PQ17
Considering the effectiveness of the U-Boats during WWI....it begs the imagination to think they would be considered any less capable during the Second World War.
I believe you will find it was a competition for assets and resources that drove the decision making by the Admiralty and Air Ministry and not any really deep strategical thinking.....matter of fact all evidence would show the "strategic thinking" was flawed in the years leading up to the start of the War.
The American Military was no better equipped or prepared than the British for the onset of hostilities on a world wide scale. We at least had begun to ramp up production and grow our forces prior to the Pearl Harbor attack. Remember we had begun to escort Convoys prior to declaring war on Germany and had lost several combat vessels in that effort.
Look at the gross failure of the US Navy to heed the advice given by the RN re Convoys and inability to darken the lights along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts......killing how many hundreds of mariners. Our CNO was no great lover of things British as you may recall.
Montgomery and his "Bridge Too Far" adventure was yet another example of a Commander refusing to heed the input of his Intelligence Officers. We see how that turned out.
There were ample warnings of the Ardenne Offensive (Battle of the Bulge) that were ignored as well.
Some how I do not believe that an Officer upon receiving an Order takes the time to consider the factors that led to the issuance of that Order.....and way too many times Orders given from a great distance away from the battlefield seem to fly in the face of the tactical reality. Yet.....local Commanders obey the orders given from up the Chain of Command.....that is how the military operates.
I believe you will find it was a competition for assets and resources that drove the decision making by the Admiralty and Air Ministry and not any really deep strategical thinking.....matter of fact all evidence would show the "strategic thinking" was flawed in the years leading up to the start of the War.
The American Military was no better equipped or prepared than the British for the onset of hostilities on a world wide scale. We at least had begun to ramp up production and grow our forces prior to the Pearl Harbor attack. Remember we had begun to escort Convoys prior to declaring war on Germany and had lost several combat vessels in that effort.
Look at the gross failure of the US Navy to heed the advice given by the RN re Convoys and inability to darken the lights along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts......killing how many hundreds of mariners. Our CNO was no great lover of things British as you may recall.
Montgomery and his "Bridge Too Far" adventure was yet another example of a Commander refusing to heed the input of his Intelligence Officers. We see how that turned out.
There were ample warnings of the Ardenne Offensive (Battle of the Bulge) that were ignored as well.
Some how I do not believe that an Officer upon receiving an Order takes the time to consider the factors that led to the issuance of that Order.....and way too many times Orders given from a great distance away from the battlefield seem to fly in the face of the tactical reality. Yet.....local Commanders obey the orders given from up the Chain of Command.....that is how the military operates.
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I thought the story of the little armed trawler with his three ships in tow would have made a damned good film... It shows though in his award that he deserved higher, but for the disobeying of orders.
As for the Costal Command cover, that would appear to have been a suicide mission at that range and how would you maintain it? It's alright sticking 500 bombers over a distant target at a given time, but maintaining an air presence over hostile territory so far north for a sustained period would be impossible.
As for the Costal Command cover, that would appear to have been a suicide mission at that range and how would you maintain it? It's alright sticking 500 bombers over a distant target at a given time, but maintaining an air presence over hostile territory so far north for a sustained period would be impossible.
Bismarck and Tirpitz were essentially 50,000 tonne battleships rather than the 35,000 tonne allied battleships. The Germans had contravened the Washington naval treaty (which was intended to minimise an arms race) and this gave their ships a significant advantage. When it comes to battleship vs battleship combat they can be very brief and very singular, with insufficient time for team efforts by a 'squadron' to bear fruit. One should not use hindsight - the admiralty was rightly very worried about the Tirpitz.
( poor Pound was basically overworked to death despite his illness)
( poor Pound was basically overworked to death despite his illness)
Following the loss of the Bismarck and the Graf Spee.....would the Germans have risked the Tirpitz if the Heavy force had closed up on the Convoy to be located by German Aircraft and perhaps a U-Boat?
I would suggest not.....as it was their last big Ship....and Hitler would not countenance another propaganda disaster.
Perhaps that is why it did not deploy against the Convoy.
I would suggest not.....as it was their last big Ship....and Hitler would not countenance another propaganda disaster.
Perhaps that is why it did not deploy against the Convoy.
The destruction of this convoy in July, 1942 was Tirpitz' greatest, if indirect, success. Prime Minister Winston Churchill called the event, "one of the most melancholy naval episodes in the whole of the war."
