I agree with Engines. Well, I would. We're of similar age and were taught in the same system. Our Bible was NAMMS, and training centered on how to implement it, and ensuring it was implemented. It's how I know what would have avoided so many unnecessary deaths; for example, the XX177 accident I mentioned, which was itself a recurrence. (Flt Lts Cunningham and Burgess). Same part of the RAF and MoD as gliding.
There is one subtlety I'd like to add, which I think was largely invisible to many...
Originally Posted by
Engines
the RAF is not very good at asking those sorts of questions of itself. Nor is the MoD, and I split these two because there are two important aspects to any airworthiness issue - the first is the procurement system (the 'MoD') doing its job by delivering an airworthy aircraft and sustaining that airworthiness through its life. The demise of Slingsby generated a number of challenges which, it appears clear, the MoD failed to tackle properly.
It is correct to look at the RAF and 'MoD' separately in this way. But there came a time when MoD(PE) regarded maintaining airworthiness as the 'rump end of PE' (our Director, in 1990, when advising us the work on equipment was being transferred to AMSO, and us with it). The line between the RAF and MoD blurred even further, as the RAF had already taken over supply management of RN and Army avionics.
AMSO (Director General Support Management) immediately put into practice two policies.
First, all admin staff were to be regarded as senior to any engineer. A young lady supply manager, 3 grades below me, was appointed my line manager. She was horrified, especially as the first request she received was from a unit wanting a briefing on an engineering investigation into power supplies in Engines' Sea Harrier radar. She baulked at this, but the majority at Harrogate revelled in this new-found authority. Senior officers gloated, 'We now have complete control'. Perhaps, but who's going to do the work? You can imagine the effect. Simple matters such as technical and financial approvals (which can only be delegated to an engineer) ground to a halt once these young clerks realised what they were signing for, and the legal implications given the policy coincided with us losing Crown Immunity. In short order, groundings were being mooted and cannibalisation became the de facto maintenance policy in many areas. Which itself brings extra layers of paperwork. And from this policy arose the concept of administrators self-delegating airworthiness approval, which led to many deaths. Something the MAA has only got to grips with in recent years.
Second, and making matters infinitely worse, was the quite deliberate policy to run down airworthiness management, to make savings at the expense of safety. A phrase later adopted by Haddon-Cave. (You don't think he made it up?!) Funding was cut, by over 25% a year for 3 years; and by January 1993 all of what I would term practical airworthiness management had ceased, simply by withholding funding. The RAF Director of Flight Safety railed against this from August 1992-on, but the money was used to compensate for waste elsewhere. No money, no work getting done, so our posts disappeared. Off back to PE. The RAF, now responsible for maintaining airworthiness across all equipment, were left with a few specialists who decided they were too old to up sticks to Bristol. In fact, only two that I can recall, from a department of 39. PE remained responsible for most of the aircraft themselves, but what aircraft is truly airworthy if you can't prove the equipment in it is, and mandated safety cases don't exist? Hence, for example, in June 1994 the Chinook's Fuel Computers, Navigation and Comms systems were 'not to be relied upon in any way whatsoever'; a restriction only lifted in January 1998. Gliders? No valid safety case. Hawk? Ditto. Same people, same policies.
All this may seem a long time ago. But, demonstrably, the effect was still being felt in 2009 (Nimrod Review), and as recently as 2018 (Cunningham trial), where nobody in court had the slightest idea what really killed him; never mind that it was traceable to these RAF policies. And, of course, gliders are not the first to suffer, Nimrod being scrapped for the same reasons.
As with Engines, I find myself repeating myself. But it is clear from the majority of posts here that history is being forgotten.