Air Cadets grounded?
Gentleman Aviator
Fine words POBJOY, with which I agree 100%.
Like many, I soloed in a Mk 3 at 16, which gave me the "bug" which led to many decades as an RAF pilot.
Although I was originally CCF(RAF), I've spent the last decade or so involved with the ATC, and have seen what happened (or what didn't..........)
It will be a "big ask" (as they say these days) to get back to anything like it was. Fingers crossed, new brooms and all that.......
Like many, I soloed in a Mk 3 at 16, which gave me the "bug" which led to many decades as an RAF pilot.
Although I was originally CCF(RAF), I've spent the last decade or so involved with the ATC, and have seen what happened (or what didn't..........)
It will be a "big ask" (as they say these days) to get back to anything like it was. Fingers crossed, new brooms and all that.......
Getting the bug
Fine words POBJOY, with which I agree 100%.
Like many, I soloed in a Mk 3 at 16, which gave me the "bug" which led to many decades as an RAF pilot.
Although I was originally CCF(RAF), I've spent the last decade or so involved with the ATC, and have seen what happened (or what didn't..........)
It will be a "big ask" (as they say these days) to get back to anything like it was. Fingers crossed, new brooms and all that.......
Like many, I soloed in a Mk 3 at 16, which gave me the "bug" which led to many decades as an RAF pilot.
Although I was originally CCF(RAF), I've spent the last decade or so involved with the ATC, and have seen what happened (or what didn't..........)
It will be a "big ask" (as they say these days) to get back to anything like it was. Fingers crossed, new brooms and all that.......
WE gave them much banter but they must have enjoyed their week as eventually some asked to join as staff, and I never turned one away. It is the knowledge of what the organisation is capable of that drives me to keep the pressure on to build it up again. It may not have the 'numbers' but it can still have the quality of experience, and its worth keeping it going. The organisation needs to get back to 'hands on' activities not burdened by shed loads of paperwork, and one hopes that those in charge realise that twitter, facebook, and fancy advertising does not fool anyone with the reality of the results of loosing the plot.
Nobody in is holding their breath.
Rising to the challenge
615 kept its staff utilised with the PTT, and have issued over 1000 certs to boot. This means they only have to re engage with their Vikings rather than trying to engage staff.
Kenley is a very historic location and a real Battle of Britain survivor. 615 carries on the number of a famous Surrey Squadron, and one can not escape the sense of flying from the site that not only sent its machines out to defend our country, but also survived a well planned low level raid that was intent on removing it from the Battle. 615 will rise to the occasion, and Kenley will always support it as it has for many decades. The Cadets now have a Gliding operation back in the London and the South East. Access is easy and the Squadrons numerous, so it is all there to play for. Once Cadets start 'TRAINING' the word and enthusiasm will spread, and who knows some sense may creep back into those up top and they will start to protect and improve what is special rather then see it wither. Well done 615 for keeping the faith and well done Kenley for still being there.
Kenley was built on a Surrey common in WW1 and used to assemble, and send machines to France. Under the defence of the realm it was kept after hostilities and underwent hasty improvements in the 1930's. However the improvements did not really give it protection of its own, and indeed the brick buildings and 'bungalow' ops room were more akin to a country club.
Like the nearby and better known Biggin Hill it was a vital sector station, but small in size. Unable to be expanded for the later jets Kenley stayed in a timewarp and eventually became an ATC Gliding school in the 50's.Having now been provided with a brand new HQ 615 has a most secure location, and a proud reputation to keep up. They will not let the Cadets down.
Anyway that's what happened to Bovingdon according to what I heard; 617 GS had just become established as 'sole user' having 'lost' their original home at Hendon; the 4 hangars were re-furbished and then they closed it because some beancounter noticed the cost of the 'new' hangars.
Still I can't complain; I got my Air Cadet Soaring Certificate/BGA 'C' Certificate at Bovingdon whilst operating a 613 GS detachment from Halton before 617 moved in.
Hope they didn't spend too much on the new HQ; some beancounter at MOD might see the cost and say 'why are we spending money on an airfield with no powered flying; close it.
Anyway that's what happened to Bovingdon according to what I heard; 617 GS had just become established as 'sole user' having 'lost' their original home at Hendon; the 4 hangars were re-furbished and then they closed it because some beancounter noticed the cost of the 'new' hangars.
