Air Cadets grounded?
No of 103's required to restart
You do not need all 100 machines for a restart.
There are only 8 Glider VGS so they could start again with 2 each.
If the 'system' can not get 16 out of 100 'available' for 2016 then there is no point in considering it a serious operation and people should depart to be replaced with those who are capable.
There will have to be some lateral thinking on utilisation with the possibility of weekday and evening flying, but any VGS worth its salt will no doubt be glad to get their backs into getting Cadets airborne again.
This is not rocket science,there is nothing complicated in flying/servicing these machines to the required standard.The RAF have the GSA as a guide as to how to work within BGA/EASA guidelines which is all that is required to maintain safe
practice. This current situation can be resolved by Leadership and Capability,if this is deficient then changes have to be made.It is the appalling delay and lack of honest information to the staff that is unforgivable.
There are only 8 Glider VGS so they could start again with 2 each.
If the 'system' can not get 16 out of 100 'available' for 2016 then there is no point in considering it a serious operation and people should depart to be replaced with those who are capable.
There will have to be some lateral thinking on utilisation with the possibility of weekday and evening flying, but any VGS worth its salt will no doubt be glad to get their backs into getting Cadets airborne again.
This is not rocket science,there is nothing complicated in flying/servicing these machines to the required standard.The RAF have the GSA as a guide as to how to work within BGA/EASA guidelines which is all that is required to maintain safe
practice. This current situation can be resolved by Leadership and Capability,if this is deficient then changes have to be made.It is the appalling delay and lack of honest information to the staff that is unforgivable.
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One more time you hit the nail on the head, the quality of management of the project is critical to its success.
Two contractors are currently bidding for the contract, one is offering to pay £45k for the general manager role, the other is offering IRO £ 30-35 K ( with other roles advertised at about £10K short of the going rate)
It will not surprise you that the company offering the lower remuneration is the company that has had the contact for the past few years and has been responsible for the mess that the MAA found.
To me this shows that I the upper management are so wide of the mark about the quality of the people they want to put in place and what you have to pay to get these skills that it demonstrates their underestimation of the task in hand.
Two contractors are currently bidding for the contract, one is offering to pay £45k for the general manager role, the other is offering IRO £ 30-35 K ( with other roles advertised at about £10K short of the going rate)
It will not surprise you that the company offering the lower remuneration is the company that has had the contact for the past few years and has been responsible for the mess that the MAA found.
To me this shows that I the upper management are so wide of the mark about the quality of the people they want to put in place and what you have to pay to get these skills that it demonstrates their underestimation of the task in hand.
You are in danger of being my newest Best Friend.
However IMHO it's hard to say what the going rate for the job is, at least by comparison with the civilian world. The glider workshops we use are all small with a few employees, who work very hard and the owners might well be pleased to earn the lower of the incomes you mention.
The nearest comparison might be what Lasham pay their workshop, which maintains a fleet of 20 gliders (if I've correctly counted their G-INFO entries) and possibly some tow planes, plus I suspect they also look after the winch and so on. I have no idea what he earns, but doubt it's £45k. Someone with access to the Lasham accounts might have a better idea.
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You do not need all 100 machines for a restart.
There are only 8 Glider VGS so they could start again with 2 each.
If the 'system' can not get 16 out of 100 'available' for 2016 then there is no point in considering it a serious operation and people should depart to be replaced with those who are capable.
There will have to be some lateral thinking on utilisation with the possibility of weekday and evening flying, but any VGS worth its salt will no doubt be glad to get their backs into getting Cadets airborne again.
This is not rocket science,there is nothing complicated in flying/servicing these machines to the required standard.The RAF have the GSA as a guide as to how to work within BGA/EASA guidelines which is all that is required to maintain safe
practice. This current situation can be resolved by Leadership and Capability,if this is deficient then changes have to be made.It is the appalling delay and lack of honest information to the staff that is unforgivable.
There are only 8 Glider VGS so they could start again with 2 each.
If the 'system' can not get 16 out of 100 'available' for 2016 then there is no point in considering it a serious operation and people should depart to be replaced with those who are capable.
There will have to be some lateral thinking on utilisation with the possibility of weekday and evening flying, but any VGS worth its salt will no doubt be glad to get their backs into getting Cadets airborne again.
