.
This one has run its public course and until any of us has any evidence of malfeasance, we can't just go telling the world that because the MAA isn't independent enough (for which I have seen your evidence) that the Trident force is equally rotten. A young lad does not constitute that evidence.
By all means make public charges if you have something better to base them than this. Your excellent inside information on airworthiness does not necessarily translate to this. Please don't compromise your airworthiness crusade by making it look like (I stress,"look like") your good work is all a conspiracy theory.
None of us here know the first thing about this lad's case, but it hasn't stopped us all guessing. Any speculation here is exactly that, speculation. If you have any insight into the RN's nuclear safety procedures and how they are managed, keep them to yourself in public. If you do not, then consider what message your posts may be sending.
Some things are bigger than your main issue.
CM:-
If that is what you think I have been saying Courtney, then I have obviously not been clear in making my case, and for that I apologise. When we started out on the campaign to reform UK Military Airworthiness Provision we cited Chinook, Hercules, Nimrod and Tornado Fatal Air Accidents. We were immediately accused of criticising the ground crews who serviced and maintained these aircraft. It took a long time to get an acceptance of the difference between serviceability and airworthiness. Our target was not the operators but the regulating and investigating authority (aka the MOD). I think that something similar is going on here.
The reason I link Airworthiness Provision and Nuclear Safety Provision is that they both share the same flawed arrangements, ie that Operator, Regulator, and Investigator are one and the same (with the partial exception of the Reactors). The problems that Airworthiness threw up became apparent at the work face but the link back to MOD policy changes was too obscure for those not professionally informed or experienced. That is why those who are so informed and experienced should be studying the statements of Mr McNeilly to see if there are similar regulatory shortfalls. Being neither informed or experienced, I do not know what those should be, but his claims of lax security would seem to be a glaring example to start with.
I am convinced that such an Inquiry would flag up many problems, just as the ARTs (that were buried out of sight by VSOs) did for Air Safety, if only because of the contradictions of self regulation and investigation. Has the MOD mended its ways since the ARTs? I am not convinced I'm afraid.
Unairworthy aircraft are a danger to those who fly in them and greatly reduce Military Air Capability. Unsafe nuclear systems are potentially many orders more dangerous and cannot be tolerated. The only way to ensure airworthy military aircraft is for an independent MAA and MAAIB, both of the MOD and of each other. It would seem logical for the same independence of Regulator and Investigator to pertain for military nuclear systems.
we can't just go telling the world that......the Trident force is equally rotten.
The reason I link Airworthiness Provision and Nuclear Safety Provision is that they both share the same flawed arrangements, ie that Operator, Regulator, and Investigator are one and the same (with the partial exception of the Reactors). The problems that Airworthiness threw up became apparent at the work face but the link back to MOD policy changes was too obscure for those not professionally informed or experienced. That is why those who are so informed and experienced should be studying the statements of Mr McNeilly to see if there are similar regulatory shortfalls. Being neither informed or experienced, I do not know what those should be, but his claims of lax security would seem to be a glaring example to start with.
I am convinced that such an Inquiry would flag up many problems, just as the ARTs (that were buried out of sight by VSOs) did for Air Safety, if only because of the contradictions of self regulation and investigation. Has the MOD mended its ways since the ARTs? I am not convinced I'm afraid.
Unairworthy aircraft are a danger to those who fly in them and greatly reduce Military Air Capability. Unsafe nuclear systems are potentially many orders more dangerous and cannot be tolerated. The only way to ensure airworthy military aircraft is for an independent MAA and MAAIB, both of the MOD and of each other. It would seem logical for the same independence of Regulator and Investigator to pertain for military nuclear systems.
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Personally I think something has gone on. Year on year budget cuts, relatively low moral, declining esteem of and within the military, increasing demands for Trident to be relocated or scrapped all together....over familiarity among defence workers with security services and their procedures? Maybe it really leaps out at you when you see it for the first time?
It's in the public interest to investigate the allegations made fully, and I hope that's exactly what the MOD is doing. Criminal prosecutions against the whistle-blower should be the last thing in mind when the safety of 60 million people is reported to be at risk.