Anyway that's what happened to Bovingdon according to what I heard; 617 GS had just become established as 'sole user' having 'lost' their original home at Hendon; the 4 hangars were re-furbished and then they closed it because some beancounter noticed the cost of the 'new' hangars.
Kenley and 615 staying put
Hope they didn't spend too much on the new HQ; some beancounter at MOD might see the cost and say 'why are we spending money on an airfield with no powered flying; close it'.(Thinks: Wonder what's happened to the HQ they built at Abingdon for 612 GS?)
Anyway that's what happened to Bovingdon according to what I heard; 617 GS had just become established as 'sole user' having 'lost' their original home at Hendon; the 4 hangars were re-furbished and then they closed it because some beancounter noticed the cost of the 'new' hangars.
Still I can't complain; I got my Air Cadet Soaring Certificate/BGA 'C' Certificate at Bovingdon whilst operating a 613 GS detachment from Halton before 617 moved in.
Anyway that's what happened to Bovingdon according to what I heard; 617 GS had just become established as 'sole user' having 'lost' their original home at Hendon; the 4 hangars were re-furbished and then they closed it because some beancounter noticed the cost of the 'new' hangars.
Still I can't complain; I got my Air Cadet Soaring Certificate/BGA 'C' Certificate at Bovingdon whilst operating a 613 GS detachment from Halton before 617 moved in.
AH Chev Kenley has a not very secret weapon up its sleeve. It is not an MOD asset but merely a 'peppercorn' leased field which has no commercial value. If gliding stops the field reverts back to being a common 'end of'. Manston and West Malling were lost because they had substantial development value when the RAF operations stopped, (and Bovingdon became a prison). Kenley was ideal for the fretwork fighters but deemed too small for Vig operations. The Viking has coped ok but higher performance machines would not be ideal. History will show that in fact the best machine for the ATC requirement was indeed the MK 3, and that record stands any scrutiny. The problem was 'dragging' the organisation into a more modern era whilst keeping it simple. The Viking has done well despite the efforts of those up top, and indeed could provide excellent service for years to come. The next generation kit will be interesting as in theory the clubs also need a glass trainer that is affordable.
I have followed this thread since it started, as I feel, having soled at Kenley in 1974 on a Mk 3, I have some skin in this fight and feel desperately sorry for what has become of the ACO. My Dad was a staff pilot, a founder member, on 1 AEF from Biggin Hill in 1958, to Manston in 1982, having joined the RAF and trained a pilot in 1941. I worked the flight line at Manston as a supernumerary staff cadet as often as I could whilst I was in the CCF, so cadet flying is in the blood, so to speak.
My eldest son now 35, was in our local ATC and the deterioration in cadet flying since he was in it, is quite depressing.
Throughout my career (in construction) I had a mantra, KISS, Keep It Simple Stupid. It worked. Rocket science not required. We had a Slingsby Grasshopper at school, one or two steps down from the Mk 3, but I learnt a lot from flying that. So I wonder if a new build Mk 3 is the way to go. It ticked all the boxes then, there are some still flying and I canot imagine they would not tick all the boxes now. It was simple uncomplicated, easy to maintain and easy to fly.
The only problem as I see it, would be the MOD procurement process, which no doubt would turn it into a multi £billion project for someone like BAE, which would never get off the ground.
WB627 airborne and over to Heathrow aproach in XK790
It is the implementation that is lacking. If the Services don't/can't/won't do the preliminary legwork, the backstop was traditionally the project manager, who was required to know how to do this work and could correct matters very quickly. (As he'd learned and practiced it in his previous 5 or more grades). Implementation becomes very difficult if you haven't worked at those 5 grades, which are all below today's entry minima. No-one learns what is NOT being done.
That's the basic problem both the Services and DE&S face. The current 'solution' seems to be to employ an army of highly paid 'consultants', because MoD's own natural recruitment grounds were decimated long ago. Many of these consultants are doing work I'd have gladly entrusted, with minimal supervision, to 3rd year apprentices. And I mean proper apprentices, who use tools; not those who are.
One has to appreciate that if you substitute 'Nimrod' with' 'Gliders' in the 2009 Nimrod Review, it still makes perfect sense, as the systemic failings are the same. Read the Hawk XX177 Board of Inquiry report. Same Type Airworthiness Authority as Gliders, and infinitely worse failings.