This is not rocket science,there is nothing complicated in flying/servicing these machines to the required standard.The RAF have the GSA as a guide as to how to work within BGA/EASA guidelines which is all that is required to maintain safe
practice. This current situation can be resolved by Leadership and Capability,if this is deficient then changes have to be made.It is the appalling delay and lack of honest information to the staff that is unforgivable.
Add in the restrictions on the number of launches/hours that can be flown each month coupled with a reduction in the operating hours, makes it not so easy with only a pair of aircraft.
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Cats Five
The military require the glider recovery to have oversight in line with EASA145 rather than lower standards of oversight required by most of light aviation.
It follows that if you are going to have airline standard oversight then the people who deliver oversight to to this standard are going to command remuneration that reflects the industry norm for such work.
The contractor who had the maintenance contract for the gliders has clearly failed to meet the required standards, first when maintaining the fleet and then following the grounding by the MAA has failed to get any sort of recovery underway.
Part of the reason for this must be the failure to put in post people capable of the task. It is clear to me that the company has failed to understand what it costs to secure the services of such people when you look at the advertisements for these posts.
It might just be starting to dawn on this company that the days of underpaying, relying on ex- military people who are getting a military pension and are spooling down to retirement to do these jobs on the cheap is over, because unless they are incredibly lucky any one they get at that price will just not be up to the job.
It follows that if you are going to have airline standard oversight then the people who deliver oversight to to this standard are going to command remuneration that reflects the industry norm for such work.
The contractor who had the maintenance contract for the gliders has clearly failed to meet the required standards, first when maintaining the fleet and then following the grounding by the MAA has failed to get any sort of recovery underway.
Part of the reason for this must be the failure to put in post people capable of the task. It is clear to me that the company has failed to understand what it costs to secure the services of such people when you look at the advertisements for these posts.
It might just be starting to dawn on this company that the days of underpaying, relying on ex- military people who are getting a military pension and are spooling down to retirement to do these jobs on the cheap is over, because unless they are incredibly lucky any one they get at that price will just not be up to the job.
Getting going again
A&C The whole point of a recovery phase is that things have to be different.
The MOD have to get their act together re contracts and capability.
They then have to have a system that monitors standards 'before' a grounding is required.
They then have to have someone heading up the 'system' that can keep it running,and motivate all those concerned.
This is not about money it is about managing a fleet of aircraft to a standard as per the contract. If the contractor has failed he must pay. If the contract was poorly written then its the clients fault.
Tigger No one is suggesting that the VGS have been deficient in this debacle,however they must be prepared to explore all opportunities to get the best utilisation out of a 'reduced' fleet. They can decide what they 'can' do with the available resources to assist providing flying again.Its quite amazing who turns up when there is extra flying available. I only suggested that flying could 'start again' with a couple of AC per VGS. Better to get going and then expand when more AC are available.
The MOD have to get their act together re contracts and capability.
They then have to have a system that monitors standards 'before' a grounding is required.
They then have to have someone heading up the 'system' that can keep it running,and motivate all those concerned.
This is not about money it is about managing a fleet of aircraft to a standard as per the contract. If the contractor has failed he must pay. If the contract was poorly written then its the clients fault.
Tigger No one is suggesting that the VGS have been deficient in this debacle,however they must be prepared to explore all opportunities to get the best utilisation out of a 'reduced' fleet. They can decide what they 'can' do with the available resources to assist providing flying again.Its quite amazing who turns up when there is extra flying available. I only suggested that flying could 'start again' with a couple of AC per VGS. Better to get going and then expand when more AC are available.
What gets me about the job descriptions, is that they are advertising salaried positions as opposed to contracts, yet once the aircraft have been through the system, will all the staff be retained? If not, why would anyone move to Syerston for a low paid job, with a skills requirement (composites)that would get them a decent job in the motor racing industry, wind turbines or an Airline? Once you subtract the typical cost of digs (i.r.o. £4K/yr), working away from home is hardly likely to be an option.
As A and C says, the business model on which the company concerned operates is dependent on having ex-servicemen with the necessary skills, a pension and a reason not to move away from the area near where they were serving. In this case, I suspect those people will be in short supply.
On a project like this, in which time is, or at least should be, of the essence, having to train staff in either the paperwork or repair skills is not an effective option. In any normal company would mean hiring in already skilled contractors and paying them accordingly.
