Air Cadets grounded?
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Ive watched this thread for some time, and have hesitated to post. However, as an ex Air Cadet who was inspired by my ATC flying to become an aircraft engineer, I would like to offer some observations that might help stimulate discussion.
There's a focus on what the contractor did, which is understandable. However, in my view there needs to be an equally strong focus on the 'customer area', specifically what the TAA (Type Airworthiness Authority, which is the PT) - the CAMO (specifically what the CAE(Chief Air Engineer) have been doing, and the activities of the various Duty Holders.
In 2010, with a bit of fanfare, the Air Cadet fleet was brought under the stewardship of the mainstream RAF, and an apparently comprehensive organisation put in place, including technical officers at every gliding squadron (according to Wiki - sorry, it's all I have to go on), and a chain of ever more senior officers, all 'in charge'. Plus a shiny new HQ replete with new facilities at some cost to the taxpayer. It also appears that Serco had been maintaining the aircraft under a contract that was originally placed in 2008.
I can only guess that a complete chain of RAF Duty Holders (DHs), CAE, TAA, and SO posts was established in 2010 or thereabouts, because if it hadn't been the aircraft should not have been flying on the military register. These post holders, particularly the TAA and the CAE, would have had to carry out the necessary oversight and assurance of the aircraft maintenance activity to make the statements required by the MAA regs.
I'd also expect that well before 2014, the MAA would have carried out some form of assurance activity on the PT's TAA activities as well as 22Gp's CAMO organisation, and their evidence trails, to allow DGMAA to make his required declarations about the Vigilant and Viking fleets.
So my first question is this. What were the MoD and RAF responsible engineers and engineer officers doing to 'assure air safety' between 2010 and 2014, while the Viking and Vigilant fleets were apparently being so comprehensively trashed? My second is this - what was the MAA doing to assure 'air safety'?
I sincerely hope that the MAA is starting an investigation to find out what appended to the 'assurance chain' between 2010 and 2014. But I'd not be surprised if the MAA had a problem trying to investigate itself.
A final thought. These are simple, robust, mass produced aircraft designed to be maintained and operated with minimal facilities and effort. Any competent military aircraft engineering organisation should have been able to keep these machines in tip top condition with absolutely no problem, even with a contractor involved. Guys, this is basic stuff. Unless maniacs have been hacking the airframes about with band saws and gaffer tape, they should and could be back in the air in days and weeks. Thoughts?
Best regards as ever to those trying to pick up the pieces at the coal face.
Engines
There's a focus on what the contractor did, which is understandable. However, in my view there needs to be an equally strong focus on the 'customer area', specifically what the TAA (Type Airworthiness Authority, which is the PT) - the CAMO (specifically what the CAE(Chief Air Engineer) have been doing, and the activities of the various Duty Holders.
In 2010, with a bit of fanfare, the Air Cadet fleet was brought under the stewardship of the mainstream RAF, and an apparently comprehensive organisation put in place, including technical officers at every gliding squadron (according to Wiki - sorry, it's all I have to go on), and a chain of ever more senior officers, all 'in charge'. Plus a shiny new HQ replete with new facilities at some cost to the taxpayer. It also appears that Serco had been maintaining the aircraft under a contract that was originally placed in 2008.
I can only guess that a complete chain of RAF Duty Holders (DHs), CAE, TAA, and SO posts was established in 2010 or thereabouts, because if it hadn't been the aircraft should not have been flying on the military register. These post holders, particularly the TAA and the CAE, would have had to carry out the necessary oversight and assurance of the aircraft maintenance activity to make the statements required by the MAA regs.
I'd also expect that well before 2014, the MAA would have carried out some form of assurance activity on the PT's TAA activities as well as 22Gp's CAMO organisation, and their evidence trails, to allow DGMAA to make his required declarations about the Vigilant and Viking fleets.
So my first question is this. What were the MoD and RAF responsible engineers and engineer officers doing to 'assure air safety' between 2010 and 2014, while the Viking and Vigilant fleets were apparently being so comprehensively trashed? My second is this - what was the MAA doing to assure 'air safety'?
I sincerely hope that the MAA is starting an investigation to find out what appended to the 'assurance chain' between 2010 and 2014. But I'd not be surprised if the MAA had a problem trying to investigate itself.
A final thought. These are simple, robust, mass produced aircraft designed to be maintained and operated with minimal facilities and effort. Any competent military aircraft engineering organisation should have been able to keep these machines in tip top condition with absolutely no problem, even with a contractor involved. Guys, this is basic stuff. Unless maniacs have been hacking the airframes about with band saws and gaffer tape, they should and could be back in the air in days and weeks. Thoughts?
