Ive watched this thread for some time, and have hesitated to post. However, as an ex Air Cadet who was inspired by my ATC flying to become an aircraft engineer, I would like to offer some observations that might help stimulate discussion.
There's a focus on what the contractor did, which is understandable. However, in my view there needs to be an equally strong focus on the 'customer area', specifically what the TAA (Type Airworthiness Authority, which is the PT) - the CAMO (specifically what the CAE(Chief Air Engineer) have been doing, and the activities of the various Duty Holders.
In 2010, with a bit of fanfare, the Air Cadet fleet was brought under the stewardship of the mainstream RAF, and an apparently comprehensive organisation put in place, including technical officers at every gliding squadron (according to Wiki - sorry, it's all I have to go on), and a chain of ever more senior officers, all 'in charge'. Plus a shiny new HQ replete with new facilities at some cost to the taxpayer. It also appears that Serco had been maintaining the aircraft under a contract that was originally placed in 2008.
I can only guess that a complete chain of RAF Duty Holders (DHs), CAE, TAA, and SO posts was established in 2010 or thereabouts, because if it hadn't been the aircraft should not have been flying on the military register. These post holders, particularly the TAA and the CAE, would have had to carry out the necessary oversight and assurance of the aircraft maintenance activity to make the statements required by the MAA regs.
I'd also expect that well before 2014, the MAA would have carried out some form of assurance activity on the PT's TAA activities as well as 22Gp's CAMO organisation, and their evidence trails, to allow DGMAA to make his required declarations about the Vigilant and Viking fleets.
So my first question is this. What were the MoD and RAF responsible engineers and engineer officers doing to 'assure air safety' between 2010 and 2014, while the Viking and Vigilant fleets were apparently being so comprehensively trashed? My second is this - what was the MAA doing to assure 'air safety'?
I sincerely hope that the MAA is starting an investigation to find out what appended to the 'assurance chain' between 2010 and 2014. But I'd not be surprised if the MAA had a problem trying to investigate itself.
A final thought. These are simple, robust, mass produced aircraft designed to be maintained and operated with minimal facilities and effort. Any competent military aircraft engineering organisation should have been able to keep these machines in tip top condition with absolutely no problem, even with a contractor involved. Guys, this is basic stuff. Unless maniacs have been hacking the airframes about with band saws and gaffer tape, they should and could be back in the air in days and weeks. Thoughts?
Best regards as ever to those trying to pick up the pieces at the coal face.
Engines