As A and C says, the business model on which the company concerned operates is dependent on having ex-servicemen with the necessary skills, a pension and a reason not to move away from the area near where they were serving. In this case, I suspect those people will be in short supply.
On a project like this, in which time is, or at least should be, of the essence, having to train staff in either the paperwork or repair skills is not an effective option. In any normal company would mean hiring in already skilled contractors and paying them accordingly.
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Pobjoy
You are correct, things have to be different, and the best part of different is not to let the contractors who caused this fiasco within a thousand miles of the recovery contract or the maintenance and upkeep contracts that will follow.
Correctly run operating to EASA/ MIL 145 standard is only marginally more costly than the light aviation / BGA standard when the cost is spread over a fleet and his size and as long as you are flying young people who are not fully informed of the risks you have to operate to public transport standards of oversight. This assumes that you have the system in place that is staffed by people who have the required skills to run it.
You can of course try to pay peanuts but eventually the quality of monkey maintenance will catch up with you, which I think precipitated this situation in the first place.
Correctly run operating to EASA/ MIL 145 standard is only marginally more costly than the light aviation / BGA standard when the cost is spread over a fleet and his size and as long as you are flying young people who are not fully informed of the risks you have to operate to public transport standards of oversight. This assumes that you have the system in place that is staffed by people who have the required skills to run it.
You can of course try to pay peanuts but eventually the quality of monkey maintenance will catch up with you, which I think precipitated this situation in the first place.
Last edited by A and C; 31st Oct 2015 at 10:10.
The Future
Hey A&C we are nearly agreeing (this has got to stop or the thread will get boring).
My 'missive' to the CAS suggested he 'talks' to his chums that run the RAF GSA and gets some real 'hands on' feedback as how the system 'could' be run and also satisfy the regulations. What is really frustrating is whilst all this 'cascading' and other 'yuk speak' has being going on the fleet could have been sorted if in the hands of a 'capable' system.
I suspect the original contract is not that watertight therefore no one wants to 'push' the contractor into a legal corner.
The priority should be to get some suitable airframes into the system so operations can start again.If these are EASA cert then they can come from anywhere and we do not need 100 (20 to start) to get going. The Viking fleet can then be 'recovered' as the VGS build up strength again.
I agree the contract should be given to a proven source (poss even the BGA/ GSA) and also the expertise of the LAA would not be a bad thing as they have a good tech history of certifying both old and new built aircraft including hi tech ones under the EASA banner. The longer this disgraceful debacle goes on the ATC will loose people and capability, if there was a time in its history that LEADERSHIP was needed it is now.(cue Reach for the Sky theme,and dont prod the AOC with your pipe Turner)
My 'missive' to the CAS suggested he 'talks' to his chums that run the RAF GSA and gets some real 'hands on' feedback as how the system 'could' be run and also satisfy the regulations. What is really frustrating is whilst all this 'cascading' and other 'yuk speak' has being going on the fleet could have been sorted if in the hands of a 'capable' system.
I suspect the original contract is not that watertight therefore no one wants to 'push' the contractor into a legal corner.
The priority should be to get some suitable airframes into the system so operations can start again.If these are EASA cert then they can come from anywhere and we do not need 100 (20 to start) to get going. The Viking fleet can then be 'recovered' as the VGS build up strength again.
I agree the contract should be given to a proven source (poss even the BGA/ GSA) and also the expertise of the LAA would not be a bad thing as they have a good tech history of certifying both old and new built aircraft including hi tech ones under the EASA banner. The longer this disgraceful debacle goes on the ATC will loose people and capability, if there was a time in its history that LEADERSHIP was needed it is now.(cue Reach for the Sky theme,and dont prod the AOC with your pipe Turner)
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That is so easy to say and so hard to do. A handful of decent 2-seat gliders come up each year, but I imagine the cadets won't want a hodge-podge of whatever turns up - they will want a fleet. As to new gliders, the lead time on a new K21 is 6-9 months, I have no idea what it is for a Perkoz or a PW6, but I doubt getting 20 airframes in a year is feasible.
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A & C, fully agree with your post no. 804. The usual contractorisation bandits run a business model which depends on chronic underpayment of their employees, on the assumption that there are 'sufficient numbers of ex-military chumps out there with their pensions in the bag' - not my words, but those of someone pushing for a major contract.