Best regards as ever to those trying to pick up the pieces at the coal face.
Engines
Limited Tech Expertise
Engines
If you trawl back in the thread i think there have been many posts alluding to the lamentable 'Tech Back up' from both Syerston and the 'system' that was supposed to support them.
The problem is a lack of hands on tech experience in the system as apart from the idea that understanding the paperwork and regulations is actually providing maintenance to a satisfactory standard. To be fair the fleet is not exactly falling apart or has given the operators (The VGS) much grief therefore it seems that although the sharp end was not 100% they were actually providing satisfactory service but were not part of a system that had any idea of what was required.
When the RAF got involved with this new technology (Glass gliders/SLMG) they did in fact have some in house expertise within the RAF GSA which itself operated in conjunction with the BGA.
The expertise on tech matters with gliding is still with the BGA (operating to EASA standards) therefore the RAF should stop trying to 'militarise' something simple but operate to the best standards in current practice. Ultimately the buck stops with the CLIENT (MOD/RAF) who for many reasons has failed to ensure that a satisfactory system actually existed to satisfy their own requirements.What i do not understand is why Syerston as the full time staffed centre of ATC gliding was not 'alerted' to the current situation long before a grounding was required.
If you trawl back in the thread i think there have been many posts alluding to the lamentable 'Tech Back up' from both Syerston and the 'system' that was supposed to support them.
The problem is a lack of hands on tech experience in the system as apart from the idea that understanding the paperwork and regulations is actually providing maintenance to a satisfactory standard. To be fair the fleet is not exactly falling apart or has given the operators (The VGS) much grief therefore it seems that although the sharp end was not 100% they were actually providing satisfactory service but were not part of a system that had any idea of what was required.
When the RAF got involved with this new technology (Glass gliders/SLMG) they did in fact have some in house expertise within the RAF GSA which itself operated in conjunction with the BGA.
The expertise on tech matters with gliding is still with the BGA (operating to EASA standards) therefore the RAF should stop trying to 'militarise' something simple but operate to the best standards in current practice. Ultimately the buck stops with the CLIENT (MOD/RAF) who for many reasons has failed to ensure that a satisfactory system actually existed to satisfy their own requirements.What i do not understand is why Syerston as the full time staffed centre of ATC gliding was not 'alerted' to the current situation long before a grounding was required.
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<snip>
A final thought. These are simple, robust, mass produced aircraft designed to be maintained and operated with minimal facilities and effort. Any competent military aircraft engineering organisation should have been able to keep these machines in tip top condition with absolutely no problem, even with a contractor involved. Guys, this is basic stuff. Unless maniacs have been hacking the airframes about with band saws and gaffer tape, they should and could be back in the air in days and weeks. Thoughts?
Best regards as ever to those trying to pick up the pieces at the coal face.
Engines
A final thought. These are simple, robust, mass produced aircraft designed to be maintained and operated with minimal facilities and effort. Any competent military aircraft engineering organisation should have been able to keep these machines in tip top condition with absolutely no problem, even with a contractor involved. Guys, this is basic stuff. Unless maniacs have been hacking the airframes about with band saws and gaffer tape, they should and could be back in the air in days and weeks. Thoughts?
Best regards as ever to those trying to pick up the pieces at the coal face.
Engines
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Like Engines I've watched this thread from afar, not wishing to comment, but have tried to keep up with what is happening on the ground through contact with my old colleagues on the Sqn.
Considering the damage that has been done to the ACO as a whole, with the word "Air" almost totally removed from the name of the organisation, let me be (possibly) the first one to ask the question that is the Elephant-In-The-Room. Is anyone going to prison over this? Has the law been broken and if so, civil or military?
McG
Considering the damage that has been done to the ACO as a whole, with the word "Air" almost totally removed from the name of the organisation, let me be (possibly) the first one to ask the question that is the Elephant-In-The-Room. Is anyone going to prison over this? Has the law been broken and if so, civil or military?
McG
Is Someone Going To Prison Over This
342 Of course no one is going anywhere regarding this for the simple reason no one person is responsible;nor should they be.
The 'system' has screwed up because of the general lack of Tech expertise within it.
You can have as many meetings and committees as you want but unless there is some actual Tech competence* involved it means nothing.
This* starts with the manufacturer who is best placed to advise on the aircraft he designed and made.
He will have also planned and published a maintenance schedule and advised on repair schemes,plus issued AW notices as required.