In June, the Germans became aware that convoy PQ-17, consisting of 35 merchantmen plus escorts, would be heading for Russia late in the month. They assembled two battle groups to attack it: Battle Group 1 centered on Tirpitz, and Battle Group 2 centered on Lützow. These forces sortied on July 5, but some ships ran aground, others had mechanical problems; only Tirpitz, 2 cruisers, six destroyers managed to get out to the sea lanes. They headed for Bear Island, where convoy PQ-17 was reported, but aware that they had been spotted, returned to base the next day. Meanwhile the British understood that Tirpitz was preparing to attack the convoy. On this basis, the order was given for the convoy to scatter (a decision that has been subsequently questioned and challenged). For the merchant ships and their crews, the result was deadly. German aircraft and submarines, working together, sank 24 of the 35 ships.
And it all happened because the Admiralty thought that Tirpitz was in the area.
In June, the Germans became aware that convoy PQ-17, consisting of 35 merchantmen plus escorts, would be heading for Russia late in the month. They assembled two battle groups to attack it: Battle Group 1 centered on Tirpitz, and Battle Group 2 centered on Lützow. These forces sortied on July 5, but some ships ran aground, others had mechanical problems; only Tirpitz, 2 cruisers, six destroyers managed to get out to the sea lanes. They headed for Bear Island, where convoy PQ-17 was reported, but aware that they had been spotted, returned to base the next day. Meanwhile the British understood that Tirpitz was preparing to attack the convoy. On this basis, the order was given for the convoy to scatter (a decision that has been subsequently questioned and challenged). For the merchant ships and their crews, the result was deadly. German aircraft and submarines, working together, sank 24 of the 35 ships.
And it all happened because the Admiralty thought that Tirpitz was in the area.
PN, I'm not suggesting that Pound's order would not be easily countermanded. Almost certainly if it had been the order would have been executed making it very difficult to reform the convoy and escorts. The point I am making is that someone should have tipped off Pound's superiors that he was ignoring the advice of others and in doing so needlessly leaving PQ17 exposed to the very real menace of the U boats and the Luftwaffe. Who those superiors might be, I don't know. What they could do in the face of a fait accompli, I don't know. Would they do anything? Again I don't know. What I do know is that as many as possible that had been overridden that day should have alerted someone higher up the CoC. Conspiracy to Mutiny? So be it. One life, one career, against so many? The decision was so bizarre as to warrant challenging and reporting, and should have been.
Your V bomber example is inappropriate. Your Captain knew that order could come, and if he wasn't going to obey it the answer wasn't to disobey it but to offer to resign instead. Tough choices all.
I do not share the characterisation of the UK Officer Corps then by you and racedo as by accident of birth. The wartime realities meant that ability not birth counted for more. Pound was FSL because of his record and proven ability not because of his birth, but he was human and subject to its frailty. The RNMS should have been on to that. It failed him and the country.
racedo, I don't think 'diatribe' given the list of generalisations that you came out with amounted to personal abuse but rather fair comment. The discussion was about one VSO, one order, and the consequences of that order. It was you that expanded it out to condemnation of most holding (UK?) command. I thought that 'diatribe' summed it up well. I'm sorry that you disagree.
Your V bomber example is inappropriate. Your Captain knew that order could come, and if he wasn't going to obey it the answer wasn't to disobey it but to offer to resign instead. Tough choices all.
I do not share the characterisation of the UK Officer Corps then by you and racedo as by accident of birth. The wartime realities meant that ability not birth counted for more. Pound was FSL because of his record and proven ability not because of his birth, but he was human and subject to its frailty. The RNMS should have been on to that. It failed him and the country.
racedo, I don't think 'diatribe' given the list of generalisations that you came out with amounted to personal abuse but rather fair comment. The discussion was about one VSO, one order, and the consequences of that order. It was you that expanded it out to condemnation of most holding (UK?) command. I thought that 'diatribe' summed it up well. I'm sorry that you disagree.
BEags -they weren't all fighting Bismarck at once. Also PoW was not fully ready when sent out with Hood , not only that but Hood was hopelessly under armoured. It was hardly surprising that the first blood went to the Germans. Notwithstanding rudder damage, Bismarck had all her guns and armour intact at the final action.
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PN, I'm not suggesting that Pound's order would not be easily countermanded. Almost certainly if it had been the order would have been executed making it very difficult to reform the convoy and escorts.
The point I am making is that someone should have tipped off Pound's superiors that he was ignoring the advice of others and in doing so needlessly leaving PQ17 exposed to the very real menace of the U boats and the Luftwaffe.
He was a hero.
What I do know is that as many as possible that had been overridden that day should have alerted someone higher up the CoC.
One was Churchill and the other was the great one, Politics and Propaganda.
As you know, Stalin and King were very displeased and the civilian morale was still fragile and to punish a hero would not have helped.