This sounds like what has killed ATC Shooting in South Wales, and rather than revisit the salary to provide a living wage for a skilled employee to run the central armoury, it's apparently simpler and easier all round to cease shooting. I am open to challenge on this, but I'll warrant that if this is contractorised, then the said contractor will still be getting paid while cadets do not get skill at arms training.
Contractorisation works well for all, as long as you negotiate a robust contract, police it, and if there is a shortfall, you get a rock and shove it all the way up the contractor's back passage. This is business. All the talk I've heard about contract 'partnerships' leads to cases like the 'pause in flying' where core capabilities are neglected and the contract provider still gets paid.
If the ATC fleet can be grounded owing to shortfalls, then those who failed need to be held to account. If this means tighter scrutiny of contracts and harsher sanctions on failing service providers, then some good will have come out of this whole goat rodeo.
This sounds like what has killed ATC Shooting in South Wales, and rather than revisit the salary to provide a living wage for a skilled employee to run the central armoury, it's apparently simpler and easier all round to cease shooting. I am open to challenge on this, but I'll warrant that if this is contractorised, then the said contractor will still be getting paid while cadets do not get skill at arms training.
Contractorisation works well for all, as long as you negotiate a robust contract, police it, and if there is a shortfall, you get a rock and shove it all the way up the contractor's back passage. This is business. All the talk I've heard about contract 'partnerships' leads to cases like the 'pause in flying' where core capabilities are neglected and the contract provider still gets paid.
If the ATC fleet can be grounded owing to shortfalls, then those who failed need to be held to account. If this means tighter scrutiny of contracts and harsher sanctions on failing service providers, then some good will have come out of this whole goat rodeo.
It is all too easy to blame the contractor (this may or may not be warranted !)
The trouble is - to negotiate the modern MAA airworthiness requirements needs good leadership and high quality people in liaison between the contractor and the MAA 'audit' team.
As I have said before - an absolutely airworthy aircraft can be grounded purely on very minor paperwork anomalies,we try to do our airworthiness reviews during scheduled servicing but the aircraft can still be delayed back into service.
As I have also previously posted - In the last 2 years I have changed many serviceable components purely because there is a very minor log card anomaly,but sometimes it is easier to change the component than seek deferment until a bigger servicing/servicing opportunity !
I have always suspected the grounding is a little more complex than simple un-airworthiness and that a different mix of 'personalities' might well have tackled this problem very differently !
I still very much doubt that all the gliders were unsafe to fly and if it was obvious to the 'top brass' that there was really a serious issue then a new fleet would have been the easiest course of action !
But of course a new fleet might well not have been part of whichever Agendas are being acted out !
The trouble is - to negotiate the modern MAA airworthiness requirements needs good leadership and high quality people in liaison between the contractor and the MAA 'audit' team.
As I have said before - an absolutely airworthy aircraft can be grounded purely on very minor paperwork anomalies,we try to do our airworthiness reviews during scheduled servicing but the aircraft can still be delayed back into service.
As I have also previously posted - In the last 2 years I have changed many serviceable components purely because there is a very minor log card anomaly,but sometimes it is easier to change the component than seek deferment until a bigger servicing/servicing opportunity !
I have always suspected the grounding is a little more complex than simple un-airworthiness and that a different mix of 'personalities' might well have tackled this problem very differently !
I still very much doubt that all the gliders were unsafe to fly and if it was obvious to the 'top brass' that there was really a serious issue then a new fleet would have been the easiest course of action !
But of course a new fleet might well not have been part of whichever Agendas are being acted out !
Start up Airframes
C5 I said to get (some 'suitable' air frames into the system) assuming that most of these could be the best of what is in the fleet now.
If we need some extra's then the balance could be made up of EASA cert machines.
As for operating a 'Hodge-Podge' (your words not mine; i would have said mixed fleet) i was not aware that the BGA Clubs/ GSA operated in any other way.
If the 'improved system' can not generate 20 air frames in 6 months then they might just as well close the whole thing down and give the flying contract to the clubs/GSA. It may well be that 'currency' can be regained with AE flights to start with followed by an increased training task as machines and instructor availability returns. The whole point is the CRISIS is here; it is not going to magic itself back to normal without some change in both management capability at the top of the system and out of the box thinking from everyone.
PS Will post reply from CAS when/if i get one.
If we need some extra's then the balance could be made up of EASA cert machines.