Originally Posted by JSF
That's still not an excuse to leave these very dangerous weapon platforms and systems in the position where they are likely to take out 50% of the population.
If your statement is purely speculation based on an unsubstantiated claim, then fine. You're entitled to your opinion. If you think you are posting facts, please provide evidence to support them.
The well known investigative tool known as Google suggests that almost all of these claims can be discounted using public domain information - including anti Trident sites!
A bit of common sense, critical thinking, and knowing some basic Physics also helps.
A bit of common sense, critical thinking, and knowing some basic Physics also helps.
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Originally Posted by Joint****e
That's still not an excuse to leave these very dangerous weapon platforms and systems in the position where they are likely to take out 50% of the population.
If you feel that there is some kind of safety issue here, what do you think it is? I'd love to know about the safety procedures involved in keeping the deterent safe. Purely out of curiosity. do, pray tell us what specific procedures are at fault here.
Maybe it's just another MOD failing? Prove it. Plenty here to attack the Centre.
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Gentlemen, I think I left my post wide open for banter. My mistake. It was an opportunity that was too good to miss, so well done. 
All right, I should have been a lot more clear - what I meant was, they have been reported to be potentially dangerous to the British public, something these particular weapons are not owned by the MOD to do. If it ever gets to the point where one of these missiles needs to be fired in anger by a British submarine, I doubt I'll care as I'll either be dead so won't know any better or too ill from the fallout of the attack on our soil.
You are correct though that I am merely speculating. Although if somebody who is a part of our nuclear deterrence, regardless of rank, says that it's not safe, then I want it looked at and I want it done thoroughly and as soon as possible. I am sure every single member of the British public has the same opinion as me.
If the person in question was wrong and just wanted to stir the sh*t pot, then he should be made to lick the spoon by the criminal justice system where appropriate. Safety first.
Originally Posted by Courtney
That is their purpose. However, with reference to this case, where do you get the evidence to support the fact that they are likely to take out 50% of the population.
If your statement is purely speculation based on an unsubstantiated claim, then fine. You're entitled to your opinion. If you think you are posting facts, please provide evidence to support them.
If your statement is purely speculation based on an unsubstantiated claim, then fine. You're entitled to your opinion. If you think you are posting facts, please provide evidence to support them.
You are correct though that I am merely speculating. Although if somebody who is a part of our nuclear deterrence, regardless of rank, says that it's not safe, then I want it looked at and I want it done thoroughly and as soon as possible. I am sure every single member of the British public has the same opinion as me.
If the person in question was wrong and just wanted to stir the sh*t pot, then he should be made to lick the spoon by the criminal justice system where appropriate. Safety first.
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they have been reported to be potentially dangerous to the British public
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Absolutely, and it is quite understandable why senior officers allegedly didn't take him seriously on the initial complaints I believe he was supposed to have made. That hierarchy is the same in any other job in any profession - young faces find themselves struggling to convince the older, more experienced colleagues to take them seriously. My point, however, is based on the public's perception. The majority of the general public are behind the Armed Forces in everything they do and they will support them all the way because the Armed Forces has earned that respect. The Trident force may quickly lose that respect if they don't make themselves seen to be investigating safety claims made by a serving member, doubly so when our nuclear deterrence has been brought to the political arena over the last few months.
If the public doesn't support it, then it's history.
I don't think anybody is expecting a public enquiry in to the safety of our nuclear deterrence in port, and there won't be (& quite rightly), but a very vague announcement of an investigation would be nice, and a very vague announcement of a conclusion with a yes or no to any (unnamed) changes possibly made to ensure the safety of the British public would be even better.
If the public doesn't support it, then it's history.
I don't think anybody is expecting a public enquiry in to the safety of our nuclear deterrence in port, and there won't be (& quite rightly), but a very vague announcement of an investigation would be nice, and a very vague announcement of a conclusion with a yes or no to any (unnamed) changes possibly made to ensure the safety of the British public would be even better.