Even if that company (on paper) has finished there are usually a core of engineers still in the 'reborn' company who can be used for advice. (Grob are in that situation). The ATC has been the ONLY user of their fleet and the nature of the organisation means the control of the aircraft has been excellent;in that there will be plenty of evidence of use and locations.
This takes a huge amount of the 'unknown' out of building up a history of any machine.As regarding the risk of unreported issues then again the nature of the operation would require a substantial 'cover up' and i do not think the VGS organisation is at all likely to be party to that.The highest probability of reducing the airworthiness of a glider is in a de-rig / rig scenario, however the VGS seem to have been quite capable of maintaining safe practice in this.
As stated before we are talking about SIMPLE TECHNOLOGY that at the worst requires a 'manufacturer quality inspection' to re certify. To be at the current stage we are at 18 Months later confirms that those 'in place' where the decisions are made are not competent to deliver this recovery in a reasonable timescale.The VGS element in this have shown far more actual competence in operating the fleet than the PAID STAFF in the system controlling them.
The 'system' has screwed up because of the general lack of Tech expertise within it.
You can have as many meetings and committees as you want but unless there is some actual Tech competence* involved it means nothing.
This* starts with the manufacturer who is best placed to advise on the aircraft he designed and made.
He will have also planned and published a maintenance schedule and advised on repair schemes,plus issued AW notices as required.
Even if that company (on paper) has finished there are usually a core of engineers still in the 'reborn' company who can be used for advice. (Grob are in that situation). The ATC has been the ONLY user of their fleet and the nature of the organisation means the control of the aircraft has been excellent;in that there will be plenty of evidence of use and locations.
This takes a huge amount of the 'unknown' out of building up a history of any machine.As regarding the risk of unreported issues then again the nature of the operation would require a substantial 'cover up' and i do not think the VGS organisation is at all likely to be party to that.The highest probability of reducing the airworthiness of a glider is in a de-rig / rig scenario, however the VGS seem to have been quite capable of maintaining safe practice in this.
As stated before we are talking about SIMPLE TECHNOLOGY that at the worst requires a 'manufacturer quality inspection' to re certify. To be at the current stage we are at 18 Months later confirms that those 'in place' where the decisions are made are not competent to deliver this recovery in a reasonable timescale.The VGS element in this have shown far more actual competence in operating the fleet than the PAID STAFF in the system controlling them.
Last edited by POBJOY; 10th Nov 2015 at 10:57.
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Pobjoy,
Well said, and entirely logical. Given that the two fleets were maintained by and under direct control of the RAF until a few years ago, and furthermore that the very much underrated, and underestimated VGS staff have diligently A/F and B/F ' d and OOPS'd them then flown them, I doubt that there would be huge issues that could have remained undiscovered and which could not have been checked on a planned rolling clearance long ago.
I would be extremely interested to see what exactly are the suspected major airworthiness issues.
All of the many that I have served alongside, including former aircrew and ATPL's , qualified Aeronautical graduate engineers and many other varieties of professional including myself would never have entertained the thought of taking to the air in anything having the slightest hint of a problem - they too have wives and young families and all were greatly aware of the huge responsibility of flying our young ATC and CCF Cadets. 🔦
Well said, and entirely logical. Given that the two fleets were maintained by and under direct control of the RAF until a few years ago, and furthermore that the very much underrated, and underestimated VGS staff have diligently A/F and B/F ' d and OOPS'd them then flown them, I doubt that there would be huge issues that could have remained undiscovered and which could not have been checked on a planned rolling clearance long ago.
I would be extremely interested to see what exactly are the suspected major airworthiness issues.
All of the many that I have served alongside, including former aircrew and ATPL's , qualified Aeronautical graduate engineers and many other varieties of professional including myself would never have entertained the thought of taking to the air in anything having the slightest hint of a problem - they too have wives and young families and all were greatly aware of the huge responsibility of flying our young ATC and CCF Cadets. 🔦
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On a matter of military etiquette the Commandant of 2 FTS wears "wings" on his uniform but if he failed the Nav/Pilot crossover "thingy" is he still entitled to wear his RAF wings or are they glider pilot wings?
I am just curious as an ex-VRT Officer I know who was also a senior British Airways Jumbo pilot had a very tough time with the Commandant so much so that he felt obliged to leave the Corps.
A touch of envy perhaps?
I am just curious as an ex-VRT Officer I know who was also a senior British Airways Jumbo pilot had a very tough time with the Commandant so much so that he felt obliged to leave the Corps.