As for operating a 'Hodge-Podge' (your words not mine; i would have said mixed fleet) i was not aware that the BGA Clubs/ GSA operated in any other way.
If the 'improved system' can not generate 20 air frames in 6 months then they might just as well close the whole thing down and give the flying contract to the clubs/GSA. It may well be that 'currency' can be regained with AE flights to start with followed by an increased training task as machines and instructor availability returns. The whole point is the CRISIS is here; it is not going to magic itself back to normal without some change in both management capability at the top of the system and out of the box thinking from everyone.
PS Will post reply from CAS when/if i get one.
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And no, given the lead time on new K21s a new fleet will take years to acquire. Grobs are no longer build built, suspect the other alternatives are not suitable. For one thing the Perkoz & PW6 look pretty flimsy compared to Grobs & K21s, and I don't think anyone is going to suggest Duos, Arcuses, DG100s & their ilk are a suitable glider for the ATC.
C5
Other countries seem to manage - it is called planning !
We are rapidly approaching 'years' since any cadet flying happened !
rgds LR
And no, given the lead time on new K21s a new fleet will take years to acquire
We are rapidly approaching 'years' since any cadet flying happened !
rgds LR
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Complication of the issue
Part of the Viking recovery is that the type certificate holder is not the manufacturer but a large defence contractor.
This contractor has a long and successful history of large aircraft maintenance, overhaul and repair .......... But next to no experience in the field of GRP gliders.
If you need to repair a civil glider and the damage is outside the repair manual limits the manufacturers will talk with repair agencies they trust and quickly come up with an authorised repair, they can do this because they have a long experience of fixing broken gliders.
With this type certificate holder things are very different, the lack of experience and defence industry culture result in decision that could be taken with a quick phone call and a few emails with a glider manufacture taking weeks to get through the system.
The MoD need to take the bold step of finding a company that can set up an EASA part 21 operation dedicated to air cadet gliders and give them the Viking type certificate, the company would not be one of the usual suspects as it is glider expertees that is required..... Not the ability to fix large metal aircraft.
I am sure that the current type certificate holder would not be too displeased with the loss of this small contract as I am sure they could make much more money with a lot less effort working with the type of aircraft they know best.
This contractor has a long and successful history of large aircraft maintenance, overhaul and repair .......... But next to no experience in the field of GRP gliders.
If you need to repair a civil glider and the damage is outside the repair manual limits the manufacturers will talk with repair agencies they trust and quickly come up with an authorised repair, they can do this because they have a long experience of fixing broken gliders.
With this type certificate holder things are very different, the lack of experience and defence industry culture result in decision that could be taken with a quick phone call and a few emails with a glider manufacture taking weeks to get through the system.
The MoD need to take the bold step of finding a company that can set up an EASA part 21 operation dedicated to air cadet gliders and give them the Viking type certificate, the company would not be one of the usual suspects as it is glider expertees that is required..... Not the ability to fix large metal aircraft.
I am sure that the current type certificate holder would not be too displeased with the loss of this small contract as I am sure they could make much more money with a lot less effort working with the type of aircraft they know best.
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Before any return to flying is signed off, revised support systems and procedures need to be in place. This whole saga resulted from a procedural failure which needs to be addressed.
It is likely to be over-engineered, and decided who will implement it. Already vgs were suffering from excessive administration burdens, are volunteers going to want to return if they face more paperwork and less time flying. The whole issue is more complicated than simply resolving the technical issue and off we go as before.
It needs a fundamental rethink on how the organisation delivers gliding. Far better to decide future strategy now in a calm and considered manner and create a robust future proof system, rather than panic and feel the need to get flying, no matter in what shape as soon as possible. However, as soon as the magnitude of this problem became apparent, those in charge should have realised that the organisation could never be as it had been, and so should have begun the end to end review far sooner.
It is likely to be over-engineered, and decided who will implement it. Already vgs were suffering from excessive administration burdens, are volunteers going to want to return if they face more paperwork and less time flying. The whole issue is more complicated than simply resolving the technical issue and off we go as before.
It needs a fundamental rethink on how the organisation delivers gliding. Far better to decide future strategy now in a calm and considered manner and create a robust future proof system, rather than panic and feel the need to get flying, no matter in what shape as soon as possible. However, as soon as the magnitude of this problem became apparent, those in charge should have realised that the organisation could never be as it had been, and so should have begun the end to end review far sooner.