Keeping it simple
[QUOTE=WB627;10699403]Although I was in the CCF at school, I did not go into the forces, so I have always been just a civvy and this is not a forum I post on lightly.
I have followed this thread since it started, as I feel, having soled at Kenley in 1974 on a Mk 3, I have some skin in this fight and feel desperately sorry for what has become of the ACO. My Dad was a staff pilot, a founder member, on 1 AEF from Biggin Hill in 1958, to Manston in 1982, having joined the RAF and trained a pilot in 1941. I worked the flight line at Manston as a supernumerary staff cadet as often as I could whilst I was in the CCF, so cadet flying is in the blood, so to speak.
My eldest son now 35, was in our local ATC and the deterioration in cadet flying since he was in it, is quite depressing.
Throughout my career (in construction) I had a mantra, KISS, Keep It Simple Stupid. It worked. Rocket science not required. We had a Slingsby Grasshopper at school, one or two steps down from the Mk 3, but I learnt a lot from flying that. So I wonder if a new build Mk 3 is the way to go. It ticked all the boxes then, there are some still flying and I canot imagine they would not tick all the boxes now. It was simple uncomplicated, easy to maintain and easy to fly.
The only problem as I see it, would be the MOD procurement process, which no doubt would turn it into a multi £billion project for someone like BAE, which would never get off the ground
.
Great Image WB, Interesting design exercise Replacement MK3, Of course apart from the 'basic' features of the MK3 (which made it very suitable for a low time first solo) the schools were backed up by a first class servicing operation MGSP which kept the fleet in tit top order. Considering the ground handling they needed and got from untrained Cadets, the wood and fabric construction stood up very well, and the end result was the best value for money 'trainer' the RAF ever had, with many still flying (some with an engine).The MK3 suited the slightly odd shaped airfield at Kenley, but the low cable break exercise had to be correctly flown for the particular 'run in use' with little margin for error. Our boss at the time reduced the odds of a problem by keeping a 'solo cable' (no knots) proving that the organisation had some wonderful competent people watching over the system before H&S existed. Another little added safety feature was the winch driver had to be 'cleared' for 'first solo launching' such was the attention given to keeping it as safe as possible. Nowadays it would be called risk assessment (then it was normal good practice) with no paperwork !!! Having seen and been part of that era I know all to well what a great experience it gave the Cadets, those that continue to give their time do so under an increasing burden of non flying workload, and it is to their credit that they have kept the system going 'despite' the chaos bestowed upon them from above, VENTURE ADVENTURE difficult to kill off I am pleased to say.
I have followed this thread since it started, as I feel, having soled at Kenley in 1974 on a Mk 3, I have some skin in this fight and feel desperately sorry for what has become of the ACO. My Dad was a staff pilot, a founder member, on 1 AEF from Biggin Hill in 1958, to Manston in 1982, having joined the RAF and trained a pilot in 1941. I worked the flight line at Manston as a supernumerary staff cadet as often as I could whilst I was in the CCF, so cadet flying is in the blood, so to speak.
My eldest son now 35, was in our local ATC and the deterioration in cadet flying since he was in it, is quite depressing.
Throughout my career (in construction) I had a mantra, KISS, Keep It Simple Stupid. It worked. Rocket science not required. We had a Slingsby Grasshopper at school, one or two steps down from the Mk 3, but I learnt a lot from flying that. So I wonder if a new build Mk 3 is the way to go. It ticked all the boxes then, there are some still flying and I canot imagine they would not tick all the boxes now. It was simple uncomplicated, easy to maintain and easy to fly.
The only problem as I see it, would be the MOD procurement process, which no doubt would turn it into a multi £billion project for someone like BAE, which would never get off the ground
.
Great Image WB, Interesting design exercise Replacement MK3, Of course apart from the 'basic' features of the MK3 (which made it very suitable for a low time first solo) the schools were backed up by a first class servicing operation MGSP which kept the fleet in tit top order. Considering the ground handling they needed and got from untrained Cadets, the wood and fabric construction stood up very well, and the end result was the best value for money 'trainer' the RAF ever had, with many still flying (some with an engine).The MK3 suited the slightly odd shaped airfield at Kenley, but the low cable break exercise had to be correctly flown for the particular 'run in use' with little margin for error. Our boss at the time reduced the odds of a problem by keeping a 'solo cable' (no knots) proving that the organisation had some wonderful competent people watching over the system before H&S existed. Another little added safety feature was the winch driver had to be 'cleared' for 'first solo launching' such was the attention given to keeping it as safe as possible. Nowadays it would be called risk assessment (then it was normal good practice) with no paperwork !!! Having seen and been part of that era I know all to well what a great experience it gave the Cadets, those that continue to give their time do so under an increasing burden of non flying workload, and it is to their credit that they have kept the system going 'despite' the chaos bestowed upon them from above, VENTURE ADVENTURE difficult to kill off I am pleased to say.