A touch of envy perhaps?
I heard a rumour last night that Southern Sailplanes has been contracted to return 48 Vikings to flying status and that Serco will not have a new support contract, but Babcock will.
I don't think he failed the crossover from Navigator to Pilot. I believe he had more than 6 months operational as a pilot on the Vulcan, so can keep his wings. I believe he failed the subsequent fast jet pilot 'crossover' which is when he returned to being a Navigator. Incidentally QWI both ground attack and air defence both F4 and Tornado.
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The entitlement to wear the RAF Flying Badge or 'wings' is covered in QR (J) 727. In order to retain wings it is necessary to have been designated as combat ready (CR) in role rather than just doing 6 months in role. It is very unusual to find a pilot who was CR on one type and who subsequently failed a fast-jet crossover to be re-roled as a navigator; they would normally either revert to type or re-train on another multi (or helo) or go to be a QFI.
I have however, flown with several navigators who were pilots but who failed to get CR and were re-roled as navigators. In this case their entitlement to wear pilot's wings ceased and so they could not just elect to wear pilot's wings if they felt like it.
I cannot explain why someone who went through an entire and successful career as a navigator would want to wear pilot's wings.
I have however, flown with several navigators who were pilots but who failed to get CR and were re-roled as navigators. In this case their entitlement to wear pilot's wings ceased and so they could not just elect to wear pilot's wings if they felt like it.
I cannot explain why someone who went through an entire and successful career as a navigator would want to wear pilot's wings.
Gentleman Aviator
One was never a V-Force person, but I understand that some co-pilots, although operational as co-pilots (CR not a term used in them days), failed to become captains on that or - in some cases - any other type.
So they would retain the entitlement to wear "The Flying Badge". That said, if they subsequently were employed as a Nav (or other brevet wearer) then IIRC other rules apply.
Along the lines of: if entitled to wear more than one flying badge/brevet, you have to wear the one appropriate to the post you are currently filling. If not filling such a post, you can wear any to which you are entitled.
One was once acquainted with another such ex-V co-pilot who became a Provost Officer (of quite some seniority). He wore his wings.
So while JM is perhaps making a point (and why not?) - IMHO he is within the letter of the law.....
Random - most pilots could!! 
So they would retain the entitlement to wear "The Flying Badge". That said, if they subsequently were employed as a Nav (or other brevet wearer) then IIRC other rules apply.
Along the lines of: if entitled to wear more than one flying badge/brevet, you have to wear the one appropriate to the post you are currently filling. If not filling such a post, you can wear any to which you are entitled.
One was once acquainted with another such ex-V co-pilot who became a Provost Officer (of quite some seniority). He wore his wings.
So while JM is perhaps making a point (and why not?) - IMHO he is within the letter of the law.....
I cannot explain why someone who went through an entire and successful career as a navigator would want to wear pilot's wings.
Return to flying status
1.3 VS Sounds like very good news 1.3, So no reason why the 'users' of the fleet can not start to get current again,and be ready for 2016.
POBJOY,
What I didn't get from rumour control is a timescale, but - if the rumour is true - then it has to be good news for air cadet gliding in the longer term.
What I didn't get from rumour control is a timescale, but - if the rumour is true - then it has to be good news for air cadet gliding in the longer term.
Timescale
All we need now is some decent 'Leadership' in the system to 'enable all this'.
Perhaps they could get all the CO's/CFI's of all the VGS together and choose a group of say (6) as a hands on steering group** to ensure the important information is properly looked at before ongoing decisions are made.
This could be a temporary but urgent 'fix' until the system gets going again and at least will reduce the timescale of decisions.
It would also ensure that whoever is to be the OC will have to show actual leadership and competence rather than Rank and position.
When you see the pictures of Syerston and all those pristine facilities it is to no ones credit that behind the facade lurked a complete failure of any ability to prevent a TWO SEASON shutdown of a service that they were tasked to provide.
** This is an entirely reasonable answer to a difficult situation that any large organisation would employ to aid a recovery.
Perhaps they could get all the CO's/CFI's of all the VGS together and choose a group of say (6) as a hands on steering group** to ensure the important information is properly looked at before ongoing decisions are made.
This could be a temporary but urgent 'fix' until the system gets going again and at least will reduce the timescale of decisions.
It would also ensure that whoever is to be the OC will have to show actual leadership and competence rather than Rank and position.
When you see the pictures of Syerston and all those pristine facilities it is to no ones credit that behind the facade lurked a complete failure of any ability to prevent a TWO SEASON shutdown of a service that they were tasked to provide.
