Reports of A400 Crash, Saville, Spain
Der Spiegel Airbus A400M: Militärmaschine stürzte wegen Software-Problemen ab - SPIEGEL ONLINE
writes that faulty software shut down 3 engines. The pilots had no chance.
That is close to the worst thing that can happen direct after take off.
writes that faulty software shut down 3 engines. The pilots had no chance.
That is close to the worst thing that can happen direct after take off.
Airbus Defence & Space has just issued this news release:
airsound
Statement regarding Alert Operator Transmission (AOT) to A400M operators
Airbus Defence and Space has today (Tuesday 19 May) sent an Alert Operator Transmission (AOT) to all operators of the A400M informing them about specific checks to be performed on the fleet.
To avoid potential risks in any future flights, Airbus Defence and Space has informed the operators about necessary actions to take. In addition, these results have immediately been shared with the official investigation team.
The AOT requires Operators to perform one-time specific checks of the Electronic Control Units (ECU) on each of the aircraft’s engines before next flight and introduces additional detailed checks to be carried out in the event of any subsequent engine or ECU replacement.
This AOT results from Airbus Defence and Space’s internal analysis and is issued as part of the Continued Airworthiness activities, independently from the on-going Official investigation.
Airbus Defence and Space has today (Tuesday 19 May) sent an Alert Operator Transmission (AOT) to all operators of the A400M informing them about specific checks to be performed on the fleet.
To avoid potential risks in any future flights, Airbus Defence and Space has informed the operators about necessary actions to take. In addition, these results have immediately been shared with the official investigation team.
The AOT requires Operators to perform one-time specific checks of the Electronic Control Units (ECU) on each of the aircraft’s engines before next flight and introduces additional detailed checks to be carried out in the event of any subsequent engine or ECU replacement.
This AOT results from Airbus Defence and Space’s internal analysis and is issued as part of the Continued Airworthiness activities, independently from the on-going Official investigation.
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Thanks Airsound.
So perhaps Spiegel was correct. Poor sods . . .
I much preferred flying aircraft where wires, pulleys, bellcranks and levers were physically attached to the important bits.
For all the 'improvements', flying doesn't seem any more comfortable (I'm paying, walking freight these days).
So perhaps Spiegel was correct. Poor sods . . .
I much preferred flying aircraft where wires, pulleys, bellcranks and levers were physically attached to the important bits.
For all the 'improvements', flying doesn't seem any more comfortable (I'm paying, walking freight these days).
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From this AOT is worth to remark this last sentence:
I have already seen online media pages reporting that "the cause" of the accident was the ECU using this AOT as reference
This AOT results from Airbus Defence and Space’s internal analysis and is issued as part of the Continued Airworthiness activities, independently from the on-going Official investigation.
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Of course 'Internal Analysis' is always devoid of any influence from ongoing real-world issues . . .
Having taught some FADEC systems, I was never overly-confident when I heard from the 'nerds' how much 'stray code' there was resident in the software.
We'll see perhaps (depends on how much is suppressed of course), long ago I stopped expecting to be told ALL the facts, even when I was involved.
Having taught some FADEC systems, I was never overly-confident when I heard from the 'nerds' how much 'stray code' there was resident in the software.
We'll see perhaps (depends on how much is suppressed of course), long ago I stopped expecting to be told ALL the facts, even when I was involved.
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Having taught some FADEC systems, I was never overly-confident when I heard from the 'nerds' how much 'stray code' there was resident in the software.
Industry sources said a new software was introduced with the particular aircraft for Turkey that allowed military maneuvers from liftoff. According to reports, this software was faulty and caused during the first flight of the Turkish machine the failure of multiple engines. How many engines have failed exactly and for how long apparently is still not fully understood.
According to this information, the new software allows military maneuvers by changing the so-called trim of the aircraft, by shifting the center of gravity. This is done among other things by pumping fuel from one tank into another. There are indications that this pumping did not work correctly.
According to this information, the new software allows military maneuvers by changing the so-called trim of the aircraft, by shifting the center of gravity. This is done among other things by pumping fuel from one tank into another. There are indications that this pumping did not work correctly.
Last edited by thf; 19th May 2015 at 18:16.
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A bigger software issue these days is 'supposed' redundancy that actually isn't. Like the Boeing 787 that has 4 generators fail at the same time, because their software has a flaw.
1. It has NEVER happened operationally, only in the test lab.
2. It will ONLY happen if the system runs continuously for 248 days.
3. The "workaround" to prevent this from happening is to shut down the system before 248 days have elapsed.
4. No one anywhere has ever or will ever run a 787 continuously for 248 days. Conclusion: not a problem in any meaningful sense, but Boeing still notified its users of this "flaw", which was eliminated in the next software revision.
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Aviation Week: Software Cut Off Fuel Supply In Stricken A400M
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Airbus has been very professional in their media releases, but I think it's clear there are limits to what they can disclose without seemingly preempting the official investigation. Airbus took up development test flights again, so it's also clear to me they have more than a hunch about what went wrong. The speculations of the media remain just speculations, however they don't appear like some of the contrived drivel we usually see. The ECU issues from the AOT may be a random coincidence, but at least those speculations don't blame the deceased. With few exceptions this thread has also been very civilized, and this is what I wanted to express, besides my condolences: my relief that no one (not even armchair investigators, "experts", the media, or posters here) has come up with surreal conspiracy theories, this does restore some faith in humanity.
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FADEC
There is no reference to FADEC in the quoted AOT
There is no reference to FADEC in the quoted AOT
FADEC is a generic term for the process conducted by the FCU (now the, more sophisticated Electronic/Engine Control Unit).
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Let's put this "flaw" in perspective.
1. It has NEVER happened operationally, only in the test lab.
2. It will ONLY happen if the system runs continuously for 248 days.
3. The "workaround" to prevent this from happening is to shut down the system before 248 days have elapsed.
4. No one anywhere has ever or will ever run a 787 continuously for 248 days. Conclusion: not a problem in any meaningful sense, but Boeing still notified its users of this "flaw", which was eliminated in the next software revision.
1. It has NEVER happened operationally, only in the test lab.
2. It will ONLY happen if the system runs continuously for 248 days.
3. The "workaround" to prevent this from happening is to shut down the system before 248 days have elapsed.
4. No one anywhere has ever or will ever run a 787 continuously for 248 days. Conclusion: not a problem in any meaningful sense, but Boeing still notified its users of this "flaw", which was eliminated in the next software revision.
..the failure to ensure the fitness/quality of the software...
..and you cannot dispute that.
Oh and it was powered up not run.
Ergo, how long does the battery on your motherboard last?
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Airbus investigates engine software as cause of troop transport crash
Airbus apparently found a "quality" problem in the ECU software that caused an anomaly in engine operations during its own testing in the wake of the crash.
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There is no reference to FADEC in the quoted AOT
Separately, it appears that the ECU related AOT is unrelated to the accident. According to the Aviation Week article cited below, a different software controlled system that auto trims fuel in the fuel tanks cut off fuel to the engines. FADEC cannot compensate for fuel starvation.
Another tidbit revealed by the Aviation Week article clears up earlier (false) speculation in this thread about who died and who survived the crash.