There was no 'need' to go to a glider with a glide ratio of some 36:1 (Viking) in order to train as many cadets as possible to solo standard; the 18.5:1 of the Mk3 was perfectly adequate for that and lets face it, the main aim of Air Cadet gliding WAS to train as many 16 year old cadets as possible to fly to solo standard as safely and efficiently as possible whilst developing excellent teamworking skills.
The use of higher performance single seat vehicles such as Prefect and Swallow allowed a more advanced level of training should the cadets' ability merit it but there's plenty of types available for that type of gliding nowadays, it's just at the bottom end that something else is needed that is simpler to operate and maintain
I can only echo POB's remarks ('tit top order!')about the abilites of MGSP personnel; they would come in on a monday and do all necessary servicing on the 'fleet' so that you had a full quota of aircraft for next weekend without having to send the airframe away to a contractor unless major work was required, that contractor usually being Slingsby anyway.
So what about the few ACO gliders that are flying? A very good question. The MAA that oversees their safe operation is founded on a lie, that of the Haddon-Cave 'Golden Period' when the subversion of UK Military Air Safety occurred. Unless and until UK Military Air Regulation and Air Accident Investigation is made independent of the MOD, and of each other, there can be no confidence in either. That won't happen until the cover up of the scandal of UK Military Airworthiness stops and the MOD, RAF, and MAA acknowledge their culpability.
Who wrote the contract !!!
I too have followed this thread from the start and it has mainly managed to miss the point ever since. I strongly recommend those that care about the ACO, as I've no doubt we all do, to read tuc's post above as well as his preceding ones. The solution isn't choosing a suitable airframe, if it was then that would be easy-peasy. The solution is ensuring that it is, and remains, airworthy. That is why the ACO fleet was grounded in the first place. The bog standard process of keeping such simple aircraft airworthy is water off a duck's back to the likes of tuc. Unfortunately the likes of tuc are conspicuous by their absence these days, as are the Regulations that he and his fellow engineers complied with. Both were binned in the plundering of the ring fenced UK Military Air Safety budget by RAF VSOs. Even if such skills and such Regulations could be reinstated, airworthiness could not be simply restored as it is a process of record keeping and audit, a paper trail if you like. No such paper trail survived the purge, hence the grounding (or 'pause'!). Aren't other military air fleets also affected then? Of course they are, but the ACO ones involved minors, others don't. Even so the MR operational fleets were deemed expendable, hence the loss of Nimrod.
So what about the few ACO gliders that are flying? A very good question. The MAA that oversees their safe operation is founded on a lie, that of the Haddon-Cave 'Golden Period' when the subversion of UK Military Air Safety occurred. Unless and until UK Military Air Regulation and Air Accident Investigation is made independent of the MOD, and of each other, there can be no confidence in either. That won't happen until the cover up of the scandal of UK Military Airworthiness stops and the MOD, RAF, and MAA acknowledge their culpability.
So what about the few ACO gliders that are flying? A very good question. The MAA that oversees their safe operation is founded on a lie, that of the Haddon-Cave 'Golden Period' when the subversion of UK Military Air Safety occurred. Unless and until UK Military Air Regulation and Air Accident Investigation is made independent of the MOD, and of each other, there can be no confidence in either. That won't happen until the cover up of the scandal of UK Military Airworthiness stops and the MOD, RAF, and MAA acknowledge their culpability.
I honestly think that in the future the Cadets should get back to the 'going solo' syndrome in a machine that suits that purpose. Their is no downside to learning some basic flying on a simple machine. History shows us that starting this way repays itself many times over, imparting essential skills, and early DECISION MAKING. If and when the Cadets get a new fleet it should be on the basis that this facility can be shared with other cadet/youth organisations thereby increasing utilisation and possibly attracting extra help. Glidng shoud be kept simple and the ability to operate them equally so. The MAA is not really in being to accommodate our needs therefore we should align ourselves with a suitable system that offers an adequate alternative.