“Need to know” can be self-defeating. The implication is that someone at the top knows everything. Safety Management isn’t like that. There are too many levels and MoD’s Service and Civilian structure ensures that it is impossible to have knowledgeable oversight. The default position becomes seniority knows best, and Service trumps Civilian.
This system was discredited once and for all when Haddon-Cave and, especially, Lord Philip issued their reports. In both cases, the very senior staffs who were meant to exercise management oversight and display leadership serially ignored dire warnings from juniors (up to and including Air Cdre rank). That does not bode well because…..
The basic problem was implementation of the safety regulations, of which airworthiness is just one strand. These regs, procedures and processes are largely common across all disciplines and domains. They simply diverge when it comes to (in simple terms) air, land, sea.
Who was in charge of oversight in MoD(PE) for example? The Chief of Defence Procurement. A 4 Star and pretty senior. He happened to be a submariner and Haddon-Cave criticised the notion of a submariner being in charge of aviation safety. But this is a little unfair, as long as the regulations are followed. Regardless of CDP’s trade, he would (or should) understand the basic safety process, if not the fine detail of day to day management. But what Haddon-Cave didn’t report is that this man had actually issued a policy statement that safety could be traded out if it meant meeting time and cost targets.
Please think about that. This “safety is tradable” ethos was ingrained in a Vice Admiral who, 20 years ago, was Controller of the Navy, including nuclear vessels. He was chair of the Naval Nuclear Technical Safety Panel. That is truly frightening. That ethos extended into his defence procurement reign and he only retired 12 years ago. Many of today’s “leaders” in MoD learned at his feet (or other parts of his anatomy). Do I trust them to have a different ethos? No.
This system was discredited once and for all when Haddon-Cave and, especially, Lord Philip issued their reports. In both cases, the very senior staffs who were meant to exercise management oversight and display leadership serially ignored dire warnings from juniors (up to and including Air Cdre rank). That does not bode well because…..
The basic problem was implementation of the safety regulations, of which airworthiness is just one strand. These regs, procedures and processes are largely common across all disciplines and domains. They simply diverge when it comes to (in simple terms) air, land, sea.
Who was in charge of oversight in MoD(PE) for example? The Chief of Defence Procurement. A 4 Star and pretty senior. He happened to be a submariner and Haddon-Cave criticised the notion of a submariner being in charge of aviation safety. But this is a little unfair, as long as the regulations are followed. Regardless of CDP’s trade, he would (or should) understand the basic safety process, if not the fine detail of day to day management. But what Haddon-Cave didn’t report is that this man had actually issued a policy statement that safety could be traded out if it meant meeting time and cost targets.
Please think about that. This “safety is tradable” ethos was ingrained in a Vice Admiral who, 20 years ago, was Controller of the Navy, including nuclear vessels. He was chair of the Naval Nuclear Technical Safety Panel. That is truly frightening. That ethos extended into his defence procurement reign and he only retired 12 years ago. Many of today’s “leaders” in MoD learned at his feet (or other parts of his anatomy). Do I trust them to have a different ethos? No.
As I recently mentioned to Chug, Mrs C and I just watched K19 (available from the big South American River - other sources are availalbe). Nuclear safety regulation? 
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tucumsh - I would expect the rate above McNeilly, in McNeilly's branch, to know his own job and Mcneilly's and so on up the tree, to the senior CPO/Fleet Chief in that branch.
Some of the senior rates and most of the officers will be PVd, I would have thought, and there is probably some overlapping, so I do not see there being too many blank spaces in the system of 'need to know'.
Can't talk about senior officers with an agenda, like 'safety is tradable' (of course it isn't), don't know anything about it, but also don't think that cuts across the rule of 'need to know'.
Some of the senior rates and most of the officers will be PVd, I would have thought, and there is probably some overlapping, so I do not see there being too many blank spaces in the system of 'need to know'.
Can't talk about senior officers with an agenda, like 'safety is tradable' (of course it isn't), don't know anything about it, but also don't think that cuts across the rule of 'need to know'.
Parabellum
I agree regarding your expectation of rates' knowledge at that working level. But I'd also have thought such a "defence in depth" would be weakened in recent years by continuous manpower reductions and being forced to make compromises? When I repaired aircraft or worked on the bench I was in the happy position of my seniors being able to teach and guide me, but when fancy new technologies (like transistors) came along, it was strictly DIY!