** This is an entirely reasonable answer to a difficult situation that any large organisation would employ to aid a recovery.
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Babcock contract
Sounds about right in terms of the Serious Rumour Squad ! However if only 48 Vikings - what about the rest, and more importantly what about the Vigilants ? And what about airfields, locations and staff - assuming there are a few still hanging on ??
If they treat as a "rush" job, who knows, some activity may resume in 2016, at some airfields, with some staff, tea and medals all round whoopee (Not !)
IMHO the whole business is a disgrace and should be examined by the Defence Select Committee to ascertain who is /was in the hot seat and what sanctions are being applied.
If they treat as a "rush" job, who knows, some activity may resume in 2016, at some airfields, with some staff, tea and medals all round whoopee (Not !)
IMHO the whole business is a disgrace and should be examined by the Defence Select Committee to ascertain who is /was in the hot seat and what sanctions are being applied.
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On second thoughts.............
I wonder how this rumour squares with the MoD Invitation to Tender on this link for a "Glider integrated operating support contract" to run w.e.f.25/4/2016 to cover RAF glider fleet (approximately 65 Vigilant self-launched motor gliders (SLMG) and approximately 80 Viking conventional winch launched gliders. See the link :-
http://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOT...5:TEXT:EN:HTML
(with contract award anticipated for late spring 2016 )
All answers on a postcard to PPrune, best answer provided will be awarded a ground tour of RAF ACCGS Syerston to examine the polished floors and read the new GOB which should extend the "pause" well into 2017.
http://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOT...5:TEXT:EN:HTML
(with contract award anticipated for late spring 2016 )
All answers on a postcard to PPrune, best answer provided will be awarded a ground tour of RAF ACCGS Syerston to examine the polished floors and read the new GOB which should extend the "pause" well into 2017.
Steering Group
Hang on Enigma they have not formed the group yet.!
There are only 8 Viking Squadrons so the best chance of ANY recovery is to start with them,as the aircraft will be relatively easy to to 'approve',and there are less issues with the equipment.
It may well be possible to convert some Vig operations to Vik if their locations are suitable.
As for the Vig fleet we do not know the financial cost of the ongoing position,or even if there IS an ongoing position.
If the air frame life is sufficient to upgrade then a replacement engine is not out of order plus the existing side by side set up suits AE work well,and the machine performs well in actual practice.
The organisation already has the Part task trainers in the system and the equipment also fits in well with the main AE fleet of the Grobs.
Yes this may lead to a reduced scale of operation (as per the RAF in general) however it does make real sense from a 'where we are situation'.
A modern engine upgrade for the 109 is available, and again not rocket science to perform although myself i would not go for one with a gearbox.
There are only 8 Viking Squadrons so the best chance of ANY recovery is to start with them,as the aircraft will be relatively easy to to 'approve',and there are less issues with the equipment.
It may well be possible to convert some Vig operations to Vik if their locations are suitable.
As for the Vig fleet we do not know the financial cost of the ongoing position,or even if there IS an ongoing position.
If the air frame life is sufficient to upgrade then a replacement engine is not out of order plus the existing side by side set up suits AE work well,and the machine performs well in actual practice.
The organisation already has the Part task trainers in the system and the equipment also fits in well with the main AE fleet of the Grobs.
Yes this may lead to a reduced scale of operation (as per the RAF in general) however it does make real sense from a 'where we are situation'.
A modern engine upgrade for the 109 is available, and again not rocket science to perform although myself i would not go for one with a gearbox.
Last edited by POBJOY; 13th Nov 2015 at 15:46.
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Steering Group ?
That's a death wish word - almost as bad as "handbrake". I do think that as you implied PobJoy, there is another agenda re the Vigilant. The snag is, that having planned some time ago, to re-engine the aircraft and planned funding, we then had this "pause" crisis, the economy waned/defence cuts, and the ship has sailed whilst they have all been grounded. Now, two years or more further on, the aircraft are older, less "life" and other factors have changed such as airfield availability, costs of getting the Vigilant back to service, availability of G 115 Tutor hours ( albeit that the sorties are not training per se, merely "experience" sorties of short duration) are all complicating factors that go into the Defence "Kenwood mixer". The end result, I fear, is that we will emerge from the crisis with a Viking fleet only aided by the 25 mission trainers, and on limited number of sites where the customers will have extensive travel, sometimes to no avail due to the variable weather, plus limited scope sorties at existing AEF's. I hope that I am wrong.......................