Speaking as someone in the organisation currently, I know I speak for many when I say we simply don't see that happening.
The RAF and the MoD hates the risk it exposes them to, and if they can reduce / remove that risk and cost, they will.
With certain other changes in the air cadets in the last couple of years it'll be a minor miracle if the entire organisation is still here in 15-20 years time.
The RAF and the MoD hates the risk it exposes them to, and if they can reduce / remove that risk and cost, they will.
With certain other changes in the air cadets in the last couple of years it'll be a minor miracle if the entire organisation is still here in 15-20 years time.
CHUG We well know how the MGSP kept us going, but they were staffed by properly trained tradesmen under the 'control' of the then centres, who in turn were backed up by tech qualified staff at HQ, who in turn had regular contact with Slingsby. Hardly a complicated system, which actually worked well and was able to adapt very quickly to replacing a machine quickly if needed. As far as the Air Cadets are concerned when we lost a UK manufacturer and the in house facility we lost control of everything. The GSA were already operating under BGA criteria so why did the largest glider fleet in the country allow itself to become 'contractor bound' to the point that know one knew what was (or was not) happening. At least the past few years has blown the myth so hopefully we will not go down this route again. Lots of money has been made by contractors not doing the business, and this must never happen again.
I admire your determination to get ATC and CCF Cadets back in the air and soloed again. I respect the selfless dedication of all those like you who set me and thousands of other prospective pilots on their first faltering steps into the air. I can only wish you all well. I suggest that if the ACO is going to rise to the skies again it does so outside of the MOD, just as Military Air Regulation and Accident Investigation must.
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Gents,
Responding to Pobjoy's, Chugalug's and Tuc's recent posts: I'm sorry to restate stuff I've previously posted, but trying to pin this on greedy contractors and contractorisation in general is, in my view (and thats all it is) not only missing the point, but also risks not identifying the real issues - and who was actually accountable.
To repeat - in my direct experience, having managed contractorised support for complex operational front line aircraft, the ultimate responsibility for the quality of such support lies firmly with the owning authority (in my case a Naval Air Station's Air Engineering Department). We were accountable for the oversight and management of the work carried out, which is why we took some care to have the work checked out, and to review the qualifications of every person working on our aircraft. We also made the contractors subject to our in house quality checks.
There isn't enough info on what happened with the contractorised support of the RAF's glider fleet (I did place a number of FOI request on this matter, all were refused on commercial confidentiality grounds) but there were clear admissions of failures by the RAF to carry out basic QA checks on the contractors. Here's the thing - these are failures at relatively low rank levels. As Tuc points out, all of this comes under the heading of failing to implement existing instructions and regulations. People were just not doing the stuff that they were to be doing. And what makes this really terrifying is the answer to the simple question: 'Did this only happen to ATC aircraft?'
The truthful answer to that has to be 'Don't know', because, and it hurts me to say it, the RAF is not very good at asking those sorts of questions of itself. Nor is the MoD, and I split these two because there are two important aspects to any airworthiness issue - the first is the procurement system (the 'MoD') doing its job by delivering an airworthy aircraft and sustaining that airworthiness through its life. The demise of Slingsby generated a number of challenges which, it appears clear, the MoD failed to tackle properly.
The second aspect is carrying out the required activity recording, maintenance and modifications required to maintain airworthiness in service. Here's where the RAF dropped the ball, and in my honest view appear to have dropped it big time. I'd offer the observation that when the glider scandal broke, the FTS staff clearly had a very poor grasp of how serious it was and what it would take to fix things - witness the repeated collapse of recovery plan after recovery plan. That lack of grasp indicates to me that it was some time since key people had been doing what they should have been doing. They just didn't appear to know what 'right' looked or sounded like.
My honest and regretful conclusion (speaking as a grateful ex ATC cadet) would be to can the whole exercise and give it over to a civilian organisation who can manage the safety aspects in a sensible and professional way. For the record, I don't agree with using public funds to fly schoolchildren in military aircraft to assist with RAF recruiting. Thats just my opinion, I know others will disagree.