I do not share the characterisation of the UK Officer Corps then by you and racedo as by accident of birth. The wartime realities meant that ability not birth counted for more. Pound was FSL because of his record and proven ability not because of his birth, but he was human and subject to its frailty.
No way was he not of the 19th Century officer class.
The same was true of Tovey was born on 7 March 1885 at Borley Hill, Rochester, Kent, the youngest child (of eleven) of Lt Col Hamilton Tovey, RE, and Maria Elizabeth Goodhue.[2] He was educated at Durnford School, Langton Matravers
2SL was a cadet in 1899.
Sorry if I misunderstood the situation re your captain, PN. Whatever it was, if he was contemplating disobeying an anticipated order then my reaction remains as was, ie don't!
By the same token I am not suggesting that Pound's order should have been disobeyed. Why should it have been? Those receiving it assumed that Tirpitz was out and close by. The trouble was that it wasn't. The only people who knew enough about it to know different were at the Admiralty. If the only person senior to Pound was Churchill, then he should have been told of their concerns about Pound. Instead the RN closed ranks and PQ17 was fed to the wolves.
Nor am I suggesting that Pound deserved punishment of any kind. On the contrary he had served his country well to this point, but he should have been retired on health grounds. As to his CV, what is the point that you are making? None of it suggests that he was FSL because of his birth, rather it was because of his ability. What is wrong with that? Are you suggesting that a wavy navy hostilities only FSL would have been better? PQ17's scatter was not because of Pound's birth but rather because of his health. We keep coming back to that and why it meant that others should have stepped in.
I can't see why that is so difficult to accept. Goodness knows there were examples of some who were never up to their job, and if you throw in accident of birth as well you end up with SAC SEAC, but he was hardly typical. British Commanders served us well on the whole, subject of course to the usual revisionists.
By the same token I am not suggesting that Pound's order should have been disobeyed. Why should it have been? Those receiving it assumed that Tirpitz was out and close by. The trouble was that it wasn't. The only people who knew enough about it to know different were at the Admiralty. If the only person senior to Pound was Churchill, then he should have been told of their concerns about Pound. Instead the RN closed ranks and PQ17 was fed to the wolves.
Nor am I suggesting that Pound deserved punishment of any kind. On the contrary he had served his country well to this point, but he should have been retired on health grounds. As to his CV, what is the point that you are making? None of it suggests that he was FSL because of his birth, rather it was because of his ability. What is wrong with that? Are you suggesting that a wavy navy hostilities only FSL would have been better? PQ17's scatter was not because of Pound's birth but rather because of his health. We keep coming back to that and why it meant that others should have stepped in.
I can't see why that is so difficult to accept. Goodness knows there were examples of some who were never up to their job, and if you throw in accident of birth as well you end up with SAC SEAC, but he was hardly typical. British Commanders served us well on the whole, subject of course to the usual revisionists.
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The loss of PQ17 cost 153 lives.
The loss of the Hood, leading a superior force against the Bismarck, at one stroke cost 1415 lives.
The PQ17 ships and cargo were replaceable.
The Hood was not. Its loss had an effect on operations in the Med and in the North Atlantic until much later in the war when the rest of the KGV class battleships were ready (and even then individually no match for the Tirpitz).
The bigger picture casts a different light on Pound's decision.
The Nelson Spirit is all very well but it is necessary to have the superior ships and gunnery to carry it off. In WW2 the RN did not have that luxury, dependent as it was for the first part on a largely WW1-built battle fleet.
The loss of the Hood, leading a superior force against the Bismarck, at one stroke cost 1415 lives.
The PQ17 ships and cargo were replaceable.
The Hood was not. Its loss had an effect on operations in the Med and in the North Atlantic until much later in the war when the rest of the KGV class battleships were ready (and even then individually no match for the Tirpitz).
The bigger picture casts a different light on Pound's decision.
The Nelson Spirit is all very well but it is necessary to have the superior ships and gunnery to carry it off. In WW2 the RN did not have that luxury, dependent as it was for the first part on a largely WW1-built battle fleet.
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The only people who knew enough about it to know different were at the Admiralty. If the only person senior to Pound was Churchill, then he should have been told of their concerns about Pound. Instead the RN closed ranks and PQ17 was fed to the wolves.
Nor am I suggesting that Pound deserved punishment of any kind. On the contrary he had served his country well to this point, but he should have been retired on health grounds.
As to his CV, what is the point that you are making? None of it suggests that he was FSL because of his birth, rather it was because of his ability.
What is wrong with that? Are you suggesting that a wavy navy hostilities only FSL would have been better?