Just for the record
I have just had sight of a FOI report as to the cost of the former contract for servicing the two fleets (Viking/Vigilant) for the ATC.
The contract ran from Nov 2008 until Mar 2015.and cost £9.6 million.
It seems amazing to me that it took over 5 years before the 'system' was found to be wanting.
It would be interesting to see how many contractors have shown an interest in the 'recovery' plan.
Not sure if the ATC 'white fleet' contract runs to the same timescale.
Nice work if you can get it!,even if the customer does not get it.
It seems to me that the contractors should have been put under more pressure to resolve the situation whilst they were still responsible to provide the service.
Unless of course the 'contract' was not exactly well founded in the first place and those responsible for that input are now out of the 'blame trail'.
The contract ran from Nov 2008 until Mar 2015.and cost £9.6 million.
It seems amazing to me that it took over 5 years before the 'system' was found to be wanting.
It would be interesting to see how many contractors have shown an interest in the 'recovery' plan.
Not sure if the ATC 'white fleet' contract runs to the same timescale.
Nice work if you can get it!,even if the customer does not get it.
It seems to me that the contractors should have been put under more pressure to resolve the situation whilst they were still responsible to provide the service.
Unless of course the 'contract' was not exactly well founded in the first place and those responsible for that input are now out of the 'blame trail'.
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Pobjoy
I did hear talk of the problems starting years back when the " new" composite repair bay was the unused because of some sort of dispute ( elf & safety + a bit of industrial action if I remember correctly ).
The result was a backlog of unserviceable airframes building up with some being written off for what a civil gliding club would have considered a routine repair.
It should have been picked up a lot quicker by the MoD and the contractor made to fix the problems but I suspect the contractor was not paying enough money to attract experienced staff and no amount of pressure from the MoD could have resolved the problems without the contractor getting outside help.
The other issue is that the MoD has much bigger fish to fry than gliders and not much glider expertees to bring to any dispute with the contractor who they must of assumed and trusted could run the maintenance of these simple aircraft.
The result was a backlog of unserviceable airframes building up with some being written off for what a civil gliding club would have considered a routine repair.
It should have been picked up a lot quicker by the MoD and the contractor made to fix the problems but I suspect the contractor was not paying enough money to attract experienced staff and no amount of pressure from the MoD could have resolved the problems without the contractor getting outside help.
The other issue is that the MoD has much bigger fish to fry than gliders and not much glider expertees to bring to any dispute with the contractor who they must of assumed and trusted could run the maintenance of these simple aircraft.
A and C
From what you have been posting I would say that a new fleet was the only viable option,but of course it needed to be planned and phased in before the whole situation got out of control !
Only MOD could have mishandled the aquisition of a simple glider fleet as badly as they seemed to have done,they never have seemed to grasp the idea that glider manufacturers are capable of designing gliders good enough for cadets to fly without expensive modifications LOL
Same happened with the motorfalke,G109 etc etc
From what you have been posting I would say that a new fleet was the only viable option,but of course it needed to be planned and phased in before the whole situation got out of control !
Only MOD could have mishandled the aquisition of a simple glider fleet as badly as they seemed to have done,they never have seemed to grasp the idea that glider manufacturers are capable of designing gliders good enough for cadets to fly without expensive modifications LOL
Same happened with the motorfalke,G109 etc etc
New Fleet Option
LR I go with that,but that is another two years delay. The existing fleet is 'fixable' (only option at present).
I always suspected that Syerston was not exactly on the ball with all this and i think the then CO was tasked with the Tutor inquiry so not around as much.
As for air frame backlog not being dealt with; then other than those that were killed in snow related hangar collapse's what level of repairs were usually dealt with.
No doubt another 'cascade' will be forthcoming soon to inform those who are to be affected by this utterly disgraceful 'pausing' episode.
The only part of the RAF/MOD system that seems to have delivered the goods is the VGS part when it was allowed.
I always suspected that Syerston was not exactly on the ball with all this and i think the then CO was tasked with the Tutor inquiry so not around as much.
As for air frame backlog not being dealt with; then other than those that were killed in snow related hangar collapse's what level of repairs were usually dealt with.
No doubt another 'cascade' will be forthcoming soon to inform those who are to be affected by this utterly disgraceful 'pausing' episode.
The only part of the RAF/MOD system that seems to have delivered the goods is the VGS part when it was allowed.