Best Regards as ever to all those fine and honest people out there still picking up the pieces of all this,
Engines
Responding to Pobjoy's, Chugalug's and Tuc's recent posts: I'm sorry to restate stuff I've previously posted, but trying to pin this on greedy contractors and contractorisation in general is, in my view (and thats all it is) not only missing the point, but also risks not identifying the real issues - and who was actually accountable.
To repeat - in my direct experience, having managed contractorised support for complex operational front line aircraft, the ultimate responsibility for the quality of such support lies firmly with the owning authority (in my case a Naval Air Station's Air Engineering Department). We were accountable for the oversight and management of the work carried out, which is why we took some care to have the work checked out, and to review the qualifications of every person working on our aircraft. We also made the contractors subject to our in house quality checks.
There isn't enough info on what happened with the contractorised support of the RAF's glider fleet (I did place a number of FOI request on this matter, all were refused on commercial confidentiality grounds) but there were clear admissions of failures by the RAF to carry out basic QA checks on the contractors. Here's the thing - these are failures at relatively low rank levels. As Tuc points out, all of this comes under the heading of failing to implement existing instructions and regulations. People were just not doing the stuff that they were to be doing. And what makes this really terrifying is the answer to the simple question: 'Did this only happen to ATC aircraft?'
The truthful answer to that has to be 'Don't know', because, and it hurts me to say it, the RAF is not very good at asking those sorts of questions of itself. Nor is the MoD, and I split these two because there are two important aspects to any airworthiness issue - the first is the procurement system (the 'MoD') doing its job by delivering an airworthy aircraft and sustaining that airworthiness through its life. The demise of Slingsby generated a number of challenges which, it appears clear, the MoD failed to tackle properly.
The second aspect is carrying out the required activity recording, maintenance and modifications required to maintain airworthiness in service. Here's where the RAF dropped the ball, and in my honest view appear to have dropped it big time. I'd offer the observation that when the glider scandal broke, the FTS staff clearly had a very poor grasp of how serious it was and what it would take to fix things - witness the repeated collapse of recovery plan after recovery plan. That lack of grasp indicates to me that it was some time since key people had been doing what they should have been doing. They just didn't appear to know what 'right' looked or sounded like.
My honest and regretful conclusion (speaking as a grateful ex ATC cadet) would be to can the whole exercise and give it over to a civilian organisation who can manage the safety aspects in a sensible and professional way. For the record, I don't agree with using public funds to fly schoolchildren in military aircraft to assist with RAF recruiting. Thats just my opinion, I know others will disagree.
Best Regards as ever to all those fine and honest people out there still picking up the pieces of all this,
Engines
I agree with Engines. Well, I would. We're of similar age and were taught in the same system. Our Bible was NAMMS, and training centered on how to implement it, and ensuring it was implemented. It's how I know what would have avoided so many unnecessary deaths; for example, the XX177 accident I mentioned, which was itself a recurrence. (Flt Lts Cunningham and Burgess). Same part of the RAF and MoD as gliding.
There is one subtlety I'd like to add, which I think was largely invisible to many...
It is correct to look at the RAF and 'MoD' separately in this way. But there came a time when MoD(PE) regarded maintaining airworthiness as the 'rump end of PE' (our Director, in 1990, when advising us the work on equipment was being transferred to AMSO, and us with it). The line between the RAF and MoD blurred even further, as the RAF had already taken over supply management of RN and Army avionics.
AMSO (Director General Support Management) immediately put into practice two policies.
First, all admin staff were to be regarded as senior to any engineer. A young lady supply manager, 3 grades below me, was appointed my line manager. She was horrified, especially as the first request she received was from a unit wanting a briefing on an engineering investigation into power supplies in Engines' Sea Harrier radar. She baulked at this, but the majority at Harrogate revelled in this new-found authority. Senior officers gloated, 'We now have complete control'. Perhaps, but who's going to do the work? You can imagine the effect. Simple matters such as technical and financial approvals (which can only be delegated to an engineer) ground to a halt once these young clerks realised what they were signing for, and the legal implications given the policy coincided with us losing Crown Immunity. In short order, groundings were being mooted and cannibalisation became the de facto maintenance policy in many areas. Which itself brings extra layers of paperwork. And from this policy arose the concept of administrators self-delegating airworthiness approval, which led to many deaths. Something the MAA has only got to grips with in recent years.