PQ17's scatter was not because of Pound's birth but rather because of his health. We keep coming back to that and why it meant that others should have stepped in.
Andrew Robert's Masters and Commanders is a good read if you want to know more about Pound and Churchill.
IIRC He makes the point that Churchill had decided to take his whole Chiefs of Staff team through the war, favouring consistency. In the end Pound was the only one to be 'subbed', for Cunningham.
I had the privilege of interviewing our local butcher for my school history project on the Arctic Convoys, as he had been a seaman on PQ17. He had never talked to anybody about it before, or since. I think he only agreed as he already knew I was set on a military career. Hel is cold, not hot.
IIRC He makes the point that Churchill had decided to take his whole Chiefs of Staff team through the war, favouring consistency. In the end Pound was the only one to be 'subbed', for Cunningham.
I had the privilege of interviewing our local butcher for my school history project on the Arctic Convoys, as he had been a seaman on PQ17. He had never talked to anybody about it before, or since. I think he only agreed as he already knew I was set on a military career. Hel is cold, not hot.
Crewing a Tanker off the East Coast of the United States was no picnic either.....and could be a fair imitation of "Hell".
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I didn't see the programme but did it consider what would have happened if Pound had kept the convoy and its escorts intact?
Tirpitz, Scheer and Hipper sailed at 1055 on the 5th (the convoy scattered on the 4th) but after numerous intercepts by the Germans of Russian and British radio messages indicated the German force had been spotted, plus the decimation of PQ17 by U-boats and aircraft, the Germans thought it wise not to take further risks and the force returned to base.
Had the convoy not scattered perhaps the Germans would have thought the risks worth it.
Having said that, the Barents Sea battle on New Years Day 1943 showed that a weakish allied escort could fend off a timid German attack.
Was it really Pound's illness that caused this debacle? I understood he simply misjudged the situation perhaps because he was not convinced of the intelligence suggesting Tirpitz and co had returned to base. The PRU could not find them.
This film gives some good images of the ships and maps, starting around 23.45.
Tirpitz, Scheer and Hipper sailed at 1055 on the 5th (the convoy scattered on the 4th) but after numerous intercepts by the Germans of Russian and British radio messages indicated the German force had been spotted, plus the decimation of PQ17 by U-boats and aircraft, the Germans thought it wise not to take further risks and the force returned to base.
Had the convoy not scattered perhaps the Germans would have thought the risks worth it.
Having said that, the Barents Sea battle on New Years Day 1943 showed that a weakish allied escort could fend off a timid German attack.
Was it really Pound's illness that caused this debacle? I understood he simply misjudged the situation perhaps because he was not convinced of the intelligence suggesting Tirpitz and co had returned to base. The PRU could not find them.
This film gives some good images of the ships and maps, starting around 23.45.
Three Part Series by the History Channel.....
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David Irving is not at all happy with this programme, claiming blatant plagiarism
Jeremy Clarkson?s BBC show in battle with Nazi historian - Telegraph
Jeremy Clarkson?s BBC show in battle with Nazi historian - Telegraph
Had the convoy not scattered perhaps the Germans would have thought the risks worth it.
They had learned the lesson about what threat enemy aircraft could be.
Unlike the British who sent two fine ships to a certain death early on in the War during the fight for Singapore.
Now if they could have coordinated an Air/Sea attack.....perhaps they might have thought about it.....but they probably had not progressed to that ability owing to the distances involved and the questionable weather.
The Tirpitz did far more good at anchor as a potential threat than at sea engaging numerically superior Allied Naval Units with far less risk of loss.
Hipper:-
When you alone, whoever you are, are confronted with the same information as everyone else but come to a different conclusion to all of them (bar one), a little voice inside your head should be asking yourself why is that? Given that Pound died of an already diagnosed Brain Tumour the following year it is highly probable that the lack of that little voice and the Brain Tumour were related. Of course, as PN has pointed out, it is unproven. I suspect though that it was the case.
The really sad thing is that it seems the others sitting around that table (bar one) did not think that Pound should have heeded them, nor that they should take further action. PN points out that they were all 'Navy through and through', and hence placed their Service above all else, including PQ17. If fingers need to be pointed anywhere then mine would be pointed at them, rather than at Pound.
Was it really Pound's illness that caused this debacle? I understood he simply misjudged the situation perhaps because he was not convinced of the intelligence suggesting Tirpitz and co had returned to base.
The really sad thing is that it seems the others sitting around that table (bar one) did not think that Pound should have heeded them, nor that they should take further action. PN points out that they were all 'Navy through and through', and hence placed their Service above all else, including PQ17. If fingers need to be pointed anywhere then mine would be pointed at them, rather than at Pound.