Many years later in MoD(PE)/DPA, etc it became very rare to have a boss who knew very much, if anything, about the technology being procured, but many would know about procurement and how to avoid the traps set for the new guy by beancounters and contractors. But gradually this corporate knowledge eroded. Servicemen on 2-3 year tours, but mainly through direct entrant civilians who are not required to be Suitably Qualified or Experienced, or gain even a modicum of understanding about the 5-6 grades they skipped. At first the latter were few, but now they are many. I suspect the problem is far worse nowadays, and I thought it beyond critical when I retired. The last aircraft programme I managed my 2 immediate bosses were not remotely technical, yet held engineering posts. The more senior recognised this and delegated all his technical responsibilities 2 grades down to me; the correct decision. My immediate boss could not accept this and self-delegated airworthiness/safety/design/overrule authority. Aforementioned CDP permitted this. This was not mentioned at the Coroner's Inquest, otherwise the Coroner would have had a fit.
Safety is not tradable. Top level Government policy says you are right. MoD practice says otherwise. When challenged on this, MoD always replies "We have a robust regulatory framework....". True, but it is not implemented properly. (See H-C and Philip).
Take this another step. When ordered to breach the safety regulations (and commit the offence of fraud by misrepresentation), try citing Government policy as an excuse for disobeying that order. You will lose. With every change of Minister I get my MP to ask if this will change, and such an order be declared illegal. The last 7 (!) have said no, it will not. I await a reply from the new one. Whether he was right or wrong, that is what McNeilly was up against.
I agree regarding your expectation of rates' knowledge at that working level. But I'd also have thought such a "defence in depth" would be weakened in recent years by continuous manpower reductions and being forced to make compromises? When I repaired aircraft or worked on the bench I was in the happy position of my seniors being able to teach and guide me, but when fancy new technologies (like transistors) came along, it was strictly DIY!
Many years later in MoD(PE)/DPA, etc it became very rare to have a boss who knew very much, if anything, about the technology being procured, but many would know about procurement and how to avoid the traps set for the new guy by beancounters and contractors. But gradually this corporate knowledge eroded. Servicemen on 2-3 year tours, but mainly through direct entrant civilians who are not required to be Suitably Qualified or Experienced, or gain even a modicum of understanding about the 5-6 grades they skipped. At first the latter were few, but now they are many. I suspect the problem is far worse nowadays, and I thought it beyond critical when I retired. The last aircraft programme I managed my 2 immediate bosses were not remotely technical, yet held engineering posts. The more senior recognised this and delegated all his technical responsibilities 2 grades down to me; the correct decision. My immediate boss could not accept this and self-delegated airworthiness/safety/design/overrule authority. Aforementioned CDP permitted this. This was not mentioned at the Coroner's Inquest, otherwise the Coroner would have had a fit.
Safety is not tradable. Top level Government policy says you are right. MoD practice says otherwise. When challenged on this, MoD always replies "We have a robust regulatory framework....". True, but it is not implemented properly. (See H-C and Philip).
Take this another step. When ordered to breach the safety regulations (and commit the offence of fraud by misrepresentation), try citing Government policy as an excuse for disobeying that order. You will lose. With every change of Minister I get my MP to ask if this will change, and such an order be declared illegal. The last 7 (!) have said no, it will not. I await a reply from the new one. Whether he was right or wrong, that is what McNeilly was up against.
tuc:-
Hammer,nail,...nail, hammer; just like that! It would also make a good movie, wouldn't you say Courtney?
Please think about that. This “safety is tradable” ethos was ingrained in a Vice Admiral who, 20 years ago, was Controller of the Navy, including nuclear vessels. He was chair of the Naval Nuclear Technical Safety Panel. That is truly frightening.
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tucumsh - Yes, I see the point in everything you say, obviously I was hoping it wasn't the case but a). I didn't serve in the RN and b). I am way out of touch with matters military now, I was just presenting the theoretical view point. 