Second, and making matters infinitely worse, was the quite deliberate policy to run down airworthiness management, to make savings at the expense of safety. A phrase later adopted by Haddon-Cave. (You don't think he made it up?!) Funding was cut, by over 25% a year for 3 years; and by January 1993 all of what I would term practical airworthiness management had ceased, simply by withholding funding. The RAF Director of Flight Safety railed against this from August 1992-on, but the money was used to compensate for waste elsewhere. No money, no work getting done, so our posts disappeared. Off back to PE. The RAF, now responsible for maintaining airworthiness across all equipment, were left with a few specialists who decided they were too old to up sticks to Bristol. In fact, only two that I can recall, from a department of 39. PE remained responsible for most of the aircraft themselves, but what aircraft is truly airworthy if you can't prove the equipment in it is, and mandated safety cases don't exist? Hence, for example, in June 1994 the Chinook's Fuel Computers, Navigation and Comms systems were 'not to be relied upon in any way whatsoever'; a restriction only lifted in January 1998. Gliders? No valid safety case. Hawk? Ditto. Same people, same policies.
All this may seem a long time ago. But, demonstrably, the effect was still being felt in 2009 (Nimrod Review), and as recently as 2018 (Cunningham trial), where nobody in court had the slightest idea what really killed him; never mind that it was traceable to these RAF policies. And, of course, gliders are not the first to suffer, Nimrod being scrapped for the same reasons.
As with Engines, I find myself repeating myself. But it is clear from the majority of posts here that history is being forgotten.
There is one subtlety I'd like to add, which I think was largely invisible to many...
the RAF is not very good at asking those sorts of questions of itself. Nor is the MoD, and I split these two because there are two important aspects to any airworthiness issue - the first is the procurement system (the 'MoD') doing its job by delivering an airworthy aircraft and sustaining that airworthiness through its life. The demise of Slingsby generated a number of challenges which, it appears clear, the MoD failed to tackle properly.
AMSO (Director General Support Management) immediately put into practice two policies.
First, all admin staff were to be regarded as senior to any engineer. A young lady supply manager, 3 grades below me, was appointed my line manager. She was horrified, especially as the first request she received was from a unit wanting a briefing on an engineering investigation into power supplies in Engines' Sea Harrier radar. She baulked at this, but the majority at Harrogate revelled in this new-found authority. Senior officers gloated, 'We now have complete control'. Perhaps, but who's going to do the work? You can imagine the effect. Simple matters such as technical and financial approvals (which can only be delegated to an engineer) ground to a halt once these young clerks realised what they were signing for, and the legal implications given the policy coincided with us losing Crown Immunity. In short order, groundings were being mooted and cannibalisation became the de facto maintenance policy in many areas. Which itself brings extra layers of paperwork. And from this policy arose the concept of administrators self-delegating airworthiness approval, which led to many deaths. Something the MAA has only got to grips with in recent years.
Second, and making matters infinitely worse, was the quite deliberate policy to run down airworthiness management, to make savings at the expense of safety. A phrase later adopted by Haddon-Cave. (You don't think he made it up?!) Funding was cut, by over 25% a year for 3 years; and by January 1993 all of what I would term practical airworthiness management had ceased, simply by withholding funding. The RAF Director of Flight Safety railed against this from August 1992-on, but the money was used to compensate for waste elsewhere. No money, no work getting done, so our posts disappeared. Off back to PE. The RAF, now responsible for maintaining airworthiness across all equipment, were left with a few specialists who decided they were too old to up sticks to Bristol. In fact, only two that I can recall, from a department of 39. PE remained responsible for most of the aircraft themselves, but what aircraft is truly airworthy if you can't prove the equipment in it is, and mandated safety cases don't exist? Hence, for example, in June 1994 the Chinook's Fuel Computers, Navigation and Comms systems were 'not to be relied upon in any way whatsoever'; a restriction only lifted in January 1998. Gliders? No valid safety case. Hawk? Ditto. Same people, same policies.
All this may seem a long time ago. But, demonstrably, the effect was still being felt in 2009 (Nimrod Review), and as recently as 2018 (Cunningham trial), where nobody in court had the slightest idea what really killed him; never mind that it was traceable to these RAF policies. And, of course, gliders are not the first to suffer, Nimrod being scrapped for the same reasons.
As with Engines, I find myself repeating myself. But it is clear from the majority of posts here that history is being forgotten.
Join Date: May 2014
Location: Hampshire
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